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There is  a  growing tendency towards the 
devaluation of the concept of  ci t izenship.  I t  was 
perceived for many years as a key instrument of  internal  
sovereignty.  Once States become transparent  as a 
consequence of globalization and global  governance,  
internal  instruments of  sovereignty become less 
powerful .  
This is  part icularly evident in the tendency which 
may be identif ied in  both scholarly works and in State 
practice towards extending broader legal  r ights to non-
cit izens.  
Although this  may appear to be a means to 
guarantee poli t ical  r ights  and effective part icipation of 
migrants in the community,  I  do not  believe i t  is  the 
best  way of integrating migrants in the poli ty.  
Scholars have developed several  theories on the 
changing phenomena of ci t izenship.  Some have declared 
the devaluation of ci t izenship,  others have recognized 
the pulverization of i ts  elements and others propose 
sl icing the concept and extending some of i ts  elements 
to migrants.  These theories are generally classif ied as 
transnational  or  global  ci t izenship. 
There is  room, however,  for  a different  proposal  
for reassessing ci t izenship and the interconnection of 
the concept both with the global  arena and internal 
democratic policies.  
In fact ,  when migrants move to l ive in another 
country they become, in the expression of Motomura,  
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cit izens in wait ing1.  This means that  to some extent 
expectations are raised with regard to obtaining the 
ci t izenship of the country where they are l iving and 
whose economic,  social  and poli t ical  growth they 
contribute to.  
I t  would be a democratic paradox to exclude these 
people permanently from the ci t izenship status.  Of 
course we can claim that  the concept is  i rrelevant or  we 
can even sl ice i t ,  give i t  away, and then claim the 
irrelevance of the status.  Yet,  i t  wil l  always be a matter  
of  discrimination and ult imately of  democratic fai l ings 
to admit  that ,  according to a certain perception of 
sovereignty,  the member of  the “club” – in the words of  
Walzer – can permanently exclude the others from the 
exercise of  poli t ical  r ights2.  
Seen from this  perspective we need to acknowledge 
the power of  ci t izenship as an instrument of  inclusion – 
and deny the theory of the decline of ci t izenship – and 
also acknowledge that  diffusing elements of  ci t izenship 
and granting them to migrants wil l  not  achieve the 
ult imate inclusive target  as the status wil l  always be 
lacking.  
If  we study natural izat ion policies around the 
world,  a  certain pattern can be found. There are also 
international  legal  instruments – such as the European 
Convention on Nationali ty – that  impose duties on 
States related to the granting of  ci t izenship and the 
aforesaid naturalization policies.  
I t  is  necessary to reinterpret  the r ight  to ci t izenship 
set  out  in the Universal  Declarat ion of Human Rights.  
For many years i t  was interpreted as prohibit ing 
                                              
1 HIROSHI MOTOMURA, Americans in Waiting (2006).  
2 MICHAEL WALZER, Spheres of Justice. A defense of pluralism and equality 
(1983). 
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policies that  created or contributed to a si tuation of 
Statelessness.  For that  purpose,  international  legal  
instruments were created and judicial  decisions were 
proclaimed. The right  to ci t izenship was perceived as a 
negative l imit  to State sovereignty.  A State could deny 
or overrule another State’s  decision on ci t izenship if  
that  decision was arbitrary (with no effective l ink) or  
contributed to the si tuation of Statelessness.  
I t  is  now necessary to reinterpret  that  reading of 
the Declarat ion.  In a globalized world where even 
ci t izenship – the last  bast ion of sovereignty (Legomsky) 
– has gone global  – i t  is  not  enough to consider 
ci t izenship as a negative l imit  to State sovereignty3.  I t  
is  probably necessary to consider i t  as  a  posit ive 
imposit ion on States.  That  means that  if  we consider the 
r ight  to ci t izenship as a natural  consequence of  a path,  
down the road,  that  someone init iated the moment they 
set  foot  as a migrant  in a country,  one should probably 
recognize that  the r ight  to ci t izenship nowadays is  no 
longer the r ight  to have one ci t izenship but  the r ight  to 
have access to a certain ci t izenship.  
Based on basic principles of  transnational  
ci t izenship law, such as the principle of  protection of 
legit imate expectat ions,  the principle of  
proportionali ty,  ius domicil i i  and adverse possessions,  
as well  as the democratic principle and also based on 
the naturalization pattern around the world,  i t  should be 
possible to determine that  no ci t izen in wait ing should 
be permanently excluded from cit izenship.  Although 
this  proposit ion might sound quite consensual  – 
especial ly within Western countries with standard 
naturalization policies – the basic essence of what has 
been said is  very controversial .  I t  not  only imposes a 
                                              
3 STEPHEN LEGOMSKY, The Last Bastions of State Sovereignty: Immigration 
and Nationality Go Global (2009), 43-57. 
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posit ive duty overriding an important  dimension of 
sovereignty – the symbolic definit ion of the people – 
but  i t  also gives r ise to a discussion about 
undocumented migration.  The Western pattern on 
naturalization policies certainly does not  include 
undocumented migrants.  However,  the same 
considerations about the democratic principle apply to 
this  category of migrants,  most  of  whom stay for 
several  years in a country with the tolerance of the host  
State,  to say the least .  The access of  these migrants to 
ci t izenship is  an active question in the US and is  
becoming one in Europe as well .  There is  no legal  
answer whatsoever,  even though i t  is  widely recognized 
that  undocumented migrants have,  as would seem 
obvious,  human rights.  Does that  mean that  they also 
hold the r ight  to ci t izenship? 
I  wil l  not  try to provide a definit ive answer to 
these questions but ,  through research and reasoning,  I  
wil l  at tempt to understand the state of  the art  in this  
f ield and ult imately identify a trend and predict what 
the near future of  legal  scholarship and court  decisions 
in this  area wil l  be.  
This dissertat ion does not  focus on a part icular  
jurisdict ion.  Even the focus on the evolution of 
instruments of  international  law and on European 
Cit izenship is  intended to merely provide examples and 
contextual  explanations of what broader ci t izenship law 
is .  
Rather,  I  wil l  fol low a transnational  law approach.  
By transnational  law I  mean the set  of  rules,  principles 
and arguments that  contribute to a certain legal  solution 
regardless of  the place or jurisdict ion where that  
solution originates or  takes place.  The locus of  the rule 
is  not  important;  i t  is  i ts  relevance to the global  legal  
order that  matters .  
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 Transnational  law has reached al l  areas of  law, 
including the last  bast ions of  sovereignty such as 
immigration and ci t izenship4.    
Global  consti tut ionalism has become an active area 
of  research in transnational  law. This means that  the 
general  assumptions in law, such as the 
inst i tut ionalization of law making,  relat ions among 
states and state law nexus,  have al l  been abandoned as 
sole sources of  law. Legal  pluralism is  making i ts  
course5.  
Principles l ike the ones I  use to identify the trend 
towards a r ight  to ci t izenship,  such as proportionali ty,  
expectations and democracy,  have al l  been developed 
within this  transnational  framework.  Some of them – 
proportionali ty and democracy - ,  as  I  wil l  later  expand 
on,  have even become bold examples of  
transnationalization of general  legal  principles6.  
Cit izenship has been associated with transnational  
law for a long t ime,  longer than the recent movement of  
scholarly discussion on transnational  law. As will  be 
discussed in chapter  3,  t ransnational  ci t izenship is  a  
concept rooted in the tradit ion of ci t izenship studies.  
If  there is  one characterist ic  of  transnational  
ci t izenship i t  is  that  i t  is  decentered from the state,  
outside the tradit ional  inst i tut ional  locus.  That  is  one of 
the cri t icisms usually leveled against  the concept.  
Interest ingly,  ci t izenship,  a  concept in the realm of 
sovereignty,  was one of the f irst  concepts to be 
explored from a transnational  law standpoint .  
                                              
4 STEPHEN LEGOMSKY, The Last Bastions of State Sovereignty: Immigration 
and Nationality Go Global (2009), 43-57. 
5 PEER ZUMBANSEN, Defining the Space of Transnational Law: Legal Theory, 
Global Governance & Legal Pluralism (2011). 
6 MATTIAS KUMM, Democracy is not enough: Rights, proportionality and the 
point of judicial review (2009). 
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Even if  we diverge from the common approach of 
the transnational  ci t izenship theorists ,  as  I  wil l  later  
elaborate,  these days i t  is  impossible to conduct 
thorough research on ci t izenship from a purely internal  
s tandpoint .  The same can be said of  the classical  
international  law standpoint .  
Although I  do not focus on any part icular  
jurisdict ion,  I  pay at tention to internal  rules of  
ci t izenship as well  as to public international  law rules 
whenever their  relevance just if ies at tention.  
The transnational  law approach does not  ignore 
these dimensions.  However,  to identify a transnational  
trend,  a  rule that  has freed i tself  from a part icular  
jurisdict ion and gained relevance at  the transnational  
level ,  one must  not  be at tached to a locus or legal  
system. 
This perspective may be regarded as being too 
broad or vain and one might say that  law cannot be 
constructed on unstable roots .  As legal  plural ism shows 
us,  i t  is  becoming increasingly diff icult  to understand 
law within the classical  mind frames.  States no longer 
represent  al l  the r ichness of  law and legal  sources.  I t  is  
necessary to search beyond the States.  
As I  wil l  also demonstrate,  an important  part  of  
this  movement is  explained by the transparency of 
states that  has been brought about by globalization.  The 
era of  information and human rights changes a world of 
states into a world of  people.   
Individuals do not  necessari ly relate,  in this  era,  
with their  neighbor ci t izens and countrymen but with 
people,  no matter  how far away they are,  that  share the 
same interests .  This has given rise to al l  sorts  of  
movements.  Some of these movements are captured 
under the idea of  transnational  ci t izenship.  
So,  ci t izenship is  also a key concept to understand 
the transnationalization of law. Transnational  law 
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cannot be understood without ci t izenship and 
ci t izenship cannot be fully understood without 
transnational  law. 
This approach does not  ignore the nation-state.  
Quite to the contrary,  unlike theories of  ci t izenship 
decline,  associated with the transnationalization of 
ci t izenship,  I  acknowledge the importance of the status 
and i ts  inclusive potential .  The nation-state is  far  from 
being destroyed.  
However,  there is  certainly a different  posit ion for 
the nation-state from Westphalia to the global  world.  A 
global  world without a global  s tate st i l l  needs 
tradit ional  s tates to enforce i ts  principles and rules.  As 
I  see i t ,  States are obliged by the transnational  law to 
enforce basic principles and rules through their  
t radit ional  enforcement channels.  I t  is  very clear that  
international  and transnational  law will  not  be enforced 
otherwise.  
This does not mean,  though, that  States remain free 
to do whatever they wish as long as this  does not  
confl ict  with other States.  Internal  constraints  
increasingly result  from international  and transnational  
law, even in areas considered to be the realm of 
sovereignty,  such as ci t izenship.  
This dissertat ion covers,  in chapter  one,  a  
conceptual  evolution of ci t izenship,  ranging from 
semantic variat ions to the evolution from the classic 
civil izations,  the Middle Ages and the French 
Revolution.  
Chapter  2 focuses on the evolution of international  
law of ci t izenship and the new international  law of 
ci t izenship.   
In chapter  3 I  address the transnational  ci t izenship 
concept and i ts  variat ions.  I  wil l  also cri t icize the 
concept in the context  of  the tradit ional  ci t izenship 
status.  
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Chapter 4 analyses European ci t izenship as the only 
inst i tut ional  example of  transnational  ci t izenship.  I  wil l  
dedicate at tention especial ly to the relat ions between 
national  and European ci t izenship and will  discuss the 
recent  and very relevant court  decision by the European 
courts .  
In Chapter  5 I  wil l  look into the concept of  
migrants as ci t izens in wait ing,  looking at  migrants’  
r ights and their  path to ci t izenship. 
The conclusion will  be presented in chapter  6 
where,  by identifying a trend towards a general  r ight  to 
a specif ic ci t izenship,  I  sum up different  arguments that  
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I – Conceptual evolution 
 
§1. Semantic variations 
 
Cit izenship has aroused the interest  of  a number of 
f ields of  knowledge and has proved to be a transversal  
topic.  Controversy extends,  however,  from the very 
concept of  ci t izenship.  Even from a legal  perspective,  
there are those who refer  to ci t izenship as the exercise 
of  r ights  – here being closer to the sociological  idea – 
and,  in this  context ,  ci t izenship is  the active 
intervention of a ci t izen within the community of which 
he is  a  part7.   
Alternatively,  ci t izenship has been seen as a l ink 
which connects an individual  to a part icular  community.  
This l ink translates into a str ict  aff ini ty,  based on 
cri teria of  connection,  which just ify that  members of  
the community have access to specif ic  r ights ,  s ince 
these are related to the community’s method of 
organization.  In this  sense ci t izenship is  synonymous 
with nationali ty.  
Many authors refer  to these two concepts 
indiscriminately8.  Others at tempt to create a dist inction 
between ci t izenship and nationali ty,  despite being 
unable to reach a consensus as to this  dist inction.  
On this  subject ,  GERARD-RENÉ DE GROOT9 has 
conducted an interest ing semantic analysis  of  several  
European languages and concluded that  in most  of  these 
                                              
7 MARC HOWARD, Comparative Citizenship: An Agenda for Cross-National 
Research (2006), 444. 
8 PETER SPIRO, A new international law of citizenship (2011), 717. 
9 GERARD RENÉ DE GROOT, Towards a European Nationality Law (2004), 2.  
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languages there is  a  variat ion which is  s imilar  to that  
which we find between the Portuguese terms 
“cidadania” and “nacionalidade”.  Thus,  the author 
states that  “In the United Kingdom, the term 
‘nationali ty’  is  used to indicate the formal l ink between 
a person and the state.  The statute that  regulates this  
s tatus is  the Brit ish Nationali ty Act .  The most  
privileged status to be acquired under this  Act,  
however,  is  the status of  ‘Brit ish ci t izen’.  In Ireland,  i t  
is  the Ir ish Nationali ty and Cit izenship Act that  
regulates who precisely possess Ir ish ci t izenship.  In the 
United States,  the Immigration and Nationali ty Act 
regulates who is  an American ci t izen,  but  the Act also 
provides that  the inhabitants  of  American Samoa and 
Swains Island have the status of  American nationals 
without ci t izenship”10.  The Author continues his  
                                              
10 Title 8, Section 1408 US Code: “Unless otherwise provided in section 1401 of 
this title, the following shall be nationals, but not citizens, of the United States at 
birth: 
      (1) A person born in an outlying possession of the United States on or after 
the date of formal acquisition of such possession; 
      (2) A person born outside the United States and its outlying possessions of 
parents both of whom are nationals, but not citizens, of the United States, and 
have had a residence in the United States, or one of its outlying possessions prior 
to the birth of such person; 
      (3) A person of unknown parentage found in an outlying possession of the 
United States while under the age of five years, until shown, prior to his attaining 
the age of twenty-one years, not to have been born in such outlying possession; 
and 
      (4) A person born outside the United States and its outlying possessions of 
parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a national, but not a citizen, of the 
United States who, prior to the birth of such person, was physically present in the 
United States or its outlying possessions for a period or periods totaling not less 
than seven years in any continuous period of ten years -  
        (A) during which the national parent was not outside the United States or its 
outlying possessions for a continuous period of more than one year, and 
        (B) at least five years of which were after attaining the age of fourteen 
years” 
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semantic analysis  by considering the variat ions in the 
different  translat ions of  the EC Treaty and the Draft  
Consti tut ion.  Here we find the dist inction between 
“cit izenship of  the Union” and “national  ci t izenship”.  
Yet,  the concepts of  ci t izenship and nationali ty are used 
indiscriminately:  in French nationali té  and citoyenneté ,  
in Dutch nationali tei t  and  burgerschap ,  in German 
staatsangehörigkeit  and  bürgerschaft ,  in Portuguese 
nacionalidade and  cidadania  and in Spanish 
nacionalidad and  c iudadania .  According to De Groot,  
“In four other languages of  the Union,  a single term is  
used to denote the concepts of  ‘nationali ty’  and 
‘ci t izenship’.  The I tal ian version uses cit tadinanza  for  
both.  The Ital ian word nazionali tà  could not  be used 
because of i ts  obvious ethnic connotation.  The Danish 
text  refers  to statsborger i  en medlemsstat  and 
unionsborgerskab ,  thus referring twice to borgerskab .  
The Danish word nationali tet  had to be avoided,  also 
because of i ts  ‘ethnic’  connotation”11.  Moreover,  the 
Danish statement on Cit izenship of the Union,  which is  
annexed to the Treaty of Maastr icht  which created i t ,  is  
evocative.12 
                                              
11 GERARD RENÉ DE GROOT, Towards a European Nationality Law (2004), 
3-4.  
12 According to this declaration:“1. Citizenship of the Union is a political and 
legal concept which is entirely different from the concept of citizenship within 
the meaning of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Denmark and of the Danish 
legal system. Nothing in the Treaty on European Union implies or foresees an 
undertaking to create a citizenship of the Union in the sense of citizenship of a 
nation State. The question of Denmark participating in any such development 
does, therefore, not arise. 
2. Citizenship of the Union in no way in itself gives a national of another 
Member State the right to obtain Danish citizenship or any of the rights, duties, 
privileges or advantages that are inherent in Danish citizenship by virtue of 
Denmark’s constitutional, legal and administrative rules. Denmark will fully 
respect all specific rights expressly provided for in the Treaty and applying to 
nationals of the Member States”. 
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The task of  defining the concepts of  “cit izenship” 
and “nationali ty”,  therefore,  proves to be rather 
complex.  Work can be carried out in this  sense in a 
given language.  However,  the conclusions might be 
disastrous if  compared with other languages,  in a global  
context .  Indeed,  at  a  t ime of internationalization of 
ci t izenship,  i t  is  important  to avoid any rumblings that  
may upset  i ts  global  terminology.  Hence,  the authors 
who have examined this  topic,  mostly from an 
international  perspective,  point  out  the indiscriminate 
use in their  texts  of  both concepts .  
In this  text  I  have opted to use the concept of  
ci t izenship rather than nationali ty.  A reference to 
nationali ty wil l  only be found when i t  relates to a quote 
from other texts ,  whether these be legal  texts  or  legal  
theory texts .  
There are three reasons for this  option: 
a)  The ethnic connotation of 
nationali ty – al though in a fundamentally 
sociological  context  – confuses the idea of  
ci t izenship as a fundamental  r ight;  
b)  Recent texts  tend to use the term 
“cit izenship”,  ei ther because i t  is  neutral  in 
character ,  or  because i t  covers a wider 
concept which includes derived and 
transnational  ci t izenships; 
c)  Transnational  and cosmopoli tan 
ci t izenship is  in opposit ion to the idea of 
nationali ty,  which is  synonymous with 
belonging to a closed ethnic group.  
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§2. Citizens, members and foreigners 
 
The current  meaning of ci t izenship depends on how 
it  is  framed within the structure of  the State,  i f  we 
accept the idea of a people as a l inking element or  
substratum of legit imacy of a poli t ical  community.  
As historical  analysis  demonstrates,  lying at  the 
origin of  ci t izenship is ,  precisely,  the consti tut ional  
concept of  a people.  This origin of the concept is  of  
great  importance if  we are to fully understand i ts  
current  configuration.  I t  is  not  possible to conceive 
ci t izenship disconnected from its  substratum and the 
consti tut ional  notion of a people.  In fact ,  the definit ion 
of ci t izenship is  the sovereign instrument for the 
definit ion of a people;  in ancient  t imes,  as wil l  be seen,  
the interpretat ion was always thus. 
On this  subject  Joseph Weiler  points  out  that  being 
the beneficiary of  r ights  created for others does not  
make a foreigner a ci t izen,  and therefore ci t izenship is  
an important  source of legit imizing legal  rules.  
Basically,  the legit imization of those rules is  based on 
the demos  that  the foreigner wishes to belong to 13.  Thus,  
considering the people – within the framework of a 
democratic system – as the basis  of  the validi ty of  legal  
rules,  the validi ty of  those rules depends on the concept 
of  a  people i tself14.  Distort ion of i ts  configuration will  
                                              
13 JOSEPH H. H. WEILER, European Citizenship (1998), 451. 
14 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, The European Nation State – Its Achievements and 
Its Limitations – On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship 
(1997), 112.  
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lead to democratic dispersal  and,  therefore,  to the 
disappearance of the substratum of i ts  validi ty15.  
This idea is  based on the blurring of the ius 
sanguinis ,  one of  the cri teria,  alongside ius soli ,  for  
at tr ibuting original  ci t izenship,  due to the transnational  
movement of  persons.  On this  topic,  we may consider 
this  expressive passage by André García Inda:  “the case 
of  immigrants is  paradigmatic.  Indeed,  the generations 
of  immigrants represent  a  paradigm that  some have 
called “new cosmopoli tans”:  the landless of  post-
modernity,  who call  into question the legit imizing value 
of  the tradit ional  identi t ies,  related with the land ( ius 
soli)  and kinship t ies ( ius sanguinis) ,  and also expose 
the excluding nature of  a  concept of  fundamental  r ights  
buil t  upon a l imited idea of  poli t ical  community,  of  a  
morally relevant “us”,  which is  the result  of  inheri ted 
national  borders.  In relat ion to them one may truly say,  
in the full  sense,  what the Letter to Diognetus  (an 
anonymous brief  from the 2n d  century,  at tr ibuted to the 
tradit ion of St .  Paul)  said regarding the universalist  
intention of the Christ ians:  “They l ive in their  own 
countries as though they were only passing through.  
They play their  ful l  role as ci t izens,  but  labor under al l  
the disabil i t ies  of  al iens.  Any country can be their  
                                              
15 On the variations of political-constitutional and ideological conceptions of a 
people, see JORGE MIRANDA, Manual de Direito Constitucional (2010), 
80;  LUZIA MARQUES DA SILVA CABRAL PINTO, Os Limites do Poder 
Constituinte e a Legitimidade Material da Constituição (1994), 185; 
MARIANO FERNANDEZ ENGUITA, Las dos Variantes del Cierre: Demos 
y Etnos (2003), 53; MIKEL AZURMENDI INCHAUSTI, Migraciones y 
Cultura Democrática (2003), 64; RICARDO ZAPATA-BARRERO, 
Inmigración y Multiculturalidad: Hacia un Nuevo Concepto de Ciudadania, 
(2003), 117. 
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homeland,  but  for them their  homeland,  wherever i t  may 
be,  is  a  foreign country””16.  
Michael  Walzer recognizes the r ight  of  each 
community to outl ine i ts  own resident population.  
However,  he raises the following issue with regard to 
foreigners:  “these people may be members in their  turn 
of  minori ty or pariah groups,  or  they may be refugees or 
immigrants newly arrived.  Let  us assume that  they are 
r ightfully where they are.  Can they claim cit izenship 
and poli t ical  r ights  within the community where they 
now live?”  17.  
This is  the central  question which I  wil l  seek to 
answer throughout this  work.  In what circumstances can 
a foreigner claim cit izenship of a given State and,  on 
the f l ip side,  what condit ions must  be fulf il led for a  
State to be obliged to grant  ci t izenship? 
According to the aforementioned author,  “The 
members must  be prepared to accept,  as their  own 
equals in a world of shared obligations,  the men and 
women they admit”18.   
The phenomenon of immigration has aroused much 
interest  in developed countries.  Europe,  which is  
composed of countries with no tradit ion of immigration 
but  with an increasingly aging population,  and feeling 
the subsequent weight of  this  aging on the social  s tate,  
looked to the phenomenon as the panacea for al l  i l ls .  
Here was the means to provide an immediate boost  to 
the labor market ,  without training costs ,  with those 
                                              
16 ANDRÉ GARCÍA INDA, El Cosmopolitismo y las Nuevas Fronteras de la 
Ciudadania (2003), 94. 
17 MICHAEL WALZER, Spheres of Justice. A defense of pluralism and equality 
(1983), 52. 
18 MICHAEL WALZER, Spheres of Justice. A defense of pluralism and equality 
(1983), 52. 
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who, apart  from anything else,  would not  be able to 
benefi t  from the social  protection systems of the 
terr i tory nor would grow old there.  This was the f igure 
of  the temporary worker applied in the State dimension.   
This kind of solution,  in my opinion,  is  not  legally 
sustainable.  The f irst  reason for this  is  that ,  as wil l  be 
shown below, states are not  able to prevent immigrants 
from gaining access to social  r ights .  Secondly,  the 
invitat ion to immigrants cannot be detached from the 
granting of ci t izenship.  I t  is  not ,  therefore,  
unreasonable to consider legit imate the desire to obtain 
ci t izenship of a given State.  To fully experience the 
community reali ty total  integration is  required.  This is  
provided,  as we may see,  for  the most  part  by the 
acquisi t ion of ci t izenship of the State.  Somebody who 
l ives and works in a given State,  contributes to i ts  
growth,  is  subject  to i ts  rules and,  in a word,  is  a  
prisoner of  i ts  fate and the success of  i ts  public 
policies,  inevitably wishes to part icipate in the 
community l ife.  Or he at  least  would l ike to feel  that  
this  possibil i ty is  not  denied him, and that  he is  
recognized as a ful l  member of  the community.  
Otherwise,  with the pretext  of  preserving a model 
of  l i fe  or  social  model,  we will  be perpetuating a 
si tuation which proves to be democratically paradoxical  
and morally deviant .  Immigrants who are denied 
ci t izenship would,  in the words of Walzer ,  be 
comparable to slaves,  which would transform our 
society into a “l i t t le  tyranny”19.  The evolution of 
history shows us,  on the contrary,  the evolution of 
ci t izenship as an instrument of  inclusion.   
                                              
19 MICHAEL WALZER, Spheres of Justice. A defense of pluralism and equality 
(1983), 52. 
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§3. Citizenship and inclusion in Ancient Greece and Rome 
 
1. Citizenship in Ancient Greece 
a) Introductory note 
 
The Greek civil izat ion,  the precursor to ci t izenship 
as poli t ical  part icipation,  gave great  importance to the 
t ies  between ci t izens and the polis .  Indeed,  “in the 
Greek world the individual  was always subjected to the 
common interest .  The community system ensured the 
unity of  the poli t ical  organization and the harmonious 
combination of interests  of  a superior order based on 
virtue”20.  Thus,  the civil izat ion which created 
democracy based the substratum of legit imization of 
popular part icipation on the demos .   
In the Greek polis ,  ci t izenship arose as a privileged 
status for  few in relat ion to many non-cit izens,  
regarding economic condit ions and poli t ical  power.  I t  
represented not  only the status of  being a member of  the 
community but ,  above al l ,  the degree of part icipation of 
each member in governing the ci ty.  
In order to understand the concept of  ci t izenship in 
Ancient  Greece,  i t  therefore seems imperative to 






                                              
20 GIOVANNI CORDINI, Elementi per una teoria giuridica della cittadinanza 
(1998), 31-32.  
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b) Citizenship in the social  organization of 
Athens 
 
The evolution of ci t izenship has demonstrated the 
capacity for  a status,  albeit  heavily influenced by 
ancient  t imes,  to change into something innovative,  
from a set  of  dependencies into a true poli t ical  
community.  We can identify “different  stages of  the 
development of  ci t izenship in ancient  Athens from 
Solon [about 630-560 b.C.]  through Cleisthenes [about 
570-508 b.C.]  and Pericles [495-429] unti l  Aristotle’s  
l i fet ime (384-322).  In this  evolution ci t izenship had 
always been accompanied by significant  social  
t ransformations or by the needs of  war.  Each t ime the 
definit ions of  who qualif ied for the status of  ci t izenship 
were modified,  and this  means that  each t ime the 
community was reshaped in terms of who had which 
r ights,  duties,  responsibil i t ies and access to both 
material  and immaterial  benefi ts”21.   
Before the reforms of Cleisthenes,  the ci t izens of 
Att ica were divided into four tr ibes (phylai) ,  each of  
which was composed of various brotherhoods 
(phratriai)  which were in turn made up of clans (gene)  
and cult  communities ( thiasoi)22.  The ci t izens belonged 
not only to their  family but  also to a cult  community via 
their  brotherhood and,  in a wider context ,  to the 
poli t ical  community considered as a whole.   
The kinship relat ionships were part icularly decisive 
since they determined the t ies and tradit ional  rules that  
would give the individual ,  on reaching adulthood,  
command of the oikos ,  the management of  which was 
essential  to his  projection into the public sphere and,  
                                              
21 ULRICH PREUSS, The ambiguous meaning of citizenship (2003), 4. 
22 CHRISTIAN MEIER, The Greek Discovery of Politics (1990), 57. 
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consequently,  his  full  elevation to the category of 
ci t izen.  
On the other hand,  the Greek ci ty sought to 
maintain a str ict  separation between the public – polis  –  
and the private – oikos .  In order to be considered a 
ci t izen,  a  man had to be the patr iarch of a private house 
where he was served by slaves and his  own wife.  This 
condit ion of head of the oikos  gave him the necessary 
projection to the polis .  Basically,  i t  was a question of 
demonstrat ing his  capacity to self-govern his  home as a 
form of guaranteeing his  capacity for public 
government.  Those who ran their  own oikos  gained 
dimension within the polis .   The two spheres were,  
nevertheless,  total ly separate,  and i t  was unthinkable 
for ci t izens to discuss their  private l ife in public23.  
Another characterist ic  of  the ci t izen,  besides self-
government – or government of  the oikos  –  was self-
control .  As long as ci t izens were able to control  
themselves,  they would be capable of  governing others 
– their  wives,  children and foreigners.  On the other 
hand,  a  lack of self-control  might mean deviation from 
behavior that  was social ly acceptable,  which would,  
certainly,  be punished as a community crime 24.  Only 
ci t izens who proved they were capable of  governing 
their  house and controll ing themselves were deemed 
virtuous and,  consequently,  worthy of ci t izenship.  This 
was,  basically,  the example of  private vir tue as a means 
of proving public vir tue.  
What defines a ci t izen in the Greek ci ty is  his  
capacity to order and obey in a poli t ical  community 
buil t  among equals.  In order for this  to happen,  the 
ci t izen had to correspond to the top of the command 
                                              
23 J. G. A. POCOCK, The ideal of citizenship since classical times (1998), 33-34. 
24 PAUL CARTLEDGE, Greek political thought (2000), 18. 
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hierarchy,  above slaves and women. Thus,  the 
community of ci t izens resulted in the community of 
decision-makers in which al l ,  s imultaneously,  decided 
and obeyed the respective decisions in a process similar  
to that  which is  today called the legislat ive process25.  
Indeed,  “throughout the history of  ancient  Greek 
ci t izenship the ci t izens were always a minority.  On no 
account did they rule only themselves.  They ruled over 
the great  bulk of  non-cit izens:  s laves,  women, children,  
metics,  al iens and other categories of  individuals who 
l ived within the physical  boundaries of  Att ica”26.  
Hence,  i t  is  not  possible to properly understand the 
Greek concept of  ci t izenship without noting that  i t  only 
led to the freedom of some persons via elevation to 
poli t ical  part icipation,  which should prevail  over the 
private sphere,  the family and economic l ife.  Thus,  the 
concept of  ci t izenship for the Greeks contained the 
seeds of  freedom, al though i t  was st i l l  l imited 
according to the condit ion of each person.  This 
dist inction presented a challenge,  from the outset ,  to 
the concept,  which would have to deal  with different  
categories of  members and various levels  of  legal  
protection.  
Class was relevant,  namely for the purposes of 
applying the criminal  law. Thus,  for  example,  the 
murder of  a Greek ci t izen or his  family was tr ied in a 
higher court  and could lead to the application of the 
death penalty.  However,  the murder of a metic or  a 
slave was tr ied in a lower court  and could only result  in 
exile27.  
                                              
25 J. G. A. POCOCK, The ideal of citizenship since classical times (1998), 33. 
26 ULRICH PREUSS, The ambiguous meaning of citizenship (2003), 3. 
27 PHILIP BROOK MANVILLE, The Origins of Citizenship in Ancient Athens 
(1990), 12. 
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Citizenship consti tuted an end in i tself  insofar as i t  
represented freedom. Being a ci t izen meant being free 
to part icipate in public l i fe .  In this  sense,  ci t izenship 
was not  only a means of achieving freedom, i t  was 
freedom in i tself28.  
For this  reason,  slaves could never acquire the 
status of  ci t izen,  being condemned to serve and 
categorized as uti l i ty goods,  as objects  rather than the 
subjects  of  property.  A slave could hardly consider 
himself  a  ci t izen,  given that  he had no decision-making 
capacity29.  His part icipation in poli t ics  was 
“unthinkable,  given that  his  natural  condit ion of 
inferiori ty was an insurmountable obstacle”,  s ince he 
was considered to an object  of  ownership30.  Slaves were 
regarded as ut i l i ty goods,  and not  as holders of  vir tue.  
These characterist ics would not  be compatible with the 
ci t izen which,  by definit ion,  should demonstrate a high 
level  of  vir tue.  
In the same way, women were t ied to the oikos ,  in 
charge of managing the house,  goods and slaves,  and 
unable to r ise above the private sphere or to transcend 
the private dimension which would al low them to 
ascend to the public cause31.  Women did not  f i t  within 
the concept of  ci t izen inasmuch as they did not  have the 
necessary authori ty for the construction of a community 
as a result  of  their  dependence on the family.   
                                              
28 J. G. A. POCOCK, The ideal of citizenship since classical times (1998), 34; 
ARISTOTLE, The Politics (1992), 182; KURT RAAFLAUB, The discovery 
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(1998), 34. 
30 GIOVANNI CORDINI, Elementi per una teoria giuridica della cittadinanza 
(1998), 34. 
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Thus,  the category of ci t izens was restr icted and 
only included free adult  men who were descendents of  
ci t izens.  Their  wives “and other female relat ives were,  
at  best ,  second-class ci t izens.  (…) The unfree were by 
definit ion deprived of al l  poli t ical  and almost  al l  social  
honor”32.  Moreover,  Solon’s reforms followed this  
direction.  Personal  freedom was considered an 
inalienable r ight  of  the ci t izen33.  
For this  reason,  Aristotle believed that  ci t izenship 
was a question of status and not one of wealth or  
power34.  Tradit ionally everything had been simple:  
“those who disposed of the resources necessary for 
survival  – land,  slaves,  mil i tary power,  spir i tual  
charisma which gave them access to the Gods – were 
those who ruled over the others”35.  The great  innovation 
in Athens,  the bir thplace of  democracy,  was,  precisely,  
the method of part icipation in public l i fe  and i ts  
subjective substratum. Indeed,  for  Aristotle ,  what 
dist inguishes the polis  f rom other human communities 
is  the common concern of  the ci t izens for just ice and 
the common good,  in addit ion to the vir tue of  others36.   
The connection between virtue and freedom is  
fundamental  to the Athenian notion of ci t izenship.  
Those who were not  free could not  be a ci t izen insofar 
as they were overshadowed in their  capacity to 
intervene.  I t  was not  enough to be r ich,  s ince this  did 
                                              
32 PAUL CARTLEDGE, Greek political thought (2000), 17. 
33 KURT RAAFLAUB, Poets, lawgivers and the beginnings of political 
reflection in Archaic (2000), 41. 
34 According to ARISTOTLE “mankind do not acquire or preserve virtue by the 
help of external goods”; The Politics (1992), 392. 
35 ULRICH PREUSS, The ambiguous meaning of citizenship (2003), 2.  
36 ARISTOTLE, The Politics (1992), 175.; JEAN ROBERTS, Justice and the 
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not necessari ly signify freedom. For this  reason,  i t  was 
so important  to introduce payment for part icipation in 
public activi t ies.  This not  only al lowed the 
part icipation of those who did not  have funds,  but  also 
paved the way to a wider definit ion of freedom of 
ci t izens,  who thus ceased to be t ied to l imitat ions of  a 
f inancial  nature37.  
Cit izenship was the unifying factor in society,  and,  
in order for i t  to play this  role,  i t  was essential  that  the 
circumstances on which i t  was based be restr icted.  
Those considered an aphretor ,  s ince they did not  belong 
to a phratria ,  were segregated,  and not afforded any 
rights.  For the Greek civil izat ion,  s tatelessness was a 
phenomenon to be combated,  even in a radical  manner,  
and ci t izenship was essential ly recognized as a concept 
of  belonging and integration.  The ci t izen can improve 
himself  by part icipation as long as he has a relat ionship 
of  belonging.  In short ,  only those who belong can 
part icipate.  The stateless have no rights .  
In ancient  t imes,  belonging to a phratria  was a true 
r i te  of  passage which provided access to ci t izenship.  As 
Christ ian Meier writes,  on this  topic,  “When a man 
married,  his  bride was introduced to the other members 
of  the phratria at  a special  sacrif icial  feast .  When a son 
was born he was ceremonially presented to them, to be 
accepted into their  circle (…).  Admission to the 
phratria entailed admission to Att ic  ci t izenship ( in i ts  
early form): only a member of  a phratria could be a 
ci t izen of  Att ica.  The patria was thus the sphere in 
which the ci t izens met in a public capacity and,  at  the 
same t ime,  the authority that  legit imated the most  
important  events in their  private l ives”38.  
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The poli t ical  community showed i tself  to be united 
– as a community of equals – around replacing the 
oligarchy with democracy,  the force of  which – based 
on the demos  –  depended on the “intensity of  the bonds 
of reciprocity,  t rust  and readiness to assume duties for 
the community”39.  According to Christ ian Meier ,  “This 
close identif ication of the polis  with i ts  ci t izens 
presupposed a high degree of  solidari ty,  and this  could 
take root  only in a general  civic interest  that  
t ranscended al l  part icularist  interests .  This general  
interest  became so powerful  that ,  on this  new plane of 
ci t izenship,  the ci t izens determined the conduct of  
poli t ics just  as much as poli t ics determined the conduct 
of  the ci t izens40”.  
Indeed,  as Shaffir  notes,  “ in the context  of  the 
Greek ci ty-state,  the polis ,  ci t izenship appeared as a 
double process of  emancipation.  First  i t  was the 
l iberation of  a portion of  humanity from tribal  loyalt ies 
and i ts  fusion into a voluntary civic community.  
Cit izenship is  the legal foundation and social  glue of  
the new communali ty”41.  
Cit izenship was,  therefore,  an important  factor for  
inclusion,  al though i t  might not  have been easy to 
obtain.  For some, obtaining ci t izenship actually proved 
impossible,  due to their  condit ion.  However,  those who 
did have i t  began to consider themselves as members of  
the most  united human community known at  that  t ime.  
I t  was a source of  pride,  recognit ion and union.  In 
short ,  i t  represented the full  inclusion of those who 
acquired the status.  Of course,  what was at  the heart  of  
                                              
39 ULRICH PREUSS, The ambiguous meaning of citizenship (2003), 4. 
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the union was collective part icipation,  on behalf  of  the 
community42.  
In this  sense ci t izens were al l  those who could 
part icipate actively in the collective l ife and in the 
construction of the community.  The condit ion of ci t izen 
was therefore defined in relat ion to the possibil i ty of  
part icipating.  Cit izens were al l  those who proved 
capable of  part icipating.  
  
c) Citizenship as polit ical  participation 
 
Part icipation in the poli t ical  l i fe of  the Greek ci ty 
consti tuted the improvement of  the individual .  The 
great  vir tue required of ci t izens was just if ied by their  
responsibil i ty to manage the public good43.  
Thus,  in this  context ,  ci t izenship bore some 
similari ty to the r ights of  ci t izenship in today’s 
societ ies,  above al l  in relat ion to the respective set  of  
poli t ical  r ights .  There are,  however,  some marked 
differences with regard to ci t izenship in modern 
societ ies.  First ly,  al though cit izens enjoyed what are 
now called poli t ical  r ights ,  such as the r ight  to vote,  
they could not  enjoy fundamental  freedoms, such as the 
r ight  to free speech or rel igious freedom. 
The idea of  community on which Athenian 
ci t izenship was based just if ied the important  l imitat ions 
to r ights  to which I  have referred.  The aim of the polis  
was the happiness of  i ts  ci t izens.  This happiness could 
only truly be achieved in the collective sense,  given 
that  the individual  concept of  happiness was unknown. 
In this  way,  each ci t izen had a genuine interest  in the 
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virtue of  the others since only collective vir tue would 
al low happiness to be achieved.  
For Aristot le,  human virtue l ies in al l  the small  
actions of Man, each of which may or may not be 
performed in a vir tuous manner.  A community based on 
virtue cannot fai l  to be fair ,  s ince al l  wil l  ensure 
compliance with the law and,  ult imately,  the vir tue of 
each of them44.   
Part icipation was,  therefore,  dependent on the 
vir tue exhibited by ci t izens.  The ci t izen would be fair  i f  
he was subjected to law and equali ty.  The law would,  
therefore,  be a source of  just ice and vir tue,  s ince the 
law requires vir tuous action and prohibits  vicious 
action45.  This action of the law was seeking the 
happiness of  the poli t ical  community.  This form of 
just ice represented complete vir tue in ci t izens’ relat ions 
with each other.  The al l iance between just ice and vir tue 
seeks al truism insofar  as i t  is  exercised in relat ions 
with the other46.  Here the law was understood in a 
community sense.  The rule of  law as i t  is  conceived 
nowadays was not  at  issue,  and neither was i ts  universal  
applicat ion,  in the l iberal  formulation.  Law was to be 
understood as the general  wil l ,  so vir tuous ci t izens were 
al l  those who presented themselves simultaneously as 
creator and recipient  of  the law in that  which would 
today correspond to the notion of poli t ical  community.  
These concepts are fundamental  to an understanding of 
the modern concept of  a  people,  s ince they were at  the 
heart  of  the consti tut ion of the demos  in Ancient  
Greece.  
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This idea is ,  naturally,  highly communitarian.  I t  is  
based on the common good as a paradigm of collective 
happiness,  with no knowledge of forms of individual  
happiness – or vir tue.  I t  is  an idea which appears very 
distant  from the current  forms of individualism, both i ts  
degenerate forms and i ts  highly correct  personalist  
form. In any event,  individual  r ights  – arising out of  the 
dignity of  the human person – were put  to one side in 
favor of  collective vir tue.  
This collective action naturally had consequences 
regarding the responsibil i ty of  the ci t izens.  Thus,  the 
communities sought to control  the actions of  the nobles 
since the ci ty would be responsible for  the actions of  i ts  
ci t izens.  This process of  forming collective guil t  was 
typical  of  a  society structured according to community 
part icipation.  The bad conduct of  individuals brought 
guil t  on the whole ci ty,  within the logic of  the ci ty 
being represented by i ts  ci t izens47.  
The collective responsibil i ty was based on the 
solidari ty required among all  the ci t izens in the 
decisions.  Indeed,  in a society of  part icipation,  or  
part icipative ci t izenship,  al l  can – and should – be 
considered as joint  decision-makers.  
The mechanism of individual  denial  of  
responsibil i ty was not  therefore admissible.  Athenian 
democracy was based on the dist inction between the 
individual  who assumed the government of  the ci ty and 
the other members of  the community48.  Precisely 
because of this ,  passive poli t ical  r ights  were reserved 
for the most  vir tuous ci t izens.   
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Indeed,  Athenian democracy was “based on the 
legit imization of civic vir tue and on the sense of  
community of  the individuals  called to be part  of  the 
poli t ical  collective,  subordinating the exercise of  public 
functions to the recognit ion of a condit ion with high 
moral  content”49.   
For this  reason specif ical ly,  unlike that  which had 
occurred in previous centuries,  governing did not  imply 
coercion.  Cit izenship established a close relat ionship 
between those who had the capacity to lead and those 
who obeyed.  This was because ci t izenship,  as i t  was 
conceived in Ancient  Greece and after  the decisive 
reforms made by Solon and Cleisthenes,  led to the 
progressive poli t icization of larger sectors of  society.  
The ci t izens increasingly recognized themselves as such 
and were aware of public interests  and motivated 
towards sharing a sense of  community and solidari ty.  I t  
was this  solidari ty in decision-making which led to the 
collective responsibil i ty.   
 
d)  The awarding of Athenian cit izenship: 
the reforms of Solon,  Cleisthenes and Pericles 
 
The legal  s tatus of  ci t izenship was vir tually non-
existent  unti l  the reforms made by Solon.  In the polis  
there were several  types of  subdivisions which covered 
al l  the ci t izens.  The other free inhabitants  – who were 
not  s laves – did not  enjoy ci t izenship,  al though they 
were enti t led to a protective regime, albeit  temporary.  
In most  cases,  the groups and communities were based 
on family connections or geographical  contiguity50.  The 
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definit ion was,  therefore,  s tr ict ly based on cri teria of  
ius sanguinis  insofar  as this  geographic contiguity only 
served to define that  which we might today call  
terr i tory.  In these terms,  geography only served as a 
dist inguishing cri terion between communities in order 
to know, by i t ,  where one began and the other ended. 
Solon was responsible for inst i tut ionalizing 
ci t izenship.  From the t ime of his  Consti tut ion the  legal  
s tatus of  the ci t izen became clear  as did the rules 
applicable to the granting of such status.   
The r ight  to ci t izenship was awarded to banished 
foreigners who were exercising a profession in Athens.  
This rule did not  last  long,  however,  and in the f if th 
century b.C. the granting of individual  ci t izenship was 
very rare51.  Collective granting of ci t izenship was 
common, and depended on important  services performed 
for the ci ty by a group.  These services could take the 
form of mili tary services,  or  even f inancial  services.  
The procedure for naturalization was quite simple,  only 
requiring a decree to be issued by the Pnyx .  However,  
in the fourth century b.C. addit ional  obstacles were 
introduced,  with a new requirement that  a  full  session 
of Parl iament confirm the procedure with 6000 votes in 
favor.  The new cit izens had al l  the same rights as the 
old ci t izens,  barring two: they could not  become part  of  
the priesthood or become arcontes .  Each naturalized 
person could choose the phratria  that  he wished to join.  
In order to be considered a ci t izen,  with full  r ights,  
two condit ions had to be met:  i t  was necessary to be 
born,  within wedlock,  to two cit izens – here ci t izenship 
was considered in the fullest  sense,  taking into account 
the restr ict ions on the r ights  applicable to women – and 
to be over 18 years of  age. 
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On the other hand,  in Solon’s Consti tut ion ci t izens 
were divided into strata based on census52.  Solon 
thought i t  necessary to extend the circle of  ci t izens who 
benefi ted from poli t ical  r ights .  This objective was 
achieved via a division in terms of census and by the 
creation of an annually elected council .  In this  sense,  
he appealed to the civic responsibil i ty of  the ci t izens 
who should actively intervene by part icipating in the 
exist ing inst i tut ions53.  Solon’s reforms,  which sought to 
strengthen poli t ical  cohesion in Athens,  consisted of the 
introduction of classes according to ownership which 
established the level  of  poli t ical  part icipation of the 
ci t izens,  as opposed to the rule of  “bir th” which had 
served as the cri terion for poli t ical  part icipation up 
unti l  that  t ime.  In short ,  Solon sought to str ike a 
diff icult  balance between recognit ion of power and 
responsibil i ty to the demos  and the inevitable role of  
the aristocracy54.  
Following the Consti tut ion,  intermediate levels  of  
part icipation were art if icial ly created.  This 
development was just if ied by the need for collective 
part icipation and also the needs of  individual  groups.  I t  
is  not  clear why communities which were already small  
in size were further subdivided into even smaller  
groups55.  
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This division al lowed individuals  to be identif ied 
for mili tary purposes and in order to better  define r ights  
and duties in the context  of  the community and,  above 
al l ,  i t  meant individuals had a sense of belonging which 
i t  would have been diff icult  to achieve by other forms 
of associat ion.  
The exclusive nature of  governing duties afforded 
to the ci t izens should not ,  however,  be confused with an 
oligarchy.  The few that  governed did not  do so for their  
own benefi t ,  but  for the good of the ci ty.  What 
transformed Attica into a community of  ci t izens was 
Solon’s capacity,  by means of  his  reforms,  to f ind the 
connecting l ink between people forming a community 
which was subject  to the law. The community of  
ci t izens gave substance to the polis  and governed for 
the benefi t  of  the ci ty56.  This growing public 
part icipation became evident from the t ime of the many 
reforms of the sixth century b.C.,  namely the creation 
of annually elected councils  and the courts  and the 
appointment of  judges.  
The importance of  Solon’s reforms l ies in the 
creation of a legal  s tatus of  ci t izenship.  With his  
poli t ical  vision,  he realized that  this  s tatus had 
enormous potential  and could play an important  role in 
unit ing the society at  that  t ime.  In this  way,  by set t ing 
out  the rules for awarding ci t izenship,  Solon sought to 
democratize the ci t izens and place them in the service 
of  the community.  From then on ci t izenship would 
become an instrument of  inclusion in such turbulent  
t imes as those later  experienced during the 
Peloponnesian war.  
At the end of the sixth century,  Cleisthenes 
provided a boost  to this  movement by inst i tut ionalizing 
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the civic presence via a deep reform in the poli t ical  
substratum of the polis57.  
Cleisthenes did not  wish to destroy the former  
structure.  He did,  however,  seek to reconsti tute the 
tr ibes and give them new functions.  The new order was 
based on the demes ,  small  local  set t lements,  each of 
which was made up of a town or small  ci ty.  Some towns 
with few inhabitants  were joined with others in order to 
form a deme .  Athens was made up of several  demes58.   
The local  assemblies were responsible for various 
tasks,  including the organization of a l is t  of  al l  the 
ci t izens.  To be a ci t izen i t  was necessary to be over 19 
years of  age and to be admitted by the demota .  A 
cit izen had to be of Greek descent and be a man who 
was capable of  part icipating in public l ife.  
Much has been discussed about what Cleisthenes 
intended when implementing his  reforms.  I t  is  thought 
that  there was a concern to generally improve the l iving 
condit ions of  the population by better  organizing the 
terr i torial  distr icts  and reducing dependency on the 
nobil i ty,  thereby contributing to the democratization of 
Att ica.  
In any event,  i t  is  undeniable that  one immediate 
effect ,  al though i t  was not  Cleisthenes’ central  concern,  
certainly carried some weight in his  decision:  many 
immigrants from the Greek world were l iving in Athens 
at  the t ime; the possibil i ty afforded to them of 
acquiring Athenian ci t izenship increased Cleisthenes’ 
support  in the assembly59.   
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The impact  of  these reforms is  not  total ly known, 
al though i t  is  thought that  they gave a great  boost  to 
Athenian democracy,  both through the more generalized 
access to ci t izenship and,  above al l ,  as  a result  of  the 
belief  that  part icipation could take place in condit ions 
of  equali ty.  The posit ions of  the nobil i ty were gradually 
losing strength and the ci t izens were becoming more 
aware of their  posit ion among equals.  In any event,  
Cleisthenes’ reforms al lowed for a new perception of 
the ci t izen.  To be a ci t izen was “now understood in a 
new sense deriving from the polis ,  while at  the same 
t ime the polis  began to be consti tuted by the ci t izens”60.  
The tradit ional  s tandard was based on personal  
relat ionships and fr iendship and never on an 
inst i tut ionalized relat ionship of  ci t izenship.  The demos  
was f inally able to overcome the strained relat ions 
between the people and the nobil i ty.  
The most  visible face of  these reforms was the 
confirmation of ci t izenship as an inst i tut ionalized 
status,  an instrument of  public policies used as an 
element of  inclusion for the foreigner.  Proof of  this  was 
the practice of  awarding ci t izenship using mechanisms 
of law. Throughout the f irst  quarter  of  the f if th century 
b.C.,  the process of  granting ci t izenship became clear 
and inst i tut ionalized.  I t  was transformed into a proper 
procedure made up of organized acts61.  
During the Peloponnesian war,  ci t izenship 
performed a central  role,  yet  – due to i ts  over-exposure 
– i t  entered a period of crisis .  By the end of the  war,  
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many Athenians were not asking what they could do for 
the polis ,  but  rather what the polis  could do for them62.  
Pericles,  therefore,  sought to restore credibil i ty to 
the status via important  reforms,  the greatest  that  had 
been made since the t ime of Cleisthenes.  He passed a 
law making ci t izenship dependent on the origins of  both 
parents63.  Thus,  for  the f irst  t ime,  i t  was st ipulated that  
ci t izens should be born of an Athenian father and an 
Athenian mother,  mixed marriages having been 
prohibited64.  
Pericles was aware of the complexity of  the status 
of  ci t izenship and of the delicate nature of  the changes 
he had produced.  He knew that  ci t izenship was a 
double-edged instrument:  i t  could both reward and 
exclude.  The reward side was associated with the public 
honors that  the ci ty granted to i ts  heroes and,  also,  the 
promise of  help to those who had heroically defended 
the public good and to their  families65.  Exclusion 
represented a lack of  morals  of  al l  those who could not  
aspire to acquire such a status.  
Pericles’  discourse on ci t izenship posit ioned the 
status at  the moral  and dogmatic level ,  rather than at  
the purely legal  level  which had been the case with 
Solon and Cleisthenes.  
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I t  is  important  to f irst  understand the historical  
background to Pericles’  reforms.  Having dealt  with the 
Peloponnesian war,  he had to resurrect  Athens from a 
part icularly disturbing period of heavy internal  
divisions.  As stated above,  ci t izenship had lost  i ts  
credibil i ty.  This was part ly due to the effects  of  the 
war,  but  also had to do with the fact  that  i t  had become 
generalized as a result  of  the previous reforms.  
Afterwards,  we must not  forget  that  the f if th century 
b.C.– Pericles’  century – was simultaneously the golden 
century and the start  of  Athens’ decline66.  
I t  was therefore clear  that  these reforms sought to 
restore to ci t izenship the prest ige i t  had once known. 
This would be achieved by providing the status with the 
exclusivity of  being a desired thing.  On the other hand,  
in terms of demographics,  Athens was now 
unrecognizable,  so i t  became necessary to rethink i ts  
population structure.  I t  was based on these assumptions 
that  Pericles decided to make the structural  changes 
that  he implemented with regard to ci t izenship. 
 
e) The foreigner and the various levels  of  
cit izenship 
 
In Ancient  Greece foreigners were eyed with 
suspicion and hosti l i ty.  All  those who were strangers to 
the community were viewed with distrust  and had to 
prove their  behavior.  Even so,  al though foreigners were 
not  enti t led to obtain ci t izenship,  the Athenian ci ty 
drew a dist inction between “metics” and “barbarians”.  
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Metics were foreigners to the ci ty of  Athens,  
al though they belonged to the Greek civil ization.  
Barbarians,  on the other hand,  were foreigners who 
spoke a tongue which the Greeks could not  understand.  
They were therefore referred to as “people who uttered 
sounds l ike “bar bar” rather than speaking Greek.  If  
they did not  speak Greek,  they were barbarians”67.  
Indeed,  “if  we translate both barbaros  and xenos  into 
modern language as “foreigner”,  we are,  for  the sake of 
ease,  distort ing a substantial  difference between the two 
terms.  The term barbaros  (…) corresponds to a means 
of naming the Other,  the non-Greek (…) xenos ,  for  i ts  
part ,  is  essential ly a foreigner who may or may not be 
Greek,  who is  welcomed into the home and connected to 
the host  due to t ies  which are social  or  rel igious in 
nature”68.   
Metics were,  therefore,  free men, foreigners by 
bir th,  but  who were l iving in Athens.  They were 
recognized as having certain r ights.  Foreigners who 
sett led in Athens had to report  to the authori t ies in 
order to undergo a process of  registrat ion and enquiry,  
without which they could be pursued by the law and 
condemned to slavery.  They were given accommodation 
in the deme  and were subject  to the control  of  the head.  
They could not ,  namely,  be full  owners,  bring 
public actions in court  or  legit imately marry a ci t izen.  
Despite this ,  they were protected by the public powers 
in the same way as ci t izens were,  and could exercise 
any economic activity and part icipate in rel igious 
fest ivals .  If  a  metic provided services to the ci ty,  he 
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could receive privileges such as exemption from paying 
taxes and could obtain a f iscal  and mili tary status 
similar  to that  of  ci t izens.  Metics performed a very 
important  role economically speaking.  They had the 
monopoly in industr ial  activit ies such as ceramics and 
metallurgy.  A large number of  them were also engaged 
in retai l  and they also had an important  presence in the 
banking world and in naval  armaments69.  The role of  
metics in the world of  the arts  and culture was also 
unquestionable.  The great  philosophers,  with the 
exception of Socrates and Plato,  were al l  metics.  
This dist inction,  therefore,  paved the way to 
differentiated treatment.  Thus,  the xenos  –  a foreigner 
to the ci ty but  a  member of  the Greek world – was 
welcomed with hospital i ty.  He was not  recognized as a 
subject  in law but could benefi t  from some legal  
protection.  One might say that  this  was a kind of 
derived ci t izenship which could be called “honorary”,  
which some foreigners benefi ted from70.   
This form of derived ci t izenship – “honorary 
ci t izenship” – sought to strengthen the t ies between the 
peoples from different  Greek ci ty-states,  by granting 
some legal  protection to their  ci t izens,  via the creation 
of a wider poli t ical  community based on mutual  
recognit ion.  Poli t ical  identi ty was truly achieved by 
Pericles in the f if th century b.C..  Many ci t izens 
dedicated a large amount of  their  t ime to the public 
cause.  This was only possible because much of Athens’ 
economic activity was guaranteed by the metics and 
slaves who, unlike in  the other ci t ies in Att ica,  ensured 
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the economic sustainabil i ty necessary for the mass 
part icipation of the ci t izens,  primarily after  the 
decision was taken to provide remuneration for this  
part icipation.  
A foreigner from within the Greek world was 
enti t led to different  treatment,  based on the reciprocal  
nature of  relat ionships between the ci t ies,  and benefi ted 
from a status of  “near” ci t izenship.  Barbarians,  on the 
other hand,  that  is  those who did not  share the same 
cultural  background as those from the Greek world,  
were not  afforded any protection by the laws of the 
Greek ci t ies.  
We may, therefore,  speak of several  degrees of  
ci t izenship and methods of dealing with foreigners.  
This is ,  perhaps,  the aspect  which best  al lows the Greek 
ci ty to be characterized as a factor of  inclusion.  
Cit izenship was clearly not  only important  in unit ing 
the Athenians but  i t  was also – albeit  in a derived form 
– an element which brought together al l  the peoples that  
inhabited Att ica.  Only the barbarians were excluded,  
s ince the difference in the language and culture 
represented an insurmountable barrier  to a deeper 
relat ionship.  
Here we can see a clear  correlat ion with modern 
t imes.  On the one hand,  the means of  dealing with 
foreigners is  s imilar .  Following a period of distrust ,  
there is  a  phase of  euphoria,  of  cosmopoli tanism. Then,  
once ci t izenship is  understood as a factor of  inclusion,  
certain potential  is  extracted from it ,  t ransforming i t  
into a geometrically variable status,  which al lows the 
progressive inclusion of various categories of  
foreigners71.  There are,  therefore,  clear s imilari t ies  with 
the si tuation exist ing today within European ci t izenship 
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or even ci t izenship of  the Portuguese-speaking world.  
In areas of  economic or cultural  identi ty,  the peoples 
promote progressive integration via the adoption of 
intermediate or derived ci t izenship statuses72.   
This similari ty demonstrates that  neither the idea 
of  derived ci t izenship nor i ts  integrating potential  is  an 
innovation of the contemporary period.  Quite the 
contrary,  these were in fact  common practice in the 
Ancient  Greek civil izations.  
 
2. Citizenship in the Roman Empire  
 
a) The Roman “civitas”  
 
One f irst  difference that  is  immediately evident 
between ci t izenship in Rome and that  in Ancient  Greece 
relates to the terr i torial  dimension.  Rome’s expansionist  
intention was clear,  in opposit ion to the l imit ing of 
terr i tory of  the Greek ci ty-state73.   
The strengthening of ci t izenship that  we f ind in 
Rome is ,  therefore,  completely understandable in the 
l ight  of  the development that  occurred there regarding 
the unit ing of peoples,  beginning with the hegemony of 
Lazio,  fol lowed by the poli t ical  unif ication of the 
I tal ian peninsula,  and up unti l  the struggle for 
domination of the Mediterranean and expansion of the 
empire74.  
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The origins of  ci t izenship were the result ,  as  in 
Greece,  of  a  deepening of social  and family t ies.  Thus,  
the social  concept of  ci t izenship symbolizes a 
gregarious state and a sense of  identi ty and of 
belonging to a certain group.  
As in Greece,  ci t izenship was also used in Rome, in 
this  social  dimension,  as a means of  integration.  Indeed,  
i t  is  at  this  t ime that  ci t izenship transcends i ts  purely 
social  dimension and is  transformed first ly into a 
poli t ical  instrument and later  into a legal  one.  
The size of  the Roman Empire meant that  i ts  social  
and poli t ical  s tructures needed to have a great  capacity 
to adapt.  As we will  see,  this  is  what happened to a 
large extent  with ci t izenship.   
Terri torial  expansion brought with i t  an 
unprecedented need to integrate peoples.  As has been 
said,  therein l ies the biggest  difference in relat ion to 
ci t izenship in the Greek ci ty-state.  In Greece 
ci t izenship was often used as an instrument of  
inclusion,  to increase the support  base of  a governor,  to 
overcome diff icult ies of  a  given t ime.  In Rome the 
challenge for the concept was permanent and structural .  
I t  would not  be possible to expand the Empire without 
having a structured vision as to the effects  of  that  
expansion on the populat ion substratum of Rome and 
the new terri tories.  
The notion of civi tas has two meanings:  i t  names 
the body of ci t izens and the individual  legal  condit ion 
of the cives75.   
Seen from the individual  perspective,  i t  denotes the 
status by which the individual  is  part  of  a  socio-
poli t ical  community,  where he is  considered a subject  in 
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law. Indeed,  the individual  who enjoys status civi tat is  
is  a  member of  a  legal  community the effects  of  which 
are not  extended to the foreigner.  In a simple 
understanding of the concept,  only the cives  could have 
full  legal  capacity76.  
The origin of  the concept dates back to the pater 
familias ,  who was the only person to possess full  legal  
capacity.  In Roman public law, this  condit ion 
corresponded to the caput – the head of the family –,  
the individual  who was granted civi tas  l ibertasque ,  and 
therefore had full  capacity and freedom of action77.   
The actual  idea of  status  is  fundamental  to an 
understanding of ci t izenship in Rome. By status  we 
mean the condit ion in which the person f inds himself  in 
relat ion to the community.  Status  corresponds to an 
identif icat ion of the layer in society to which the 
person may gain access.  From the legal  point  of  view, 
status  corresponds to the treatment received by each 
person in relat ion to the legal  order.  Thus,  the set  of  
r ights and duties was defined according to the status  of  
each ci t izen.   
We may, therefore,  dist inguish three fundamental  
condit ions:  status l ibertatis ,  civi tatis  and familiae .  
Each of these corresponds to a different  set  of  r ights  
and duties,  and the paterfamilias  could be considered a 
full  holder and,  therefore,  have access to al l  the 
status78.   
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Besides posit ioning the individual  in terms of the 
legal  order,  each of these statuses represented his  
condit ion in society i tself .  Thus,  ci t izenship in Rome – 
similarly to that  which had already occurred in Greece – 
was not  disconnected from a deep set  of  social  relat ions 
which were projected into public l ife.  This projection 
would lead to legal  consequences which were of  
relevance regarding the way the individual  was treated.  
The status l ibertatis  s ignif ied the individual’s  
condit ion in society.  Ult imately,  i t  was a form of 
knowing the legal  capacity of  persons insofar as 
freedom was a condit ion for access to this  capacity.  The 
result  of  this  was,  naturally,  a  clear exclusion of slaves,  
both from exercising and from holding most  r ights .  I t  
is ,  in fact ,  an extension of the Greek concept,  which – i t  
wil l  be remembered – already excluded from cit izenship 
al l  those who were not free since freedom was a 
presupposit ion for the exercise of  r ights  and 
part icipation.   
There is  an obvious connection between status 
civi tat is  and status familiae .  The legal  configuration of 
ci t izenship sought to guarantee the family unit .  This 
basic unit  provided the guarantee that  society would be 
controlled by small  groups whose projection formed a 
larger whole.  The cives  began at  home, demonstrat ing 
his  capacity for control .  I t  is  not  by chance that  the 
caput  –  paterfamilias  –  was considered to be the 
paradigm of the ci t izen,  thereby guaranteeing him 
access to most  r ights.  As we know, the function of head 
of family was of great  social  importance in Rome and 
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was part icularly relevant in legal  terms.  The same was 
true with regard to ci t izenship.  Family relat ionships 
were projected into the wider panorama of society.  
Furthermore,  the connection between ci t izenship 
and family was decisive inasmuch as i t  was present in 
the most  relevant connecting element – of  the t ime – for  
awarding ci t izenship:  ius sanguinis .  In this  case i t  
revealed the personal  status  of  the individual  that  was 
condit ioned by the social  reali ty79.  
Historical  developments in Rome, along with social  
change,  projected the status of  ci t izenship to within the 
f ield for defining the status of  the individual .  While 
many variat ions of  the concept were based on ideas 
already known in Greek civil ization,  Roman social  
organization was part icularly responsible for turning 
ci t izenship into a status.   
I t  is  t rue that  the transformation of  ci t izenship into 
a legal  concept had already been seen.  What happened 
now, however,  was i ts  inst i tut ionalization.  I t  was 
transformed into a legal  s tatus which characterized the 
ci t izen regarding his  abil i ty to hold or enjoy a 
significant  range of r ights .  
 
b) The awarding of cit izenship in Rome 
 
Originally only the cives optimo iure resident  in 
the ci ty-state enjoyed full  legal  capacity80.  Inhabitants  
of  the municipia ,  annexed to Roman terri tory and 
considered colonies,  were considered civis  sine 
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suffragio81.  This rule placed the municipes  in a special  
relat ionship with Rome, al though i t  afforded them full  
use of  their  municipal  ci t izenship82.  However,  the lack 
of voting rights  demonstrated that  the municipes  were 
not  members of  the community.  
As a rule,  ci t izenship was granted at  bir th.  A child 
would be a ci t izen of  Rome if  he were:  i )  a  child of  
parents with Roman cit izenship;  i i )  the child of  a 
Roman father who had married the child’s non-Roman 
mother by means of a marriage which was provided for 
in Rome. 
Thus,  as has been said,  the awarding of ci t izenship 
in Rome was ini t ial ly str ict ly restr icted to the ci ty.  I t  is  
t rue that  there was a provision for the extension of 
some rights to inhabitants  of  annexed ci t ies,  al though 
they were denied the central  poli t ical  r ights .  
The great  challenge that  Rome presented for the 
concept of  ci t izenship was precisely related to the 
expansion of the terr i tory and the need to include the 
inhabitants  of  the new terri tories in the vast  expanse 
that  was to become the Roman Empire.  Thus,  the 
development of  the technical  rules on awarding 
ci t izenship stemmed largely from the expansion of the 
Empire and the consequences of  this  expansion for the 
original  conception of ci t izenship.  
As a result  of  this  need,  in addit ion to acquiring 
ci t izenship by bir th,  i t  was also possible to  acquire i t  by 
public decision,  predominantly for individuals who did 
not  l ive in Rome but who had privileged relat ions with 
the ci ty.  
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I t  is  not  known when the Romans f irst  began to 
grant  ci t izenship to those l iving outside the ci ty of  
Rome. There are,  however,  records of  some form of 
ci t izenship being awarded to Carthaginian deserters  
who sett led in Sici ly at  the end of the third century 
b.C.83.  
I t  was rare for  ci t izens who were not  from Rome to 
be granted full  ci t izenship84.  The Roman’s careful  
approach with regard to granting ci t izenship is  
part icularly evident if  we look at  the issue of loss of  
ci t izenship.  Thus,  al l  Roman cit izens who sett led in 
another terr i tory were deemed to have lost  Roman 
cit izenship while they remained in that  location.  They 
were able to recover their  ci t izenship if  they returned to 
Rome.  
The underlying principle here is ,  nevertheless,  
surprisingly modern.  Indeed,  the rule outl ined in the 
paragraph above sought to ensure that  each individual  
was a ci t izen or member of  the community in which he 
actually resided.  This rule is  no more than an ancient  
manifestat ion of the current  principle of  effective 
connection,  according to which the acquisi t ion and 
maintenance of ci t izenship depends on an effective 
connection between the ci t izen and the State.  Thus,  in 
Rome an element of  effective connection was required 
before ci t izenship could be granted and the loss of  that  
connection implied the loss of  the ci t izenship i tself .  
This rule permitted the f irst  s igns of  an as-yet  hidden 
influence,  of  ius soli ,  which up unti l  that  t ime had been 
overshadowed by ius sanguinis .  
The generalized granting of ci t izenship only began 
in the second century b.C.85.  At that  t ime numerous 
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awards of Roman cit izenship were registered by Pro-
consuls as a reward for services to Rome. With the 
proliferat ion of these awards,  the problem arose as to 
what exact  s tatus these individuals could enjoy in 
Rome, and what relat ionship they maintained with their  
community of origin.  
At that  t ime,  the idea that  Roman cit izenship was 
incompatible with other ci t izenships was abandoned and 
the concept of  dual  ci t izenship was born86.  Yet doubts 
st i l l  remained.  Apparently,  those who held dual  
ci t izenship were governed by the laws of Rome in 
relat ion to their  personal  status,  al though they were not 
prevented from part icipating in the public l ife  of  their  
communities of  origin.   
Lex Iulia  of  90 b.C. and Lex Plautia Papiris  of  89 
b.C.are clear  examples of  the expansion of the granting 
of ci t izenship with the aim of promoting inclusion87.  
Via these laws,  Roman cit izenship was granted to a 
large number of  the inhabitants  of  the I tal ian Peninsula,  
from Cisalpine Gaul to Sici ly88.  
The need for inclusion was immediately fel t  in the 
terr i tories that  were annexed to Rome. For this  reason,  
the municipes were the f irst  to be recognized as 
ci t izens.  This was f irst ly sine suffragio ,  but  later  
optimo iure .  However,  as  t ime went on,  the increasing 
establishment of  the Empire in more distant  lands 
forced a rethink of ci t izenship beyond the physical  
l imits  of  the Peninsula.   
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The need to include the Greeks was the cause of  a 
further impact  on the r ights  of  foreigners and,  later ,  on 
the generalized granting of ci t izenship.  During the f irst  
century b.C.,  the emperors frequently granted Roman 
cit izenship to persons from the East .  However,  no 
instrument is  known of which enti t led persons from the 
West to acquire Roman cit izenship.  Since there does not  
appear to have been a law which inst i tut ionalized the 
granting of ci t izenship to the Greeks and other peoples 
from the West,  i t  is  clear that ,  at  least  from the t ime of 
Augustus’  reign,  Greek ci t izens could benefi t  from 
Roman cit izenship without,  by reason of this ,  having to 
give up a poli t ical ly active l ife in their  communities of  
origin.  In any event,  i t  appears that  the granting of 
ci t izenship always stemmed from an individual  
ini t iat ive,  probably for important  services provided to 
Rome89.  In any case,  ci t izenship was awarded by the 
Emperor on the advice of  the pro-consuls.  If  these 
awards were init ial ly rare,  i t  was largely because i t  was 
impossible for the pro-consuls to intervene.  In fact ,  
only mili tary chiefs were able to suggest  these awards 
to the Emperor.  Later ,  the actions of  the pro-consuls 
were decisive.  Being able to see close hand,  they had a 
clear  idea of the importance of granting ci t izenship as a 
means of inclusion.  
Finally the  Consti tut io Antoniana f igures as an 
undeniable mark in the history of  Roman cit izenship.  In 
212 AD, the Emperor Antoninus Caracalla decided to 
extend Roman cit izenship to al l  free inhabitants  of  the 
Empire.  
From that  moment on al l  subjects  of  the Empire 
were also ci t izens and could invoke the protection of 
Roman law. This award of ci t izenship was therefore an 
advantage to unifying the legal  systems.  Inclusively,  i t  
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would el iminate confl icts  in law that  resulted from the 
co-existence of different  legal  orders within the 
Empire90.  
Despite i ts  general  character ,  the edict  excluded 
certain categories of  persons.  Those excluded from 
Roman cit izenship were barbarians who l ived in the 
areas near the border who had a low level  of  
Romanization,  most  rural  populat ions and the dedit ici i .  
This exclusion demonstrated that  Caracalla had not  
ceased to consider ci t izenship as an instrument of  
inclusion dependent on more or less str ict  connecting 
elements.  In fact ,  ci t izenship was not  granted across the 
board but  rather there was a concern to award i t  to 
those who were capable of  being integrated or included,  
and leave out those who did not demonstrate much hope 
of integration.   
I t  is  important  to note that  Caracalla’s  edict  had 
one immediate purpose – the Romanization of the 
Empire.  I t  was not  s imply a question of increasing the 
population’s affection for the Emperor.  The effect  of  
the measure was to accelerate the Romanization of the 
law and administrat ion of the colonies.  The ubiquity of  
individuals  with Roman cit izenship and their  demands 
for tr ial  in l ine with the privileges of  their  s tatus had 
long promoted the acquisi t ion of ci t izenship,  or  at  least  
made Roman law familiar  throughout the Empire.  As 
more and more people were being tr ied according to 
Roman law, legal  act ivi ty became more homogenous 
across the Empire91.  Furthermore,  as SEBASTIÃO CRUZ 
states,  “the “inflat ion” of ci t izenship caused an 
“inflat ion” of iurisprudentia .  There was a need to 
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quickly create more jurists ,  especial ly in the provinces,  
to now apply the Ius Romanum to al l  the subjects  of  the 
Empire;  i ts  value began to decrease greatly.  This was 
the great  “provincial ization” of classic Roman Law. The 
move was underway towards i t  becoming vulgarized"92.  
Despite these diff icult ies and i ts  immediate 
purposes,  the Consti tut io Antoniana had merit  in that  i t  
consti tuted an element of  unity within the Empire .  
Indeed,  at  one point ,  i t  was the element that  joined the 
various units  of  the Empire,  bringing i t  together around 
one common system of law93.  Given the lack of cultural  
elements that  might ensure this  unity,  Roman 
cit izenship,  together with the application of law, 
created the necessary and sufficient  t ies to maintain the 
community94.   
Roman cit izenship created a class of  trans-local ,  
mult i-ethnic and multi - l inguist ic  persons who formed an 
as-yet  unknown concept:  that  of  an “international  legal  
community”95.  
We may, therefore,  speak of a unifying sense of  
Roman cit izenship and the creation of a vast  
community,  based on exclusively legal  t ies.  Throughout 
history,  whenever i t  has proved necessary to unite 
communities that  do not share other t ies beyond 
economic and legal  ones,  ci t izenship has always played 
a fundamental  role.  
The connections with modern t imes are clear.  We 
may immediately point  to the American example.  A 
State of  immigration,  formed from the cosmopoli tanism 
of disparate communities,  unites around the 
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Consti tut ion and ci t izenship.  The Consti tut ion,  a  
symbol of  the union of the American people,  begins 
with the words “We the people”.   
This same feeling is  also evident today in the 
context  of  the European Union.  The creation of 
ci t izenship of the Union in the Maastr icht  Treaty has,  
precisely,  this  unifying purpose,  of  creating a 
community of persons,  rather than a mere economic 
community.  As Jorge Pereira da Silva expressively 
states,  “the evolution of the European construction 
means that  addressing the issue of ci t izenship has 
become unavoidable.  In fact ,  i t  would not  be possible to 
advocate any form of European poli t ical  construction 
without creating a “Europe of the ci t izens”96,  oriented 
towards sat isfying the needs of  i ts  peoples and to the 
creation of a collective awareness of  a European people.  
Besides the legal  consequences that  the route taken by 
the Member States implies,  i t  is  important  not  to 
underest imate the symbolic relevance that  the idea of  
European ci t izenship carries,  above al l  at  t imes when 
the European construction is  at  i ts  most  fragile”97.  
 
c) Treatment of the foreigner 
 
One ini t ial  form of protection for the foreigner in 
Rome resulted from the adoption of the inst i tute of  
hospit ium .  This consisted of  the possibil i ty of  a ci t izen 
providing protection for a foreigner.  This protection 
involved protecting the r ights  of  the foreigner98.  
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Foreigners – peregrini  –  were divided into two 
categories:  civi tates peregrini  and peregrini .  The f irst  
category related to foreigners who already belonged to 
urban communities that  predated the Roman conquest .  
These were considered peregrini  al icuius civi tat is .  
Owing to this  s tatus,  they benefi ted from legal  
protection which could be invoked in court  before the 
praetor peregrinus .  The other group,  the peregrini ,  
whether i t  was because they were not  organized in 
urban communities,  or  because the communities they 
belonged to were the object  of  punishment,  did not  
enjoy any rights99.  
Foreigners who were not  considered to be guests  in 
Rome – hostis  –  could enjoy some protection,  al though 
they were denied access to poli t ical  r ights .  These r ights  
were recognized by means of the ius gentium  applicable 
to the non-Romans with whom Rome maintained close 
t ies.  As t ime passed,  the hostis  eventually ceased to be 
hostis  and became fully integrated into the community.  
Even so,  foreigners were afforded some 
prerogatives.  First ly,  they could trade in Rome, later  
there was the ius conubium  –  the possibil i ty of  
marrying a Roman cit izen and,  last ly,  there was ius 
testamenti  factio  –  the possibil i ty of  being a beneficiary 
in the wil l  of  a  Roman cit izen.   
Even before full  ci t izenship was granted f irst  to the 
I tal ian peninsula and later  to the whole Empire,  there 
was,  as previously indicated,  an intermediate form of 
ci t izenship.  This was the cives sine suffragio  as  
opposed to the cives iure optimo .  The former were 
integrated foreigners who were given the r ights  of  
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cit izens,  namely the r ight  to act  in court  in defense of 
their  own rights .  However,  they were not  given the r ight  
to vote or to be elected to public office.  
The treatment of  foreigners in Rome underwent 
great  changes as a result  of  the Consti tut io Antoniana .  
The whole range of relat ionships which had been 
established to differentiate between the Roman and the 
foreigner ceased to have any meaning once the 
Consti tut io Antoniana  had been passed.  
The dist inction between the cives  and peregrini  had 
long been losing strength due to the variat ions in the 
intermediate statuses which had been created in the 
meantime.  The most important  dist inction,  at  the t ime,  
was between the individuals who were subject  to ius 
gentium  and the others – dedit ici i  –  who did not  benefi t  
from any legal  protection100.  
Once the Romanization of law had begun in the 
municipia  which were closest ,  i t  soon began to expand 
throughout the Empire.  The proximity,  in geographical  
terms,  was,  nevertheless,  decisive in the early t imes for 
the easier  acquisi t ion of ci t izenship. 
I t  is  clear  that  the progressive integration of  
foreigners aided the Emperor Caracalla in deciding to 
award Roman cit izenship to al l  inhabitants  in the 
Empire.  In fact ,  many of them already benefi ted from 
the protection of Roman law as a consequence of the ius 
gentium .  
In short ,  the treatment of  foreigners in Rome 
changed in l ine with the status of  ci t izenship.  Whereas 
foreigners were al l  ini t ial ly treated in the same way, 
different  types of  foreigners then began to be treated 
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differently and f inally Roman cit izenship was granted 
to al l  inhabitants  in the Empire.  
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§4. Citizenship in the Middle Ages 
 
In the Middle Ages the structure of  society changed 
radically from that  which existed in the ancient  
civil izations in Greece and Rome101.  
In Europe the dispersal  of  the social  fabric 
produced a dissemination of fort if ied ci t ies under the 
protection of the ruler .  Even in cases where there was a 
king or a kingdom, the king was often a “primus inter  
pares” whose authori ty was no greater  than that  of  other 
nobles in control  of  s ignificant  ci t ies.  
Outside the ci t ies there was an almost  entirely rural  
society;  a  land of danger and the unknown. Knights 
provided most  of  the protection in and outside the ci ty.  
They consti tuted the army at  the t ime,  at  the service of 
a given ruler .  
Regarding the organization of society,  the Middle 
Ages were characterized by a feudalist ic  society,  
meaning that  the landowners possessed privileges over 
the land workers,  most  of  whom agreed to work the land 
in a si tuation almost  equivalent  to slavery.  
In terms of legal  knowledge,  the Middle Ages were 
characterized by the consil ia  and responsa  of  eminent 
jurists .  In a way,  “ the task of  many generations of  
medieval lawyers was to understand and assimilate the 
ancient  law to their  own reali t ies”102.  
Chief  among these jurists  were Acursius,  Bartolus 
de Sassoferrato and Baldus de Ubaldis .  “The law they 
interpreted,  known as ius commune,  or common law, 
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was composed of  the ancient  Roman law and all  the 
medieval glosses and commentaries on i t”103.  
The law in the Middle Ages was basically the 
adaptation of the Roman law to the medieval  t imes 
according to the comments of  these jurists .  
According to Riesenberg,  “ there is  not  a single 
formal treatise on ci t izenship,  nor a single medieval 
ci t izenship act  comparable to that  of  Caracalla in 
212”104.  This meant that  the medieval  law of ci t izenship 
had to be found in the commentaries of  the said jurists .  
In the societal  s tructure described above,  
ci t izenship gains a renewed importance,  not  so much for 
i ts  poli t ical  part icipation dimension – al though this  was 
also present in the Middle Ages – but  part icularly for  
the status of  protection i t  conferred. 
A cit izen would not only be able to engage in 
business in the ci ty,  but  would also seek i ts  protection – 
l ike a warm blanket  – in t imes of war and turmoil .  I t  
was very important  for  a person to know that  he could 
count on the protection of the ci ty and i ts  fort if ied 
walls  and knights.  That  was especial ly evident in the 
case of land workers outside of the ci ty walls  that  
would seek refuge in the ci ty in the case of  a war105.  
So knowing who the ci t izens were was a cri t ical  
question in the Middle Ages,  not  necessari ly for the 
exact  same reasons as in the classical  t imes.  
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As in modern t imes,  in medieval  ci t ies ci t izenship 
could be acquired by bir th or  by naturalization 106.   
According to Accursius,  naturalization demanded a 
commitment of  ten years’  residence and fulf i l lment of  
civic obligations.  For Bartolus de Sassoferrato i t  was 
enough that  a  man moved most  of  his  resources from 
one place to another to establish residence.  Baldus de 
Ubaldis  claimed that  a  ci t izen must love his  ci ty;  i t  was 
not  enough to l ive quiet ly and pay taxes.  He would be 
required to obey i ts  laws,  l ive in town, and desire to 
support  his  ci ty even against  the family107.  
I t  is  part icularly significant  that  the most  
influential  jurists  and commentators in the Middle Ages 
gave such importance to residence.  In fact ,  the law at  
the t ime was largely influenced by the perceptions of  
these jurists  regarding the classical  rules and 
regulat ions.  
I t  is  understandable that  residence played such a 
crucial  role at  the t ime.  In moments of  war and turmoil  
the ci ty would work as a shelter  for  those l iving within 
i ts  walls .  I t  was not so much a matter  of  poli t ical  
part icipation but  rather a question of protection.  So 
those who put themselves under such protection by 
residing within the walls  of  the ci ty ought to be 
considered ci t izens.  
I t  is  especial ly interest ing that  Accursius even 
considered a specif ic t ime frame of ten years.  As I  wil l  
develop in chapter 6,  that  is  precisely the t ime frame 
that  we should consider nowadays as relevant for 
naturalization.  
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This means that  ten years’  residence as a qualifying 
cri terion for natural ization is  not  only rooted in 
modern-day ci t izenship practices adopted around the 
world,  as  revealed by recent surveys,  but  was already a 
relevant cri terion in the Middle Ages.  
Other commentators,  al though not considering or 
daring to r isk a specif ic t ime frame, al l  referred to 
residence as a qualifying cri terion for natural izat ion.  
This means that  residence was always considered as a 
relevant factor for  natural izat ion.  I t  is  deeply rooted in 
the Western legal  tradit ion.  
Assimilat ion in a given community started with 
residence.  Other factors may also have had an impact .  
Jurists  could be str icter  or  more lenient  with regard to 
naturalization.  This might have entai led objective 
factors,  such as paying taxes,  belonging to an army or 
contributing to the ci ty,  or moral  factors ,  such as 
al legiance to or love of the ci ty.  However,  residence 
was a common factor and the beginning of any 
assimilat ion process without which naturalization would 
not  be possible.  
In short ,  naturalization was perceived as a common 
and deep-rooted means of acquiring ci t izenship based 
on residence.   
Of course this  protection came at  a  price.  Gradually 
the classical  concept of  cives  evolved into a medieval  
one of subditus108.  This revolution in the late Middle 
Ages corresponded to the formation of the State that  I  
wil l  describe later  in this  chapter .  
As Pocock describes i t ,  “ the advent of  
jurisprudence moved the concept of  the “cit izen” from 
the zoon poli t ikon toward the legalis  homo, and from 
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the civis  or poli tes toward the bourgeois or burger.  It  
further brought about some equation of  the “cit izen” 
with the “subject”,  for in defining him as the member of  
a community of  law, i t  emphasized that  he was,  in more 
senses than one,  the subject  of  those laws that  defined 
his  community and of  the rulers and magistrates 
empowered to enforce them (…) what is  the dif ference 
between a classical  “cit izen” and an imperial  or 
modern “subject”? The former ruled and was ruled,  
which meant-  among other things that  he was a 
participant in determining the laws by which he was to 
be bound”109.  
This is  coherent  with a vision of ci t izenship  -  
maybe with the exception of Marsil ius de Padua – 
which is  less connected to poli t ical  part icipation and 
more focused on protection against  war.  I t  is  certainly 
in l ine with the medieval  societal  s tructure and i ts  
feudalist ic  approach110.  
The fading of the democratic dimension of 
ci t izenship in the late Middle Ages led some scholars to 
consider that  ci t izenship almost  disappeared at  that  
t ime111.  
In a way this  is  the same kind of crisis  that  
advocates of  the decline of ci t izenship theory point  out  
with regard to ci t izenship nowadays.  I t  is  not  possible 
to identify a single ci t izenship element and,  in i ts  
absence,  the crisis  of  ci t izenship or even i ts  
disappearance is  proclaimed. 
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As I  wil l  later  elaborate on,  ci t izenship is  
composed of a complexity of  elements and an absence 
of one does not  necessari ly create a crisis .  
I t  is  certainly true that  the democratic dimension 
faded in medieval  t imes.  I t  is  clear that  the ci t izen 
became a subject .  
Once again,  however,  this  episode is  very useful  
when tracking the history of  ci t izenship.  One of the 
most  important  phases in the history of  ci t izenship was 
the passage from the subject  to the ci t izen.  This did not  
occur,  at  least  from an international s tandpoint ,  in the 
modern state unti l  the 20t h  century,  with the evolution 
of the individual’s  posit ion in international  law. Again,  
from the same standpoint ,  the democratic principle is  
s t i l l  not  globally recognized,  as I  wil l  later  develop.  
In this  sense,  the notion of protection within the 
ci ty walls  and the concept of  ci t izenship as a warm 
blanket  for those residing in the ci ty are crucial  to a 
full  understanding of the concept and i ts  evolution.  
Thus I  do not  agree with the theory that  the passiveness 
of  the ci t izen in the Middle Ages consti tuted a denial  of  
the very concept of  ci t izenship. 
This is  not  to purport  that  the democratic 
dimension is  irrelevant.  Quite to the contrary,  I  
consider  i t  to be of  utmost  importance in the ci t izenship 
context  insofar  as i t  belongs to the very nature of  
ci t izenship or democratic ci t izenship.  
Yet the fact  that  societ ies were undemocratic does 
not  mean they did not have ci t izenship.  This was so in 
the Middle Ages just  as i t  is  today.  We might not  
consider i t  democratic ci t izenship but i t  is  some form of 
ci t izenship.  
In any event,  ci t izenship in the Middle Ages was a 
more passive concept than i t  was in the classical  t imes.  
The classical  concept of  vita activa  gave way to a 
concept of  vita contemplativa ,  where every member of  
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society had to accept his  posit ion in the chain of  
hierarchy with l i t t le  or  no ambition to actively 
part icipate112.  In a way this  is  the denial  of  the classical  
concept of  ci t izenship but not  necessari ly of  ci t izenship 
i tself .  
Another important  contribution of medieval  
ci t izenship to the concept of  ci t izenship,  part icularly 
regarding naturalizat ion,  was the equali ty of  born and 
naturalized ci t izens.  According to the commentators,  
s ince al l  ci t izens were subject  to the same cit izenship 
law, regardless of  whether they were born or 
naturalized,  this  subjection blurred the differences 
between them. This meant that  i t  was not  acceptable to 
legally differentiate between cit izens of origin and 
those naturalized113.  
I t  is  undisputable that  ci t izenship acquired a 
different  meaning and format during the Middle Ages,  
especial ly if  we compare i t  with the classical  t imes.  The 
difference is  well  explained by the radical  changes in 
the fabric and organization of society in the Western 
world.  
In my view these changes were very important  for 
the evolution of the concept and for i ts  later  
understanding.  As Riesenberg wisely sums up,  “during 
the medieval  centuries a strong t ie  was established 
between the ci ty  and the ci t izen based on mutual need 
and service.  Given the strong cultural element in this  
form of  bond,  no change of  the form of  government was 
strong enough to change i t .  I t  lasted through the 
Renaissance,  survived the period of  princely authority,  
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the unif ication of  I taly and into the modern Ital ian 
democracy”114.   
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§5. The French Revolution and the concept of citizenship 
 
I t  is  often said that  the French Revolution invented 
the modern concept of  ci t izenship.  According to Rogers 
Brubaker,  “modern national ci t izenship was an 
invention of  the French Revolution.  The formal 
delimitation of  the ci t izenry; the establishment of  civi l  
equali ty ,  entail ing shared rights and shared 
obligations; the inst i tut ionalization of  poli t ical  r ights;  
the legal rationalization and ideological  accentuation 
of  the dist inction between ci t izens and foreigners;  the 
art iculation of  the doctrine of  national sovereignty and 
of  the l ink between ci t izenship and nationhood; the 
substi tut ion of  immediate,  direct  relations between the 
ci t izen and the state for the mediated,  indirect  relations 
characterist ic  of  the ancien régime—the Revolution 
brought all  these developments together on a national 
level  for the f irst  t ime”115.  
The long medieval  period is  often forgotten or 
erased from the history of ci t izenship.  “Diderot,  for 
example,  presented ci t izenship in the Encyclopédie in 
terms of  an ancient  ci ty-state,  ignoring the long 
medieval past”116.  
The lack of medieval  ci t izenship studies,  al though 
understandable,  is  total ly unjustif iable given the 
importance of  this  period for later  developments,  even 
those of  today. 
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I t  is ,  however,  understandable since with the 
French revolution ci t izenship gained an unparalleled 
and unprecedented relevance,  at  least  in comparison 
with the medieval  t imes.  
As Brubaker describes i t ,  “ the pervasiveness of  
privi lege in ancien-régime society lef t  no room for the 
common rights and obligations that  make up the 
substance of  modern ci t izenship.  The dist inction 
between ci t izens and foreigners had neither ideological  
nor practical  s ignif icance.  Foreigners suffered few 
disabil i t ies ,  and the most  s ignif icant of  these,  in the 
domain of  inheritance,  had been largely removed by the 
late eighteenth century.  Cit izenship was not  
consistently defined or systematically codif ied; i t  was 
determined in an ad hoc manner in particular cases to 
make i t  accord with legal judgments about inheritance 
rights.  The Revolution was to change all  this” 117.  
A crucial  part  of  the French revolution was the idea 
of  equali ty between ci t izens.  The “Declaration des 
droits  de l´homme et  du ci toyen” denotes a clear and 
consistent  concern for human rights and ci t izens’ 
r ights.  
As Riesenberg acknowledges,  “ in al l  the poli t ical  
l i terature that  surrounded the French Revolution,  
ci t izenship assumed a principal place.  “Citizen” 
became a favored form of  address used by members of  
every class.  I t  appears in consti tut ional documents,  in 
the cahiers drafted in anticipation of  the 1789 meeting 
of  Estates General,  and in the Declaration of  the Rights 
of  Man and Cit izens of  1789.  In all  these texts  “cit izen” 
is  used variously,  but  especially in preambles and other 
places of  a conceptual,  programmatic nature; and when 
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i t  is  used,  i t  refers to an important  aspect  of  a man’s 
condit ion,  his  poli t ical  role and duties”118.  
In this  sense the importance of  ci t izenship for the 
French Revolution is  also unquestionable and represents 
a bold break with the medieval  past .  Cit izenship,  in a 
way, played a very egali tarian role.  In order to break 
with the r igid class differentiat ion from the ancient  
regime, a concept  was needed that  would work as a 
unifier  of  the societal  fabric.  This would have to be 
ci t izenship.  Only ci t izenship would be capable of  
unit ing nobles,  clergy,  bourgeois and people under the 
same category.  Only ci t izenship could equalize the third 
estate,  as described in the words of Abbe Sieyès.  
Although an inclusive concept,  ci t izenship had 
important  consequences in the French Revolution.  I t  
already entailed a number of  r ights and obligations,  
including poli t ical  r ights .  
For that  purpose,  a  r igorous definit ion of  
ci t izenship was needed.  As Brubaker says,  “ the crucial  
point  about ci t izenship,  from this  perspective,  is  that  an 
immediate,  direct  form of  s tate-membership replaced 
the mediated,  indirect  forms of  membership 
characterist ic  of  the ancien régime.  From this  
transformation in the structure of  membership,  the state 
gained both greater resources and greater control .  The 
“immediatization” of  membership permitted an 
expansion of  direct  taxation,  replacing the old system 
of  tax farming,  based on contracts  with largely 
autonomous corporations.  I t  permitted the state to 
demand mili tary service from every ci t izen,  and directly 
to regulate foreigners.  The strengthening of  the state 
through the “immediatization” of  membership 
depended,  however,  on the legal rationalization and 
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codif ication of  membership.  To demand services from 
its  ci t izens or to exclude or regulate noncit izens,  the 
state had to be able to determine unambiguously who 
was and was not  a ci t izen.  In this  domain,  too,  the 
Revolution marked a decisive stage in the development 
of  ci t izenship.  The Consti tut ion of  1791 contained the 
f irst  formal,  explici t  delimitation of  the ci t izenry 
carried out by a western terri torial  s tate”.  
In fact ,  for  the f irst  t ime,  a codified regulat ion of  
ci t izenship appeared in the Consti tut ion.  According to 
Tit le 2,  numbers 2 and 3:  
2. French ci t izens are: 
Those who are born in France of  a French father; 
Those who, born in France of  a foreign father,  have 
f ixed their  residence in the kingdom; 
Those who, born in a foreign country of  a French 
father,  have become established in France and have 
taken the civic oath; 
Lastly,  those who, born in a foreign country and 
descended in any degree whatsoever from a French man 
or a French woman expatriated on account of  rel igion,  
may come to l ive in France and take the civic oath.  
3.  Those residing in France,  who were born outside 
of  the kingdom from foreign parents,  become French 
cit izens after f ive years of  continued domicile in the 
kingdom, i f  they have in addit ion acquired real  estate 
or married a French woman, or formed an agricultural  
or commercial  establishment,  and have taken the civic 
oath.   
 These rules already reveal  a balanced combination 
of the ius sanguinis  and the ius soli  rule,  on one hand,  
and,  on the other ,  a  clear and consistent  path to 
ci t izenship through naturalization.  
In fact ,  naturalization was available under three 
prerequisi tes:  period of residence;  establishment of  
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business,  act ivi ty,  acquisi t ion of real  estate or 
marriage;  and civic oath.  
The foundations of  modern ci t izenship show, with 
regard to naturalization,  that  the basic principles were 
there from the beginning.  Naturalization was a 
possibil i ty for al l  those who resided in the terr i tory.  
The necessary period was not  very long – 5 years,  
consistent  with current  surveys of naturalization 
practices,  as I  wil l  later  describe.  The demand for 
establishment could be related,  as today,  to the 
effective l ink theory:  there had to be an effective l ink 
between the person and the terri tory of  the state where 
he intended to become a ci t izen.  Of course nowadays 
residence would suffice to fulf i l l  this  prerequisi te .  
However,  i t  is  understandable that  at  that  t ime i t  might 
have been more diff icult  to prove residence,   and 
therefore an addit ional  element was required.  In any 
event ,  i t  does not  seem an impossible prerequisi te ,  as  
any permanent resident would have been able to show 
either one of those elements.  
This means that  ci t izenship in the French 
Revolution was not  only an inclusive and egali tarian 
concept;  i t  was also a clear  and transparent  legal  
category that  anyone could acquire.  
Of course,  as usual ,  i t  is  necessary to qualify what 
has just  been said.  Only active men were able to access 
ci t izenship.  Women were st i l l  excluded from the status,  
as were “passive ci t izens”,  somewhat reminiscent of  the 
medieval  ideal  of  vita contemplativa.  
There was evidently a democratic dimension of 
ci t izenship in the French Revolution.  In that  sense i t  
reinterpreted the classical  ci t izenship concept.  As 
Brubaker points  out ,  “as a democratic revolution,  the 
French Revolution inst i tut ionalized poli t ical  r ights as 
ci t izenship rights,  transposing them from the plane of  
the ci ty-state to that  of  the nation-state,  and 
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transforming them from a privi lege to a general  r ight .  
The Revolution,  to be sure,  did not  in practice ful ly  
inst i tut ionalize poli t ical  r ights  as general  ci t izenship 
rights.  Women were excluded,  as were the ci toyens 
passi fs .  Nonetheless,  the Revolution was decisive for 
the development of  the modern inst i tut ion of  national 
ci t izenship.  As a democratic revolution,  i t  joined the 
substantive and formal definit ions of  ci t izenship,  the 
classical  Republican and modern conceptions.  
Attaching the content  of  the classical  defini t ion—
participation in the business of  rule—to the 
generalizing,  inclusive form of  the modern definit ion,  i t  
made poli t ical  participation a general  rather than a 
special  r ight .  I t  fol lowed the program of  absolutism in 
making ci t izenship a general  rather than a special  
s tatus.  But i t  also fol lowed the classical  tradit ion in 
making participation in the business of  rule,  i f  not  
consti tut ive of  ci t izenship,  at  least  essential  to 
ci t izenship”.   
This means that  the democratic principle is  also 
present  in the very definit ion of modern ci t izenship and 
is  inextricably l inked to i t .  That  is  why, as I  wil l  
develop in chapter 6,  intentions to decouple ci t izenship 
from its  democratic dimension are not  successful .  I t  is  
certainly possible to identify ci t izenship in 
undemocratic states but  i t  certainly does not  correspond 
to the concept in i ts  pure form and cannot be called 
democratic ci t izenship.  
All  the French cit izens possessed poli t ical  r ights 
but  only active ci t izens could exercise these r ights.  
According to Troper,  “ the inhabitants of  France could 
thus be classi f ied and divided up into four large 
concentric circles,  the largest  of  which comprised al l  
the inhabitants .  Only those who met the condit ions laid 
out  in Article 2 were French ci t izens and these included 
women and minors.  These made up the intermediate 
circle;  from which only foreigners were excluded.  
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Because foreigners exercised the same civi l  r ights  as 
the French,  their  exclusion proves,  once again,  that  
even passive ci t izens had poli t ical  r ights refused to 
foreigners.  The third circle comprised only active 
ci t izens.  Finally the smallest  circle was formed by those 
who ful f i l led the condit ions to be electors”  119.   
The idea of  concentric circles is  very useful  to 
explain the different  layers of  ci t izenship r ights.  As I  
wil l  develop in chapter  6,  different  layers of  r ights  
correspond to the relat ive posit ion of different  classes 
of  people in society.  Unlike in the Middle Ages,  where 
society was strat if ied vert ically by social  class,  the 
Revolution ini t iated a tradit ion of concentric 
ci t izenship circles.  This means that  al l  ci t izens 
belonged to the community but  not  al l  were enti t led to 
the same rights,  especial ly poli t ical  r ights .  
From the outer  circle to the inner circle,  the 
enti t lement and enjoyment of  r ights grew. An important  
characterist ic  of  this  system is  that  the inner ,  and 
smallest ,  circle control led access and evolution from 
one circle to the next .  
The system st i l l  works l ike this  in current  t imes.  
This probably dates back to classical  ci t izenship,  but  
reshaped by the French Revolution.  As I  wil l  t ry to 
demonstrate,  global  ci t izenship tr ies to cope with this  
tradit ion by making the transit ion automatic rather than 
relying on the decision of  those included in the inner 
circle.   
In any event,  the egali tarian nature of  ci t izenship 
in the French Revolution is  a  very important  aspect  that  
gains renewed significance these days.  The only 
discrimination admitted – as today – was related to 
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poli t ical  r ights .  As Brubaker underl ines,  “ the preamble 
to this  Consti tut ion proclaimed that  there would be “no 
privi lege,  no exception to the common law of  al l  
Frenchmen.” Yet  outside the domain of  poli t ical  r ights ,  
the “common law of  al l  Frenchmen” applied equally to 
foreigners.  The Rights of  Cit izens seemed to be 
dissolved into the Rights of  Man. The Consti tut ion of  
1793 even extended poli t ical  r ights  to most  
foreigners”120.  
This notion is  very important  and was probably 
only interpreted properly much later  in the age of 
Universal  Human Rights,  as  I  wil l  later  develop in 
chapter  5,  yet  i t  was clearly stated in the documents of  
the French Revolution that  ci t izenship is  not  an 
appropriate instrument to exclude foreigners from the 
exercise of  civil  r ights.  Being a concept related to the 
organization of society,  ci t izenship is  only appropriate 
for  at tr ibuting or denying rights specif ical ly related to 
that  organization,  such as poli t ical  r ights,  a  and not  
r ights that  are related to personhood and must  be 
recognized for al l  human beings.  By stat ing “rights of  
man and cit izen”,  the Revolution and i ts  declaration 
already proclaimed that  some rights were inherent  to al l  
men,  regardless of  their  ci t izenship status.   
To sum up, with Brubaker,  “as a national 
revolution,  the French Revolution shaped the inst i tut ion 
of  modern ci t izenship in several  dist inct  ways.  By 
leveling legal dist inctions inside the nation,  i t  gave a 
common substance to ci t izenship: civi l  equali ty .  By 
valorizing the nation and the idea of  national 
ci t izenship,  i t  created the ideological  basis  for modern 
nationalism, in i ts  domestic and international 
expressions.  And by defining precisely who was French,  
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i t  provided a technical  basis  for denying certain rights  
to or imposing certain obligations on foreigners”121.  
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II – International law of citizenship 
 
§1.  Background 
 
Significant  changes have occurred in the 
international  law of ci t izenship. 
During the 19t h  century,  international  law had 
nothing or l i t t le  to say about ci t izenship.  I t  was 
considered to be a matter  related to the sovereignty of 
the states122.  
At the beginning of the 20t h  century ci t izenship 
increasingly became a subject  of  dispute among states,  
especial ly because i t  was relevant for  the legal  
treatment and status of  foreigners in a given country.  
In a world of  States,  international  law’s function 
was to resolve disputes that  might arise among them. 
Cit izenship,  despite i ts  unquestionable internal  
dimension,  always had a strong international  dimension.  
In that  respect ,  for  a  State there were two categories of  
persons:  the ci t izens and the foreigners.  That  is  why 
those who would not  f i t  into these two categories – the 
stateless and the dual  ci t izens – were perceived as 
abominations123.  
Thus,  a  f irst  l ine of  intervention for the 
international  law of ci t izenship was basically to 
el iminate the phenomena that  might consti tute an 
obstacle to the stabil ized way of looking at  people in a 
given terri tory.  
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That is  also why diplomatic protection was so 
important  in the early definit ion of an international  law 
of ci t izenship124.  
Cit izens would deal  – at  al l  different  levels  – with 
their  s tate.  Foreigners would benefi t  from diplomatic 
protection and representat ion from their  home State.  
International  law was the law of States,  not  the law 
of individuals.  Individuals would relate with their  own 
States and then States would relate with each other.  
From 1920 to 1930 the international  community 
was unusually active with regard to ci t izenship.   
First ly,  ci t izenship was considered by the League 
of Nations to be one of the three areas that  required 
codification by international  law125.   
In 1929 one of  the most  interest ing enterprises in 
the history of  international  ci t izenship law was 
launched: the Harvard project .  
According to John P.  Grant  and J .  Craig Barker,  
“ the Harvard Research in International Law was 
conducted in four phases.  The aim of  each of  the 
thirteen projects  within these four phases was the 
preparation of  a draft  convention,  representing the 
collective view of  a group of  Americans with special  
interest  in the development of  international law (and,  
though not s tated,  with expertise in the topic under 
investigation),  in the hope that  each draft  convention 
would be "of  interest" to,  or "merit  the attention" of ,  
those involved in codifying international law. In his  
1928 note announcing the Harvard Research,  Manley 
Hudson said only that  the research "should be 
undertaken along the general  l ines fol lowed by the 
Inst i tut  de Droit  International and the American Law 
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Inst i tute,  with a director of  research,  with a reporter 
for each of  the subjects  to be considered . . . ,  and with 
advisers to assist  each of  the reporters.  That brief  
description of  how the Harvard Research was to be 
conducted for the nationali ty ,  State responsibil i ty  and 
terri torial  waters projects  was essentially  the 
procedure that  was fol lowed in all  four phases of  the 
Research”126.  
Concerning ci t izenship,  as highlighted by Ruth 
Donner,  the Harvard Research prepared a draft  
Convention on Nationali ty,  “ intended as preparatory 
work for the f irst  League of  Nations Codif ication 
Conference held in 1930”127.  
The Harvard Draft  Convention on nationali ty is  
s t i l l  regarded as a founding moment in the international  
law of ci t izenship.  Regardless of  the contents ,  which 
largely referred to a conception based on a State’s  
sovereignty over ci t izenship,  for  the f irst  t ime there 
was a consolidated effort  from a dist inguished group of 
jurists  to put  together a draft  international  convention 
on ci t izenship.  I t  certainly influenced the later  
developments in international  ci t izenship law, 
especial ly the international  conferences and 
conventions adopted not longer after .  
 In any event what is  interest ing to understand is  
that  at  the beginning of the 20t h  century ci t izenship,  
while st i l l  being considered an essential ly domestic 
matter  for each of the States,  began to reveal  i ts  
international  character .  
As Spiro elegantly phrases i t ,  in reference to the 
principle that  arose from the Harvard research,  “States 
could not,  in other words,  draw the l ines of  human 
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community in an arbitrary,  over-  inclusive fashion,  in 
much the same way that  they could not  redraw 
terri torial  maps to include lands to which they had no 
rightful  claim”.  
The international  nature of  ci t izenship is  then 
clear.  Cit izenship was perceived as a fundamental  
element of  states,  much l ike the terr i tory or the internal  
poli t ical  organization.  
As with the terr i tory,  confl ict  might arise.  The 
definit ion of people is  very important  for the state’s  
identi ty,  and ci t izenship is  seen as a connecting element 
used in international  law (both public and private)  for 
several  purposes.  
Even depart ing from a domestic reserved domain 
standpoint ,  mult iple national  ci t izenship regulations 
create the environment for  confl icts  of  laws,  both 
negative and posit ive128.  
Negative confl icts  lead to statelessness.  This 
phenomenon is  s t i l l  perceived as an undesired 
consequence of these confl icts  and has been a diff iculty 
since the beginning of international  regulation on 
ci t izenship,  as I  -wil l  show. 
Posit ive confl icts  lead to mult iple ci t izenships.  
Despite the current  vision on this  matter  – which I  wil l  
develop in chapter  3 – posit ive confl icts  were not  
desired in the early days of  international  regulation of  
ci t izenship.  As Ruth Donner notes,  according to the 
Harvard research,  “The f irst  paragraph states:  "Except 
as otherwise provided in this  convention,  a state may 
naturalize a person who is  a national of  another state,  
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and such person shall  thereupon lose his  prior 
nationali ty”129.  
This was meant as a measure to avoid not  only 
multiple ci t izenships but  also the temptation of states to 
“steal” people from other states.  There was also the 
idea of  preventing “arbitrary” concessions of  
ci t izenship that  was later  developed in the Nottebohm 
decision as the “effective l ink” theory,  which I  wil l  
describe later  in this  chapter.  
So the international  relevance of  ci t izenship was 
highly motivated by the at tempt to regulate and prevent 
confl icts  of  ci t izenship laws – both negative and 
posit ive.  
As I  wil l  develop later  in this  chapter ,  al though 
there was an immense evolution result ing from the 
pressure of  mass cross border migration movements,  
also motivated by significant  changes in the very 
structure of  international  law, that  makes i t  impossible 
to assess current  international  ci t izenship law from the 
viewpoint  of  the early 20t h  century,  the same basic 
principles st i l l  persist .  
This does not  contradict  my basic thesis .  On the 
contrary,  the fact  that  early developments in 
international  law of ci t izenship were related to confl icts  
of  national  ci t izenship laws not only proves that  
international  law has interacted with national  
ci t izenship law since early t imes but also that  this  
interaction was not  l imited to reducing statelessness.  
This interaction,  as I  wil l  show in this  chapter ,  
existed in different  t imes and areas of  international  
ci t izenship law. I t  evolved in many ways and via 
various international  instruments.  
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§2.  The domestic reserved domain and The Hague Convention 
on certain questions relating to the conflict of nationality laws 
 
There is  a  set  idea that  ci t izenship issues are 
inscribed in the reserved domain of the states.  
The assert ion is  well  founded in the tradit ion and 
the conceptual  idea of  the national  s tate.  In fact ,  the 
definit ion of the people is  a  prerogative of  any poli t ical  
community.  The legal  instrument to define the people is  
therefore the national  ci t izenship legislat ion. 
Seen from this  perspective,  ci t izenship is  embedded 
in the very notion of sovereignty.  While there are few 
characterist ics of  a State that  can be identif ied in the 
realm of sovereignty,  ci t izenship is  certainly one of 
them. 
This notion helped the states to value ci t izenship as 
a precious gif t ,  an instrument to achieve several  
internal  goals ,  and,  in a word,  a  powerful  tool  of  the 
poli ty.  
The notion of domestic reserved domain or 
exclusive domestic jurisdict ion is  not  strange to 
international  law130.  The expression appears in Article 
2(7) of  the UN charter ,  which states that  “nothing 
contained in the present Charter shall  authorize the 
United Nations to intervene in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdict ion of  any 
state(…)”.  
A first  question that  should be asked though is  who 
defines what matters  shall  be and shall  not  fal l  within 
the definit ion of “domestic jurisdict ion”? 
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If  the states are to define this  basic aspect  of  their  
intervention in the international  arena,  a  reason not to 
comply with international  law can be found.  
Whenever a state wishes to escape from an 
international  obligation i t  is  a  question of  simply 
invoking the “domestic jurisdict ion” clause and not 
complying with the said obligation.  
I t  seems evident  that  the definit ion of  the matters 
included in the “domestic domain” has to be 
international  or  from international  law. 
The so called “essential is t” approach to the notion 
was abandoned by the development of  international  law. 
I t  is  now clear that  i t  is  no longer possible to aff irm 
that  al l  nationali ty questions are the exclusive concern 
of the states themselves131.  
Indeed,  the Permanent Court  of  International  
Justice aff irmed in the Nationali ty Decrees in Tunis and 
Morocco that  “the question whether a certain matter  is  
or  is  not  solely within the domestic jurisdict ion of a 
state is  an essential ly relat ive question;  i t  depends upon 
the development of  international  relat ions”.  
That  is  why i t  is  crucial  to understand the evolution 
of international  relat ions and international  law. I t  is  not  
enough to say that  ci t izenship belongs to the domestic 
reserved domain,  according to national  states – because 
i t  is  not  up to them to decide what belongs to the said 
reserved domain.  Nor is  i t  enough to answer that  the 
question was resolved in past  international  court  
decisions – for the evolution of international  relat ions 
and international  law may have brought changes to the 
same answer.  
The aff irmation of the doctrine of  the exclusive 
domestic jurisdict ion was always accompanied by the 
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affirmation of i ts  l imits .  From the f irst  international  
law courts’  decisions and international  treaties to the 
most  recent decisions of European courts ,  there has 
been no single decision assert ing the existence of this  
principle that  did not  express i ts  l imitat ions.  
That  is  why i t  is  possible to aff irm that  the 
domestic jurisdict ion over matters  of  ci t izenship is  a  
power conferred and l imited by international  law. 
The boundaries to this  power have often been 
expressed.  
The Hague Convention on certain questions relat ing 
to the confl ict  of  nationali ty laws signed in The Hague 
in 12 April  1930 establishes in Article 1 that  “I t  is  for 
each State to determine under i ts  own law who are i ts  
nationals.  This law shall  be recognized by other States 
in so far as i t  is  consistent  with international 
conventions,  international custom, and the principles of  
law generally recognized with regard to nationali ty”.    
 This assert ion certainly incorporates the principle 
which had long been affirmed by many authors that  
ci t izenship is  an essential ly national  mat ter .  Yet,  along 
with this  principle,  l imits  to national  sovereignty over 
ci t izenship have always been underl ined.  The Hague 
convention is  very clear  about these l imitat ions:  i)  
international  conventions,  i i )  international  custom and 
i i i)  principles of  law. 
Van Panhuys132 identif ies different  sorts  of  l imits  
on the State´s  sovereignty over ci t izenship according to 
The Hague convention.   
These l imits  can be of  a diverse nature.   
i )  First ly,  regarding l imitat ions deriving from 
international  conventions,  Van Panhuys refers to three 
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different  types of  conventions:  those of  self-executing 
character ,  those which impose legislat ive obligations on 
States and those which impose mere obligations of  
equal  treatment among cit izens.  
Conventions included in the f irst  type are the 
strongest  in terms of l imitat ions placed on the State in 
conferring ci t izenship.  These conventions are typically  
of  a posit ive nature since they prescribe the at tr ibution 
of a certain ci t izenship to a class of  individuals or  to 
those who find themselves in a part icular  category.   
The second type of convention st i l l  imposes a 
part icularly str ict  l imitat ion al though these conventions 
do not come into force without the intervention of the 
States.  They impose duties on the States to legislate 
accordingly.  Failure to do so means that  the State wil l  
be found l iable in international  terms or that  specif ic 
sanctions set  forth in the treaty wil l  be imposed.  
The third type of convention merely creates 
obligations to treat  the ci t izens of  the member states as 
their  nationals would be treated.  These were founded in 
the early stages of  the European Economic Community.  
Although they do not interfere specif ically with the 
State´s reserved domain with regard to ci t izenship,  by 
extending the equali ty of  treatment  they reduce the 
scope of the decision to grant  ci t izenship,  in terms of 
r ights,  s ince the states wil l  ul t imately have to extend 
those r ights  to ci t izens of al l  the member states.  
 i i )  By international  custom, in the wording of The 
Hague Convention,  we should interpret  international  
customary law. 
A first  conclusion that  should immediately be 
drawn from this  rule is  the acceptance that  international  
customary law exists  in matters  of  ci t izenship.  In fact ,  
one might be led to conclude that ,  according to the 
reserved domain principle,  no international  customary 
law should exist  in matters  of  ci t izenship.  If  ci t izenship 
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were to be a purely internal  concept i t  would be very 
hard to accept  the formation of an international  rule by 
rei terat ion,  at tached to the psychological  element 
according to which the States believe the said rule to be 
mandatory.  
Van Panhuys says that  when referring to 
international  customary law the ius sanguinis  and ius 
soli  rules were in the mind of the framers.  In fact ,  the 
option of the States to draft  an internal  ci t izenship rule 
was balanced in a combination of the two factors.   The 
author even questions whether this  rule means that  i t  is  
not  legit imate for a State to introduce a new type of 
legislat ion,  outside this  combination. 
This same author answers the question by saying 
that  i t  would be admissible to introduce a new type of 
legislat ion.  However,  bearing in mind that  Van Panhuys 
is  interpreting The Hague Convention,  drafted in the 
30´s,  and that  his  book dates back to the late 50´s,  the 
mere fact  that  the answer appears speaks volumes.  In 
fact ,  i f  this  is  not  the case,  what other international  
customary law should we consider other than the 
combination of these two principles? According to the 
same author,  some countries represented at  The Hague 
conference even proposed that  “in issuing laws 
concerning nationali ty States must  str ict ly adhere to the 
usual  types”133.  
i i i )    When referring to principles of  law generally 
recognized,  the Convention used another general  
formula.  According to Van Panhuys,  at tempts were 
made at  the conference to “lay down in explici t  terms 
the minimum condit ions a proper nationali ty law must 
sat isfy”.  I t  was clear  that  the conference was far  from 
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reaching an agreement on such condit ions and opted for 
a more general  approach.   
Nevertheless,  i t  is  important  to remember that  the 
conference agreed on both the existence of  generally 
accepted principles of  international  law regarding 
ci t izenship and the theory that  the principles should be 
a l imit  to the reserved domain principle.  
Among these principles we could point  out  the 
genuine l ink,  the prohibit ion regarding conferring 
nationali ty on those who do not desire i t ,  the 
prohibit ion regarding retroactive application of  
consti tut ive ci t izenship rules and the general  principle 
on the prohibit ion of arbitrary denationalization. 
I t  is  clear  that ,  s ince The Hague Convention,  
regarding certain quest ions relat ing to the confl ict  of  
nationali ty laws in the 30´s the principle of  the 
exclusive domestic domain in ci t izenship mat ters  is  not  
absolute.  In fact ,  the exceptions and l imitat ions set  
forth in the Convention on the State’s  sovereignty over 
ci t izenship are stronger and broader than some authors 
even recognize today. 
I t  is  also clear that  these exceptions and l imitat ions 
grew stronger in the international  instruments approved 
afterwards.
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§3.  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 
The Universal  Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) adopted by the General  Assembly of  the United 
Nations on December 10,  1948,  establishes the r ight  to 
nationali ty,  in Article 15,  as follows: “(1) Everyone has 
the right  to a nationali ty .  (2)  No one shall  be 
arbitrarily  deprived of  his  nationali ty  nor denied the 
right  to change his  nationali ty”.  
The exact  extent  of  the r ight  to nationali ty in the 
UDHR has been a source of  controversy since the 
negotiat ion of the text  inserted in the declarat ion.  
In fact ,  according to the “travaux preparatoires” of  
the UDHR, i t  was not  unti l  the Third Committee that  
Article 15 became autonomous.  In the ini t ial  draft ,  the 
r ight  to a nationali ty was embodied in Article 13134.   
Article 13 established rules to avoid actions l ike 
those taken during the World War II  by the Nazi regime 
when significant  parts  of  the population were arbitrari ly 
deprived of ci t izenship135.  Also,  Article 13 stated that  
no one should be forced to keep a ci t izenship against  
their  wil l .  
I t  was a long and turbulent  path that  led the 
negotiat ions to the text  known today136.  
Following a French proposal ,  supported by Lebanon 
and Uruguay,  Article 15 was introduced.  In addit ion to 
the prohibit ion on the arbitrary deprivation of 
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cit izenship and to the r ight  to change ci t izenship – rules 
that  were somewhat consensual  among State 
representat ives – Article 15 included an enigmatic and 
very controversial  r ight  to ci t izenship.  In fact ,  the idea 
of  the r ight  to ci t izenship as a human right  was not  
consensual  at  al l .  The United States representat ive 
doubted that  i t  would be possible to implement this  
r ight .  The USSR representat ive maintained the classical  
view of ci t izenship according to which those matters  
should fal l  entirely within the domestic domain of the 
States137.  
This discussion was central  throughout the debate 
about Article 15.  As stated above,  there was a fair  
consensus among States representatives about the other 
issues of  Article 15.  The main concern was the r ight  to 
a nationali ty.  
The main source of  controversy was whether 
ci t izenship should become a fundamental  international  
human right  or  whether i t  should continue to be 
included within the realm of State sovereignty. 
At some point  in the discussions,  as the preparatory 
documents show, the US representat ive questioned the 
practical  applicabil i ty of  a r ight  to ci t izenship.  The 
question then was not  so much about whether a r ight  to 
ci t izenship actually existed – which some States were 
wil l ing to accept – but  rather how that  r ight  would be 
applicable in the international  legal  order.  
I t  was quite clear  when the provision was adopted –
by a majori ty vote – that  ci t izenship contained certain 
aspects  of  human rights but  that  States’  visions on the 
content  of  this  r ight  varied immensely.  This might help 
to explain why the r ight  to ci t izenship has never been 
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properly explored in the international  legal  order and 
why i ts  pace of  development has always been so slow138.  
A first  question that  might be asked when 
interpreting this  provision is:  who is  enti t led to the 
r ight  to ci t izenship? 
The rights  enshrined in the declarat ion are 
typically human rights  in the sense that  they are 
inherent  to al l  human beings.  The f irst  word in the 
art icle indicates that  very notion:  Everyone .  
This does not  necessari ly mean,  though, that  the 
r ight  can be claimed by anyone.  In fact  two elements 
could lead to the interpretat ion that  the art icle is  only 
applicable to stateless people.  
First ly,  the “travaux preparatoires” show that 
during the process of  draft ing the convention a great  
deal  of  concern was placed on the si tuation of stateless 
people.  
Secondly,  the wording “everyone has the right  to a 
nationali ty” might lead the interpreter  to conclude that  
the r ight  is  to have one  c i t izenship and not a certain  
c i t izenship.  
Seen from this  perspective,  the art icle’s  scope 
would be extremely narrow, but  useful  anyhow. I t  
would mean that  every human being would be enti t led 
to have one ci t izenship, and that  no one should be 
deemed stateless.  Yet international  law would go no 
further than that;  i t  would stop when a person acquired 
a ci t izenship,  regardless of  what that  was and i ts  
content .  
Even if  this  interpretat ion seems reasonable and in 
accordance with later  developments in the international  
law of ci t izenship,  i t  is  already revolutionary and 
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probably contradicts  much of the scholarly doctrine 
produced about this  topic,  even nowadays.  
In fact ,  the idea that  a  human being would be 
enti t led to a ci t izenship,  under certain circumstances – 
statelessness or  any other –,   directly contradicts  the 
theory of the domestic reserved domain. 
I t  is  not  just  that  international  law poses 
l imitat ions on State sovereignty over ci t izenship – 
which most  of  the scholars recognize – and that  when 
those l imitat ions are violated,  other States can deny 
recognit ion of  a State’s  decision to grant  ci t izenship 
(negative l imitat ions),  but  also that  under certain 
circumstances a State should grant  ci t izenship to a 
person (posit ive l imitat ions).  
The very recognit ion of the existence of  posit ive 
l imitat ions consti tutes a signif icant  s tep forward in the 
construction of the international  law of ci t izenship that  
not  every scholar recognizes yet  today.  
A first  conclusion to be drawn from the 
interpretat ion of Article 15 is  that  i t  implies posit ive 
l imitat ions on the States’  decisions concerning 
ci t izenship.  
However,  the extent  of  these l imitat ions is  yet  to be 
determined.  As stated before,  i t  is  fair ly consensual  that  
Article 15 establishes a human right  that  can be claimed 
by stateless people,  but  i t  seems to be quite a narrow 
interpretat ion to say that  a  fundamental  r ight  provided 
in the Universal  Declarat ion of Human Rights can only 
be claimed by those who were not  awarded any 
cit izenship at  al l .  
A robust  r ight  to ci t izenship would be claimed by 
everyone and not only by the stateless.  That  would give 
substantive significance to such an enigmatic r ight .  
That  would then mean that  everyone  has the r ight  to 
ci t izenship – under cri teria to be determined – and not 
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just  the r ight  to have any  c i t izenship and just  that  f irst  
one.  
The argument regarding the phrasing of the 
declarat ion cannot be deemed decisive.  In fact ,  the r ight  
to “a nationali ty” does not  necessari ly mean the r ight  to 
one or to the f irst  ci t izenship.  
Article 15 also states,  in number 2,  that  no one 
should be denied the r ight  to change nationali ty.  I t  
clearly shows that  Article 15 is  not  concerned 
exclusively with the stateless.  Only people that  already 
have one nationali ty can logically change i t .  
I t  could be argued that  Article 15,  number one,  
concerns stateless people and number 2 is  applicable to 
the rest .  However,  this  would mean a restr ict ion on the 
interpretat ion of the Declarat ion that  cannot be 
supported by the exact  phrasing or the “travaux 
preparatoires” and certainly not  by the later  
developments in the international  law of ci t izenship.      
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§4.  The Nottebohm decision and the genuine link theory 
 
Commonly referred to in the ci t izenship l i terature 
as a historic decision,  the Nottebohm case which came 
before the International  Court  of  Just ice indeed f ixed 
the way ci t izenship is  perceived in international  law 
and helped to forge the opinion of scholars afterwards.  
Nottebohm was born in Hamburg on September 
16th,  1881.  He was German by birth and st i l l  possessed 
German nationali ty when,  in October 1939,  he applied 
for naturalization in Liechtenstein.  In 1905 he went to 
Guatemala.  He took up residence there and made that  
country the headquarters of  his  business activit ies,  
which increased and prospered.  These activit ies 
developed in the f ield of  commerce,  banking and 
plantat ions.  Having been an employee in the f irm of 
Nottebohm Hermanos,  which had been founded by his  
brothers Juan and Arturo,  he became their  partner in 
1912 and later ,  in 1937,  he was made head of the f irm. 
After  1905 he sometimes went to Germany on business 
and to other countries for  holidays.  He continued to 
have business connections in Germany. He paid a few 
visi ts  to a brother who had l ived in Liechtenstein since 
1931.  Some of his  other brothers,  relat ives and fr iends 
were in Germany, others in Guatemala.  He himself  
continued to have his  f ixed residence in Guatemala 
unti l  1943,  that  is  to say,  unti l  the occurrence of the 
events which consti tute the basis  of  the dispute139.  
                                              
139 Facts as described in the The Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) 
International Court of Justice April 6, 1955 I.C.J. 4. 
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On October 9th,  1939,  Nottebohm, who had been 
resident  in Guatemala since 1905,  applied for admission 
as a national  of  Liechtenstein.   
According to the law of Liechtenstein,  i t  was 
necessary to fulf i l l  a  three years’  residence prerequisi te 
to be able to obtain nationali ty.  Nottebohm sought 
dispensation from the condit ion of three years’  
residence as prescribed by law, without indicating the 
special  circumstances warranting such a waiver.  He 
then paid substantial  fees associated with the 
acquisi t ion of nationali ty and waiver of  the 
prerequisi tes.   
Having obtained a Liechtenstein passport ,  
Nottebohm returned to Guatemala at  the beginning of 
1940,  where he resumed his  former business activi t ies.  
Nottebohm was arrested on October 19th,  1943,  by 
the Guatemalan authori t ies.  He was turned over to the 
armed forces of  the United States on the same day.  
Three days later  he was deported to  the United States 
and interned there for  two years and three months.   
In 1944 a series of  f if ty-seven legal  proceedings 
was commenced against  Nottebohm, designed to 
expropriate,  without compensation to him, al l  of  his  
propert ies,  whether movable or immovable.  Nottebohm 
was not permitted to return to Guatemala.  
When he was released in the United States,  in 1946 
and wanted to return to Guatemala,  he was refused 
admission.  In 1946 he went to Liechtenstein where he 
f ixed residence.  In 1949,  after  l iving in Liechtenstein 
for three years,  his  propert ies in Guatemala were 
confiscated under Guatemalan law.  
By application in December 1951,  after  l iving in 
Liechtenstein for f ive years,  the Principali ty brought 
his  case to the International  Court  of  Just ice against  
Guatemala.  In the f irst  phase of the judgment the Court  
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rejected the prel iminary objection raised by Guatemala 
against  the jurisdict ion of the Court 140.  
In the second phase,  the Court  addressed the more 
substantial  issues.  
The real  issue before the Court  was the 
admissibil i ty of  the claim of Liechtenstein in respect  of  
Nottebohm. So the Court  had to ascertain whether the 
nationali ty conferred on Nottebohm by Liechtenstein by 
means of naturalization could be validly invoked as 
against  Guatemala,  whether i t  bestowed upon 
Liechtenstein a sufficient  t i t le  to the exercise of  
protection in respect  of  Nottebohm as against  
Guatemala.   
The Nottebohm case is  a  landmark in ci t izenship 
studies for  several  reasons.  
I t  was the f irst  t ime that  the Court ,  af ter  The Hague 
Convention and the UDHR, recognized the existence of  
real  interactions between municipal  and international  
ci t izenship law and the competence of the Court  to 
resolve such disputes.  
Some scholars analyze the case today by 
contextualizing i ts  circumstances to diminish i ts  impact  
and scope,  or  to say that  i t  was a product of  those 
specif ic circumstances141.   
When analyzing the Nottebohm case i t  should not  
be forgotten that  i t  was produced in the aftermath of the 
Second World War,  and that  Nottebohm was persecuted 
for his  al leged collaboration with the Nazi regime. I t  
should also not  be forgotten that  when the case was 
decided he had been l iving in Liechtenstein for several  
                                              
140 JOSEF L. KUNZ, The Nottebohm Judgement (1960), 536. 
141 ROBERT D. SLOANE, Breaking the Genuine Link: The Contemporary 
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years – more than those demanded by law – and that  he 
ended up being a stateless  person in the United States,  
after  being str ipped of the German cit izenship and 
refused the protection of the ci t izenship of  
Liechtenstein.  
All  this  being true,  i t  is  not  so much the personal  
si tuation of Nottebohm that  makes this  decision historic 
but  the legal  conclusions i t  is  possible to extract  from 
it .  
One of the major conclusions of  the decision and 
the one that  is  s t i l l  at tached to the case today is  the 
genuine l ink theory,  also known as effective l ink.   
The theory means that ,  despite being a municipal  
law competence,  a  State can disregard the at tr ibution of 
ci t izenship by another State if  i t  is  proved that  between 
the ci t izen and the State that  granted ci t izenship and 
whose protection is  claimed there is  no effective l ink142.  
Of course this  theory raises al l  sorts  of  diff icult  
legal  questions.  
The f irst  of  these is  the competence to define 
effective l ink.  Here the Court ,  by accepting i ts  
competence to resolve the case and by denying the 
existence of an effective l ink in the case of Nottebohm, 
set  the rule that  another State can simply disregard the 
awarding of ci t izenship and that ,  in the case of a 
dispute,  the ICJ would be competent  to resolve this  
question.  
Another relevant question is  related with the 
cri teria used to establish the effective l ink.  According 
to the Court ,  “nationali ty  is  a legal bond having as i ts  
basis  a social  fact  of  at tachment,  a genuine connection 
of  existence,  interests  and sentiments,  together with the 
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existence of  reciprocal rights and duties.  I t  may be said 
to consti tute the juridical  expression of  the fact  that  the 
individual upon whom it  is  conferred,  ei ther directly by 
the law or as the result  of  an act  of  the authorit ies,  is  
in fact  more closely connected with the population of  
the State conferring nationali ty  than with that  of  any 
other State.  Conferred by a State,  i t  only enti t les  that  
State to exercise protection vis-a-vis  another State,  i f  i t  
consti tutes a translation into juridical  terms of  the 
individual 's  connection with the State which has made 
him i ts  national”.  
I t  is  t rue,  as stressed by Josef Kunz,  that  the Court  
did not  create the genuine l ink theory as a precondit ion 
for the validity of  a nationali ty.  In fact  the decision was 
only vis-à-vis  Guatemala in a functional  approach to the 
dispute regarding Liechtenstein.   
However,  i t  is  also true that  the Court  is  bound by 
i ts  own rules and procedures,  according to which – 
Article 38 of the Statute of  the ICJ – the Court  must  
decide in accordance with international  law such 
disputes as are submitted to i t ,  and shall  apply:  a)  
international  conventions;  b)  international  custom; c)  
the general  principles of  law recognized by civil ized 
nations and d) judicial  decisions and the teachings of  
the most  highly qualif ied publicists  of  the various 
nations,  as subsidiary means for the determination of 
rules of  law. 
So the application to the case of  the genuine l ink 
theory means,  at  least ,  that  the judges believed that  in 
the context  of  the case the theory was applicable as one 
of the el igible sources of  law. 
I t  is  not  so important  to determine whether the 
Court  created the theory in the Nottebohm decision or 
whether i t  became binding afterwards.  
The relevant conclusion from the decision is  that  
the Court  applied the theory as law and that,  according 
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to the rules of  i ts  Statute,  i t  ought to be classif ied as 
coming from an el igible source.  
As stated in The Hague Convention,  a  ci t izenship 
law as defined by a State shall  be recognized by other 
States in so far as i t  is  consistent  with international 
conventions,  international custom, and the principles of  
law generally recognized with regard to nationali ty .  
The recognit ion by the Court  that  the decision of 
Guatemala to disregard the Liechtenstein at tr ibution of 
ci t izenship to Nottebohm proved that  the Court  assumed 
the genuine l ink theory as a l imit  to the doctrine of  the 
exclusive domestic jurisdict ion.  And the l imit  derives,  
as seems obvious,  from the international  law.  
Yet this  very recognit ion seems to have had l imited 
effects  in the way scholars analyze ci t izenship in 
international  law. I t  was even recently classif ied as 
anachronist ic  in the l ight  of  other principles and 
developments under international  law143.  
Notwithstanding the importance of other principles that  
have arisen in recent  case decisions,  especial ly from the 
European Court  of  Just ice,  such as the abuse-of-rights 
principle (and which was not  absent in the Nottebohm 
decision),  i t  seems that  the full  extent  of  the content  of  
the genuine l ink theory was never truly recognized. 
This plays a crucial  role in clarifying the current  
meaning of the doctrine of  exclusive domestic 
jurisdict ion and the l imitat ion to i t  from international  
law. 
In fact ,  in a decisive work on ci t izenship and 
international  law, Ian Brownlie advocates a general  
principle of  effective nationali ty.  He states that  “ the 
evidence of  practice both before and since Nottebohm, 
as well  as the logical  force of  other principles of  
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international law, just i fy  the conclusion that  the 
principle of  ef fective nationali ty  is  a general  principle 
of  international law and should be recognized as 
such”144.  
The total  extent  of  this  principle is  yet  to be 
developed.  First  and above al l ,  i t  is  necessary to 
determine i ts  impact  on the exclusive domestic 
jurisdict ion doctrine that  is  s t i l l  accepted today as an 
untouchable rule.  
If  the effective l ink is  to be considered a general  
principle of  ci t izenship law and if  the principle 
consti tutes a l imit  on States’  decisions concerning 
ci t izenship and a l imit  to the exclusive domestic 
jurisdict ion doctrine,  i t  is  very important  to understand 
what this  principle real ly means.  
As defined in the Nottebohm decision,  i t  means that  
the at tr ibution of ci t izenship without an effective l ink 
can be disregarded by the States that  would have to 
respect  the municipal  law attr ibution otherwise. 
This view created the idea that  the l imits  to the 
exclusive domestic jurisdict ion doctrine were negative.  
The violat ion of international  law l imits  would al low 
other States to ignore or disregard an internal  decision 
by another State.  
However,  this  conclusion is  probably too narrow 
and too at tached to the Nottebohm case.  Some cri t ics  
claim too much emphasis  has been placed on the 
Nottebohm case and the effective l ink theory,  and state  
that  the case was too contextual  and condit ioned by the 
historical  circumstances.  
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This cri t icism is  r ight ,  but  i t  does not  necessari ly 
lead to the conclusion that  the theory should be 
ignored.  On the contrary,  being a product of  a  specif ic 
context  but  mirroring the existence of a broader 
principle,  the uti l i ty of  Nottebohm is  to confirm the 
existence of such a principle.  
I t  is  certainly possible to aff irm that  the full  extent  
of  an effective l ink principle in international  law 
implies a l imitat ion on State sovereignty over 
ci t izenship not only in a negative way – as recognized 
in the Nottebohm case – but  also in a posit ive way. 
A consistent  application of the principle demands a 
conclusion according to which those who find 
themselves in a si tuation of  an effective l ink with a 
State should be awarded cit izenship by that  State.  
I t  is  not  easy to establish solid cri teria to determine 
what kind of l ink between a person and a State should 
be recognized as effective.  Going back to the words of  
the Court  in the Nottebohm case,  “nationali ty  is  a legal 
bond having as i ts  basis  a social  fact  of  at tachment,  a 
genuine connection of  existence,  interests  and 
sentiments,  together with the existence of  reciprocal 
rights and duties”.  How are these interests  and 
sentiments expressed? How strong should the reciprocal  
r ights and duties be? 
When analyzing the Nottebohm case,  several  
authors refer  to the tradit ional  cri teria for at tr ibution of 
ci t izenship:  ius soli  and ius sanguinis145.   
The two tradit ional  cri teria are considered as 
ci t izenship rules commonly adopted by States146.  Not 
                                              
145 IAN BROWNLIE, The relations of nationality in public international law  
(1963), 302; ROBERT D. SLOANE, Breaking the Genuine Link: The 
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being exclusive,  i t  is  fair ly safe to conclude that  a  State 
that  designs i ts  naturalization rules around the two 
cri teria is  in accordance with the effective l ink theory.  
Residence is  a  common way of acquiring 
ci t izenship by naturalization,  also called derivative 
acquisi t ion147.  I t  seems then reasonably safe to affirm 
that  someone who establishes a long term relat ionship 
with a State ( land) by way of residence is  considered to 
have an effective l ink with that  State,  according to 
international  law. I  wil l  return to this  issue in the last  
chapter .  
                                                                                                                
146 IAN BROWNLIE, The relations of nationality in public international law  
(1963), 302. 
147 PAUL WEISS, Nationality and statelessness in international law (1979), 98.  
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§5.  Increasing interaction between national and international 
laws of citizenship 
 
Although not at  a  pace that  might be expected after  
the evolutions registered in international  ci t izenship 
law in the aftermath of  the Second World War,  there is  
a  clear  trend towards increasing interaction between 
national  and international  laws of ci t izenship and 
towards a gradual  recognit ion of an individual’s  r ight  to 
ci t izenship148.  
A number of  international  conventions regarding 
nationali ty have been concluded.  
The content  of  these conventions suggests  the idea 
of  increasing interaction between national  and 
international  ci t izenship laws.  
 
a)  Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness 
  
One of the international  instruments regarding 
ci t izenship to be approved after  the UDHR was the 
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness,  which 
occurred in New York on 30 August  1961. 
Short ly before the proclamation of the UDHR, the 
Secretary General  was asked by the Economic and 
Social  Council  to promote a study on statelessness by 
the Resolution 116D, in 1948149.  The resolution 
requested the Secretary-General ,  in consultat ion with 
interested commissions and special ized agencies:  (a)  To 
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undertake a study of the exist ing si tuation in regard to 
the protection of stateless persons by the issuance of 
necessary documents and other measures,  and to make 
recommendations to an early session of  the Council  on 
the interim measures which might be taken by the 
United Nations to further this  object;  (b)  To 
undertake a study of national  legislat ion and 
international  agreements and conventions relevant to 
statelessness,  and to submit  recommendations to the 
Council  as to the desirabil i ty of  concluding a further 
convention on this  subject .”   
The Social  Department of  the Secretariat  gave the 
term “stateless persons” a wider meaning by including 
in the study not  only de jure  s tateless persons but  also 
de facto  s tateless persons150.  The study discusses these 
two categories of  s tateless persons.  Stateless persons de 
jure  are persons who are not  nationals of  any State,  
ei ther because at  bir th or  subsequently they were not 
given any nationali ty,  or  because during their  l i fet ime 
they lost  their  own nationali ty and did not  acquire a 
new one.  Stateless persons de facto  are persons who, 
having left  the country of  which they were nationals,  no 
longer enjoy the protection and assistance of  their  
national  authori t ies,  ei ther because these authori t ies 
refuse to grant  them assistance and protection,  or  
because they themselves renounce the assistance and 
protection of the countries of  which they are nationals .  
Although in law the status of  stateless persons de facto  
differs  appreciably from that  of  s tateless persons de 
jure ,  in practice i t  is  s imilar151.  
The same study identif ied two main problems to be 
considered:  the improvement of  the status of  stateless 
persons and the el imination of statelessness.  However 
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necessary and urgent,  the improvement of  the status of  
the stateless person is  only a temporary solution 
designed to at tenuate the evils  result ing from 
statelessness.  The el imination of statelessness,  on the 
contrary,  would have the advantage of abolishing the 
evil  i tself ,  and is  therefore the f inal  goal152.  
The International  Law Commission of the United 
Nations decided at  i ts  f irst  session in 1949 to include 
ci t izenship and statelessness in the l is t  of  topics 
provisionally selected for codification153.  
Following this  decision,  the Secretary-General  
convened an international  Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries for  the conclusion of a Convention for 
the reduction or el imination of future statelessness.  The 
Conference was held in Geneva from March 24 to April  
18,  1959.  The Conference reconvened in New York and,  
on August  28,  1961,  adopted the Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness.  
According to the Convention provisions,  a  
Contracting State shall  grant  i ts  nationali ty to a person 
born in i ts  terr i tory who would otherwise be stateless.  
Such nationali ty shall  be granted:  (a)  at  bir th,  by 
operation of law, or (b) upon an application being 
lodged with the appropriate authori ty,  by or on behalf  
of  the person concerned,  in the manner prescribed by 
the national  law.  
A Contracting State shall  also grant  i ts  nationali ty 
to a person who would otherwise be stateless and who is  
unable to acquire the nationali ty of  the Contracting 
State in whose terr i tory he was born because he has 
passed the age for lodging his  application or has not  
fulf i l led the required residence condit ions,  i f  the 
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nationali ty of  one of his  parents at  the t ime of the 
person’s bir th was that  of  the Contracting State f irst  
above mentioned.  
Even if  the stateless person was not  born in the 
terr i tory of  the Contracting State,  he shall  s t i l l  be 
granted nationali ty by that  State if  the nationali ty of  
one of his  parents at  the t ime of the his  bir th was that  
of  that  State.  
The Convention also establishes str ict  rules in 
terms of loss or  deprivation of ci t izenship when such a 
decision might lead to the creation of a si tuation of 
statelessness.  
I t  is  very important  to note,  when analyzing this  
Convention,  that ,  for  the f irst  t ime,  an international  
legal  instrument imposes specif ic  condit ions on States 
to award ci t izenship.  
I t  is  t rue that  the Convention imposes duties on 
States and does not  create individual  r ights .  So i t  is  not  
designed to award stateless people an individual  r ight  
to ci t izenship.  I t  is  the States that  are obliged to grant  
i t .  
Nevertheless i t  is  a  considerable step forward.  
First ly,  we should bear in mind that  at   that  s tage in i ts  
development international  law did not  recognize the 
individual  as a subject  of  international  law. 
Nevertheless,  i t  is  s ignif icant  that  the Convention 
imposes duties on States to grant  ci t izenship.  The 
convention directly contradicts  the exclusive domestic 
domain doctrine.  
The contradict ion is  direct  and evident.  I t  is  not  
even in l ine with the Nottebohm case.  In Nottebohm the 
court  recognized the existence of negative l imits:  a  
State could oppose another State’s  decision on 
ci t izenship when this  decision violated international  
law. Here the l imits  are designed in a posit ive way: a 
State is  obliged by international  law to grant  i ts  
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cit izenship.  Of course this  obligation only affects  
Contracting States as i t  derives from an international  
convention,  unless we are able to conclude that  this  
principle has become international  customary law. 
In any event,  i t  is  possible to conclude that ,  
according to international  law, a State’s sovereignty 
over ci t izenship is  l imited both in a negative and in a 
posit ive way154.   This conclusion is  very important  for  
later  developments in international  ci t izenship law, 
even if ,  in the context  of  the Convention,  we cannot 
grant  individuals  a r ight  to ci t izenship – but  merely 
create an obligation on the States to ensure their  
internal  legislat ion complies with international  law – 
and even if  the Convention is  s t i l l  connected with the 
extreme si tuation of stateless people,  which might lead 
to the wrongful  conclusion that  the fundamental  r ight  to 
ci t izenship is  the exclusive preserve of  the stateless.  
Further developments wil l  prove the contrary and 
will  show the r ise of  an individual  r ight  to ci t izenship,  
not  only of  the stateless but  of  al l  foreigners effectively 
l inked with a given State.  
  
b)  The International Covenant on Civil  
and Polit ical  Rights 
 
The International  Covenant on Civil  and Poli t ical  
Rights was adopted on December 16,  1966.  The main 
purpose of the Covenant was to implement some of the 
r ights provided for in the UDHR. I t  became one of  the 
core instruments of  the UN international  human rights 
body.  
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The at tention that  the Convention dedicates to 
ci t izenship is  surprisingly very l imited.  Article 24/3 
establishes that  every child has the r ight  to acquire a 
nationali ty.  The same right  was later  recognized in the 
Convention on the Rights of  the Child of 1989.  
I t  is  nonetheless important  to confirm the trend 
identif ied above.  The Covenant recognizes that  every 
child has a r ight  to a nationali ty.  I t  is  not  a  general  
obligation imposed on Contracting States but  a specif ic 
r ight  that  every child should be enti t led to.  
I t  can be said that  l i t t le  progress,  i f  any,  was made 
in relat ion to the UDHR. The Declarat ion already 
provided for a r ight  to ci t izenship for everyone,  not  just  
children.  
The explanation for this  can be found in the 
Covenant’s  “travaux preparatoires”.  There was an 
agreement among States that  every effort  should be 
made to avoid statelessness among children.  Some State 
representat ives also argued that  s tatelessness problems 
were not  specif ic to children and that  the Covenant 
should contain a general  r ight  to ci t izenship.  Another 
opinion expressed was that  naturalizat ion should not  be 
considered an individual  r ight  as i t  should be within 
State discret ion.  The Convention on Reduction of  
Statelessness was used as an excuse for the l imited 
scope of the Covenant with regard to ci t izenship 
issues155.  I t  does,  however,  protect  children from being 
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c)  International Conventions on the 
Elimination of Discrimination 
 
The International  Convention on the Elimination of 
All  Forms of Racial  Discrimination was adopted and 
opened for signature and rat if ication by General  
Assembly resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 December 1965,  
and entered into force on 4 January 1969.  
I t  is  another important  instrument that  belongs to 
the core of  the UN conventions on human rights .  
Regarding ci t izenship,  Article 5 provides that  
States Part ies shall  undertake to prohibit  and to 
el iminate racial  discrimination in al l  i ts  forms and to 
guarantee the r ight  of  everyone,  without dist inction as 
to race,  color,  or  national  or  ethnic origin,  to equali ty 
before the law, notably in the enjoyment of ,  among 
others,  the r ight  to nationali ty.  
I t  is  noticeable that  there is  a  sl ight  wording 
difference between the way this  r ight  is  phrased here 
and how it  was phrased in the UDHR: not just  the r ight  
to a  nat ionali ty but  the r ight  to  nat ionali ty.  
I t  is  worth noting that  Article 1(3) establishes that  
nothing in the Convention may be interpreted as 
affecting in any way the legal  provisions of States 
Part ies concerning nationali ty,  ci t izenship or 
naturalization,  provided that  such provisions do not 
discriminate against  any part icular  nationali ty.  
In the “travaux preparatoires” of  the Convention i t  
was clear  that  a  concern regarding the exclusive 
domestic jurisdict ion doctrine was present  here156.  The 
f irst  part  of  the provision expressly guarantees States 
sovereignty over naturalization and ci t izenship,  but  i t  
adds a very important  l imitat ion:  State provisions on 
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cit izenship should not be discriminatory in terms of 
nationali ty.  
This means that  regardless of  State sovereignty 
over ci t izenship,  naturalization procedures must  not  be 
discriminatory in terms of national  origin.  A State 
cannot establish different  naturalization cri teria based 
on the nationali ty of  those seeking naturalization.  
This very important  recognit ion adds a l imit  to 
those that  i t  was already possible to identify according 
to The Hague Convention:  Cit izenship rules cannot be 
discriminatory in terms of nationali ty.  
I t  also helps to interpret  the exist ing international  
ci t izenship law. The r ight  to ci t izenship,  as many 
authors claimed before and after  this  convention,  is  not  
exclusive to stateless persons.  I t  is  not  a r ight  of  the 
stateless alone.  If  this  were the case,  i t  would not  make 
sense to aff irm a general  principle of  non-
discrimination in terms of nationali ty.  By definit ion,  
s tateless persons do not possess nationali ty.  The 
provision – and al l  the others,  including Article 15 of 
the UDHR – has to be interpreted in the sense that  the 
r ight  to ci t izenship is   a  general  enti t lement of  everyone 
– stateless persons and ci t izens of  other States.  
The same principle of  non-discrimination is  present  
in the Convention on the Elimination of All  Forms of 
Discrimination against  Women, which was adopted and 
opened for signature,  rat if ication and accession by 
General  Assembly resolution 34/180 of 18 December 
1979,  and entered into force on 3 September 1981.  
Article 9 provides that  States Part ies shall  grant  
women equal  r ights  with men to acquire,  change or 
retain their  nationali ty.  They shall  ensure in part icular  
that  neither marriage to an al ien nor change of 
nationali ty by the husband during marriage shall  
automatically change the nationali ty of  the wife,  render 
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her stateless or force upon her the nationali ty of  the 
husband.  
The principle was already present  in the 
Convention on the Nationali ty of  Married Women, 
agreed in New York on 20 February 1957,  which 
entered into force on 11 August  1958.  
Article 1 states that  Each Contracting State agrees 
that  neither the celebration nor the dissolution of a 
marriage between one of i ts  nationals and an al ien,  nor 
the change of nationali ty by the husband during 
marriage,  shall  automatically affect  the nationali ty of  
the wife.   
Article 3 establishes that  each Contracting State 
agrees that  the al ien wife of  one of i ts  nationals may,  at  
her request ,  acquire the nationali ty of  her husband 
through special ly privileged naturalization procedures;  
the grant  of  such nationali ty may be subject  to such 
l imitat ions as may be imposed in the interests  of  
national  securi ty or public policy.  
This consti tutes another imposit ion on the States:  a  
State should establish a special  natural izat ion procedure 
for the naturalization of married women. Following a 
general  principle of  non-discrimination set  forth in the 
Convention on the Elimination of All  Forms of 
Discrimination,  this  obligation shall  also apply when 
the husband claims the naturalization.   
 
d)  Nationality of  Natural Persons in 
relation to the Succession of States 
 
Recent developments related to the nationali ty of  
natural  persons in the succession of States are very 
relevant in terms of defining an international  r ight  to 
ci t izenship.  
At i ts  forty-fif th session,  in 1993,  the International  
Law Commission decided to include in i ts  agenda the 
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topic enti t led “State succession and i ts  impact  on the 
nationali ty of  natural  and legal  persons”.  Václav 
Mikulka was appointed as a Special  Rapporteur for  that  
purpose.  
In i ts  resolution 50/45 enti t led “Report  of  the 
International  Law Commission on the work of  i ts  forty 
seventh session”,  the General  Assembly noted,  among 
other things,  the beginning of the work on State 
succession and i ts  impact on the nationali ty of  natural  
and legal  persons,  and invited the Commission to 
continue i ts  work on this  topic.  The Assembly also 
requested the Secretary-General  to again invite 
Governments to submit  relevant materials  as soon as 
possible,  including treaties,  national  legislat ion,  
decisions of  national  tr ibunals and diplomatic and 
official  correspondence relevant to this  topic.  By means 
of this  resolution,  the Commission received a clear 
instruction to complete the prel iminary study on this  
subject .  
In 1999,  the Commission adopted the Draft  Articles 
on Nationali ty of  Natural  Persons in relat ion to the 
Succession of States.  
According to the Report  drawn up by Mikulka,  
there was broad support  in the Commission for the 
Special  Rapporteur’s contention that ,  while internal  law 
essential ly governed nationali ty,  international  law 
imposed certain restr ict ions on the freedom of action of 
States.  I t  was generally agreed that  i t  was precisely this  
l imited role of  international  law in the specif ic context  
of  State succession which was to be the focus of  the 
Commission’s work.  The human rights aspect  of  the 
topic was part icularly highlighted in this  respect .  I t  was 
strongly emphasized that  the Commission’s work on the 
topic should aim at  the protection of the individual  
against  any detr imental  effects  in the area of nationali ty 
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result ing from State succession,  especial ly 
statelessness157.  
The Special  Rapporteur’s  comments,  in his  f irst  
report ,  on the individual’s  r ight  to a nationali ty gave 
r ise to a debate within the Commission.  Several  
members regarded the r ight  to a nationali ty as central  to 
the work.  Special  emphasis  was placed on Article 15 of 
the UDHR. At the same t ime i t  was noted that  the 
International  Covenant on Civil  and Poli t ical  Rights 
reflected a reluctance to recognize that  r ight  as a 
general  rule.  As to the conclusions which the 
Commission should draw from the existence of the r ight  
to a nationali ty within the context  of  State succession,  
i t  was noted inter  al ia  that the r ight  implied a 
concomitant  obligation on States to negotiate so that  
the persons concerned could acquire a nationali ty.  The 
report  also added that  the r ight  to a nationali ty,  as a 
human right ,  is  conceivable as a r ight  of  an individual  
vis-à-vis  a certain State,  deriving,  under certain 
condit ions,  from international  law158.  
In the Draft  Articles proposed by the Commission,  
there is  a  general  r ight  to a nationali ty.  Article 1 states 
that  every individual  who, on the date of  the succession 
of States,  had the nationali ty of  the predecessor State,  
i rrespective of  the mode of acquisi t ion of that  
nationali ty,  has the r ight  to the nationali ty of  at  least  
one of the States concerned,  in accordance with those 
Articles.  
I t  is  worth noting that  this  r ight  is  not  exclusive to 
stateless persons.  Nothing in the provision requires a 
status of  statelessness in order for  the r ight  to 
                                              
157 Second report on State succession and its impact on the nationality of natural 
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158 Second report on State succession and its impact on the nationality of natural 
and legal persons (1996), 124. 
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nationali ty to be recognized.  This is  especial ly evident 
in cases of  dual  nationali ty where one of them is  of  a  
third country not  involved in the succession of States.  
In that  case,  a  person,  even if  holding another 
ci t izenship,  is  s t i l l  enti t led to the ci t izenship that  
resulted from a succession of  states.  
This interpretat ion is  clear even if  read against  
Article 4 of  the Draft  Articles:  States concerned shall  
take al l  appropriate measures to prevent persons who, 
on the date of  the succession of States,  had the 
nationali ty of  the predecessor State from becoming 
stateless as a result  of  such succession.  This provision 
only makes sense if  Article 1 is  interpreted as 
applicable to everyone and not just  s tateless people.  
Then,  the Draft  Articles establish very important  
rules in terms of effective l ink and residence,  adopting 
a presumption of nationali ty in the following terms: 
persons concerned having their  habitual  residence in the 
terr i tory affected by the succession of States are 
presumed to acquire the nationali ty of  the successor 
State on the date of  such succession.   
Of course these Draft  Articles are of  l imited scope.  
First  of  al l ,  they were not  adopted as a Convention nor 
opened for rat if icat ion.  Then,  the Draft  Articles st i l l  
imposed duties on States to adapt their  legislat ion in a 
way which can be regarded as diminishing the strength 
of a fundamental  r ight  to ci t izenship.  
However,  more recently,  in 2008,  there was a 
resolution from the General  Assembly,  rei terat ing i ts  
invitat ion to Governments to take into account the 
Provisions of  the Articles in dealing with issues of  
nationali ty of  natural  persons in relat ion to the 
succession of States.  I t  also encouraged States to 
consider at  the regional  or  sub regional  levels ,  the 
elaboration of legal  instruments regulating questions of 
nationali ty of  natural  persons in relat ion to the 
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succession of States,  with a view, in part icular ,  to 
preventing the occurrence of statelessness as a result  of  
a  succession of States.  The same resolution invited 
Governments to submit  comments concerning the 
advisabil i ty of  elaborating a legal  instrument on the 
question of nationali ty of  natural  persons in relat ion to 
the succession of States,  including the avoidance of 
statelessness as a result  of  a  succession of States.  
I t  is  certainly possible to conclude that  States 
involved in a succession have the posit ive obligation to 
confer nationali ty on the individuals who possess 
genuine effective l inks to the terri tory in question.  
There is  an emerging right  to an effective nationali ty in 
the State with which an individual  possesses genuine 
and effective l inks,  at  least  in the context  of  state 
successions159.  I t  is  also clear that  these principles are 
inquiringly general  and indist inguishable.  They are not  
exclusive to State successions but  increasingly 
applicable in general  international  ci t izenship law 160.  
 
                                              
159 JEFFREY BLACKMAN, State successions and statelessness (1997-1998), 
1192. 
160 IAN BROWNLIE, The relations of nationality in public international law 
(1963), 319; JEFFREY BLACKMAN, State successions and statelessness 
(1997-1998), 1193. 
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§6.  Regional International Citizenship Law 
 
a)  The Inter-American Instruments on 
Human Rights  
 
The American Convention on Human Rights,  
adopted at  the Inter-American Special ized Conference 
on Human Rights in  San José,  Costa Rica,  on 22 
November 1969,  which entered into force on 18 July 
1978,  contains a general  r ight  to ci t izenship161.  
According to Article 20,  every person has the r ight  
to a nationali ty and to the nationali ty of  the state in 
whose terr i tory he was born if  he does not  have the 
r ight  to any other nationali ty.  I t  also states that  no one 
shall  be arbitrari ly deprived of his  nationali ty or  of  the 
r ight  to change i t .  
This general  provision goes beyond the content  of  
the UDHR, combining also what is  established in the 
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.  
The Inter-American Court  of  Human Rights issued 
a very important  opinion in 1984 stat ing that  “i t  is  
generally accepted today that  nationali ty is  an inherent  
r ight  of  al l  human beings.  Not only is  nationali ty the 
basic requirement for the exercise of  poli t ical  r ights ,  i t  
also has an important  bearing on the individual 's  legal  
capacity.  Thus,  despite the fact  that  i t  is  t radit ionally 
accepted that  the conferral  and regulation of nationali ty 
are matters  for  each state to decide,  contemporary 
developments indicate that  international  law does 
impose certain l imits  on the broad powers enjoyed by 
the states in that  area,  and that  the manners in which 
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state regulate matters  bearing on nationali ty cannot 
today be deemed within their  sole jurisdict ion;  those 
powers of  the state are also circumscribed by their  
obligations to ensure the full  protection of human 
rights.  The classic doctrinal  posit ion,  which viewed 
nationali ty as an at tr ibute granted by the state to i ts  
subjects ,  has gradually evolved to the point  that  
nationali ty is  today perceived as involving the 
jurisdict ion of the state as well  as human rights 
issues”162.  
The opinion is  very powerful  and recognizes what 
no other court  in the world had recognized before.  I t  
also gives great  s trength to the interpretat ion of Article 
20 of the American Convention on Human Rights,  s ince 
the Court  has jurisdict ion on the interpretat ion of the 
Convention.  
More recently,  the Inter-American Court  of  Human 
Rights issued another very important  opinion on States’  
sovereignty to grant  ci t izenship that  combines the 
general  principles of  effective nationali ty,  non-
discrimination and protection against  s tatelessness163.  
This opinion was issued in a case concerning the 
Yean and Bosico children164.  In this  case the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights submitted to 
the Court  an application against  the Dominican 
Republic.  The Commission al leged that  the State,  
through i ts  Registry Office authori t ies,  had refused to 
issue bir th cert if icates for the Yean and Bosico 
                                              
162 Advisory Opinion on Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provision 
of the Constitution of Costa Rica, OC 4/84, Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (IACrtHR) (1984). 
163 MIRNA ADJAMI and JULIA HARRINGTON, The Scope and Content of 
Article 15 of the UDHR (2008), 105. 
164 Dilcia Yean and Violeta Bosico v. Dominican Republic  (Series C, No. 130, 7 
Oct. 2005). 
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children,  even though they were born within the State’s 
terr i tory and the Consti tution of the Dominican 
Republic establishes the principle of  ius soli  to 
determine those who have a r ight  to Dominican 
ci t izenship.  The Commission indicated that  the State 
obliged the al leged vict ims to endure a si tuation of 
continued i l legali ty and social  vulnerabil i ty,  violat ions 
that  are even more serious in the case of  children,  s ince 
the Dominican Republic denied the Yean and Bosico 
children their  r ight  to Dominican nationali ty and let  
them remain stateless persons unti l  September 25,  2001.  
According to the Commission,  the child Violeta Bosico 
was unable to at tend school for  one year owing to the 
lack of an identi ty document.  The Commission 
requested the Court  to order the State to grant  
reparations that  would make full  amends for the al leged 
violat ions of  the children’s r ights .  I t  also requested that  
the State adopt the legislat ive and other measures 
necessary to ensure respect  for the r ights  embodied in 
the Convention and establish guidelines that  contain 
reasonable requirements for  the late registrat ion of 
bir ths and do not impose excessive or discriminatory 
obligations,  so as to facil i tate the registrat ion of 
Dominican-Hait ian children.  
The court  aff irmed that  “the determination of who 
has a r ight  to be a national  continues to fal l  within a 
State’s domestic jurisdict ion.  However,  i ts  discretional  
authori ty in this  regard is  gradually being restr icted 
with the evolution of international  law, in order to 
ensure a better  protection of the individual  in the face 
of  arbitrary acts  of  States.  Thus,  at  the current  stage of 
the development of  international  human rights  law, this  
authori ty of  the States is  l imited,  on the one hand,  by 
their  obligation to provide individuals  with the equal  
and effective protection of the law and,  on the other 
hand,  by their  obligation to prevent,  avoid and reduce 
statelessness.  The Court  considers that  the peremptory 
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legal  principle of  the equal  and effective protection of 
the law and non-discrimination determines that ,  when 
regulat ing mechanisms for granting nationali ty,  States 
must  abstain from producing regulat ions that  are 
discriminatory or have discriminatory effects  on certain 
groups of population when exercising their  r ights .  
Moreover,  States must  combat discriminatory practices 
at  al l  levels ,  part icularly in public bodies and,  f inally,  
must  adopt the aff irmative measures needed to ensure 
the effective r ight  to equal  protection for al l  
individuals .  
States have the obligation not  to adopt practices or  
laws concerning the granting of nationali ty,  the 
application of which fosters an increase in the number 
of  stateless persons.  This condit ion arises from the lack 
of a nationali ty,  when an individual  does not  qualify to 
receive this  under the State’s laws,  owing to arbitrary 
deprivation or the granting of a nationali ty that ,  in 
actual  fact ,  is  not  effective.  Statelessness deprives an 
individual  of  the possibil i ty of  enjoying civil  and 
poli t ical  r ights  and places him in a condit ion of extreme 
vulnerabil i ty”165.  
This opinion is  very important  as i t  summarizes the 
current  trend in internat ional  law of increasing l imits 
on and interaction with national  law by international  
law. I t  also recognizes general  principles of  ci t izenship 
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b)  The European Convention on 
Nationality 
  
The Council  of  Europe has been concerned with 
issues relat ing to nationali ty for over thir ty years.   
The Parl iamentary Assembly has adopted a number 
of  recommendations concerning nationali ty,  invit ing 
member States to facil i tate in part icular  the 
naturalization of refugees in their  country.  In 1988,  i t  
adopted Recommendation 1081 (1988) on problems of 
nationali ty in mixed marriages166.  Therein,  the 
Assembly noted that  i t  was desirable for  each of the 
spouses of  a mixed marriage to have the r ight  to acquire 
the nationali ty of  the other without losing the 
nationali ty of  origin;  furthermore,  children born from 
mixed marriages should also be enti t led to acquire and 
keep the nationali ty of  both of  their  parents.  
In December 1992,  the Committee of  Experts  on 
Multiple Nationali ty proposed the preparation of a 
feasibil i ty study concerning a new, comprehensive 
convention which would contain modern solutions to 
issues relat ing to nationali ty suitable for al l  European 
States.   
As a result  of  this  work and the consultat ions of  the 
Parl iamentary Assembly,  the text  of  the draft  
convention was f inalized on 29 November 1996 and 
adopted by the Committee of  Ministers  on 14 May 1997.  
The Convention was opened for signature on 6 
November 1997.  
The Convention is  the most  comprehensive 
international  text  on ci t izenship and the one that  
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imposes the most intense obligations on Member 
States167.  
While reaffirming the exclusive domestic 
jurisdict ion doctrine by stat ing that  “each State shall  
determine under i ts  own law who are i ts  nationals”,  the 
Convention recognizes that  internal  ci t izenship law 
shall  be accepted by other States in so far  as i t  is  
consistent  with applicable international  conventions,  
customary international  law and the principles of  law 
generally recognized with regard to nationali ty.  
After  reaffirming the acquired principles of  
international  law, such as non-discrimination of 
spouses,  reduction of statelessness and effective 
nationali ty,  the Convention accepts a principle that  has 
arisen in international  law in relat ion to the effective 
ci t izenship:  the principle of  residence.  
The Convention establishes that  each State Party 
shall  provide in i ts  internal  law for the possibil i ty of  
naturalization of persons lawfully and habitually 
resident  in i ts  terr i tory.  In establishing the condit ions 
for naturalization,  i t  shall  not  provide for a period of 
residence exceeding ten years before the lodging of an 
application.  
This very provision consti tutes a landmark in 
international  ci t izenship law but is  also recognit ion of 
the developments described above.  
For the f irst  t ime an international  legal  instrument 
imposes a posit ive obligation on States to grant  
ci t izenship based on residence.  Residence is  then 
considered a relevant element for  naturalization,  as an 
effective l ink for ci t izenship.  Of course i t  is  also 
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connected with the tradit ional  effective l ink element ius 
soli .  
The Convention not  only elects  residence as an 
element of  effective ci t izenship in order to impose a 
posit ive obligation on States,  but  even defines a length:  
not  more than ten years.  
One might ask what cri teria  were used to reach 
such a f igure.  A survey conducted in 2006 on European 
Union Member States’  legislat ion on naturalization 
reveals  that  Member States require a minimum 
residence period of  between three years (Belgium, for 
acquisi t ion by naturalization) and ten years (Austria,  
Greece,  I taly,  Portugal168 and Spain).  Eight  states 
require f ive years or  fewer.  In most  countries,  residence 
must have been legal  and the applicant’s  place of 
habitual  residence must  have been in the State 
concerned.  Generally,  residence must have been 
uninterrupted immediately before the application169.  
The ten-year residence period is  the maximum 
period for naturalization that  can be found in European 
countries’  natural izat ion laws.  The Convention 
identif ied a trend and established a rule accordingly.  
Since this  was such a controversial  issue,  the 
Convention opted for a f igure that  was probably not  the 
average but at  the l imit  of  what is  considered the 
maximum lawful residence period before granting 
naturalization.  
I t  can be concluded that  the Convention imposed a 
posit ive obligation on Member States to grant  
ci t izenship to any lawful immigrant after  ten years of  
                                              
168 Portuguese law changed after the survey, reducing the residence period to six 
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169 RAINER BAUBÖCK, EVA ERSBØLL, KEES GROENENDIJK and 
HARALD WALDRAUCH, The Acquisition of Nationality in EU Member States: 
Rules, Practices and Quantitative Developments (2006). 
Gonçalo Saraiva Matias – The Path to Citizenship 
122 
residence within i ts  terr i tory.  Of course this  is  a  
maximum period,  and each country is  free to establish 
shorter  periods.  
Twenty countries have rat if ied the Convention so 
far .  
I t  should be also noted that  the rule only applies to 
persons lawfully and habitually resident in the terr i tory.  
I t  excludes undocumented migrants.  
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§7.  The new international law of citizenship 
 
Due to the intense activity around cit izenship in 
international  law, scholars speak now about a “new 
international  law of ci t izenship”170.  
According to Spiro,  “even today,  most  leading 
commentators on ci t izenship theory—both legal 
scholars and social  scientists—continue to characterize 
nationali ty  practice as largely outside the ambit  of  
international law”171.  
Reali ty,  as I  have described above,  largely 
contradicts  this  idea.   
A first  s ign of a new international  law of 
ci t izenship is  a  result  of  s ignif icant  changes in the very 
structure of  international  law with special  and deep 
consequences at  the ci t izenship law level .  
One of these changes has to do with a “human 
rights-oriented approach to nationali ty law”172.  In this  
sense,  as I  wil l  expand on in chapter  5,  personhood has 
replaced ci t izenship as the cri teria for  the enjoyment of  
human rights.  This universalist ic  approach to human 
rights also has to do with the renewed role of  the 
individual  as the subject  of  international  law, an issue 
which I  wil l  also address in chapter  5.  
As Spiro puts i t ,  “ i t  is  becoming increasingly clear 
that  s tate discretion is  no longer unfet tered and that  
ci t izenship practice must  account for the interests  of  
                                              
170 The expression was eloquently phrased by PETER SPIRO, A new international 
law of citizenship (2011), 698. 
171 PETER SPIRO, A new international law of citizenship (2011), 716. 
172 KAY HAILBRONNER, Nationality in public international law and European 
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individuals as well  as those of  s tates”.  And, he adds,  
that  “ these developments depart  from historical  
understandings of  nationali ty  practice.  In contrast  to 
earlier,  minimal constraints  on state practice,  these 
prospective norms would mandate inclusive ci t izenship 
practices.  That is ,  whereas earlier international law 
constrained states only by tel l ing them whom they could 
not  include as nationals ( for example,  barring them 
from extending ci t izenship to those with whom they have 
no connection),  more recently evolving norms tel l  s tates 
whom they must  include as ci t izens.  The dif ference is  
radical .  The old law of  nationali ty ,  such as i t  existed,  
in no case dictated the adulteration of  national 
community by directing the inclusion of  individuals who 
would otherwise (as a matter of  endogenous processes)  
be excluded.  The old law of  ci t izenship had almost  
nothing to say about birthright  ci t izenship and 
naturalization.  The new law of  ci t izenship,  by contrast ,  
may dictate ci t izenship el igibil i ty  for habitual  residents 
and their  children”  173.  
This evolution described by Spiro is  in fact  radical .  
I t  largely rel ies on the renewed relevance of  the 
individual  in international  law. From the international  
law of states we have moved to the international  law of 
individuals .  
For that  matter ,  the old international  law of 
ci t izenship was only concerned with the relat ions 
between States.  A State could establish any rule on 
ci t izenship as long as i t  did not  confl ict  with another 
State.  
That  is  why early international  ci t izenship law was 
basically aimed at  avoiding confl ict  of  laws,  whether 
posit ive or negative.  
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In the framework of a new international  law of 
individuals ,  this  scenario dramatically changes. 
First  of  al l ,  ci t izenship is  no longer the cri teria for  
the enjoyment of  human rights .  Personhood plays that  
role.  This means that  ci t izenship is  now less of  a r ights-
based status but  rather has become a poli t ical  s tatus.  I  
wil l  develop this  idea in chapter  5.  
This has paved the way for theories on the 
devaluation of ci t izenship.  
Secondly,  being centered on the human being,  the 
new international  law needs to be concerned with 
individual  r ights  and aspirat ions.  
In that  sense,  i t  is  not  so important  that  States are 
in agreement with each other about their  internal  
definit ion of ci t izenship if  the individual´s  r ights  and 
aspirat ions are adequately taken care of .  
Of course these two perspectives might be deemed 
as contradictory:  if  a  person can enjoy human rights 
anywhere regardless of  his  ci t izenship status,  why 
should his  r ights and aspirat ions get  in the way and 
play a role in the definit ion of ci t izenship at  the State 
level? 
As I  wil l  develop in chapter  6,  some fundamental  
principles make the case for a trend towards a general  
r ight  to natural izat ion based on residence.  The 
democratic principle is  certainly one of them. 
On the democratic principle and i ts  relat ionship 
with the new international  law of ci t izenship,  Spiro 
says,  “ the other driver here is  a democracy norm. To 
the extent  that  sel f-governance consti tutes a right ,  
ci t izenship is  centrally important.  When cit izenship—
and with i t ,  ful l  equali ty—is denied to habitual  
residents,  especially from birth or early childhood, 
democratic values are compromised.  As Diane 
Orentl icher observes,  “a democratic principles 
paradigm .  .  .  presents an especially potent  challenge to 
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the discretion that  s tates have classically enjoyed in 
respect  of  ci t izenship policies”174.  
In fact ,  as far  as self-governance is  concerned,  
some form of naturalization procedure ought to be 
established.  Otherwise,  permanent residents of  a 
poli t ical  community wil l  be excluded from poli t ical  
part icipation.  
As I  s tated above,  poli t ical  r ights  are among the 
few that  can now be exclusively associated with the 
ci t izenship status – even if  there are also trends to 
extend these to migrants,  as  I  wil l  analyze in chapter  5.  
In any event,  only full  poli t ical  s tatus that  is  
at tached to ci t izenship can provide migrants  with the 
kind of r ights  that  wil l  make them members of  the 
poli t ical  community as they should be when residing in 
a given country for a  long period of t ime. 
The nature of  the democratic principle in 
international  law can certainly be disputed.  I  wil l  
discuss this  question thoroughly in chapter  6.   
For now we can be sure that  the full  integration of  
a person in the poli t ical  community is  dependent on the 
at tr ibution of  the ci t izenship status and when a State 
refuses to do this ,  on an arbitrary basis ,  the new 
international  law of ci t izenship plays a role.  
In fact ,  i t  is  fair ly consensual  that  arbitrary 
practices or discriminatory rules on the at tr ibution of 
ci t izenship,  such as those based on race,  ethnici ty or 
gender,  shall  not  be accepted in the context  of  
international  law. 
If  this  is  the case,  the theory can be extended and a 
general  cri teria based on residence can be established,  
for reasons that  I  wil l  develop later ,  according to 
which,  with the support  of  international  law, a State 
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ought to recognize the enti t lement of  a certain person to 
i ts  ci t izenship.  
At least  a  clear  trend in that  direction can be 
identif ied.  As Spiro recognizes,  “with respect  to the 
acquisi t ion of  ci t izenship,  emerging norms point  to 
l imitations on threshold naturalization requirements for 
long-term residents,  and the trajectory suggests  a move 
toward the required adoption,  at  least  in some contexts ,  
of  a jus soli  basis  for birthright  ci t izenship.  Both 
developments suggest  that  the balance is  t ipping toward 
a rights metric in how international law understands 
nationali ty  questions.  I f  so,  international norms 
regarding nationali ty  determinations are l ikely to 
harden in the medium to long term”175.  
This trend is  in nature revolutionary.  I t  is  not  just  
that  international  law plays a role in national  
ci t izenship law. This assert ion is  becoming consensual ,  
even if  to very different  extents .  
The trend that  is  now identif iable points  to a 
fundamental  r ight  to a specif ic  ci t izenship that  is  
recognizable regardless of  the State’s wil l ,  by 
determination of international  law. 
Such recognit ion is  only possible in the context  of  
a new international  law of ci t izenship based on persons 
and not on States.  
This is  so because extending a r ight  to a specif ic 
ci t izenship to a person without any State’s  dispute on 
that  at tr ibution must  depart  from a view that  cares 
about the individual’s  r ights and aspirat ions rather than 
the interests  of  States and of the international  
community.  
That  was certainly not  the case of  the broader 
interpretat ion of Article 15 of the UDHR. If  interpreted 
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in the tradit ional  way,  as I  have described above,  i t  
meant that  al l  s tateless  persons had a r ight  to a 
nationali ty.  In that  sense i t  is  less of  an individual  r ight  
and more of another mechanism to avoid statelessness,  
which corresponds to a threat  to the international  law of 
nations.   
According to this  view, i t  is  not  so important  that  
an individual  person wishes to acquire a different  
ci t izenship.  As long as the person possesses one,  the 
r ight  provided for in the UDHR should not  be invoked. 
This is  clearly an interpretat ion anchored in the 
old-fashioned international  law perspective,  very much 
based on States.  Why would the Universal  Declarat ion 
provide for a human right  that  can only be exercised by 
the stateless? Why would the objective of  such a r ight  
be the el imination of statelessness,  a  bold target  of  the 
international  community? And even if  the mentioned 
objective should not  be neglected,  why would the said 
individual  r ight  elude the protection of legit imate 
expectations of an individual  that ,  regardless of  
possessing a prior ci t izenship,  would l ike to acquire a 
different  one in order to fully integrate in the 
community in which he resides? 
This means that  in the context  of  a new 
international  law of ci t izenship,  based on personhood 
rather than on States,  Article 15 of the UDHR ought to 
be read in a different  and modernized way, centered on 
individual  r ights ,  aspirat ions and legit imate 
expectations.  The only way to do this  is  to recognize 
that  i t  entai ls  not  only the r ight  to possess one 
ci t izenship but also to possess the ci t izenship of one’s 
choice.  
Also,  as I  wil l  discuss in chapter  6,  Nottebohm and 
the genuine l ink theory might provide addit ional  
ammunition for this  conclusion.  Spiro underl ines that  
“ the genuine-l ink test  could be turned around to require 
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the extension of  ci t izenship to individuals in the 
presence of  such a l ink.  The thresholds would dif fer.  
The l ink required to validate the extension of  
nationali ty  is  low, even under Nottebohm itsel f .  When a 
state has refused nationali ty ,  the l ink required to 
compel i ts  extension would be high.  Underlying both is  
an assumption that  nationali ty  should comport  with the 
social  facts  of  community on the ground”.  
This means that  whenever the effective l ink exists ,  
according to international  law, ci t izenship should be 
granted.  I t  is  certainly the case of  residence for a 
certain number of  years.  This idea,  in conjunction with 
a renewed reading of Article 15 of the UDHR, helps to 
make the case for the trend I  believe to have identif ied.  
In chapter  6 I  wil l  develop this  idea,  contrast ing i t  with 
the ius nexi  proposed by Ayelet  Schachar176.  
A different  issue is  whether i t  also entai ls  the r ight  
to retain the former ci t izenship,  thus becoming a dual  
ci t izen.  Spiro actually makes the case for  dual  
ci t izenship as a human right177.  
The recognit ion of such a r ight  largely rel ies on a 
transparent ,  equal  and expedited naturalization 
procedure.  
As Spiro notes,  “as a matter of  practice,  al l  s tates 
provide for the possibil i ty  of  naturalization ( that  is ,  the 
acquisi t ion of  ci t izenship after birth).  Availabil i ty  of  
naturalization may now be required as a matter of  
international law. The 1997 European Convention on 
Nationali ty  requires that  s tates parties provide for “the 
possibil i ty  of  naturalization of  persons lawfully and 
habitually resident on i ts  terri tory.” Naturalization has 
become “more of  a right  than a favor.” As the poli t ical  
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theorist  Seyla Benhabib concludes in sketching a 
“human right  to membership,” i t  “would be 
objectionable from a moral point  of  view [not to 
provide]  any procedure or possibil i ty  for foreigners 
and resident al iens to become cit izens at  al l;  that  is ,  i f  
naturalization were not  permitted at  al l”178.  
Again,  the conclusion is  somewhat revolutionary.  
According to this  view, naturalization would not be a 
possibil i ty rendered to States in their  discret ion to 
regulate ci t izenship;  i t  would be an imposit ion of  
international  law. 
Despite the general  trend that  I  have identif ied and 
will  later  develop,  international  law provides an 
undeniable example:  the European Convention on 
Nationali ty,  which I  have briefly described above.  
According to Hailbronner,  “ the Universal  
Declaration of  Human Rights states that  everybody is  
enti t led to a nationali ty .  I t  has been rightly remarked 
that  this  provision does not  indicate under which 
provisions a person is  enti t led to a specif ic  nationali ty  
(…) This does not  mean that  a state’s right  to determine 
nationali ty  law has remained unaffected by the 
development of  human rights and human dignity,  which 
has shif ted the very foundation of  public international 
law from a system of  coordination of  sovereign states to 
the well-  being of  human beings”.  He adds that  “ the 
right  to a nationali ty  as a human rights concept raises 
a number of  issues with regard to the acquisi t ion of  
nationali ty  by second or third generation migrants”.  As 
an example of this ,  he points  that  “ the European 
Convention on Nationali ty  (ECN) provides that  internal 
law shall  contain rules which make i t  possible for 
foreigners lawfully and habitually resident  in the 
terri tory of  a state party to be naturalized.  The 
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maximum period of  residence that  can be required for 
naturalization is  f ixed at  a maximum of ten years.  This 
corresponds to a common standard in Europe,  most  
countries requiring between f ive and ten years of  
residence”179.  
Even if  the acknowledgment of  the emergence of a 
new international  law of ci t izenship is  not  evident,  
s igns of  change are becoming very clear.  
I t  might be harder to aff irm a general  r ight  to 
naturalization – al though I  do acknowledge the 
existence of a trend towards such a r ight  – but  i t  is  very 
clear  that  such an imposit ion on States is  becoming a 
matter  of  international  law, at  least  in international  
treaties.  
As I  have described above,  the ECN is  the f irst  
international  instrument to establish such an imposit ion.  
As De Groot notes,  “ for the f irst  t ime an international 
treaty attempts to indicate which grounds for 
acquisi t ion and loss of  nationali ty  are acceptable”180.  
First ,  as  Hailbronner notes,  “chapter 2 of  the 
European Convention describing the general  principles 
relating to nationali ty  therefore very cautiously states 
that  the rules on nationali ty  of  each state party shall  be 
based on the fol lowing principles:   
–  Everyone has the right  to nationali ty,   
–  Statelessness shall  be avoided,   
–  No-one shall  be arbitrarily  deprived of  
his  or her nationali ty ,   
–  Neither marriage nor the dissolution of  
a marriage between a national of  a state party 
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and an alien,  nor a change in nationali ty  by 
one of  the spouses during the marriage shall  
automatically affect  the nationali ty  of  the other 
spouse”181.  
 
Although the Convention is  not innovative in terms 
of the general  principles of  international  law of 
ci t izenship,  the mere fact  that  an international  
convention lays down those principles is  relevant.  I t  
means,  in a way,  a compilat ion or condensation of 
general  principles of  international  ci t izenship law. 
Then,  to test  the relevance of the ECN, i t  can be 
said that  i t  is  regional .  Although this  is  the case,  i t  
cannot be l imited to the EU or even to the geographical  
space of Europe.  This is  not  to say that  the EU 
cit izenship experience is  less relevant.  On the contrary,  
i t  has brought an enormous input to the international  
law of ci t izenship,  as I  wil l  expand on in chapter  4.  In 
fact ,  and this  explains why I  included the ECN in this  
chapter ,  this  Convention is  not  merely European.  As 
Spiro recalls ,  i t  “ is  open for accession not  only by 
members of  the Council  of  Europe,  but  also those states 
who “participated” in the Convention’s “elaboration,” 
including Bosnia and Herzegovina,  Canada, 
Kyrgyzstan,  and the United States”182.  
Also,  the ECN represents,  to a certain extent ,  a  
general  codification of ci t izenship law in international  
law. As De Groot says,  “ the main importance of  the 
ECN is  that  obligations and ideas that  have emerged as 
a result  of  developments in both international and 
domestic law have gradually been consolidated into a 
single text .  Most  provisions of  the Convention were 
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inspired by provisions of  a considerable number of  
other international instruments.  The nationali ty  
provisions of  these instruments have been adopted in 
the ECN, in some instances in a sl ightly elaborated 
form. Moreover,  a number of  provisions included in the 
Convention aim to contribute to the progressive 
development of  an international law on nationali ty .  
This applies in particular to the provisions in Chapter 
VI on State succession and nationali ty”183.   
A crucial  aspect  of  the Convention to my general  
thesis  is  the obligation imposed on Member States to 
naturalize those lawfully and habitually resident  in 
their  terr i tories,  as established in Article 6(3).  The 
art icle also states  that  “ in establishing the condit ions 
for naturalization,  i t  shall  not  provide for a period of  
residence exceeding ten years before the lodging of  an 
application”.  
Thus the ECN imposes a duty on States to 
naturalize and,  in a way,  grants  a r ight  to naturalization 
to lawful and habitual  residents.  The Convention 
considers habitual  residence a period that  shall  not  
exceed ten years.  
As Michel  Autem underl ines in a report  about the 
ECN, “ i t  promotes the idea that  voluntary residence on 
a state 's  terri tory gives individuals rights which they 
may rely on in order to acquire that  s tate 's  nationali ty  
(…) In this  way,  lawful  and habitual  residence is  no 
longer considered as one of  the condit ions that  has to 
be ful f i l led for acquiring the nationali ty  of  a State 
Party,  but  almost  as a ground for becoming enti t led to 
the right  to acquire that  nationali ty .  The importance 
attached to the notion of  residence is  such that ,  in 
cases of  s tate succession,  i t  appears to form the basis  
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of a "right  to remain" for non-nationals residing on a 
terri tory whose sovereignty has been transferred and on 
which they were residing previously (Article 20-1a)”184.  
Several  qualif icat ions must  be made while 
analyzing the ECN, in part icular  the naturalization 
clause.  
First ly,  i t  is  clear  that  the Convention is  not  a  
general  international  law instrument as i t  is  not  opened 
to rat if icat ion by al l  the members of  the international  
community,  but  i t  is  far  from being a regional  
instrument l imited to a reduced number of  States.  I t  
goes far  beyond the members of  the European Union 
and that  is  why I  do not include i t  within the analysis  of  
EU cit izenship.  
Secondly,  as Autem reveals  and as I  have 
underl ined above,  the drafters  conceived the 
Convention as a codification of international  
ci t izenship law. In that  sense i t  is  much more 
representat ive than the l is t  of  rat if icat ions may imply.  
I t  is  an international  instrument aiming to depict  the 
status of  international  law of ci t izenship at  a  given 
moment,  regardless of  which States can or wil l  rat ify i t .  
Also,  i t  must  be carefully read.  I t  imposes an 
obligation on States to naturalize lawful and habitual  
residents.  I t  is  not  a mere option of  the States.  The 
wording “shall  provide” indicates a clear  obligation.  
Whether or  not  this  obligation is  self-executing is  
debatable.  As I  t ranscribed above,  authors read here a 
r ight  to naturalization.  The abil i ty to exercise such a 
r ight  is  not  evident .  However,  i t  is  very clear that  a  
direct  obligation to naturalize lawful and habitual  
residents derives from the Convention and that  where 
                                              
184 MICHEL AUTEM, The European Convention on Nationality: is a European 
Code on Nationality possible? (1999), 32. 
Gonçalo Saraiva Matias – The Path to Citizenship 
135 
Members States fai l  to do so they will  incur 
international  l iabil i ty for  breaching obligations in an 
international  treaty according to the principle pacta 
sunt servanda .  
For my general  thesis ,  especial ly from a 
transnational  law standpoint ,  the discussion about the 
self-executing nature of  the Convention is  not  so 
important .  The fact  is  that  an international  treaty,  
furthermore one which the drafters  intended to be a 
general  codification of international  ci t izenship law, 
provides for an obligation or imposit ion on States to 
naturalize.  This is  of  course revolutionary.  I t  represents 
a bold break with the tradit ional  ideal  that  ci t izenship is  
in the realm of State sovereignty and the responsibil i ty 
for defining i t  l ies  essential ly with States.  
As I  have outl ined,  the reserved domain doctrine 
suffered a significant  evolution over t ime and several  
exceptions were considered.  However,  unti l  the ECN, 
none of these exceptions provided directly for  an 
imposit ion to grant  ci t izenship.  Several  negative 
l imitat ions were considered,  especial ly after  the 
effective l ink doctrine elaborated in Nottebohm. Yet,  
these l imitat ions always concerned the abil i ty of  a  State 
to refuse recognit ion of ci t izenship of  another State 
based on certain condit ions enshrined in international  
law. Never before in a crystal  clear fashion had any 
instrument of  international  law provided for such a bold 
imposit ion,  in a posit ive way. 
This opens the door,  obviously,  to different  
approaches and theories,  relying on the existence of 
posit ive l imitat ions in international  law of ci t izenship,  
such as the trend that  I  generally identify.  I t  cannot be 
said,  in the l ight  of  this  Convention,  that  international  
law does not  impose any obligation on States regarding 
the at tr ibution of ci t izenship.  
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Another very important  aspect  of  this  rule that  
s trengthens my interpretat ion is  the identif ication of a 
t imeframe for establishing habitual  residence.  
According to the Convention this  period shall  not  
exceed 10 years.  
As I  have stated above and will  expand on in 
chapter  6,  this  period of 10 years results  from several  
s tudies and surveys in Europe and elsewhere regarding 
the standard residence prerequisi te  for naturalization.  
According to these surveys,  10 years would not be the 
standard but the maximum residence period for 
naturalization.  That  is  why the Convention establishes 
this  l imit  as a ceil ing,  al lowing States to establish 
shorter  periods.  
In any event,  this  l imit  certainly el iminates the 
possibil i ty of  Member States maintaining or raising 
exist ing prerequisi tes that  do not comply with this  
ceil ing.  Again,  from a transnational  law standpoint ,  the 
rule is  of  utmost  importance due to what i t  reveals .  A 
general  principle may be identif ied as an obligation of 
any State to naturalize residents after  a  reasonable 
period of residence,  this  period not  being longer than 
10 years.  This is  absolutely crucial  for  my general  
thesis  and sustains very solidly the idea of  a general  
t rend towards the r ight  to naturalize in the country of  
residence.  
A final  qualif ication must  be made.  The Convention 
imposes the obligation to naturalize lawful and habitual  
residents.  Although absolutely clear about the 
“habitual” port ion of the rule,  even adding a number to 
i t ,  the Convention does not  clarify what i t  means by 
lawful.  
First  of  al l  i t  is  necessary to discover according to 
which law the lawful residence must  be assessed:  
national  or  international? 
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Of course i t  can be said that  the lawfulness of  
residence is  always assessed according to national  law 
because the exclusive domestic jurisdict ion also applies 
to immigration law. 
However,  i t  is  also clear that  this  power is  not  
unlimited.  International  law may not rely entirely on 
States regarding the lawfulness (or unlawfulness)  of  a  
residence status,  s ince this  may be the result  of  a  
discriminatory provision (based on suspect  categories 
for international  law, such as gender or  race).  
The intent  of  the provision is  clear:  the obligation 
to naturalize should not  include naturalization of 
undocumented migrants.   
The specif ic si tuation of this  category of migrants 
and the controversy i t  generates every t ime their  r ights  
and duties are discussed in international  law is  always a 
matter  of  debate,  as  I  wil l  show in chapter  5.  
I t  is  no surprise that  such a qualif icat ion had to be 
made in the text  of  the Convention or otherwise i t  
would be deemed as unacceptable by many States and 
that  would compromise the very goal  of  the Convention 
as a whole.  
This does not mean,  however,  that  the obligation to 
naturalize and the corresponding r ight  are l imited to 
documented migrants.  I t  is  s ignif icant  that  the drafters 
did not  use the phrasing documented/undocumented,  or  
even worse,  legal/ i l legal  but  used the phrasing 
lawful/unlawful residence. 
This means that  the judgment about the legali ty 
must  be made on the residence status and not on the 
person himself .  I  wil l  return to this  issue in chapter  5.  
I  also interpret  i t  as  locating,  at  least  in part ,  in 
international  law the assessment of  that  legali ty.  For 
the reasons I  have set  out ,  i t  cannot be total ly 
dependent on the national  decision.  
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Finally,  this  opens room for a discussion that  must  
go beyond the specif ics of  this  Convention and must 
consider other elements,  especial ly those generated 
after  i t  was drafted,  on whether or  not  a human right  to 
nationali ty that  entai ls  a  r ight  to be naturalized in the 
country of residence should include those admitted in 
that  country in violat ion of national  immigration laws 
and thus being considered undocumented.  I  wil l  return 
to this  in chapter  6.  
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III – Transnational citizenship 
 
§1.  Citizenship elements and their transnationalization  
 
I t  is  impossible to conduct  a study on ci t izenship 
nowadays without addressing the cri t ical  question of 
transnational  ci t izenship.  I t  is  clear that  a  narrow and 
monochromatic vision of ci t izenship centered on the 
State,  defined by reference to a terr i tory with i ts  
established borders and result ing from a perfect  
coincidence between etnos  and demos  is  long gone.  
Thus scholars have increasingly invoked the concept of  
“transnational  ci t izenship”,  a  term I  use to denote a 
ci t izenship that  is  not  tethered to the State.   
Many factors may have contributed to the 
pulverization of the basic elements of  ci t izenship.  One 
of them is  the aff irmation of the individual  as a subject  
of  international  law.  
Also the growing importance of transnational  
associat ions of  States,  regional  organizations,  
international  organizations,  NGO’s and other forms of 
transnational  involvement has contributed to the 
emergence of a form of ci t izenship beyond the State’s 
borders.  Some scholars refer  to the concept of  
transnational  ci t izenship,  post-national  ci t izenship and 
global  ci t izenship.  These different  formulas try o 
capture an expression that  best  describes the phenomena 
of membership decentered from the State185.  
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Terri torial  integri ty has been challenged by the 
massive migratory movements that  cannot even be 
stopped by States’  regulations and law enforcement.  
National  sovereignty has been ineffective in stopping 
that  movement and i l legal  migration somehow 
substi tutes the internal  admission process.  
On the other hand,  international  protection of 
human rights,  especial ly in the second half  of  the 20t h  
Century,  contributed to blurring the differences between 
cit izens and foreigners.  By recognizing a significant  
number of  r ights  to every human being – in direct  
connection to personhood – i t  was no longer possible 
for national  legislat ion to discriminate against  
foreigners in the protection of basic human rights.   
As Linda Bosniak points  out ,  the following 
elements can be devised within the ci t izenship 
concept186:  
1.  Citizenship as legal  status 
2.  Citizenship as r ights  
3.  Citizenship as poli t ical  act ivi ty 
4.  Citizenship as identi ty/solidari ty 
 Cit izenship as a legal  s tatus results  from the 
ancient  Greek and Roman heri tage and corresponds to a 
formal t ie  of  belonging to a legally organized 
community.  I t  entai ls  the classic notion of ci t izenship 
as the l ink between the individual  and the State.  In fact  
one can consider transnational  ci t izenship from an 
inst i tut ional  s tandpoint  or  just  as an isolated movement 
of  diffusion of the elements which consti tute 
ci t izenship.  The f irst  dimension is  less frequent.  I t  is  
                                                                                                                
borders: Immigration and the decline of citizenship (1996); RAINER 
BAUBÖCK, Transnational Citizenship (1994). 
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diff icult  to support  an inst i tut ional  transnational  
ci t izenship unless we advocate the creation of a Global  
State in which this  ci t izenship could be regulated.  On 
the contrary,  the idea of  transnational  ci t izenship has 
l i t t le  connection with inst i tut ionalization for i t  resulted 
from recognit ion of the fai lure of  States to regulate 
ci t izenship and the weakness of  States’  borders in 
control l ing i t .  
European ci t izenship is ,  however,  an exception to 
this  general  idea.  European ci t izenship represents the 
best ,  i f  not  the only,  example of  an inst i tut ional  
transnational  ci t izenship.  I t  contains the most  relevant 
ci t izenship elements and aspires to include them all 187.  I  
wil l  discuss this  idea later  in the chapter  on European 
cit izenship.  
The concept of  ci t izenship perceived as a group of 
r ights results  from sociological  approaches to 
ci t izenship regarding the r ights that  i t  brings with i t ,  
and corresponds to the vision of T.  H. Marshall 188 or  the 
r ight  to have r ights discussed by Hannah Arendt189.  
Despite these theories,  we should acknowledge the 
scarcity of  ci t izenship r ights today,  s ince the majori ty 
of  human rights are protected in relat ion to every 
human being regardless of  his  ci t izenship.  
Cit izenship as poli t ical  activity results  from a 
concept shaped by Hannah Arendt according to which 
the basic content  of  ci t izenship is  the abil i ty i t  conveys 
on i ts  holders to part icipate actively in and shape the 
poli t ical  community.  In this  sense ci t izenship means 
any type of community engagement and poli t ical  
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part icipation,  regardless of  the formal status of  the 
individual  or  even of the locus of  that  part icipation. 
Cit izenship can also be seen as an element of  
identi ty.  Sometimes that  identi ty results  from natural  
factors as a consequence of restr ict ive or ethnocentric 
policies of  at tr ibuting ci t izenship,  but  often i t  also 
results  from an intentional  creation of  communit ies.  In 
the lat ter  cases ci t izenship is  the glue that  keeps the 
community united.  
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§2.  Moral, philosophical and economic justification for the 
transnational citizenship  
 
Among the dimensions of  moral  and philosophical  
just if ication for ci t izenship,  perhaps the more relevant 
are190:  
a.  Moral cosmopoli tanism (Joseph 
Carens191,  Matha Nussbaum192)  
b.   Deterriatorial ized or post-national  
ci t izenship (Rosenau193,  Soysal194)  
c .  The decline of  ci t izenship (Walzer195,  
Jacobson196)  
 
a) Moral Cosmopolitanism  
 
The idea of  moral  cosmopoli tanism originates in 
the Kantian cosmopoli tan legacy and i ts  r ight  to 
                                              
190 For a thorough analysis of these theories, see SEYLA BENHABIB, The 
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hospital i ty197.   The r ight  to hospital i ty entai ls  the 
possibil i ty of  entering and being welcomed in the 
terr i tory of  any State for al l  migrants,  especial ly those 
with special  needs or facing diff icult ies or  persecutions 
in their  home countries.  This r ight  to hospital i ty also 
entai ls  a  guarantee that  the host  State wil l  not  deport  
the migrants whenever their  return to the home country 
represents a special  sacrif ice198.  
This idea represents the very basis  for  what would 
later  become the refugee law and i ts  main principle of  
non refoulement  that  prevents a refugee’s  deportat ion to 
the State of  origin once he has been admitted and his  
status official ly recognized,  .  
  More recent  readings of  the moral  
cosmopoli tanism theory advocate the aboli t ion of 
borders.  The at tr ibution of r ights  based on the mere fact  
that  someone was born in a given terri tory or on blood 
l ine is  as arbitrary as the at tr ibution of r ights  based on 
race,  color or  gender.  
This trend can be associated with a broader 
movement that  has been advocating “open borders”.   
According to Joseph Carens,  ci t izenship in l iberal  
democracies is  the contemporary equivalent  of  feudal  
privileges.   Being an inheri ted status,  i t  contributes 
decisively to the personal  success of  i ts  holders.  The 
author recognizes the sovereignty argument according 
to which the ci t izens of  a State can establish their  own 
cri teria of  admission of foreigners and also the 
incorporation of foreigners in their  internal  poli ty by 
approving their  own immigration and ci t izenship laws.  
A parallel  can be drawn with a property r ight ,  as  if  this  
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were a collective property r ight  over the terr i tory,  
legit imizing the decisions of  i ts  ci t izens to exclude 
foreigners199.  The problem for Carens is  that  the answer 
rel ies on a conception of  collect ive property and not  of  
private property,  contrary to the l iberal  t radit ion.   
Carens refers to the conceptions of Nozick,  Rawls 
and Walzer which support ,  in different  fashions,  border 
controls  and the State’s r ight  to control  immigration.  
Carens opposes the main arguments for  supporting 
border controls .   
First ly,  for  Carens those who approve immigration 
and ci t izenship laws – the ci t izens in a democratic 
society – do not  f ind themselves in a legit imate posit ion 
since their  power results  from an arbitrary at tr ibution 
based on cri teria such as place of bir th or  l ineage.   
Secondly,  Carens at tempts to deny the economic 
argument according to which immigration brings about 
a reduction in the ci t izens’ well-being.  According to 
Carens this  consequence of the migratory movements is  
yet  to be confirmed. Even if  such an argument could be 
confirmed i t  would be necessary,  from a l iberal  
democracy standpoint  based on human dignity,  for  the 
ci t izens’ sacrif ice to be greater  than the sacrif ice 
imposed on the migrant  that  is  prevented from entering 
the State’s  terr i tory.   
Lastly,  the argument according to which 
immigration endangers the culture of  the host  State is  
i rrelevant for Carens because even if  i t  was true i t  
would not  violate the basic principles of  a democratic 
society200.  
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Although Caren uses compell ing arguments,  the 
case for  open borders which he presents brings up 
various problems.  In part icular  i t  ignores the serious 
diff icult ies in controll ing migratory movements.   
A unilateral  decision of one State to open i ts  
borders would lead to chaos in that  very State,  unless 
the same decision was taken at  the same t ime by al l  the 
other countries in the world.  In order to avoid the chaos 
of  a world without borders,  an open borders policy 
would require a world authori ty that  would be able to 
regulate migratory movements.  A State that  chooses to 
implement an open border policy would be isolated in 
the context  of  the international  community and would 
immediately be f looded by al l  sorts  of  migratory 
movements.  Chaos would follow. 
Nevertheless,  the case for open borders is  an 
excellent  intel lectual  exercise to challenge set  ideas on 
immigration and on State sovereignty over migration 
and ci t izenship.  A very important  point  Carens makes is  
the challenge to the ci t izens’ legit imacy to restr ict ively 
legislate on the admission of ci t izens. Of course that  
also has significant  implications regarding the decision 
to grant  ci t izenship.  The right  to ci t izenship that  Carens 
claims depends only on the migrant’s  decision201.  In a 
way i t  is  close to Walzer’s  posit ion when he claims that  
a  State that  pushes i ts  workers away from cit izenship is  
in fact  a  tyranny202.  
The open borders theory,  i f  combined with the r ight  
to ci t izenship,  leads to loss of  a State’s  control  over i ts  
population,  transferring from the ci t izens to the migrant  
the decision on the acquisi t ion of ci t izenship.  Carens 
                                              
201 JOSEPH H. CARENS, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders 
(1987), 345. 
202 MICHAEL WALZER, Spheres of Justice. A defense of pluralism and equality 
(1983), 52. 
Gonçalo Saraiva Matias – The Path to Citizenship 
147 
attempts to avoid this  cri t ic ism by saying that  according 
to his  theory the dist inction between foreigners and 
ci t izens should be maintained.  Foreigners should be 
al lowed to adhere to the social  contract  and become full  
members of  the community once the basic condit ions of  
the said contract  are fulf i l led. 
Responding to Noah Pickus on natural izat ion 
policies,  Carens says that  the requirements for 
naturalization should be set  very low. He continues:  
“Nevertheless,  I  want to argue that ,  as a matter of  
fundamental  just ice,  anyone who has resided lawfully in 
a l iberal  democratic state for an extended period of  
t ime (e.g. ,  f ive years or more) ought to be enti t led to 
become a ci t izen i f  he or she wishes to do so”203.   
Although I  could entirely subscribe to the lat ter  
aff irmation,  the combination of the open borders theory 
with the r ight  to ci t izenship after  a  period of residence 
is  problematic and could ult imately contribute to the 
reverse effect  Carens aims to achieve.  If  the borders are 
opened and migration is  a  free decision and if  after  
entering the terr i tory migrants wil l  receive ci t izenship 
after  a  certain period of t ime in residence,  i t  is  highly 
probable that  States wil l  ei ther try to control  migration 
or ci t izenship.  Such a policy might lead to the reverse 
effect  and result  in States t ightening policies towards 
migration and using al l  their  power to prevent migrants  
from even gett ing close to their  borders.   
On the contrary – as I  wil l  show in later  chapters – 
I  argue that  the decision whether to admit  a  migrant  to a 
State’s  terr i tory should be a free decision of that  State 
– so that  there are few or no expectat ions raised for the 
migrant and no r ight  to democratic part icipation – but  
the decision to extend ci t izenship should be a much 
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more restr icted one,  in l ine with the arguments used by 
Carens in his  response to Pickus.  I  wil l  return to this  
issue later .   
When Carens refers  to the idea of  a social  contract  
between the migrant  and the State i t  can be l inked to 
the theory of immigration by contract  that  can be used 
to oppose the r ight  to ci t izenship.  According to this  
theory,  the immigration rules are laid down in the 
contract  between the State and the migrant.  As long as 
the basic condit ions of  that  contract  are met there is  no 
reason to dispute i ts  internal  fairness.  The problem is  
that  migrants not  have extremely l imited bargaining 
power– as Motomura acknowledges – but  they also 
cannot claim a r ight  to ci t izenship because that  r ight  
was not  part  of  the contract  when they decided to 
migrate to a certain country and they have tacit ly 
accepted that  contract .  In other words – and I  wil l  come 
back to this  later  – the expectat ions of the migrants 
after  l iving for a certain period in the country could not 
be used as an argument to sustain the r ight  to 
ci t izenship because that  r ight  was not inscribed in the 
contract  that  they tacit ly concluded while crossing the 
State’s  borders204.  
Transferring the decision power over the 
at tr ibution of ci t izenship from cit izens to the migrants 
is  also problematic,  even from the democratic 
standpoint .  I t  means transferring a decision from a 
larger group of people with diverse and convergent 
interests  to the decision of one single person that  is  
directly interested.  From the Rawls concept of  just ice,  
the “veil  of  ignorance” can only be used by ci t izens 
since the migrant  can never put  himself  in such an 
impart ial  s i tuation.  
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The moral  cosmopoli tanism theory can also be 
found in the thought of  Martha Nussbaum205.  Nussbaum 
sees cosmopoli tanism as a way of bringing people 
together,  for  greater  mutual  understanding.  For 
Nussbaum, this  would have been the only way to 
prevent tragic events in human history that  were caused 
by rage,  such as Nazism or,  more recently,  Islamic 
terrorism. 
Cosmopoli tanism trends can also be sustained from 
an economic standpoint .  The open borders case can 
have an economic approach.  Recent studies have 
demonstrated that  migration produces a very posit ive 
impact  on the host  countries’  economies.  The decision 
to migrate is  often associated with the search for better  
l iving and working condit ions that  migrants hope to 
f ind in the host  countries.  When that  expectat ion is  
fulf i l led,  migrant  workers wil l  be adding value and 
contributing to improving the economy. The direct  
effect  of  that  value added is  produced in the migrant’s  
personal  f inancial  s i tuation and quali ty of  l i fe .  Yet the 
benefi ts  for  both the host  and the home country are also 
significant .  The economy of the host  country benefi ts  
from addit ional  workforce,  often at  a  cost  which is  
lower than that  of  the national  work force.  There wil l  
also be benefi ts  for  consumers since the migrants wil l  
be part  of  the national  market .  The home countries 
benefi t  from remittances of  their  migrants that  hugely 
contribute to the development of  the economies and in 
many cases consti tute one of the main sources  of  
income. I  wil l  return to these issues later  in the chapter  
about migrant workers as ci t izens in wait ing.  
These conclusions are far  from being consensual  
and the economic effects  of  migration have been at  the 
center  of  recent poli t ical  and social  debate.  Many 
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challenge the posit ive effects  and argue that  the 
posit ive economic effect  is  only fel t  by the r icher 
classes of  the host  country,  which are able to  benefi t  
from cheaper basic services and able to enjoy extra 
resources in other act ivi t ies.  That  is  the case when the 
jobs for which ci t izens and migrants are competing are 
low income ones aimed at  less qualif ied people.  This 
means that  immigration would lead to unemployment 
for poorer ci t izens and economic benefi ts  for  r icher 
ci t izens.  A classic example is  that  of  a  restaurant  that  
hires immigrants and can therefore serve cheaper meals 
to i ts  customers – typically the higher classes – while 
the lower class ci t izens,  those looking for a job at  the 
restaurant ,  would f ind themselves in a diff icult  
s i tuation,  having to choose between unemployment or 
working for a substantial ly reduced salary,  equivalent  
to what is  paid to the immigrant206.  
However,  as Chang demonstrates,  this  idea is  based 
on incorrect  assumptions.  First ly i t  would be necessary 
to assume that  immigrants and ci t izens compete for the 
same jobs.  This assumption is  not  correct  s ince i t  is  
clear  that  in modern Western societ ies there are many 
jobs that  the ci t izens are not  wil l ing to do.  Secondly the 
argument rests  on the presumption that  the beneficial  
effect  of  the immigration can be l imited to the higher 
classes.  Even if  the direct  effect  could only be fel t  by 
these privileged classes – the usual  cl ients  of  
restaurants or  taxi  cab owners –the posit ive effect  
would rapidly spread to the whole community as the 
extra resources that  would result  for  the higher classes 
would be used in other consumption that  would 
ult imately benefi t  everyone.  Going back to the 
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restaurant  example used by Chang,  the competit ion 
between migrants and ci t izens is  not  at  the same level .  
The owners of  the restaurants  prefer  to hire ci t izens as 
waiters  – maybe for the language skil ls  – and migrants 
to work in the kitchen – if  this  option proves to be 
economically more profi table because migrants wil l  
take less pay than ci t izens.  In this  case restaurant  
owners would be able to serve cheaper meals and 
maintain the profi t  margin.  With cheaper meals cl ients  
could go to restaurants more often.  The profi t  growth 
could lead the restaurant  owner to expand his  
business207.  This movement would have a very posit ive 
economic impact on the real  economy as a whole,  
creating more jobs for  migrants and for ci t izens208.  
Admittedly,  the arguments associated with 
economic cosmopoli tanism may not be applicable to the 
moment of  at tr ibution of ci t izenship to the migrants.  
Some of the identif ied economic advantages might be 
lost  once the migrant  acquires ci t izenship of  the host  
country.  
Nevertheless,  the various cosmopoli tan theories 
which favor the el imination of border controls ,  al though 
controversial ,  highlight  the relat ionship between 
migration and ci t izenship.  I t  is  not  possible today to 
discuss the migratory movements without seriously 
pondering the consequences of  those movements and of 
the rules created to control  them by the design of the 
host  country demos .  The cosmopoli tan views also have 
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to be addressed– and their  theorists  do not ignore this  – 
bearing in mind that  the migrant  might,  down the road,  
acquire the host  country ci t izenship given that  the host  
should not  permanently deny ci t izenship to those who 
part icipate in building the community.  
 
b) Deterritorialized or post-national cit izenship  
 
The theory of a deterri torial ized or post  national  
ci t izenship looks at  the  porous nature of borders as a 
sign of a new global  order and the waning of the nation-
state.  Universal  human rights protection is  also a sign 
of those changes209.  
As Rosenau points  out ,  ci t izenship was conceived 
as a narrower concept of  at tachment ,  but  more recently 
i t  has gained broader meanings.  According to Rosenau,  
the sources of  transformation have been many, ranging 
from the civic abil i t ies  of  individuals to the devaluation 
of ci t izenship,  the State and a promise of universal  
personhood. Rosenau also identif ies the erosion of 
ci t izenship as a consequence of cross border migration 
and the blurring of the differences between ci t izens and 
al iens210.  Yet Rosenau acknowledges new types of 
at tachments,  ei ther with transnational  origins or  with 
social  movements,  or  even with sub national  
collectivit ies211.  Thus i t  seems that  Rosenau is  
advocating a relocation of ci t izenship beyond the 
States’  porous borders and within the new center  of  
at tachments location.  
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For Soysal  “ in the post-national model,  universal  
personhood replaces nationhood and universal  human 
rights replace national rights.  The just i f ication for the 
state’s  obligations to foreign populations goes beyond 
the nation-state i tsel f .  The rights and claims of  
individuals are legit imized by ideologies grounded in a 
transnational community,  through international codes,  
conventions and laws on human rights,  independent of  
their  ci t izenship in a nation state.  Hence the individual 
transcends the ci t izen.  This is  the most  elemental  way 
that  the post-national model di f fers from the national 
model”212.  
Soysal  goes on to use the example of  the 
international  conventions on refugee law to i l lustrate 
that  in cases of  poli t ical  persecution personhood 
replaces ci t izenship in the sense that  the r ights of  the 
refugee are protected by the host  country that  cannot 
even deport  to the home country a person whose refugee 
status has been recognized.  
Soysal  identif ies three major developments that  
explain the post-national  ci t izenship movement.  First ly,  
in the post  war period the nation-state as a formal 
organization was decoupled from the locus of  
legit imacy and shif ted to the global  level .  “In this  new 
order of  sovereignty,  the larger system assumes the role 
of  defining rules and principles,  charging the nation-
states with the responsibil i ty  to uphold them”213.  The 
second development is  “ the emergence of  universal  
rules and conceptions regarding the rights of  the 
individual,  which are formalized and legit imated by a 
mult i tude of  international codes and laws.  International 
                                              
212 YASEMIN SOYSAL, Limits of citizenship: migrants and postnational 
membership in Europe (1994), 142. 
213 YASEMIN SOYSAL, Limits of citizenship: migrants and postnational 
membership in Europe (1994), 144. 
Gonçalo Saraiva Matias – The Path to Citizenship 
154 
conventions and charters ascribe universal  rights  to 
persons regardless of  their  membership status in the 
nation-state (…) both the Universal  Declaration of  
Human Rights and the European Convention have been 
incorporated into the consti tut ions and laws of  many 
countries”214.  The third development is  the previously 
mentioned international  protection of refugees and the 
principle of  non refoulement .  
Soysal  considers EU law as the best  example of  
post-national  ci t izenship and of the decoupling of r ights  
from the nation-state to the international  arena215.  
Despite advocating the idea of post-national  
ci t izenship,  Soysal  does not  sustain the duali ty of  the 
world ci t izen vs.  local  ci t izen or the idea of  creating a 
world state.  For Soysal  post-national  formations of  
membership do challenge set  ideas and show that  
national  ci t izenship is  no longer an adequate concept 
but  she acknowledges that  the domestic locus  s t i l l  plays 
an important  role216.  
Post-national  theories are very important  in 
understanding the signs of  ci t izenship 
denationalization.  However,  in my view they fai l  in two 
aspects.  
First ly,  the focus of  the analysis  is  s t i l l  terr i torial .  
The idea is  that  the national  was replaced by 
supranational .  But then the new locus  is  hard to f ind.  
That  is  probably why Soysal  refuses to acknowledge the 
end of the nation-state and struggles to f ind i ts  new 
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posit ioning in the global  order.  The answer to this  
diff iculty would be to advocate the creation of a global  
s tate which is  not  a  concern of the post-national  
theorists .  
Secondly,  most  of  the arguments used by the post-
national  theorists  are r ights-related.  Thus,  post-national  
theory rel ies largely on an update of  ci t izenship as 
r ights theory at  the supranational  level .  
Notwithstanding the importance of the ci t izenship as 
r ights theory,  i t  fai ls  to analyze and understand other 
features of  the r ich and mult ifaceted ci t izenship 
concept.  
 
c) The decline of cit izenship  
 
The decline of  ci t izenship theory departs  from the 
cri t ique on cosmopoli tanism to consider that  the waning 
of the nation-state as a consequence of globalization 
and the international  protection of human rights results  
in the devaluation of ci t izenship217.  
Walzer rejects  the open borders theory.  Poli t ical  
communities should be free to establish the f irst  entry 
policy,  whether concerning migrants or  refugees.  For 
Walzer,  as long as the country complies with i ts  
international  obligations and with the mutual  aid 
principle,  i t  is  free to admit  or  refuse entrance of  
foreigners within i ts  borders218.  However,  once admitted 
in the terr i tory,  individuals  cannot remain foreigners 
forever and must  be naturalized.  As Benhabib 
underl ines,  “ the basis  for this  claim is  unclear; there 
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certainly is  no such thing as a human right  to 
membership in Walzer’s view; why exist ing poli t ies 
should feel  an obligation to naturalize foreigners is  lef t  
unexplained”219.  
Also Walzer is  not  concerned with the effect  of  
human rights protection on the detachment of  
individuals  from the national  poli ty.  He rejects  the 
dualism between human rights and ci t izens’ r ights.  If  
such dualism existed he would favor the r ight  to 
collective self-determination220.  In fact ,  in a response to 
Benhabib,  Walzer defended the r ight  of  States to pass 
anti- immigration legislat ion on the basis  of  the r ight  to 
self-determination221.  Walzer defends the r ight  of  the 
State to control  migration but ,  as I  have underl ined 
above,  once the migrants are admitted in the terr i tory,  
they should be put  on a quick path to ci t izenship.  
Commenting on a proposal  by Benhabib to extend 
voting rights  to immigrants and her fear that  this  might 
delay the path to ci t izenship,  Walzer acknowledges the 
r isk of  “permanent al ienage.” However,  because of  this  
danger he argues “ in Spheres of  Just ice  that ,  in 
democratic nation-states,  resident al iens,  guest  
workers,  and any other groups that  f i t  into the old 
Athenian category of  the metic should be put  as quickly 
as possible on the road to ful l  ci t izenship.  Since,  in 
most  European countries,  al l  the crucial  decisions are 
made nationally,  not  locally,  the most  important pre-
cit izenship rights are probably those of  poli t ical  and 
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economic organization.  Allowing new immigrants to 
vote in municipal elections would be a useful  reform, 
but  i t  is  more crucial  that  they be able to bargain 
collectively and participate freely in social  movements.  
I  am sure Benhabib agrees that  whatever condit ions she 
or I  would want to attach to ci t izenship,  the right  to 
organize unions and join movements is  
uncondit ional”222.  
Part  of  the discussion on the decline of  ci t izenship 
has to do with the recognit ion of i ts  devaluation in the 
l ight  of  the access migrants have gained to “cit izenship 
goods” outside of  the legal  formal status.  Be i t  the r ight  
to part icipate poli t ical ly or the protection of 
fundamental  r ights  or  even certain r ights  of  admittance 
in the terr i tory,  the theorists  of  the decline of  
ci t izenship look at  these phenomena as a demonstrat ion 
of ci t izenship devaluation.  Yet,  as Walzer puts i t ,  any 
theory on migration and ci t izenship needs to define two 
basic premises:  should immigration be free and 
ci t izenship controlled? Should both be controlled under 
str ict  scrutiny or should States be free to establish 
cri teria of  admittance and then establish clear  and 
relat ively easy natural izat ion policies? Walzer clearly 
opts for the lat ter .  As I  wil l  discuss later ,  al though I  
would not  adhere to the ci t izenship devaluation thesis  – 
and maybe even Walzer would contest  that  qualif ication 
– I  would total ly endorse Walzer’s  conclusion on this  
subject .  Although there is  no legal  basis– beyond basic 
principles of  international  law such as non-
discrimination – to restr ict  the State’s  competence to 
regulate migration,  there are several  compell ing 
arguments to restr ict  that  competence when i t  comes to 
naturalization.   
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Having said that ,  I  would also subscribe to the 
following cri t icisms that  Benhabib levels  at  Walzer’s  
theory.  First ly,  Walzer insists  on the idea of  the need 
for a naturalizat ion path but  fai ls  to provide substantial  
arguments for  this .  I t  is  t rue that  in Spheres of  Justice ,  
Walzer discusses at  length the tyranny associated with 
denying ci t izenship to effective members of  the “club”,  
but  he provides no compell ing legal  or  moral  
arguments.  I  wil l  discuss this  further later .  
Secondly,  I  would agree with Benhabib’s claim that  
a  clear  l ine should be drawn between the protections of  
a refugee and of a migrant  and that  Walzer does not  
acknowledge this .  In fact ,  as  Benhabib puts i t  “ from the 
standpoint  of  international law as well  as moral 
philosophy,  the duties and obligations we owe to 
strangers who seek entry into our communities on the 
grounds that  they are persecuted -  for their  ancestry 
and ethnici ty ,  beliefs  or convict ions,  or because war,  
persecution,  or natural  disasters make their  homes 
uninhabitable -  is  of  a dif ferent  kind than the 
obligations we owe others who choose to l ive in our 
midst .  The claims of  refugees and asylum seekers do 
generate stronger obligations of  compliance on the part  
of  receiving communities.  Denying refuge and sojourn 
to refugees and asylees would violate a fundamental  
rule of  human morali ty  -  namely,  to aid those in need -  
as well  as st ipulations of  the 1951 Geneva Convention 
relating to the Status of  Refugees.  Therefore,  recipient  
communities must  stand under a “stricter burden of  
proof” to show why such claims are unworthy of  
recognit ion,  or how or why recognizing them would 
jeopardize not  just  the economic standard of  l iving but  
the very survival  of  the receiving communit ies”223.  
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Jacobson begins by acknowledging that  human 
rights are not  predicated on nationali ty and are not  
based on the dist inction between national  and foreigner.  
Yet,  he also acknowledges that  the human rights codes 
are becoming the vehicle that  is  transforming the 
nation-state since “ the basis  of  the state legit imacy is  
shif t ing from principles of  sovereignty and national 
sel f-determination to international human rights  (…) 
the state is  becoming less a sovereign agent and more 
an inst i tut ional forum of  a larger international and 
consti tut ional order based on human rights”224.  
Jacobson goes on to elaborate on the consequences 
of  this  blurring of sovereignty on the States’  legit imacy 
in order to conclude that  i t  is  increasingly diff icult  for  
the State to maintain control  and define the national  and 
social  boundaries of  the poli ty since,  he claims,  
transnational  migration challenges the State’s  abil i ty to 
define the people.   
Jacobson elaborates on the importance of defining 
ci t izenship in order to determine the human fabric of  
the nation-state,  but  he places that  determination,  as 
Walzer does,  at  the level  of  immigration control  and not  
the naturalization process225.  Jacobson considers border 
control  a  vital  instrument of  sovereignty.  
Specif ical ly on ci t izenship,  Jacobson defines i t  as  
fulf i l l ing two main tasks:  “ f irst  i t  determines the 
cri teria of  membership,  that  is ,  who may and may not 
belong to or join “the people”; and,  second,  rules of  
ci t izenship determine the nature of  the “conversation” 
between the individual and the state – the rights  and 
obligations of  the ci t izen,  the kind of  access the ci t izen 
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has to the state,  and the kinds of  demands the state can 
make upon the ci t izen”.  Yet,  he adds that  transnational  
migration is  eroding the tradit ional  basis  of  the nation-
state and chief  among i ts  aspects  is  ci t izenship.  That  
erosion can be seen in the blurring of the difference 
between ci t izen and al ien.  He concludes that  the 
devaluation of ci t izenship has contributed to the 
increasing importance of  international  human rights .  He 
maintains that  the devaluation of ci t izenship and the 
weakening of sovereign control  create questions about 
the legit imacy of the States226.  
Another sign of the devaluation of ci t izenship that  
Jacobson acknowledges is  the increasingly lower 
interest  in the ci t izenship status that  migrants show, 
especial ly as a result  of  al l  sorts  of  r ights being 
conferred on them, including in some cases the r ight  to 
vote in local  elections227.  
The decline of  ci t izenship theory contests  
cosmopoli tanism depart ing from the same grounds.  I t  is  
clear  that  the nation-state is  waning,  borders are porous 
and the States’  abil i ty to deal  with massive migration 
movement is  l imited.  What varies in these theories is  
the assessment of  these facts  and the proposals  on how 
States should deal  with them. 
The decline of  ci t izenship proposal ,  al though 
compell ing in i ts  arguments,  is  somehow weak in i ts  
conclusions.  The decline of ci t izenship theorists  do not 
advocate the end of ci t izenship nor do they propose an 
al ternative status.   
Also,  the international  protection of human rights 
and the extension of poli t ical  r ights to foreigners at  the 
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State level  have diminished the interest  of  migrants in 
acquiring ci t izenship,  Jacobson says.  
Again,  the decline of  ci t izenship theory is  
primarily based on a ci t izenship as r ights  conception.  I t  
does not  value other dimensions of  the ci t izenship 
concept.  
By refusing the cosmopoli tan approach i t  also 
denies an important  development of  the ci t izenship 
concept and i ts  transnationalization.  
 Finally,  as  I  wil l  later  discuss,  subsequent 
developments and data show, contrari ly to what 
Jacobson affirms,  that  there is  a  revival  of  the search 
for ci t izenship and naturalization numbers are growing 
in Europe and in the United States.  
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§3.  The Universal Protection of Human Rights  
 
a)  Citizenship as rights 
 
In the 20t h  century the social  theory associated 
ci t izenship with the possession and exercise of  r ights228.  
The ci t izenship-as-rights theory has been art iculated by 
T.  H. Marshall229.  For Marshall ,  ci t izenship is  an 
enjoyment of  r ights achieved in the civil ,  poli t ical  and 
social  spheres of  capital is t  societ ies230.    
In the legal  f ield,  Marshall’s  ci t izenship concept 
was adopted by consti tut ionalists ,  such as Charles 
Black231 and Kenneth Karst232.  
According to this  theory the content  of  ci t izenship,  
i ts  r ights  and the way these can be possessed and 
exercised is  the necessary condit ion of ci t izenship233.   
  Bosniak acknowledges some diff icult ies with this  
theory.  First ly,  when ci t izenship is  placed at  a  level  of  
recognit ion of  r ights,  a  central  question is  by whom 
should these r ights be recognized,  and against  whom.234 
Underlying these theories,  and this  may be the reason 
why the above question is  not  raised by the ci t izenship-
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as-rights theorists ,  is  the idea that  the locus  of  these 
r ights is  the nation-state.   
However,  as I  have stressed above,  the ci t izenship-
as-rights theory was subject  to a more recent approach,  
which was transnational  in nature.  Depart ing from the 
ci t izenship-as-rights theory,  the post-national  
ci t izenship concept detached i t  from the nation-state 
and placed i t  at  the transnational  level .  
I t  is  also the case – as I  wil l  later  elaborate,  
especial ly about voting r ights – that  the municipal  law 
of most  States grants many rights to non-cit izens.  
In the context  of  the Universal  Declarat ion of  
Human Rights and of the l iberal  democracies’  
consti tut ions,  i t  is  human dignity  rather than ci t izenship 
that  defines the recognit ion of human rights235.  We can 
identify a basic framework of human rights  that  are 
granted to everyone regardless of  their  relat ionship with 
a specif ic State.  Those r ights are inherent  to al l  human 
beings.  This would be a basis  for a global  ci t izenship 
where we could f ind a perfect  match between the person 
and the ci t izen since both would hold the same rights.  
We can no longer argue that  basic human rights  are 
the exclusive preserve of  ci t izens.  The common ground 
for these r ights  is  personhood and not ci t izenship.  Since 
ancient  Greece,  ci t izenship has been used as a pretext  
to exclude people from rights .  I t  was the basis  for  
discrimination based on race,  gender and State origin.  
In the 20t h  century the international  protection of 
human rights was associated with the increasing 
importance of  legal  protection for the individual  and 
human dignity.  
Migratory movements played their  part  in this  
development.  The porous nature of  the States’  borders 
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and the mass migratory movements brought new claims 
and necessi t ies which were previously unknown. 
A very important  feature of  the development of  
international  legal  protection for the individual  is  the 
requirement of  legal  personali ty in international  law, 
and the recognit ion of the individual  as a subject  of  
international  law. 
 
b)  The individual as subject of  
international law  
 
In the f irst  s tages of  the development of  
international  law, States were the only actors and 
subjects  of  international  law236.  
The f irst  manifestat ions of  the international  
relevance of  the individual  were deeply connected with 
the States’  actions.  This was the case of  diplomatic 
protection,  diplomatic immunities,  and the status of  
heads of  state,  government officers and foreign affairs  
ministers .  
The individual  emerged with autonomous relevance 
in the international  legal  order with the protection of 
human rights,  the exercise of  a r ight  to self-
determination of peoples,  protection of minori t ies and 
the creation of the International  Criminal  Court .  
The controversy about the international  subjectivi ty 
of  individuals is  s t i l l  going on among scholars and 
international  courts .  An important  question these days 
is  whether individuals  can be recipients  of  international  
legal  norms. 
The answer to this  question tends to be posit ive in 
al l  the cases where the individual  establishes a direct  
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relat ionship with other subjects  of  international  law, be 
i t  because that  possibil i ty is  conferred by general  
international  law or because i t  is  conferred by specif ic  
international  treaties.  
For a recent  example that  resumes the tradit ion of 
diplomatic protection as a cradle for international  
protection of human rights ,  and which also concerns the 
nationali ty of  corporations,  fol lowing the Barcelona 
Traction Case ,  i t  is  interest ing to analyze the 
International  Court  of  Just ice’s decision on a dispute 
between the Republic of  Guinea and the Democratic 
Republic of  Congo, known as the Ahmadou Sadio Diallo 
case237.  
Ahmadou Sadio Diallo was a Guinean ci t izen,  
set t led in the DRC. There,  he founded an import-export  
company.  At the end of the 1980s,  Diallo’s company 
brought a case against  i ts  business partners in an 
at tempt to recover various debts.  The various disputes 
continued throughout the 1990s and for the most  part  
remain unresolved today.   
Apparently for  no reason,  but  in connection with 
these lawsuits ,  Mr.  Diallo was arrested and imprisoned.  
According to the Court ,  those deprivations of  l iberty 
were “arbitrary” and Mr.  Diallo was not  informed, at  
the t ime of his  arrests ,  of  the reasons for those arrests ,  
nor was he informed of the charges against  him. 
The public prosecutor in Kinshasa ordered the 
release of  Mr.  Diallo after  the case was closed for 
“inexpediency of prosecution”.  In 1995,  the Zairean 
Prime Minister  issued an expulsion decree against  Mr.  
Diallo.  Mr.  Diallo was arrested and placed in detention 
with a view to his  expulsion.  After  having been released 
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and rearrested,  he was f inally expelled from Congolese 
terr i tory in 1996. 
The Court  decided that  “having concluded that  the 
Democratic Republic of  the Congo has breached i ts  
obligations under Articles 9 and 13 of the International  
Covenant on Civil  and Poli t ical  Rights,  Articles 6 and 
12 of the African Charter  on Human and Peoples’  
Rights,  and Article 36,  paragraph 1 (b),  of  the Vienna 
Convention on Consular  Relat ions,  i t  is  for  the Court  
now to determine,  in l ight  of  Guinea’s f inal  
submissions,  what consequences f low from these 
internationally wrongful  acts  giving rise to the DRC’s 
international  responsibil i ty (…)  In the l ight  of  the 
circumstances of  the case,  in part icular  the fundamental  
character  of  the human rights obligations breached and 
Guinea’s claim for reparation in the form of 
compensation,  the Court  is  of  the opinion that ,  in 
addit ion to a judicial  f inding of the violat ions,  
reparation due to Guinea for the injury suffered by Mr.  
Diallo must  take the form of compensation (…) The 
Court  is  of  the opinion that  the Part ies should indeed 
engage in negotiat ion in order to agree on the amount of  
compensation to be paid by the DRC to Guinea for the 
injury f lowing from the wrongful  detentions and 
expulsion of Mr.  Diallo in 1995-1996, including the 
result ing loss of  his  personal  belongings”238.  
Although i t  was a dispute between two States,  at  
the centre of  the dispute was the violat ion of an 
individual’s  human rights.  In a sense,  i t  is  recognit ion 
of the capacity of  the individual  to be holder of  
fundamental  r ights  in the international  arena.  
 The international  subjectivi ty of  the individual  
should then be considered whenever his  relat ionship 
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with the international  order just if ies an intervention 
beyond the State.   
The international  protection of human rights  is  an 
example of that  subjectivity,  even within a State’s  
borders.  In fact ,  as  we have witnessed in recent events,  
sometimes the international  community acts  to protect  
human rights of  individuals against  their  own State (as 
shown in the recent intervention of the international  
community in the Libyan conflict) .  The slaughtering of 
a part  of  the population – as in genocide – or violence 
committed against  the State’s  own population in general  
can be the object  of  international  intervention.  
According to the UN charter ,  this  can take –the form of 
humanitarian rel ief ,  the deployment of  armed forces to 
restore peace or even the creation of  international  
criminal  tr ibunals239.  
Another example of subjectivity is  the international  
criminal  just ice system. Although the purpose of  these 
courts  is  to punish perpetrators of  international  crimes 
and not to vindicate the r ights of  the vict ims,  their  
provisions are applicable to individuals and not to 
States and international  organizations.  So unlike in 
other international  courts  – such as the International  
Court  of  Just ice – the defendant in the procedure is  an 
individual  rather than a State.   
The f irst  t r ibunals to be created in the aftermath of 
the World War II  were those set  up in Nuremberg and 
Tokyo to try the war crimes committed by Nazi 
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officials .  Much later ,  ad hoc  t r ibunals for the war 
crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia and in 
Rwanda were created by Resolutions 827 of May 25,  
1993 and 955 of November 8,  1994.  These tr ibunals 
were intended to bring to tr ial  the perpetrators of  the 
war crimes committed against  the population of the 
aforementioned countries ,  whose courts  were unable to 
deal  with the si tuation.    
The example of  these courts  is  usually used to 
i l lustrate the discussion about the international  
subjectivity of  the individual  s ince they are examples of  
the direct  intervention of individuals  in the 
international  legal  order.   Finally,  in 1998,  the Statute 
of  Rome on the International  Criminal  Court  was 
approved,  and i t  entered into force on 1 July,  2002.  
Today international  criminal  just ice is  clearly a f ield of  
international  subjectivi ty of  the individual  because the 
individual  is  not  only subject  to i ts  norms but also to 
the jurisdict ion of  i ts  court .  
Of course,  as stressed above,  a  major f ield for  the 
aff irmation of the individual  as a subject  of  
international  law is  the international  protection of 
human rights.  That  protection is  clear in international  
instruments such as the Universal  Declarat ion of Human 
Rights (UDHR) adopted by the General  Assembly of the 
United Nations on December 10,  1948 or the 
International  Covenant on Civil  and Poli t ical  Rights,  
adopted on December 16,  1966.  At the European level ,  
the same can be said about the European Convention on 
Human Rights or  the European Charter  of  Fundamental  
Rights.  
This new approach to the individual  by 
international  law goes back to i ts  original  configuration 
as “ ius gentium”,  by placing human beings at  the center  
of  the international  legal  order.  Having human dignity 
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as a common background,  the center  of  this  new global  
order is  the person and personhood.  
An interest ing proposal  in this  same direction is  
made by Rafael  Domingo in his  recent book on “The 
new Global  Law” in which he advocates that  the 
difference between international  law and global  law is  
precisely the role of  the individual .  International  law is  
a law of States and international  organizations whereas 
global  law is  the law of persons,  placing the human 
being at  the center  of  the international  legal  order240.  
This dimension is  very present  in the theorists  that  
s tudy transnational  ci t izenship.  From the second half  of  
the 20t h  century onwards,  international  law abandoned 
i ts  exclusively State-centered configuration.  The 
movement towards revaluing the individual  in the 
international  arena,  result ing from the 
internationalization of human rights ,  produced clear  
consequences with regard to ci t izenship.  Thus a legal  
order envisaged for the inter-State relat ionship has been 
changed into a person-centered legal  order.  
 
c)  The cit izenship-as-rights theory 
crit ique 
 
As I  have shown above,  ci t izenship was seen for a 
long t ime as a reserved domestic domain of the State.  In 
fact ,  the purely inter-State dimension of ci t izenship can 
only be addressed as a problem of international  law in 
the sense that  i t  consti tutes a dispute of  applicable 
laws.  As I  have stressed above,  the f irst  international  
interventions in the ci t izenship domain targeted the 
resolution or el imination of  disputes between States.   
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However,  as I  have also shown, the paradigm 
changed dramatically,  and these changes made i t  
possible to foresee a fundamental  r ight  to individual  
ci t izenship rather that  an international  law for dispute 
resolution between States.  
This,  moreover,  departs  from the notion that  the 
transnationalization of ci t izenship needs a locus  of  
protection,  due to the lack of a global  authori ty.  
As Bosniak stresses,  apart  from the r isk of  
overstat ing the degree to which the international  human 
rights regime actually protects  the individual ,  i t  is  
important  to acknowledge that  the protection is  made 
available to individuals by way of their  States241.   
This means that  for  those who claim that  the 
international  protection of human rights  is  weakening 
the concept of  ci t izenship i t  is  important  to state clearly 
that  the international  global  order has not  entirely 
replaced the nation-state and that  ci t izenship within the 
nation-state is  ul t imately st i l l  a  vehicle to enjoy the full  
protection of r ights .  This is  part icularly evident in the 
case of undocumented migrants,  as I  wil l  later  discuss.  
Also,  the theory,  as compell ing as i t  is ,  s t i l l  largely 
rel ies on a ci t izenship-as-rights conception.  Here we 
should take into consideration not only that  ci t izenship 
entai ls  other elements besides r ights ,  but  also that  not  
al l  the r ights can be included in the international  
protection of human rights.  In fact ,   we can st i l l  look at  
some rights – poli t ical  r ights – as being typical  
ci t izenship r ights as they might not  be recognized as 
inherent  to al l  humans beings but  only to those who are 
active members of  a community and while they 
part icipate in i t .  As every human being is ,  in principle,  
member of ,  at  least ,  one community,  i t  can be said that  
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poli t ical  r ights  are also human r ights .  Although this  
assert ion might be true,  poli t ical  r ights are defined by a 
specif ic relat ionship between the person and the State  
and therefore they are not  inherent  to a human being in 
whatever circumstance.  In any event there is  a  growing 
movement in the direction of granting poli t ical  r ights  to 
al iens,  at  least  to documented immigrants.  
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§4.  Transnational political activism  
 
Cit izenship is  usually referred to as poli t ical  
activism or civic engagement.  This is  certainly not  the 
legal  s tatus of  the ci t izenship related concept ,  but  i t  has 
entered the vocabulary.   
Hannah Arendt has writ ten on this  notion of 
ci t izenship242.  In this  sense,  ci t izenship means the 
nature of  the public involvement by members of  the 
poli ty243.  A ci t izen would then be an active member of  
the poli t ical  community.  The roots of  this  idea are 
found in the Greek tradit ion of ci t izenship,  as I  have 
above described.  
According to Maurizio Passerin d 'Entreves,  
Arendt’s  conception of ci t izenship is  art iculated around 
the public sphere,  poli t ical  agency and collective 
identi ty.  These themes are crucial  in the construction of 
democratic ci t izenship.  According to Arendt’s  thinking,  
“ the practice of  ci t izenship depends on the reactivation 
of  a public sphere where individuals can act  
collectively and engage in common deliberation about 
all  matters affecting the poli t ical  community (…) 
Participatory ci t izenship is  also essential  in the 
attainment of  ef fective poli t ical  agency since i t  enables 
each individual to have some impact on the decisions 
that  the well  being of  the community”244.  
Yet this  idea entai ls  a  concept of  poli t ical  
engagement detached from a part icular  locus .  The very 
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notion of part icipation does not  depend upon a specif ic 
place but  on the activi ty i tself ,  and that  contradicts  a  
set t led concept of  modern t imes according to which the 
locus  of  ci t izenship is  the nation-state.   
There is  also a transnationalization movement 
regarding poli t ical  act ivism. Thus ci t izenship as a 
poli t ical  act ivi ty can not only be seen at  the national  
level  but  also at  the international  level .  Often that  is  
the phenomenon that  authors refer  to when mentioning 
transnational  or  global  ci t izenship245.  This tendency can 
be found in new ways of transnational  poli t ical  
organization in the form of non-governmental  
organizations,  social  movements and other forms of 
organizations related to the protection of the 
environment or  of  human rights246.  
According to Richard Falk,  there is  a  growing 
movement of  what he calls  “globalization from below”, 
that  is ,  in essence,   a  “democracy without frontiers”.  In 
that  sense ci t izenship is  in the realm of the construction 
of a global  civil  society that  is  seeking to extend ideas 
of  moral ,  legal  and environmental  accountabil i ty.  For 
Falk there are four dimensions of  ci t izenship beyond 
tradit ional  boundaries of  the nation-state:  i )  the 
aspirat ion to the unity of  human experience as seeking 
to create a better  world;  i i )  the tendency towards global  
integration as a result  of  economic globalization (ex.  G-
7 summits);  i i i )  an expanding consensus of  informed 
people around the world on the survival  of  mankind 
(issues l ike energy,  resources and the environment);  and 
iv)  transnational  mili tancy towards international  causes 
and the abil i ty to change mainstream views247.  
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Interest ingly,  two of the major examples of  
transnational  poli t ical  act ivi ty are both against  the 
leaders in poli t ical  and economic globalization (such as 
at  non-inst i tut ional  summits l ike the G-7 or against  
mult inational  companies l ike McDonalds248)  and against  
globalization (demonstrat ions at  Davos World Economic 
Forum or at  the G-7 summits) .  So probably one of the 
best  examples of  transnational  poli t ical  act ivism is  
precisely the demonstrat ion against  globalization! 
Examples of  other organizations can also i l lustrate 
this  form of transnational  activism with focused causes 
and stabil ized activity.  This is  the case of  transnational  
organizations for the protection of the environment 
( l ike Greenpeace) or  for  the protection of  international  
human rights (such as Amnesty International  or  Human 
Rights Watch)249.  
The cri t icism that  can be made of  this  new form of 
ci t izenship is  that  i t  has no inst i tut ional  basis  and exists  
in the anarchy of a non-regulated global  order250.  
Therefore the absence of a World State would obstruct  
the existence of  a transnational  ci t izenship.  
As Bosniak very elegantly describes i t ,  “one could 
argue that  “transnational activism as transnational 
ci t izenship” fulf i l ls  the normative requirements of  the 
theory of  poli t ical  ci t izenship very well .  For here,  
ci t izenship does not  suffer the thinness and passivi ty of  
s tatus-based and rights-based conceptions; i t  is  robust  
and engaged,  ref lecting “commitment to the common 
good and active participation in public affairs”251.  
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In fact ,  I  do not  believe that  the lat ter  reason can 
be regarded as the major obstacle for  a transnational  
ci t izenship based on transnational  poli t ical  activism. 
This cri t icism is  State-centered since i t  refuses to 
consider ci t izenship outside of an established State.  
According to this  view i t  would only be possible to 
achieve transnational  ci t izenship in the remote event 
that  the national  States were replaced by a global  State. 
In my view, more relevant than the absence of  an 
inst i tut ional  framework is  the absence of democratic 
mechanisms and poli t ical  representation.  Poli t ical  
activism and part icipation can only be considered as 
elements of  ci t izenship if  they contribute to the creation 
of a democratic community.  Peter  H. Schuck argues that  
post-national  ci t izenship is  only possible and 
meaningful  in reasonably democratic States252.  I t  is  
necessary that  the locus  of  that  part icipation shows the 
mechanisms of a l iberal  democratic society that  is  able 
to enhance and control  poli t ical  wil l ,  part icipation and 
representat ion.  Poli t ical  act ivism and part icipation 
cannot be seen as a ci t izenship element in authori tarian 
regimes that  restr ict  freedom of expression.  I t  is  useless 
to consider poli t ical  part icipation if  i t  cannot influence 
poli t ical  choices.  
This view is  very different  from the State-centered 
one that  calls  for  a  global  State.  I  am advocating a 
democratic forum that  can work as a cradle for 
transnational  poli t ical  act ivism and reduce the cri t icism 
of an absence of poli t ical  part icipation in the global  
order.  
In any event European ci t izenship can be identif ied 
as an example of  inst i tut ional  transnational  ci t izenship,  
somewhere in between national  and transnational  
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cit izenship.  European cit izenship reproduces the 
ci t izenship elements as i t  t r ies to replicate at  the Union 
level  the idea of  common rights ,  s tatus and poli t ical  
part icipation.  I  wil l  develop this  idea in the next 
chapter .  
The ci t izenship as poli t ical  act ivism theory departs  
from a concept of  ci t izenship as poli t ical  part icipation.  
Thus,  i t  helps us to understand how mult ifaceted and 
rich the ci t izenship concept is .  
However,  acknowledging al l  these facets  of  the 
concept also entai ls  acknowledging that  relying on the 
legal  s tatus to define ci t izenship is  probably too 
l imited.  I t  is  just  not  sufficient  to legit imate ci t izenship 
upon the decision of the sovereign within the nation-
state.  
Cit izenship as poli t ical  act ivi ty is  a  central  idea 
that  aids an understanding of the democratic paradox 
and the principle of  democracy that  I  wil l  develop in 
the last  chapter .  In fact ,  there can be no meaningful  
ci t izenship without substantial  poli t ical  part icipation.  
Consequently,  proper ci t izenship in a democratic 
context  needs to be inclusive and al low part icipation 
for al l  the active members of  the community.     
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§5.  Dual and multiple citizenships  
 
The plural  ci t izenship phenomenon has been 
identif ied as another sign of ci t izenship 
transnationalization253.  In fact ,  the mass migration 
movements in recent years have provided the 
opportunity for mult iple at tachments254.  These 
at tachments lead the migrants to seek naturalization in 
their  host  country while often retaining ci t izenship in 
their  home country.  
According to Stephen Legomsky, “ large-scale dual 
nationali ty  is  made possible by the interaction of  three 
fundamental  maxims.  Maxim # 1 [subject  to some 
expanding exceptions]  is  that  each state decides who i ts  
own nationals are.  Maxim # 2 is  that ,  in making those 
decisions,  a given state typically provides alternative,  
mult iple routes to nationali ty .  These alternative paths 
frequently confer nationali ty  by virtue of  birth in the 
state’s  terri tory (“jus soli”),  by descent from one or 
both of  one’s parents (“jus sanguinis”),  and by 
naturalization.  Maxim # 3 is  that  the rules vary from 
state to state”255.  
The combination of these factors explains the 
increasing numbers of  dual  and mult iple cit izenships 
these days.  Peter  Spiro says that  “although statist ical  
information is  lacking,  i t  is  clear that  there has been an 
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explosion in the numbers of  individuals holding plural  
ci t izenship”256.  
Despite being skeptical  about the transnational  
nature of  the mult iple ci t izenship phenomenon, Bosniak 
acknowledges that  i t  entai ls  some transnational  
aspects257,  aff irming that  “ the claim that  plural  
nationali ty  actually enhances,  as well  as undermines,  
s tate power (or the power of  at  least  some states)  
maybe contestable but  i t  is  plausible enough to suggest  
some circumspection to those who uncrit ically embrace 
the idea that  plural  nationali ty  leads to national 
decline”258.  
 In any event,  i t  is  clear that  there is  a  growing 
tendency for dual  and mult iple ci t izenships.  For many 
years dual  ci t izenship was perceived as an anomaly or 
an abomination259.  As I  described above,  international  
law fought against  the phenomenon. However,  there has 
been a recent change towards multiple ci t izenships.  
First ly,  the notion of sovereignty over ci t izenship 
lost  much of i ts  original  meaning.  Then,  the r ise of  the 
human rights age made i t  easier  to recognize mult iple 
at tachments of  the individual  and his  r ight  to claim 
rights within each of those at tachments260.  
Also one should consider the question of mult iple 
ci t izenships from the perspective  of  interests .  For many 
years,  mult iple ci t izenships tended to be a source of  
confl ict  between States.  Then,  progressively,  States 
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understood that  this  could be beneficial .  So the 
transit ion in the perception of mult iple ci t izenships 
went from them being detrimental  to neutral  to 
beneficial ,  especial ly from the home state perspective261.  
In fact ,  and this  factor was part icularly evident in the 
negotiat ion of the International  Convention on the 
Protection of  the Rights of  All  Migrant  Workers and 
Members of  Their  Families – as I  wil l  discuss in the 
f if th chapter  –,  for  the sending countries i t  is  very 
important  to maintain at tachments with the migrants.  
They do not want them to integrate too well  because 
maintaining the l ink with the home country makes i t  
easier  and more probable for  the migrant to keep the 
f low of remittances that  in some cases represents a 
significant  source of income to these countries262.  
So al lowing ci t izens to maintain their  ci t izenship 
despite their  acquisi t ion of another ci t izenship and 
longtime residence in another country is  completely 
just if ied from the perspective of the sending country’s 
interest .  
Given that  mult iple ci t izenship is  not  imposed,  but  
is  rather a voluntary phenomenon, i t  is  also interest ing 
to analyze the migrant’s  perspective.  Multiple 
ci t izenship would not be as popular  if  the obligations 
entai led were overwhelming or represented a sacrif ice 
for those who held i t .  
So this  raises the question of  the obligations 
ci t izenship entai ls .  So far  – and i t  is  often the case – 
the discussion about ci t izenship has been about r ights.  
Yet when we discuss the advantages of  having more 
than one ci t izenship,  the obligations side arises. 
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There are typically two obligations connected with 
ci t izenship:  mil i tary service and taxes. 
According to Legomsky, there are two possibil i t ies  
for  dealing with the problem related to mili tary service:  
reduce the number of  dual  nationals  or  try to solve the 
problems that  dual  nationali ty poses within the mili tary 
service context .  His option is  the lat ter .  Yet as 
Legomsky abundantly shows in his  art icle,  the problems 
have been solved ei ther by transforming the mili tary 
service into a voluntary obligation – in many countries 
– or by concluding bilateral  or  mult i lateral  agreements 
that  wil l  deal  with this  issue263.  
With regard to taxes,  cri teria other than ci t izenship 
have been elected to determine the relevant taxation 
place,  namely residence.  In those cases where 
ci t izenship might st i l l  play a role,  international  
agreements,  both bilateral  and mult i lateral ,  have also 
been signed in order to deal  with problems related to 
mult i- taxation264.  
So the major obligations that  are at tached to 
ci t izenship and that  might consti tute an obstacle to 
mult iple ci t izenship and naturalization from the 
migrant’s  perspective have been progressively resolved,  
ei ther internally – in the sending countries by removing 
barriers  to the naturalization in the host  country and by 
el iminating denationalization clauses;  in the host  
countries by facil i tat ing naturalization policies and 
el iminating mili tary service obligations – or  
internationally by regulat ing in international  treaties 
questions l ike the fulf i l lment of  mili tary obligations 
and international  taxation.  
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However,  as  Spiro acknowledges,  i t  is  one thing to 
recognize the increasing numbers of  dual  ci t izens,  due 
to the causes already identif ied,  and the evolution of i ts  
worldwide acceptance due to the States’  and 
individuals’  interests ,  and quite another to frame i t  as  
an individual  r ight .  Yet Spiro actually makes the case 
for dual  ci t izenship as a human right .  
According to Spiro,  though, the r ight  to ci t izenship 
should be recognized in accordance with the internal  
rules of  ci t izenship,  in l ine with the Legomsky maxims. 
For Spiro,  the human right  to dual  ci t izenship rests  
on two basic arguments:  the conception of  ci t izenship 
as identi ty and a form of associat ion and ci t izenship as 
necessary to perfecting poli t ical  r ights  of  self-
governance265.   
Being a form of membership,  equated with 
membership in other organizations,  ci t izenship should 
not  be restr icted.  As a matter  of  both consti tut ional  and 
international  law, States may not restr ict  membership in 
non-State enti t ies without a necessary cause.  According 
to Spiro,  even when the associat ion takes place in a 
foreign State that  does not  necessari ly remove 
cit izenship from the category for consti tut ional  
purposes266.  
For me the most  compell ing argument Spiro uses in 
his  case for dual  ci t izenship as a human right  is  the idea 
of  plural  ci t izenship as a poli t ical  r ight .   
According to Spiro,  “plural  ci t izenship implicates 
sel f-governance values.  Formal status is  typically 
necessary to the perfection of  poli t ical  r ights .  I f  plural  
ci t izenship is  obstructed,  with the result  that  an 
individual is  denied a ci t izenship for which she would 
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otherwise be el igible,  poli t ical  r ights  are l ikely to be 
compromised.  The acquisi t ion and maintenance of  
plural  ci t izenship thus becomes a protectable predicate 
status”.  However,  Spiro is  then very clear about his  
proposit ion in terms of the r ight  to ci t izenship.  He 
clearly states that  “ this  again implicates state 
discretion in determining membership quali f ications.  
International law has afforded states broad discretion 
with regard to naturalization.  There is ,  however,  an 
increasing disconnect  between the legal regime and the 
l iberal  sel f-governance paradigm. Liberal  theory works 
from the premise that  those who are terri torially  
present  are members of  “society,” are affected by 
governmental  action,  and should be able to participate 
in sel f-governance on the basis  of  equali ty .  Hence,  
l iberal  theory has assumed the virtue of  low barriers to 
naturalization.  Some theorists  have asserted the 
necessi ty  of  a naturalization option after a period of  
residence.  Under that  approach,  the renunciation 
condit ion appears to offend l iberal  values,  insofar as i t  
contributes to a disconnect  between society (defined in 
terri torial  terms) and the poli ty  (defined by ci t izenship 
status)”  267.  
Following this ,  Spiro acknowledges the existence 
of possible objections to his  proposit ion,  the f irst  main 
one being that  plural  ci t izenship undermines equali ty 
and dilutes the solidari ty of  the ci t izenry and the 
second that  i t  wil l  undermine the solidari t ies necessary 
to support  the l iberal  s tate.  This last  objection is  deeply 
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l inked with the naturalization process and 
requirements268.  
Finally,  Spiro makes his  case for a r ight  to dual  
ci t izenship both in consti tut ional  and international  law. 
He recognizes though that  international  law provides a 
more stable framework for his  claim and gives as an 
example the at t i tude of the 1997 European Convention 
on Nationali ty towards dual  ci t izenship,  this  being the 
f irst  international  instrument to not  deny i ts  
desirabil i ty269.  
Spiro’s case,  given that  i t  is  so thorough and has 
been engaged by a scholar  who has conducted an in-
depth study of the dual  ci t izenship phenomenon, is  very 
relevant.  
First ly i t  puts plural  ci t izenship in i ts  r ightful  
place.  Notwithstanding the massive development i t  
suffered both in terms of number of  acquisi t ions and in 
the at t i tude of  countries and individuals  towards i t ,  
mult iple ci t izenship is  s t i l l  largely a national  
phenomenon and implies the decision of mult iple 
States.  So i t  does not  simply ignore the activi ty of  the 
nation-state.  
More importantly,  Spiro recognizes dual  
ci t izenship as a human right  anchored both in internal  
consti tut ional  law and,  above al l ,  in international  law. 
Evidently Spiro is  very cautious in his  disclaimer 
by repeating that  in order to acquire dual  ci t izenship 
the individual  must  comply with the internal  rules of  
the States.  
                                              
268 PETER J. SPIRO, Dual Citizenship as Human Right (2010), 125-128. 
269 PETER J. SPIRO, Dual Citizenship as Human Right (2010), 129-130. In 
general on multiple citizenship and international law see ALFRED BOLL, 
Multiple Nationality and International Law (2007), 267-295. 
Gonçalo Saraiva Matias – The Path to Citizenship 
184 
  The arguments that  he uses,  though,  have no 
relat ionship whatsoever with the State discret ion over 
ci t izenship.  They could in fact  be used – and I  wil l  use 
them, at  least  the second one – to call  for  the human 
right  to a certain ci t izenship – be i t  the f irst ,  the second 
or the third – regardless of  the State power over i t .  
In fact ,  for  Spiro,  one of  the main arguments in his  
case is  the democratic principle and democratic 
part icipation.  Depriving a person with mult iple 
at tachments of  poli t ical  r ights  ei ther in the host  State or 
in the sending State is ,  for  Spiro,  undemocratic.  
He recognizes – unlike the decline-of-ci t izenship 
theorists  – that  the formal ci t izenship status is  
necessary in order to properly exercise poli t ical  r ights  
in a given country.  
The problem with Spiro’s case seems to me to be 
exactly the lack of scrutiny he dedicates to 
naturalization rules.  Spiro is  very concerned with 
renunciat ion and mandatory termination of  original  
ci t izenship.  This is  a  common concern of the theorists  
who study and favor dual  ci t izenship270.  This concern 
has to do directly with the State’s  sovereignty over 
ci t izenship and naturalization.  Virtually  speaking,  if  
every country in the world adopted a rule that  dual  
ci t izenship would not be possible and that  
naturalization entai ls  renunciation of the previous 
ci t izenship,  dual  ci t izenship would vanish.  Yet 
contest ing this  rule would be admitt ing that  a  State’s  
sovereign decision over ci t izenship is  disputable.  
So if  not  being able to fully part icipate without the 
status offends,  in Spiro’s view, the democratic 
                                              
270 For a thorough analysis on loss of citizenship and dual citizenship see 
GERARD-RENE DE GROOT, Loss of Nationality: a critical inventory, 
(2002), 202-278. 
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principle,  then i t  should be considered as having an 
effect  not  only on the r ight  to have dual  ci t izenship but 
also on the r ight  to have a certain ci t izenship even if  
the internal  rules of  the State do not  indicate so.  
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§6.  Multiculturalism and citizenship 
 
Mult icultural ism theories have been under pressure 
in recent  years271.  Declarat ions on the fai lure of  
mult iculturalism – l ike the one produced by German 
Chancellor  Angela Merkel  – and legislat ive measures 
l ike those adopted in France as a reaction to the scarf  
affair  ( l ’af fair  du foulard) ,  abundantly show that  
integration policies for  migrants can and will  be bit terly 
disputed even in l iberal  democracies.  
The very basis  of  mult iculturalism is  not  at  s take.  
Mult icultural ism theories do not  contest  some form of 
cultural  integration.   As Kymlicka recognizes “few 
immigrant  groups have objected to the requirement that  
they must  learn an official  language as a condit ion of 
ci t izenship”272.  The host  countries must ,  in return,  
provide the necessary condit ions for such integration.  
Fail ing to do so wil l  result  in unjust  integration 
requirements or  undemocratic integration policies.  
When discussing the relat ionship between 
multiculturalism and cit izenship,  i t  is  very important  to 
dist inguish between mult iculturalism before and after  
naturalization.  
Many of the examples of  mult icultural ism fai lure 
have nothing or l i t t le  to do with naturalization policies.  
Sometimes they relate to ci t izens of  origin that  remain 
                                              
271 For an account on the evolution of multiculturalism and citizenship see WILL 
KYMLICKA, Politics in the vernacular: nationalism, multiculturalism, and 
citizenship (2001), 17-27. 
272 WILL KYMLICKA, Politics in the vernacular: nationalism, multiculturalism, 
and citizenship (2001), 29-30. 
Gonçalo Saraiva Matias – The Path to Citizenship 
187 
in disenfranchised areas or pockets of  cultural  
disintegration.  
For the purposes of  this  discussion,  the relevant 
mult iculturalism concept is  the one related to the 
acquisi t ion of ci t izenship via naturalization ,  in 
part icular ,  how important  cultural  integration should be 
as a cri terion for naturalization.  
I t  is  also important  to discuss how cultural  
assimilat ion can be in opposit ion to transnational  
ci t izenship.  If  total  integration is  demanded – by not  
only absorbing the host  country’s language and cultural  
background but also breaking the t ies with the home 
country’s culture – i t  might be an indirect  way of 
denying transnational  ci t izenship and mult iple 
ci t izenships.  I  say indirect  because while the 
naturalization regulation of dual  ci t izenship that  
demands termination of the former ci t izenship is  clear 
enough and under the direct  scrutiny of the 
international  community,  assimilat ion policies act  
s i lently but  can be as effective.   Behind the curtains of  
a total ly acceptable naturalization policy a country can 
hide a forceful  assimilat ion demand that  ei ther makes i t  
impossible to become naturalized or demands total  
assimilat ion on a take i t  or  leave i t  basis ,  or  – even 
worse – take i t  and leave i t  (your former culture) .   
I t  is  also important  to recall  that  countries’  policies 
do change.  As Kymlicka aff irms,  certain groups,  l ike 
the Turks in Germany, have not  been encouraged to 
integrate273.   So when Chancellor  Merkel  cal ls  for  the 
fai lure of  mult iculturalism what is  really at  s take is  the 
national  policy of integration,  and a claim for a better  
or  more extensive integration policy.  Yet i t  is  also 
important  to acknowledge that  human beings are under 
                                              
273 WILL KYMLICKA, Politics in the vernacular: nationalism, multiculturalism, 
and citizenship (2001), 31. 
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pressure here and that  a  shif t  in a country’s 
mult iculturalism approach will  impact the l ives and 
legit imate expectat ions of  mill ions of  people.  I t  brings 
back the discussion which has existed since the 
beginning of mult iculturalism theories and ult imately 
the division between l iberals  and communitarians274.    
According to Seyla Benhabib,  “ the most  
spectacular examples of  mult icultural  confl ict  which 
have occupied public consciousness in recent decades,  
such as the Salman Rushdie affair  in Great Britain,  the 
affaire over the foulard (head-scarf)  in French schools,  
and scandals around the practice of  female 
circumcision”, are somehow related to the groups of 
cultural ly and ethnically identif ied migrants that  have 
operated,  in recent  years ,  what can be designated as a 
“reverse globalization”275.  
The scarf  affair  dates back to 1989 when three gir ls  
– Fatima, Leila and Samira – were forbidden to wear 
their  head scarves by the school headmaster .  They 
insisted on wearing the scarf  in what could be noted as 
a poli t ically driven at t i tude276.  
In 1989 the case was brought to the French Conseil   
d’Etat ,  which reached the following conclusions:  “ in 
schools,  the wearing by students of  s igns by which they 
wish to express their  rel igious aff i l iat ion is  not  in i tsel f  
incompatible with the principle of  secularism since i t  
consti tutes the exercise of  freedom of expression and 
                                              
274 WILL KYMLICKA, Politics in the vernacular: nationalism, multiculturalism, 
and citizenship (2001), 18; Id., Multicultural citizenship: a liberal theory of 
minority rights (1995). 
275 SEYLA BENHABIB, The Rights of Others, Aliens, Residents and Citizens 
(2004), 184. 
276 I follow closely the fact descriptions and conclusions as in SEYLA 
BENHABIB, The Rights of Others, Aliens, Residents and Citizens (2004), 
184-198. 
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manifestation of  rel igious beliefs ,  but  this  freedom does 
not  al low students to display signs of  rel igious 
aff i l iat ion,  which by their  nature,  the condit ions under 
which they would be worn individually or collect ively,  
or by their  ostentatious or protest  would be an act  of  
pressure,  provocation,  proselyt ism or propaganda, 
would undermine the dignity or freedom of  the student 
or other members of  the educational community,  
jeopardize the health or safety,  disrupt the teaching and 
the educational role of  teachers,  or disturb the order in 
the establishment or normal operation of  public 
service”277.  
I t  is  a  somewhat Solomonic decision,  as Seyla 
Benhabib describes i t ,  that  “eventually came to stand 
for all  the dilemmas of  French national identi ty  in the 
age of  globalization and mult iculturalism: how to 
retain French tradit ions of  laïci té ,  republican equali ty ,  
and democratic ci t izenship in view of  France’s 
integration into the European Union on the one hand,  
and the pressures of  mult iculturalism generated through 
the presence of  second and third generation immigrants 
from Muslim countries on French soil  on the other”278.  
What this  decision ult imately i l lustrates is  that  the 
assimilat ion practice fai ls  to achieve i ts  objectives.  No 
matter  how str ict  a  country is  in trying to assimilate the 
migrant community,  there should always be room for 
diversi ty and the maintenance of original  cultural  t ies.  
Plus,  from a consti tut ional  and international  law 
standpoint ,  ful l  assimilat ion conflicts  with the 
                                              
277 Avis rendus par l'assemblée générale du Conseil d'État N° 346.893 - Mme 
LAROQUE, rapporteur (section de l'Intérieur) séance du 27 novembre 1989. 
278 SEYLA BENHABIB, The Rights of Others, Aliens, Residents and Citizens 
(2004), 190. 
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fundamental  r ights  of  freedom of expression,  freedom 
of rel igion and other personali ty r ights .  
Thus mult icultural ism cannot be addressed 
disregarding these fundamental  principles and rights .  
The scarf  affair  also appeared in Germany, in the 
form of a complaint  presented to the German 
Consti tut ional  Court  by Fereshta Ludin,  a  school 
teacher of  Afghan origin but  with German cit izenship 
who was denied the r ight  to wear a scarf  at  school.  She 
peti t ioned to be appointed to a teaching posit ion in the 
state of  Baden-Württemberg.  In her consti tut ional  
complaint  she challenged the decision of the Stuttgart  
Higher School Authori ty,  which had been confirmed by 
the administrat ive courts ,  refusing to appoint  her as a 
civil  servant on probation as a teacher at  German 
primary schools (Grundschule)  and non-selective 
secondary schools (Hauptschule)  on the grounds that  
her declared intention to wear a headscarf  at  school and 
in lessons meant that  she was unsuited for the office279.  
The court  decision was as follows: “a provision 
prohibit ing teachers from continuously showing their  
membership in a particular rel igious group or belief  by 
external signs is  part  of  the law determining the 
relationship between state and religion in schools.  The 
religious diversi ty  in society,  which has evolved 
gradually,  is  ref lected here particularly clearly.  School 
is  the place where dif fering rel igious views inevitably 
coll ide and where this  juxtaposit ion has particularly 
great  ef fects .  Tolerant coexistence with people of  other 
beliefs  could be practised here with most  last ing ef fect  
through education.  This need not  mean denying one's  
own convict ions; instead,  i t  would give a chance for 
insight  and to strengthen one's  own point  of  view, and 
for mutual tolerance that  does not  see i tsel f  as reducing 
                                              
279 BVerfG, 2 BvR 1436/02 of 09/24/2003. 
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all  beliefs  to the same level  (cf .  BVerfGE 41,  29 (64)) .  
Reasons could therefore be given for accepting the 
increasing variety of  rel igions at  school and using i t  as 
a means for practicing mutual tolerance and in this  way 
making a contribution to the attempt to achieve 
integration.  On the other hand,  the development 
described above is  also associated with a greater 
potential  for possible confl icts  at  school.  There may 
therefore also be good reasons to accord the state duty 
of  neutrali ty  in schools a stricter importance that  is  
more distanced than i t  has been previously,  and thus,  as 
a matter of  principle,  to keep religious references 
conveyed by a teacher's  outward appearance away from 
the pupils  in order to avoid confl icts  with pupils ,  
parents or other teachers (…)As long as there is  no 
statutory basis  that  indicates specif ically enough that  
teachers at  the primary school and non-selective 
secondary school have an off icial  duty to refrain from 
identi fying characterist ics of  their  rel igious aff i l iat ion 
at  school and in lessons,  then on the basis  of  prevail ing 
law i t  is  incompatible with Article 33.2 in conjunction 
with Article 4.1 and 4.2 of  the Basic Law and Article 
33.3 of  the Basic Law to assume that  the complainant 
lacks apti tude.  The decisions challenged by the 
consti tut ional complaint  therefore infringe the legal 
posit ion of  the complainant guaranteed in these 
provisions”280.  
The reading of this  decision was a major victory 
for Fereshta Ludin and advocates of  mult iculturalism. 
However,  the Court  was,  in fact ,  saying that  i t  is  
possible for  the states to approve legislat ion that  bans 
the scarf;  i t  cannot just  be an administrat ive decision.  
So the decision was more of a procedural  decision than 
a substantial  one.  Moreover,  the legislator responded 
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very quickly by approving legislat ion that  banned 
rel igious symbols281.   
A balanced integration policy needs to recognize a 
country’s fundamental  r ight  to self -governance and 
determination.  So if  a  balance is  needed i t  should be 
between the individual’s  r ights  and freedoms and the 
collective r ight  to self-determination.  
As Spiro states,  “multiculturalism demands 
redistributive and other forms of  just ice from the state,  
but  i t  also seeks group autonomy in social ,  cultural  and 
even poli t ical  spheres.  Multiculturalism borrows key 
concepts from global characterizations of  group 
dist inction.  The term “self-determination”, a familiar 
doctrine of  international law protecting the claim of  
nationhood and sovereignty by certain communities,  is  
also deployed by mult iculturalists  in the domestic 
context  to advance group autonomy”282.  
The developments that  I  have shown above favor 
the individual’s  s tandpoint .   
First ly,  this  is  the case because an individual’s  
r ight  – especial ly in this  context  – tends to protect  a  
minority against  the majori ty wil l .  Thus,  favoring the 
majori ty would undermine these fundamental  values.   
Secondly,  as I  have also shown, the evolution of  
fundamental  r ights  created a “human rights” era where 
the person is  at  the center  and where personhood has 
replaced ci t izenship283.  This evolution tends to favor 
individual  choices instead of collective choices. 
                                              
281 SEYLA BENHABIB, The Rights of Others, Aliens, Residents and Citizens 
(2004), 200. 
282 PETER SPIRO, Beyond citizenship: American identity after globalization 
(2008), 130. 
283 PETER SPIRO, Beyond citizenship: American identity after globalization 
(2008), 133. 
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Lastly,  forced assimilat ion creates worse problems 
than voluntary assimilat ion.  Ult imately migrants wil l  
obtain ci t izenship.  The recent examples in France,  
Germany or the United Kingdom show that  frequently 
examples of  violence and complete disenfranchisement 
are shown by ci t izens – naturalized or of  origin.  The 
explanation for that  fact  is  very simple:  migrants on a 
path to ci t izenship do not involve themselves in 
controversy since what they stand to lose is  much 
greater  than their  potential  gain.  The incentive is  to 
keep quiet  and wait  for  ci t izenship.  Once the status is  
acquired – and one should not  assume that  the problems 
arise in naturalized communities because this  often 
happens with disenfranchised ci t izens of origin – they 
have l i t t le  to lose.  
Forced assimilat ion and str ict  natural izat ion 
policies wil l  only achieve an art if icial  peace created by 
raised expectat ions and controlled emotions that  might 
explode l ike a gunpowder barrel  once the status is  
acquired.  
How then should a country be consti tut ionally 
inclusive and yet  protect  i tself  from cultural  invasion 
or,  worse,  the crumbling of basic principles and 
identi t ies? 
According to international  law and the majori ty of  
legal  and philosophical  theorists ,  a  country possesses 
several  moments or  layers of  decision.  Very few 
advocate – and I  am not included in that  group – that  
the state should open i ts  borders and not  control  
migration.  
Even after  entering the state’s  terr i tory,  the border 
follows the migrant  in a way,  meaning that  deportat ion 
is  always pending and that  substantive immigration 
decisions wil l  fol low in the process.  Often a person 
enters the terr i tory holding a certain status and then 
Gonçalo Saraiva Matias – The Path to Citizenship 
194 
changes i t  unti l  he at tains permanent residency and 
cit izenship.  
I  am not advocating – and here I  am making a 
normative policy argument and not a claim based on 
international  law – an open borders theory or a denial  
of  some sort  of  assimilat ion.  However,  a  country cannot 
– based on principles of  democracy and expectat ions 
that  I  wil l  discuss further in the f inal  chapter – simply 
raise the expectations of a part  of  i ts  population by 
let t ing i t  s tay after  different  layers of  immigration 
decisions and then solemnly declare that  the strategy 
fai led and people should be sent  home. Where is  home 
in those cases? 
The proof that  the described strategy does not  work 
is  that  in most  of  the more serious cases the 
disenfranchisement with the community – or at  least  i ts  
public manifestat ion – is  led by ci t izens.  No one would 
reasonably defend that  these individuals  should be 
deprived of ci t izenship without harking back to the dark 
t imes of  humanity l ike the Nuremberg laws.  
My case is  for  a conscientious and proport ional  
immigration law and policy that  may assess the entire 
immigrant  population of the country at  any t ime – 
documented or undocumented – and use the different  
layers of  decision to protect  i tself  against  organized 
crime,  violat ions of  basic principles and cultural  
disenfranchisement.  
Assimilat ion policies and speeches against  
mult iculturalism simply will  not  work if  produced at  the 
edge of naturalization or after  i t .  The naturalization 
process is  not  – as I  wil l  later  elaborate – the 
appropriate moment for  substantial  assessments of  
assimilat ion or cultural  incorporation.   
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IV – European Citizenship as a form of institutional 
transnational citizenship 
 
§1. European Citizenship: the debate 
 
If  there is  a  good example of  a transnational  
ci t izenship,  European cit izenship might be i t .  
I t  is  defini tely not  a national ci t izenship since the 
European Union (EU) is  not  a federal  State nor was the 
EU cit izenship status created in that  direction,  as I  wil l  
discuss in this  chapter.  
Despite these l imitat ions,  EU cit izenship has been 
undergoing significant  developments,  most  of  them 
result ing from the Court  of  Just ice of  the European 
Union’s (CJEU) judicial  activism that  wil l  eventually 
transform EU cit izenship into something closer to a 
federal  s tatus.  
For the moment,  despite those very promising 
developments that  I  wil l  later  describe,  EU cit izenship 
is  probably the only example of  an inst i tut ional  
transnational  ci t izenship because,  as I  have stated 
above,  i t  holds most  of  the ci t izenship elements and 
aspires to include al l  of  them.  
 I t  also very relevant to acknowledge – and this  is  
increasingly evident in the more recent and 
revolutionary CJEU decisions – the relat ionship 
between EU cit izenship and national  ci t izenship and the 
intense constraints  that  the former impose on the lat ter .  
Even if  the domestic reserved domain is  st i l l  the 
official  doctrine that  the Court  wishes to proclaim, 
decisions are going in a different  direction imposing 
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stronger and t ighter  obligations on States´  decisions 
over ci t izenship.  
The evolution shows a trend towards a federal  
ci t izenship in the EU, but  i t  also helps to support  my 
general  idea of  a growing influence of global ,  
t ransnational  and international  law on ci t izenship 
issues.  This has been acknowledged expressly by the 
CJEU in the decisions that  I  wil l  discuss since i t  refers  
to principles of  international  law as boundaries to 
member states’  decisions on ci t izenship.   
The evolution of the EU has brought the topic of  
European ci t izenship to the center  of  European concerns 
nowadays.  I t  would not  be possible to support  any kind 
of European project  without the creation of the EU for 
the Cit izens facing not  only the needs of  i ts  population 
but  also a consciousness of  a European people.   
The purpose of  creating European ci t izenship was 
not  only to create a legal  s tatus but  also to take 
advantage of the symbolic meaning of the ci t izenship 
concept.   
For these reasons in 1992 the Maastricht  Treaty 
created European cit izenship,  s tat ing in art icle B that  i t  
was a means of “reinforcing the national  r ights  and 
interests  of  the member States”. 
Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) States that  every person 
considered to be a ci t izen of a member State  is  a  ci t izen 
of the Union.  
European ci t izenship is  meant to overlap with 
rather than replace national  ci t izenship.  The ci t izenship 
of  the union is  not  autonomous from the national  
ci t izenship;  i t  is  a  mere reflex of  the national  ruling on 
ci t izenship.   
One can question if  this  derivative ci t izenship can 
truly be called a ci t izenship.  First  of  al l ,  we should say 
that  at  this  s tage of the Union development i t  would not  
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be possible to aim for a unified concept of  ci t izenship.  
Also,  one should add that  the concept of  ci t izenship has 
been undergoing great  developments lately.  For these 
reasons one can speak about a ci t izenship here even if  
we should be careful  and add that  i t  is  a  second level  
ci t izenship,  different  in many ways from the tradit ional  
one we already know in well-established States.  
In any event,  Europe did not  follow the American 
federal  example in this  topic.  In fact ,  as  stated in the 
14th amendment of  the US Consti tut ion:  “all  persons 
born or naturalized in the United States and subject  to 
the jurisdict ion thereof are ci t izens of  the United States 
and of the State wherein they reside”.  This means that  
f irst  the Americans are ci t izens of the federal  State and 
then of the State where they reside.  Yet this  dual  form 
of ci t izenship is  entirely dependent upon the federal  
law and,  as stated in the 14t h  amendment:  “no State 
shall  make or enforce any law which shall  abridge the 
privileges or immunit ies of  ci t izens of  the United 
States”.  
So,  unlike the United States,  in Europe one is  f irst  
a  ci t izen of a member State and then – and because of 
that  – a ci t izen of the Union.  That  obviously diminishes 
the strength of  the European ci t izenship and destroys i ts  
autonomy. 
I t  is  worth noting in this  respect  that  the usual  
evolution of the relat ionship between cit izenships in 
early federation stages is  to grow from bottom up,  
meaning that  usually i t  is  determined by the states and 
then evolves to a federal  competence.  This was the case 
in the US before the Civil  War and,  in a way; i t  is  s t i l l  
the case in Switzerland284.  
                                              
284 For a very interesting study on federal citizenship see CHRISTOPH 
SCHÖNBERGER, European Citizenship as Federal Citizenship, some 
citizenship lessons of comparative federalism (2007), 70. 
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The derivative nature of  the European ci t izenship is  
also quite evident when considering i ts  r ights.  Their  
scarcity and weakness of  protection show that  also here 
– as happens in the definit ion of the European ci t izens 
– the drafters  were relying on the member states.  The 
reluctance to create a more robust  body seems to have 
close connections with the previously expressed 
diff icult ies in aff irming an autonomous European 
cit izenship.  
In any event,  the drafters  did not  total ly ignore the 
importance of  the doctrine of  ci t izenship as r ights .  
European ci t izenship is  immediately at tached,  in the 
TFEU, to a group of r ights identif ied in the Treaty as 
ci t izenship r ights.  Therefore,  European cit izenship can 
also be considered a derivative or second level  
ci t izenship,  given the l imited catalogue of r ights  i t  
includes.  
Articles 20 to 24 of the TFEU list  the r ights 
included in European ci t izenship285:  
a)  the r ight  to freely move within the 
terr i tory of  the member states;  
b)  the r ight  to vote and stand for 
municipal  elections in the member state where the 
ci t izen is  currently residing given i t  is  not  the 
state of  national  ci t izenship under the same rules 
applicable to the nationals of  that  member state;  
c)  the r ight  to vote and stand for 
elections at  the European parl iament;  
d)  The right  to benefi t  from diplomatic 
protection if  in a state where there is  no 
                                              
285 Armando Rocha points out that the Lisbon treaty introduces the citizens’ 
initiative that may also be considered as an additional citizenship right. See 
ARMANDO L. S. ROCHA, Uma Europa em busca de cidadãos (2012), 100. 
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diplomatic representat ion from the ci t izen’s 
national  ci t izenship.  
e)  The right  to f i le  a peti t ion to the 
European parl iament;  
f)  The right  to f i le  a peti t ion to the 
Ombudsman; 
g)  The right  to address to any European 
inst i tut ion in a language of any member state and 
get  an answer in that  same language.  
 
If  we compare this  catalogue with a typical  bi l l  of  
r ights that  can be found in any modern Consti tut ion of  a 
democratic state we will  immediately conclude that  
European ci t izenship r ights  are somewhat scarce.  
These are the r ights  that  the Treaty formally 
at taches to EU cit izenship.  Other r ights  must  be 
considered,  especial ly after  the incorporation of the 
Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights of  the European Union 
in the Lisbon Treaty.  Despite this  incorporation,  the 
r ights the Charter  provides for are human rights 
common to al l  human beings.  That  is  why I  do not  
consider these r ights here as specif ic ci t izenship r ights.  
One addit ional  –  but  very important  – r ight,  with a 
special  connection to immigration within EU borders,  
which is  connected to the r ight  of  free movement and 
establishment,  is  the r ight  to family reunification within 
the Union286.  This r ight  might seem obvious when all  
family members are EU cit izens but  can acquire a 
special  s ignificance when spouses or  descendants are 
                                              
286 STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, Rationing Family Values in Europe and 
America: An Immigration Tug of War between States and Their Supra-
National Associations (2011). 
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not EU cit izens.  Some of the cases I  wil l  analyze in this  
chapter  focus on this  specif ic si tuation.  
One possible explanation for this  scarcity of  r ights  
could be that  the drafters  captured the real  nature of  the 
ci t izenship concept,  extending human rights and social  
r ights to al l  human beings and reserving a l imited 
number of  r ights  to ci t izens.  This l imited number of  
r ights would be directly connected to the community – 
freedom of movement and poli t ical  r ights .  
Unfortunately,  apparently this  was not  the case.  
The discrimination against  third country nationals  who 
are outside European ci t izenship rel ies largely on the 
decisions of  the member states287.  This happens because 
European ci t izenship is  a  derivative model of  
ci t izenship,  so what is  not  protected at  the Union level  
is  supposed to have an adequate level  of  protection at  
the national  level288.  
Admitt ing that  ci t izens and third country nationals  
have an adequate level  of  protection within the member 
states where they reside or  happen to be found,  which is  
a  reasonable assumption given the guarantees associated 
with the admission process in the EU, the scarcity of  
ci t izenship r ights could be explained by the l imited 
intervention of the EU inst i tut ions289.  
The recurrent  claims for democratic legit imacy and 
the lack of i t  at  the EU level  deny this  assumption290.  In 
fact  people think that  more part icipation of ci t izens is  
                                              
287 THEODORA KOSTAKOPOLOU, European Union Citizenship as a model of 
citizenship beyond the nation state: Possibilities and limits (1998), 164. 
288 RICHARD KUPER, The many democratic deficits of the European Union 
(1998), 148. 
289 For a critique on the doctrine of subsidiary see RICHARD KUPER, The many 
democratic deficits of the European Union (1998), 148. 
290 RICHARD KUPER, The many democratic deficits of the European Union 
(1998), 149. 
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necessary to legit imate the ever increasing intervention 
of the EU inst i tut ions’ decisions in everyday l ife.  
The way these r ights  are specif ically protected also 
shows a certain weakness of  EU cit izenship.  Even at  the 
Union level  i t  has fai led to create a robust  group of 
r ights that  could,  i f  not  be compared to a national  
ci t izenship,  at  least  legit imate in a democratic fashion 
the EU decisions291.          
The provision regarding the r ight  to vote and stand 
for elections at  the European Parl iament tr ies to deal  
with this  problem. Also the provision related to the 
r ight  to vote and stand in municipal  elections of  the 
member states tr ies to help create a European poli t ical  
community.  One should note,  however,  that  these r ights  
are scarce and weak.  EU cit izens are excluded from 
voting and standing for elections to national  legislat ive 
parl iaments and executive branches.  Here the r ight  to 
vote is  restr icted to municipal  elections and the 
European parl iament.  So there is  no r ight  to vote for  the 
major elections.  There is  a  clear contrast  with Federal  
States,  as the US example i l lustrates,  where ci t izens 
vote for  the legislature of  their  home states as well  as 
in Federal  elections for Congress and Presidential  
elections.  
The r ight  to diplomatic protection also has an 
important  restr ict ion.  A European ci t izen can only seek 
diplomatic protection if  he cannot f ind a diplomatic 
representat ive of  his  national  s tate.  So if  while in a 
third country a ci t izen of a given member state seeks 
protection at  an embassy of any EU member state,  
protection may be denied if  he could seek help at  his  
                                              
291 On European citizenship and legitimacy: JOSEPH H. H. WEILER, European 
Citizenship. Identity and Differentity (1998), 8; JÜRGEN HABERMAS, The 
European Nation State – Its Achievements and Its Limitations – On the Past 
and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship (1997), 112. 
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own embassy.  So when would this  work? Only in the 
event that  there was no diplomatic representat ion of his  
s tate and help was needed.  In that  circumstance help 
could be sought  at  the embassy of any other member 
state.  Again,  a  contrast  arises with the US federal  
system. Here diplomatic protection is  a  task of the 
federal  Government,  not  the States.  The US embassies 
represent  and confer protection to al l  the American 
ci t izens regardless of  the State where they reside.  
The rights  to address the European Parl iament and 
the Ombudsman are not  even exclusive to European 
cit izens.  In fact  they belong to any natural  person and 
precede the very creation of  European ci t izenship292.  
Herein l ies one of the major mysteries of  European 
cit izenship.  The r ights catalogue is  scarce since i t  
excludes basic fundamental  r ights,  presumably because 
those r ights  are inherent  to every human being and not  
exclusive to ci t izens293.  In this  very l imited catalogue of 
r ights the drafters  included two that  are not  only minor 
but  also inherent  to al l  human beings.  The rulings 
regarding the exercise of  these r ights confirm this ,  
s ince they are common to al l  natural  persons.   
I t  seems that  l i t t le  coherence can be found in this  
catalogue.  Or,  as J .H.H. Weiler  noted,  the drafters  
might have been looking for r ights  to include in the 
catalogue that ,  despite their  contribution to the formal 
creation of the European cit izenship,  would not  weigh 
                                              
292 JOSEPH H. H. WEILER, The Selling of Europe: The Discourse of European 
Citizenship in the IGC 1996 (1996).  
293 Basic fundamental rights are provided for in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union. These rights are not specifically connected to 
the European citizenship. The Charter includes a chapter of rights exclusive of 
citizens that reproduces the rights provided for in the Treaty. 
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too much in the overall  balance of  r ights294.  This means 
that  the drafters  fel t  the need to identify a basic 
catalogue of r ights to compose a bundle of  ci t izenship 
r ights but ,  given the scarci ty of  these r ights – due to 
poli t ical  constraints  – they fai led to achieve a l is t  of  
r ights typical  of  a national  ci t izenship. 
Even though the creation of European ci t izenship 
could be seen as a step forward in the federalist  
tendencies,  the mild model created and the way i t  
differs  from the American model tel ls  us that  the 
drafters  were not  wil l ing or were not  able to follow the 
federalist  model of  ci t izenship.  
 
                                              
294 JOSEPH H. H. WEILER, The Selling of Europe: The Discourse of European 
Citizenship in the IGC 1996 (1996). 
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§2. Relationship between national and European citizenship 
 
One of the most  controversial  issues related to 
European Cit izenship is  i ts  relat ionship with the 
ci t izenship of the member States.  The derivative form 
of the European ci t izenship entai ls  a  very close 
connection with the rules on acquisi t ion and loss of  the 
ci t izenship of the member States.  
A decision related to the granting of ci t izenship in 
a part icular  member State wil l  have a direct  impact in 
al l  the other member States.  Once someone becomes a 
ci t izen of a member State he automatically benefi ts  
from the catalogue of European ci t izenship r ights ,  
including the freedom of movement and establishment 
and the associated r ight  of  family reunification.  
Unti l  the present ,  though, the common 
understanding is  that  harmonization of ci t izenship laws 
is  not  needed Europe wide.  I t  is  s t i l l  considered a 
reserved domain of  the member States as definition of 
ci t izenship is  s t i l l  at  the core of  State sovereignty.  If  i t  
is  clear in International  law that  more restr ict ions are 
being laid on States’  sovereignty regarding their  
freedom to establish ci t izenship rules,  i t  is  even more 
evident in Europe due to the potential  confl ict  between 
the ci t izenship laws of different  member States and i ts  
impact  on European ci t izenship295.  
One interest ing question related to this  topic is  
whether someone would be interested in European 
cit izenship rather than in the ci t izenship of a member 
                                              
295 On examples of soft harmonization and mutual influence see KAROLINA 
ROSTEK and GARETH DAVIES, The impact of Union citizenship on 
national citizenship policies (2006). 
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State.  Actually there are ci t izens of  third countries 
seeking European ci t izenship and not the ci t izenship of 
a part icular  member State.  
This si tuation happened in a leading and recent  
case of  the Court  of  Just ice of  the European Union: the 
Chen case296.   
Man Lavette Chen,  a Chinese ci t izen was traveling 
very often to the UK due to family business.  She was 
pregnant and on one of those tr ips she went to Belfast  
in Northern Ireland,  where she gave bir th to her 
daughter Catherine.  She already had a son and was 
concerned about the Chinese second child policy.   
At the t ime Ireland had a purely “ius soli” rule ,  
meaning the bir thright  ci t izenship297.  After  l i t t le  
Catherine was born,  her mother f i led a claim with the 
UK immigration authori t ies to get  a  residence permit  to 
l ive there.  She claimed Catherine was Ir ish and for that  
reason,  a ci t izen of  the European Union.   
Being a European ci t izen,  Catherine was enti t led,  
under the r ight  to free movement and establishment 
provided for in the EU Treaty,  to l ive in any other EU 
member State.  Obviously l i t t le  Catherine was entirely 
dependent on her mother and her family and claimed, 
under the provisions of  a European directive,  the r ight  
                                              
296 Case E.C.J. C-200/02, Kunqian Catherine Zhu and Man Lavette Chen v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department; JEAN-YVES CARLIER, Case 
C-200/02, Kunqian Catherine Zhu, Man Lavette Chen v. Secretary of State 
for the Home Department (2005), 1127.  
297 Catherine was granted Irish citizenship even though she was born in Northern 
Ireland, part of the United Kingdom, because, at the time, article 6 of the Irish 
Nationality and Citizenship Act 2004 stated that “every person born in the 
island of Ireland is entitled to be an Irish citizen”. The law was changed after 
a referendum, heavily influenced by the outcome of the Chen Case (that was 
still pending a court decision at the time of the referendum in 2005), and the 
Irish Constitution and citizenship law were amended to eliminate birthright 
citizenship. 
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to l ive in the UK with her family.  They also proved to 
have sufficient  f inancial  means so they would not  be a 
burden for the Brit ish social  securi ty system.  
The Brit ish immigration authori ty refused to grant  
the residence permit to Man Lavette Chen on the 
grounds that  the only purpose the child was born in 
Ireland was to get  the Ir ish ci t izenship and through that  
action the r ight  to reside in the UK. There was arguably 
“abuse of  law”, meaning that  the mother was trying to 
circumvent the law, trying to get  out  of  i t  an effect  that  
was not  provided for in the Ir ish ci t izenship rules.  In 
fact ,  according to the Brit ish authori t ies,  the Ir ish 
ci t izenship law did not aim to al low third countries’  
nationals  to,  through the Ir ish ci t izenship,  gain access 
to residence r ights  for the newborn and family in the 
EU neighboring countries.  
The arguments used by the Brit ish authori t ies 
showed that  the member States were convinced of the 
supremacy of the national  ci t izenship and that  the third 
countries’  nationals  would probably not  be interested in 
gett ing the European ci t izenship without really caring 
about the underlying national  ci t izenship.  And they 
considered that  to be an i l l ici t  advantage.   
The case was referred to the Court  of  Just ice of  the 
European Union that  recognized that  Catherine had the 
r ight  to l ive with her family in the UK. The Court ,  
however,  did not  take advantage of this  case to try to 
build the autonomy of the European ci t izenship.  Instead 
i t  fol lowed the tradit ional  theory of the domestic 
reserved domain in international  law, saying that  i t  is  
up to each State to decide on cit izenship matters,  so if  
Ireland decided to grant  ci t izenship to l i t t le  Catherine,  
Bri tain had no authori ty to question that  granting.  This 
means that  the UK should accept Ir ish authori ty to 
establish i ts  own cit izenship rules with al l  the at tached 
consequences,  such as the EU cit izenship and the r ights 
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i t  entai ls  (freedom of movement,  establishment,  family 
reunificat ion).  
In order to reach that  conclusion,  the Court  
referred to a previous leading case on the impact  of  
European ci t izenship on the national  ci t izenship,  the 
Michelet t i  decision298.   
Mário Vicente Michelet t i  was born in Argentina 
and had both Argentinean and Ital ian ci t izenships.   In 
1989 he claimed a temporary residence permit  from the 
Spanish authori t ies,  having shown his  I tal ian passport .  
Shortly before his  visa expired he claimed a permanent 
residence permit  to be able to stay in Spain and work as 
a dentist .  That  claim was denied by the Government of  
Cantábria.  According to Spanish law, in cases of  dual  
ci t izenship,  preference is  given to the ci t izenship of  the 
place of  residence,  which was Argentina in Michelett i´s  
case.   
Since he was considered Argentinean by Spanish 
law, Michelet t i  could not  benefi t  from the provisions of  
the European ci t izenship.   
The Court  decision in this  case was as follows: 
“under international  law, i t  is  for  each Member State,  
having due regard to Community law, to lay down the 
condit ions for  the acquisi t ion and loss of  nationali ty.  
However,  i t  is  not  permissible for  the legislat ion of a 
Member State to restr ict  the effects  of  the grant  of  the 
nationali ty of  another Member State by imposing an 
addit ional  condit ion for recognit ion of that  nationali ty 
with a view to the exercise of  the fundamental  freedoms 
provided for in the Treaty”299.  
                                              
298 Case E.C.J. C-369/90, M.V. Micheletti and others v. Delegacion del Gobierno 
en Cantabria; JESSURUM D´OLIVEIRA, Case C-369/90, M.V . Micheletti 
and others v. Delegacion del Gobierno en Cantabria (1993), 623. 
299 Case E.C.J. C-369/90, M.V. Micheletti and others v. Delegacion del Gobierno 
en Cantabria. 
Gonçalo Saraiva Matias – The Path to Citizenship 
208 
I t  is  worth noting that  in these cases the dispute 
was not  exactly on the abil i ty of  the member states to 
define ci t izenship internally but  on the external  
consequences of that  decision,  especial ly in the context  
of  the European ci t izenship r ights .  For that  matter  i t  is  
not  so different  from the Nottebohm decision and the 
classical  international  ci t izenship law among states.  
The difference in the EU is  the level  and impact  of  
those consequences,  given the close connections 
between EU and national  ci t izenship.  
This decision is  referred to as if  i t  supports  the 
theory of the State reserved domain over ci t izenship300.  
In fact ,  according to this  theory i t  is  entirely up to a 
State to decide on internal  rules of  granting ci t izenship.   
However one should add that  this  freedom is  
l imited by international law and,  in the case of the EU, 
by community law. The same conclusion was reached in 
the previously mentioned Chen case.  Again the Court  
said that  i t  was up to Ir ish law – and not  the Brit ish 
authori t ies – to decide what rules of  Cit izenship would 
apply in that  case.  So Britain would have to comply 
with whatever rules – in respect  of  the international  and 
community law – Ireland decided to adopt.  
I  argue that  this  decision opens the way to a new 
interpretat ion of the international  boundaries for 
ci t izenship rules.  Unlike the tradit ional  view – relying 
on State freedom with regard to ci t izenship rules – this  
decision reaffirms the existence of l imits  to this  
freedom deriving from the international  law and from 
the community law. In fact ,  the basic conclusion of the 
Michelet t i  decision is  that  the Spanish law should not  
be applicable to Michelet t i  because the application of 
that  law would breach the community law and,  more 
                                              
300 JESSURUM D´OLIVEIRA, Case C-369/90, M.V. Micheletti and others v. 
Delegacion del Gobierno en Cantabria (1993), 634. 
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specif ically,  Michelet t i´s  r ight  to establish as a dentist  
in Spain.   
I  wil l  conclude by reinterpreting the Court  decision 
in the l ight  of  recent  developments in international  and 
European ci t izenship law stressing the existence of  
boundaries or l imits  to the State freedom to establish 
ci t izenship rules.  What kind of l imits  are these?  
We can generally say,  in accordance with 
international  and European law, that  a  State cannot 
grant  i ts  own cit izenship if :  
a)  There is  no serious reason to grant  the 
ci t izenship;   
b)  There is  no effective l ink between the 
person and the State;  or  
c)  I t  results  from “abuse of law”.   
These boundaries correspond essential ly to the 
l imits  already identif ied in International  ci t izenship 
law. The f irst  two have been well  established for a long 
t ime following Nottebohm and the lat ter  can be clearly 
identif ied in the CJEU Chen decision.  
The granting of ci t izenship would lack serious 
reasons if  a  State decided to grant  ci t izenship 
arbitrari ly.  Concerns about i l legal  migration networks,  
drug and gun traff ic and terrorism increase the need for 
surveil lance regarding the seriousness States at tach to 
granting ci t izenship.  Arbitrary concessions of  
ci t izenship for no apparent reason may hide i l l ici t  
reasons connected to the protection of  these networks.  
Developing countries are part icularly exposed to this  
danger.   
The theory of the effective l ink dates back to the 
Nottebohm case in the International  Court  of  Just ice in 
1955.  In this  decision the Court  Stated that  a  unilateral  
grant  of  ci t izenship by Liechtenstein could be 
disregarded by Guatemala,  the country where 
Nottebohm was l iving and where he kept his  property.  
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From that  decision on i t  was assumed by the 
international  community that  an effective l ink between 
the ci t izen and the State could be demanded in order to 
oblige other countries to recognize the ci t izenship 
status thus granted.  
A si tuation of “abuse of law” may occur when 
someone tr ies to circumvent a certain ci t izenship law to 
get  benefi ts  not  intentionally provided by that  law. 
According to the Brit ish authori t ies that  was the case in 
“Chen” as the mother was trying to obtain a residence 
permit  in the UK for the whole family through the Ir ish 
ci t izenship law. 
 Despite recent  developments,  the doctrine of  the 
exclusive domestic jurisdict ion is  s t i l l  prevalent  in 
international  law. The cases of  accepted interference of  
international  law in the domestic sovereignty over 
ci t izenship are st i l l  l imited301.  
The case is  different  if  we look at  European 
cit izenship.  Here the potential  confl icts  between 
national  and European ci t izenship are many. According 
to Gerard-René De Groot302,  member State ci t izenship 
legislat ion can vir tually be contrary to the European 
basic principles of  solidari ty among Member States and 
free movement.  
The historic relat ions European countries maintain 
with former colonies may just ify the temptation to 
create special  bonds leading to ci t izenship.  This has 
happened on several  occasions in recent  Brit ish 
                                              
301 SATVINDER JUSS, Nationality Law, Sovereignty and the Doctrine of 
Exclusive Domestic Jurisdiction (1994), 219. 
302 GERARD RENÉ DE GROOT, The Relationship between the Nationality 
Legislation of the Member States of the European Union and European 
Citizenship (1998), 123; Id., Towards a European Nationality Law  (2004), 
12. 
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history303.  I t  has also been the case in Portugal ,  where 
affirmative action made i t  easier  for  ci t izens of 
Portuguese-speaking countries to gain access to 
ci t izenship.  
That  said,  this  does not seem to be an i l legit imate 
action of the State.  Acting in a matter  of  State 
sovereignty,  the States decide to grant  or  ease the 
granting of ci t izenship to a part  of  a  population with 
whom the State maintains close connections.  I t  could 
also be just if ied by the natural  cultural  and l inguist ic  
bond already exist ing.  
What if  a  Member State decides to grant  ci t izenship 
to a substantial  part  of  the population of a non EU 
country?  304 That  would have a direct  and significant  
impact  on other member States.  That  was the basic Ir ish 
fear that  may well  explain the dramatic numbers in the 
referendum that  refused the bir thright  ci t izenship 
cri teria for  granting ci t izenship,  preventing cases such 
as “Chen”.  
Although current  interpretat ions of  the Court’s  
decisions in “Chen” and “Michelet t i”  s t i l l  point  to the 
conclusion that  ci t izenship is  a  matter  of  national  
jurisdict ion,  Ireland may have been “de facto” 
harmonizing ci t izenship law. To avoid the f low of 
people trying to get  through the “Irish open window” to 
European ci t izenship,  Ireland closed the door to the 
bir thright  ci t izenship as a whole.  
Again,  within the doctrine of  exclusive domestic 
jurisdict ion i t  was as legit imate for  Ireland to establish 
the bir thright  ci t izenship as i t  was to el iminate i t .  What 
                                              
303 GERARD RENÉ DE GROOT, Towards a European Nationality Law (2004), 
12; SATVINDER JUSS, Nationality Law, Sovereignty and the Doctrine of 
Exclusive Domestic Jurisdiction (1994), 219. 
304 For an interesting example regarding Dutch law: GERARD RENÉ DE 
GROOT, Towards a European Nationality Law (2004), 12. 
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we cannot ignore is  the influence these facts  may have 
had on the decision to change the law.  
This means that  the ci t izenship law that  other 
member States may approve is  not  irrelevant for the 
European member States,  given that  i t  wil l  have a direct  
impact  in their  countries because of  the European 
cit izenship r ights.  
Solidari ty might  be at  s take if  other member States 
were to suffer  the direct  impact of  a decision on 
ci t izenship of another member State.  
Gonçalo Saraiva Matias – The Path to Citizenship 
213 
 
 §3. In-between national and transnational citizenship: the 
groundbreaking evolution in Court of Justice of the European 
Union case law 
 
After  Michelet t i  and Chen,  there was a significant  
evolution in the decisions of the CJEU that  led some 
scholars to identify a revolution in EU cit izenship 
law305.  
A first  decision was reached in Case C-135/08,  
Janko Rottmann v.  Freistaat  Bayern306.  
Janko Rottmann was born in Graz (Austria)  and 
was originally,  by bir th,  an Austrian.   
In 1995 he transferred his  residence to Munich,  
after  being heard by the criminal  court  of  Graz 
following an investigation concerning him which had 
opened on account of  suspected serious fraud on an 
occupational  basis  in the exercise of  his  profession,  
which he denied.  
In February 1997 the criminal  court  of  Graz issued 
a national  warrant  for  his  arrest .  
Rottmann applied for German nationali ty in 
February 1998.  During the natural isat ion procedure he 
fai led to mention the proceedings against  him in 
Austria.   The naturalisat ion in Germany had the effect ,  
                                              
305 DIMITRY KOCHENOV, A Real European Citizenship. A New Jurisdiction 
Test. A Novel Chapter in the Development of the Union in Europe (2011), 56; 
MICHAELA HAILBRONNER and SARA IGLESIAS SÁNCHEZ (2011), 
498-537; and the very interesting collective discussion promoted at the 
European University Institute on Has the European Court of Justice 
Challenged the Member State Sovereignty in Nationality Law?  (2011).  
306 Case C-135/08, Janko Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern. 
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in accordance with Austrian law, of  causing him to lose 
his  Austrian nationali ty.   
In August  1999 the ci ty of  Munich was informed by 
the municipal  authori t ies of  Graz that  a  warrant  for  
Rottmann’s arrest  had been issued in Graz.  In the l ight  
of  those circumstances,  on 4 July 2000 the Freistaat  
Bayern withdrew the natural isat ion with retroactive 
effect ,  on the grounds that  Rottmann had not disclosed 
the fact  that  he was the subject  of  judicial  investigation 
in Austria and that  he had,  in consequence,  obtained 
German nationali ty by deception.    
Si t t ing as the court  of  second instance,  the 
Bayerischer Verwaltungsgerichtshof held,  by judgment 
of  25 October,  2005,  that  the withdrawal of  the 
applicant’s  naturalisat ion was compatible with German 
law, even though the effect  of  that  withdrawal,  once 
definit ive,  would be to render the person concerned 
stateless.  
The German Court  referred the case to the CJEU 
for a prel iminary ruling on the following grounds:  
“(1) Is  i t  contrary to Community law for Union 
ci t izenship (and the rights and fundamental  freedoms 
attaching thereto) to be lost  as the legal consequence of  
the fact  that  the withdrawal in one Member State ( the 
Federal  Republic of  Germany),  lawful  as such under 
national (German) law, of  a naturalisation acquired by 
intentional deception,  has the ef fect  of  causing the 
person concerned to become stateless because,  as in the 
case of  the applicant [in the main proceedings] ,  he does 
not  recover the nationali ty  of  another Member State 
( the Republic of  Austria)  which he originally possessed,  
by reason of  the applicable provisions of  the law of  that  
other Member State? 
(2) [I f  so,]  must  the Member State … which has 
naturalised a ci t izen of  the Union and now intends to 
withdraw the naturalisation obtained by deception,  
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having due regard to Community law, refrain altogether 
or temporarily from withdrawing the naturalisation i f  
or so long as that  withdrawal would have the legal 
consequence of  loss of  ci t izenship of  the Union (and of  
the associated rights  and fundamental  freedoms) …, or 
is  the Member State … of  the former nationali ty  
obliged,  having due regard to Community law, to 
interpret  and apply,  or even adjust ,  i ts  national law so 
as to avoid that  legal consequence?” 
A first  – and decisive – question addressed by the 
Court  relates to the Court’s  competence to rule in this  
case.  In fact ,  i t  could be argued that  this  was a si tuation 
of a “German l iving in Germany stripped of  German 
nationali ty  in a German legal process:  typically an 
internal case,  a si tuation in which all  of  the elements 
are enclosed in one member state,  which Union law has 
no say in,  and which must  lead to the inadmissibil i ty  of  
the preliminary questions”307.  
The Advocate-General ,  Poiares Maduro,  addressed 
this  question cautiously in his  opinion,  arguing that  
“ the presence of  a foreign element cannot legit imately 
be disputed on the ground that ,  German nationali ty  
once obtained,  the legal relationship of  the applicant in 
the main proceedings with the Federal  Republic of  
Germany became that  of  a national of  that  State and 
that ,  in particular,  withdrawal of  the naturalization is  a 
German administrative act  addressed to a German 
national residing in Germany.  That would be to ignore 
the origins of  Mr.  Rottmann’s si tuation.  I t  was by 
making use of  the freedom of movement and residence 
associated with Union ci t izenship which he enjoyed as 
an Austrian national that  Mr.  Rottmann went to 
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Germany and established his  residence there in 1995,  in 
order to ini t iate a naturalization procedure”.   
Thus the AG did not  aff irm the competence of the 
Court  on the basis  of  EU cit izenship nature per se  but  
because of  the transnational  relevance of the case.  
Contrary to what  Jussurum d`Oliveira has writ ten about 
this ,  Poiares Maduro saw several  cross border elements.  
In fact ,  as Maduro r ightly observes,  the only reason 
why Rottman lost  his  Austrian ci t izenship and then 
qualif ied to obtain German cit izenship was that  he was 
exercising the freedoms provided for in the Treaty 
which consti tute the fundamental  r ights embedded in 
the EU cit izenship status.  
In that  sense,  Maduro goes back to what De Groot 
had said years before when he argued that  national  rules 
on acquisi t ion and loss of  ci t izenship could breach the 
Treaty if  proven to be contradictory to fundamental  EU 
principles or freedoms308.  Maduro eloquently says “ thus,  
a State rule providing for loss of  nationali ty in the 
event of  a transfer of  residence to another Member 
State would undoubtedly consti tute an infringement of  
the right  of  movement and residence conferred on 
ci t izens of  the Union by Article 18 EC”.  
The Court  went further than the AG’s opinion in 
one part  of  the decision that  I  consider of  utmost  
importance.  The Court  said that  “ i t  is  clear that  the 
si tuation of  a ci t izen of  the Union who, l ike the 
applicant in the main proceedings,  is  faced with a 
decision withdrawing his  naturalization,  adopted by the 
authorit ies of  one Member State,  and placing him, after 
he has lost  the nationali ty  of  another Member State that  
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he originally possessed,  in a posit ion capable of  
causing him to lose the status conferred by Article 17 
EC and the rights at taching thereto fal ls ,  by reason of  
i ts  nature and i ts  consequences,  within the ambit  of  
European Union law”.  
   The ground-breaking effect  of  this  decision is  
that ,  without ignoring that  ci t izenship st i l l  fal ls  within 
the competence of the member states,  any national  
decision that  interacts  with the EU cit izenship status – 
and vir tually al l  of  them do,  at  least  potential ly – is  
considered by the Court  to fal l ,  by reason of  i ts  nature 
and i ts  consequences,  within the ambit  of  European 
Union law”.  
That  means that  the Court  extended i ts  competence 
to al l  questions arising from internal  decisions on 
ci t izenship as long as they interfere with the EU status 
and fundamental  r ights and freedoms.  
The Court  had had the opportunity before to 
intervene in cases where national  ci t izenship decisions 
were at  s take – for instance,  in the cases of  Michelet t i  
or  Chen that  I  described above – but  had never before 
aff irmed i ts  competence over ci t izenship matters  in 
such a broad and unrestr icted way. In fact  the Court  not  
only aff irmed the competence of EU Law over 
ci t izenship cases,  even when there is  no cross border 
movement,  but  also recognized the existence of a 
principle of  EU Law – the principle of  proportionali ty – 
that  imposes l imitat ions – both posit ive and negative – 
on member states´  sovereignty over ci t izenship.  In fact ,  
as  the Court  decided and I  wil l  later  describe,  Germany 
could withdraw cit izenship based on deception,  but  
Austr ia should have considered that  withdrawal when 
deciding whether or not  to reattr ibute Austrian 
ci t izenship to Rottman.  The principle of  proportionali ty 
works here as a double l imitat ion:  to the withdrawing 
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country (Germany) and to the reattr ibuting country 
(Austria) .   
The Court  went on to address the question of 
whether withdrawing cit izenship on the grounds of 
deception is  a  violat ion of international  and EU law. 
The withdrawal of  ci t izenship in cases of  fraud is  
generally accepted by international  law309.  This is  
recognized in the Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness.  Article 8(2) provides that  a  person may 
be deprived of the nationali ty of  a Contracting State if  
he has acquired that  nationali ty by means of 
misrepresentation or by any other act  of  fraud.  
Likewise,  Article 7(1) and (3) of  the European 
Convention on nationali ty does not  prohibit  a  State 
Party from depriving a person of his  nationali ty,  even if  
he thus becomes stateless,  when that  nationali ty has 
been acquired by means of fraudulent  conduct,  false 
information or concealment of  any relevant fact  
at tr ibutable to that  person.  I t  is  therefore in l ine with 
the general  principle of  international  law that  no one is  
arbitrari ly to be deprived of his  nationali ty,  that  
principle being reproduced in Article 15(2) of  the 
Universal  Declaration of Human Rights and in Article 
4(c)  of  the European Convention on nationali ty.  The 
Court  concluded that  when a State deprives a person of 
his  nationali ty because of his  acts  of  deception,  which 
have been legally established,  that  deprivation cannot 
be considered to be an arbitrary act .  
Therefore,  the decision of the Court  regarding the 
loss of  ci t izenship and i ts  conformity with international  
law was that  “a decision withdrawing naturalisation 
because of  deception corresponds to a reason relating 
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to the public interest .  In this  regard,  i t  is  legit imate for 
a Member State to wish to protect  the special  
relationship of  solidarity and good faith between i t  and 
i ts  nationals and also the reciprocity of  r ights  and 
duties,  which form the bedrock of  the bond of  
nationali ty”.  
The Court  goes back to Michelett i ,  Kaur and Chen 
cases to aff irm that  “ the Member States must ,  when 
exercising their  powers in the sphere of  nationali ty ,  
have due regard to European Union law (  Michelet t i  
and Others ,  paragraph 10; Mesbah ,  paragraph 29; 
Case C-192/99 Kaur [2001]  ECR I-1237,  paragraph 19; 
and Zhu and Chen ,  paragraph 37)”.  
According to AG Maduro´s opinion,  “at the present  
t ime,  the Court  has not  yet  suff iciently clari f ied the 
scope of  that  proviso.  I t  has merely inferred from it  the 
principle that  a Member State must  not  restrict  the 
ef fects  of  the grant of  the nationali ty  of  another 
Member State by laying down an addit ional condit ion 
for recognit ion of  that  nationali ty  with a view to the 
exercise of  a fundamental  freedom provided for in the 
Treaty”.  Following that  opinion,  the Court  takes here 
the opportunity to revisi t  the very important  proviso of  
the Michellet i  decision that  I  have interpreted above.  
According to the Court ,  “member States must ,  when 
exercising their  powers in the sphere of  nationali ty ,  
have due regard to European Union law”.   Here the 
Court  adds,  reinterpret ing that  fundamental  proviso in 
the l ight  of  the Rottman case that  “ the proviso that  due 
regard must  be had to European Union law does not  
compromise the principle of  international law 
previously recognised by the Court ,  and mentioned in 
paragraph 39 above,  that  the Member States have the 
power to lay down the condit ions for the acquisi t ion 
and loss of  nationali ty ,  but  rather enshrines the 
principle that ,  in respect  of  ci t izens of  the Union,  the 
exercise of  that  power,  in so far as i t  af fects  the rights 
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conferred and protected by the legal order of  the 
Union,  as is  in particular the case of  a decision 
withdrawing naturalisation such as that  at  issue in the 
main proceedings,  is  amenable to judicial  review 
carried out in the l ight  of  European Union law”.  
The Court  concludes that  “ i t  is  not  contrary to 
European Union law, in particular to Article 17 EC, for 
a Member State to withdraw from a ci t izen of  the Union 
the nationali ty  of  that  State acquired by naturalisation 
when that  nationali ty  has been obtained by deception,  
on condit ion that  the decision to withdraw observes the 
principle of  proportionali ty”.  
As Jessurum d´Oliveira points  out  in a cri t ical  
tone,  “ the A.G. had not devoted a single word to the 
principle of  proportionali ty .  He was of  the opinion that  
the revocation in this  case was not  a violation of  any 
Community rule.  I t  is  the Court’s  own invention to 
colour in i ts  long-held st ipulation – the member states’  
‘reserved domain’ in the area of  nationali ty law – with 
the proportionali ty  principle”310.  
That  is  why this  is  the most  important  part  of  the 
decision,  deemed as avant gard  by some scholars311.  
The Rottman decision is  an important  part  of  a 
long-running debate on EU cit izenship law that  sets  
those who read CJEU decisions as a reinforcement of  
the reserved domain doctrine312 against  those who see,  
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in cases l ike Michelet t i  or  Chen,  a clear l imitat ion 
deriving from EU law on national  decisions over 
ci t izenship313.  
The reactions to Rottman were extreme, even from 
those who have long identif ied this  trend.  Gerard René 
de Groot and Anja Seling qualif ied the decision as 
judicial  avant-gardism,314 Dimitry Kochenov said that  
“although confirming the general  trend in the recent 
development of  EU law,  characterised by the shif t  from 
dual to co-operative federalism, which stands for ‘a  
philosophy where sovereignty is  shared’ and no 
‘reserved domains’ exist ,  Rottmann is  fundamentally 
innovative in a number of  important  respects”315.  
Kochenov adds that  “Rottmann is  the f irst  case to hold 
unequivocally that  the f ield of  nationali ty  regulation is  
not  a ‘reserved domain’ for the Member States where 
EU law does not  apply.  In fact ,  clearly,  there are no 
such reserved domains at  al l ,  s ince EU competences are 
goal oriented and interpreted teleologically,  which 
makes immunity of  particular f ields of  regulation to EU 
law impossible”316.  
At the other extreme, Jessurum d´Oliveira says that  
“ the Court  is  persist ing in i ts  judicial  error.  The 
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question of  whether the European Union has authority 
over the organization of  the member states’  nationali ty  
law not only leads to divisions in the doctrine,  but  also 
among the inst i tut ions of  the Union.  In i ts  interventions 
in the cases submitted to the Court ,  and again in the 
Rottmann case,  the Commission has systematically 
taken the point  of  view, despite the Court’s  case-law, 
that  nationali ty  law is  a matter exclusively for the 
member states.  In i ts  answers to writ ten questions from 
the European Parliament,  as well ,  the Commission has 
always refused to make a substantial  s tatement on 
member states’  nationali ty  law, because i t  claimed to 
lack the competence to do so”.  
I  do not  think that  the Rottman decision represents 
such a bold change in relat ion to what the Court  said 
before about the relat ionship between EU cit izenship 
and national  member states’  ci t izenship.  In fact  only a 
narrow reading of the preceding cases could lead to the 
conclusion that  this  decision represents some kind of 
revolution in EU cit izenship law. As Kochenov 
acknowledges,  this  decision confirms the “general trend 
in the recent development of  EU law”317.  
The interpretat ion of the Michelet t i  and the Chen 
cases that  I  have outl ined above shows that  my true 
understanding of these cases is  that  they were the 
beginning of a revolution in EU cit izenship law.  
The fundamental  proviso “having due regard to 
community law” had to mean something.  As De Groot 
has argued at  length,  i t  meant that  a  violat ion of  EU 
fundamental  principles and freedoms by a national  
ci t izenship law could be reviewed by the Court  and 
declared contrary to EU law. I t  was just  a  matter  of  
when and how the question would arise.  
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 I t  was also possible to speculate about different  
principles and freedoms that  could potential ly be 
breached by a national  ci t izenship rule.  What the Court  
now did was to explici t ly state one of these principles:  
proportionali ty.  
I t  is  very important  to recall  that  the Court  
aff irmed explici t ly that  the principles highlighted in 
this  decision are applicable both to acquisi t ion and loss 
of  ci t izenship:  “ the principles stemming from this  
judgment with regard to the powers of  the Member 
States in the sphere of  nationali ty ,  and also their  duty 
to exercise those powers having due regard to European 
Union law, apply both to the Member State of  
naturalisation and to the Member State of  the original  
nationali ty”.  This obiter dicta is  just if ied by the need 
to address the duties of  Austria  in this  process,  but  may 
well  be used in other cases.  In fact ,  aware of  the 
importance of  this  case and of future developments,  the 
Court  wanted to clarify that  the principles identif ied do 
not only apply to si tuations of  loss of  ci t izenship.  Such 
a narrow reading would immediately follow had the 
Court  fai led to include such a sentence.  
The principle of  proport ionali ty seems an adequate 
proposit ion to regulate ci t izenship cases,  especial ly 
related to the loss of  ci t izenship,  s ince i t  demands a 
careful  proportionali ty test  to assess whether or  not  the 
decision is  proportionate to the facts .  I t  means,  in the 
present  case,  that  withdrawing ci t izenship on the 
grounds of a fraudulent  action related to the concealing 
of a relevant fact ,  such as a criminal  procedure pending 
upon the person,  is  adequate in terms of the 
proportionali ty test .  I t  would probably not  be the case if  
there was a fai lure to report  a  speeding t icket  or  another 
minor misdemeanor.  The Court  aff irmed that  any 
decision on the withdrawal of  ci t izenship – but  also,  
very importantly,  on acquisi t ion – should comply with 
the str ict  scrutiny of a proport ionali ty test .  
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The Court  established precise rules related to this  
proportionali ty test .  As Jessurum d´Oliveira points  out ,  
“ for completing this  Union law proportionali ty  test ,  the 
Court  provides a number of  quite concrete 
instructions”.  
The Court  does this  in paragraph 56: “having 
regard to the importance which primary law attaches to 
the status of  ci t izen of  the Union,  when examining a 
decision withdrawing naturalisation i t  is  necessary,  
therefore,  to take into account the consequences that  
the decision entails  for the person concerned and,  i f  
relevant,  for the members of  his  family with regard to 
the loss of  the rights  enjoyed by every ci t izen of  the 
Union.  In this  respect  i t  is  necessary to establish,  in 
particular,  whether that  loss is  just i f ied in relation to 
the gravity of  the offence committed by that  person,  to 
the lapse of  t ime between the naturalisation decision 
and the withdrawal decision and to whether i t  is  
possible for that  person to recover his  original  
nationali ty”.    
   Several  elements should be considered:  i)  
consequences of the decision to the person concerned; 
i i )  consequences to the members of  the family;  i i i )  
just if ication in relat ion to the gravity of  the offence 
committed;  iv)  lapse of  t ime between natural izat ion and 
withdrawal;  and v) possibil i ty of  the person recovering 
the original  ci t izenship.  
Underlying this  crucial  proportionali ty test  is  
another principle:  protection of expectations.  AG 
Maduro very r ightly identif ied this  principle:  as 
regards the withdrawal of  naturalisation at  issue in this  
case,  some might invoke against  i t  the principle of  the 
protection of  legit imate expectations as to maintenance 
of  the status of  ci t izen of  the Union.  However,  i t  is  not  
clear in what respect  that  principle has been 
contravened,  in the absence of  any expectation merit ing 
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protection on the part  of  the person concerned who has 
provided false information or committed fraud and has 
thus obtained German nationali ty  i l legally.  More 
especially because,  as we have seen,  international law 
authorises the loss of  nationali ty  in cases of  fraud,  and 
Union ci t izenship is  l inked to possession of  the 
nationali ty  of  a Member State .  In fact  this  shows that  
while most  authors say that  the AG’s opinion missed 
the proport ionali ty issue318,  AG Maduro actually set  the 
tone for the art iculat ion of this  principle by mentioning 
the principle of  the protection of  legit imate 
expectations .  
Although i t  is  clear  that  the action was unlawful,  
the proport ionali ty test  must  take into consideration 
factors such as the consequences for the person and the 
family and the t ime elapsed.  In this  sense legit imate 
expectations does not  mean legal  or  lawful 
expectations,  but  rather expectat ions that  the law must  
accommodate319.  I  wil l  use this  argument later  to show 
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the trend towards a r ight  to a specif ic ci t izenship and 
the importance of  expectat ions in that  context .  The t ime 
elapsed is  also an important  factor,  related to the 
expectations principle,  s ince i t  shows residence and the 
relevance of  the said expectat ions.  I t  is  comparable to 
the acquisi t ion of property through adverse 
possession320.  I  wil l  come back to this  later .  
Despite the enthusiast ic  reaction to this  decision,  
Kochenov is  very cri t ical  of  the application of the 
proportionali ty principle in a case related to the 
withdrawal of  ci t izenship.  According to this  author,  
“ the application of  proportionali ty  in the cases of  
s tatelessness seems more of  a farce,  indicating the 
dangerous l imitations of  thinking about rights in 
Europe”.  And, he adds,  “all  in all ,  i t  is  regrettable that  
the CJEU chose proportionali ty  – ‘a specif ic  test  which 
pretends to balance values avoiding any moral 
reasoning’.  There is  no doubt that  the application of  
proportionali ty  deprives nationali ty ,  in the context  of  
imminent statelessness,  of  the weight i t  deserves and 
tends to ignore the fundamental  potential  i t  has in 
terms of  rendering human rights  and the most  basic 
protections unusable,  i .e .  erasing a person”.  
However,  i t  is  understandable that  the f inal  
solution of this  case might sound disappointing since a 
decision that  is  deemed to be historical  ends up 
rendering Rottman potential ly stateless.  
Yet the importance of  the decision cannot always 
be assessed by i ts  f inal  result .  The f inal  decision in 
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Chen is  certainly more fortunate than that  in Rottman 
but neither of  them will  remain as the key factors in 
these two CJEU cases.  
A proportionali ty test  certainly al lows the Court  to 
assess different  aspects  and weigh up their  relat ive 
importance.  Such a weighing up was not  possible in the 
Rottman case,  at  least  in the prevail ing narrow visions 
of  i t .  In that  scenario,  the court  had no al ternative but  
to render Rottman stateless,  not  after  i ts  own 
proportionali ty assessment but  on the grounds of the 
reserved domain doctrine or,  even worse,  by declining 
competence to review the case due to the purely internal  
nature of  the si tuation.  
In that  sense,  this  case seems to be an important  
leap forward,  essential ly because i t  identif ies an 
important  principle – proportionali ty – that  was not 
evident before and that  the states wil l  now have to 
comply with.  
I  wil l  make a f inal  point  on this  case just  to 
underl ine that  these principles are also applicable to 
ci t izenship acquisi t ion or naturalization rules.  In fact  
the question is  also pending in this  case because i t  is  
not  clear if  Rottman will  become stateless.  On this  
issue,  which is  the second question the German court  
asked,  the Court  said:  “ in this  instance,  i t  is  to be noted 
that  the withdrawal of  the naturalisation acquired by 
the applicant in Germany has not  become defini t ive,  
and that  no decision concerning his  s tatus has been 
taken by the Member State whose nationali ty  he 
originally possessed,  namely,  the Republic of  Austria”.  
And i t  added: “ the Court  cannot,  however,  rule on the 
question whether a decision not  yet  adopted is  contrary 
to European Union law. As the Austrian Government 
maintained at  the hearing,  the Austrian authorit ies wil l  
possibly have to adopt a decision on the question 
whether the applicant in the main proceedings is  to 
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recover his  nationali ty  of  origin and when that  decision 
has been adopted the Austrian courts  wil l ,  i f  necessary,  
have to determine whether i t  is  valid in the l ight  of  the 
principles referred to in this  judgment”.  
However,  i t  is  worth noting the opinion of AG 
Maduro on this:  “as regards the restoration of  Austrian 
nationali ty ,  Community law does not  impose any such 
obligation,  even though, fai l ing such restoration,  the 
applicant in the main proceedings remains stateless 
and,  therefore,  deprived of  Union ci t izenship.  (…) 
Admittedly,  the view could be taken that ,  s ince the 
withdrawal of  German naturalisation has retroactive 
ef fect ,  Mr.  Rottmann has never had German nationali ty ,  
so that  the event tr iggering the loss of  Austrian 
nationali ty  never took place.  Consequently,  he would 
have a right  to automatic restoration of  his  Austrian 
nationali ty .  However,  i t  is  for Austrian law to decide 
whether or not  that  reasoning should apply.  No 
Community rule can impose i t .  The posit ion would be 
otherwise only i f  Austrian law already provided for 
such a solution in similar cases,  and,  in that  case,  on 
the basis  of  the Community principle of  equivalence”.  
There is  a  very interest ing at tempt by the AG, 
almost  certainly because a result ing statelessness 
si tuation was not  desirable to the Court ,  to point  to an 
ingenious yet  r igorous legal  solution to avoid the 
undesirable conclusion.  
Where I  disagree and,  I  believe,  the Court  does too,  
is  that  no community rule can impose the granting or 
the restorat ion of ci t izenship.  In fact ,  when the Court ,  
fol lowing the AG’s opinion,  expressly states that  “[…] 
and also their  duty to exercise those powers having due 
regard to European Union law, apply both to the 
Member State of  naturalisation and to the Member State 
of  the original  nationali ty”,  the Court  is  saying that  
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Austria must  comply with the same principles when 
deciding whether or not  to restore Austrian ci t izenship.  
In fact ,  this  t iny detai l  in the whole decision is  
probably the most  important  yet  unidentif ied one:   for  
the f irst  t ime the Court  aff irmed a posit ive l imitat ion on 
States to grant  ci t izenship.  When deciding to grant  or  
restore ci t izenship,  States must  comply with community 
law. I  wil l  not  qualify this  proviso for the moment but  I  
wil l ,  as  I  did in Michelet t i ,  predict  s ignificant  
evolutions out  of  i t .  
Another very important  and recent  CJEU decision,  
also perceived as a revolution in EU cit izenship law, is  
the Zambrano case,  and the decision of 8 March 2011321.  
On 14 April  1999,  Ruiz Zambrano,  who was in 
possession of a visa issued by the Belgian embassy in 
Bogotá,  applied for asylum in Belgium. In February 
2000,  his  wife,  also a Columbian national ,  l ikewise 
applied for refugee status in Belgium. 
By a decision of 11 September 2000,  the Belgian 
authori t ies refused their  applications and ordered them 
to leave Belgium. However,  the order sent  to them 
included a non-refoulement clause stat ing that  they 
should not  be sent  back to Colombia in view of the civil  
war in that  country.  
On 20 October 2000,  Ruiz Zambrano applied to 
have his  si tuation regularized.  In his  application,  he 
referred to the absolute impossibil i ty of  returning to 
Colombia and the severe deteriorat ion of the si tuation 
there,  whilst  emphasizing his  efforts  to integrate into 
Belgian society,  his  learning of French and his  child’s 
at tendance at  pre-school,  in addit ion to the r isk,  in the 
event of  a return to Columbia,  of  a worsening of the 
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significant  post- traumatic stress syndrome he had 
suffered in 1999 as a result  of  his  son,  then aged 3,  
being abducted for a week.  
That  application was rejected.  An action was 
brought for annulment and suspension of that  decision 
before the Conseil  d’État ,  which rejected the action for 
suspension.  
Since 18 April  2001,  Ruiz Zambrano and his  wife 
have been registered in the municipali ty of  Schaerbeek 
(Belgium).  On 2 October 2001,  al though he did not hold 
a work permit ,  Ruiz Zambrano signed an employment 
contract  for  an unlimited period to work full - t ime with 
the Plastoria company, with effect  from 1 October 2001. 
On 1 September 2003,  Ruiz Zambrano’s wife gave 
bir th to a second child,  Diego,  who acquired Belgian 
nationali ty pursuant to Article 10(1) of  the Belgian 
Nationali ty Code,  s ince Columbian law does not  
recognize Colombian nationali ty for children born 
outside the terri tory of  Colombia where the parents do 
not  take specif ic steps to have them so recognised.  
The order for reference further indicates that ,  at  the 
t ime of his  second child’s bir th,  Ruiz Zambrano had 
sufficient  resources from his working activit ies to 
provide for his  family.  His work was paid according to 
the various applicable scales,  with statutory deductions 
made for social  securi ty and the payment of  employer 
contributions.  
On 9 April  2004,  Mr.  and Mrs.  Ruiz Zambrano 
again applied to have their  s i tuation regularized,  
putt ing forward as a new factor the bir th of  their  second 
child.  
Following the bir th of  their  third child,  Jessica,  on 
26 August  2005,  who, l ike her brother Diego,  acquired 
Belgian nationali ty,  on 2 September 2005 Mr.  and Mrs.  
Ruiz Zambrano lodged an application to take up 
residence in their  capacity as ascendants of  a Belgian 
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national .  On 13 September,  2005 a registrat ion 
cert if icate was issued to them provisionally covering 
their  residence unti l  13 February,  2006. 
Ruiz Zambrano’s application to take up residence 
was rejected.  
From the lodging of his  action for review of the 
decision rejecting his  application for residence in 
March 2006,  Ruiz Zambrano held a special  residence 
permit  valid for the entire duration of that  action.  
In the meantime, on 10 October 2005,  Mr.  Ruiz 
Zambrano’s employment contract  was temporari ly 
suspended on economic grounds,  which led him to lodge 
a f irst  application for unemployment benefi t ,  which was 
rejected.  
In the course of  an inspection carried out  on 11 
October 2006 by the Direction générale du contrôle des 
lois  sociales (Directorate General ,  Supervision of  
Social  Legislat ion) at  the registered office of  Mr.  Ruiz 
Zambrano’s employer,  Ruiz was found to be at  work.  He 
had to stop working immediately.  The next day,  Mr.  
Ruiz Zambrano’s employer terminated his  contract  of  
employment with immediate effect  and without 
compensation.  
The application lodged by Mr.  Ruiz Zambrano for 
full- t ime unemployment benefi ts  was rejected. 
On 19 November,  2007,  Ruiz Zambrano brought an 
action to the Belgian Court  based on the inexistence of 
the ‘ legal  engineering’ of  which he had been charged,  
s ince the acquisi t ion of Belgian nationali ty by his  
minor children was not the result  of  any steps taken by 
him, but  rather of  the application of the relevant 
Belgian legislat ion.  
The Belgian court  referred the case to the CJEU for 
a preliminary ruling,  asking the following: 
“1. Do Articles 12 [EC] ,  17 [EC]  and 18 [EC] ,  or 
one or more of  them when read separately or in 
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conjunction,  confer a right  of  residence upon a ci t izen 
of  the Union in the terri tory of  the Member State of  
which that  ci t izen is  a national,  irrespective of  whether 
he has previously exercised his  right  to move within the 
terri tory of  the Member States?  
2.  Must  Articles 12 [EC] ,  17 [EC]  and 18 [EC] ,  in 
conjunction with the provisions of  Artic les 21,  24 and 
34 of  the Charter of  Fundamental  Rights,  be interpreted 
as meaning that  the right  which they recognise,  without 
discrimination on the grounds of  nationali ty ,  in favour 
of  any ci t izen of  the Union to move and reside freely in 
the terri tory of  the Member States means that ,  where 
that  ci t izen is  an infant  dependent on a relative in the 
ascending l ine who is  a national of  a non-member State,  
the infant’s  enjoyment of  the right  of  residence in the 
Member State in which he resides and of  which he is  a 
national must  be safeguarded,  irrespective of  whether 
the right  to move freely has been previously exercised 
by the child or through his  legal representative,  by 
coupling that  right  of  residence with the useful  ef fect  
whose necessi ty is  recognised by Community case-law [ 
Zhu and Chen ] ,  and granting the relative in the 
ascending l ine who is  a national of  a non-member State,  
upon whom the child is  dependent and who has 
suff icient  resources and sickness insurance,  the 
secondary right  of  residence which that  same national 
of  a non-member State would have i f  the child who is  
dependent upon him were a Union ci t izen who is  not  a 
national of  the Member State in which he resides? 
3.  Must  Articles 12 [EC] ,  17 [EC]  and 18 [EC] ,  in 
conjunction with the provisions of  Articles 21,  24 and 
34 of  the Charter of  Fundamental  Rights,  be interpreted 
as meaning that  the right  of  a minor child who is  a 
national of  a Member State to reside in the terri tory of  
the State in which he resides must  entail  the grant of  an 
exemption from the requirement to hold a work permit  
to the relative in the ascending l ine who is  a national of  
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a non-member State,  upon whom the child is  dependent 
and who, were i t  not  for the requirement to hold a work 
permit  under the national law of  the Member State in 
which he resides,  ful f i ls  the condit ion of  suff icient  
resources and the possession of  s ickness insurance by 
virtue of  paid employment making him subject  to the 
social  security system of  that  State,  so that  the child’s 
right  of  residence is  coupled with the useful  ef fect  
recognised by Community case-law [ Zhu and Chen ]  in 
favour of  a minor child who is  a European ci t izen with 
a nationali ty  other than that  of  the Member State in 
which he resides and is  dependent upon a relative in the 
ascending l ine who is  a national of  a non-member 
State?” 
The Court ,  in an extremely laconic decision,  again 
made history by the way i t  considered the questions 
referred to i t  and answered them. 
First  of  al l  i t  is  worth noting several  s imilari t ies 
between this  case and the Chen case.  This was noted by 
Zambrano in his  arguments and also by the Court  and 
several  commentators.  As in the Chen case,  Zambrano 
was claiming to have a r ight  of  residence in an EU 
member state due to the fact  that  he and his  wife were 
ascendants of  EU cit izens that  were,  at  the t ime,  total ly 
dependent on them. 
Yet there are also some aspects  that  do not  
perfectly coincide with the facts  in Chen.  The most  
ground-breaking parts  of  the decision are probably 
related to these aspects.  
The f irst  one has to do with the purely internal  
nature of  the si tuation.  While in Chen the si tuation was 
clearly cross-border since there was no relat ionship 
whatsoever between Catherine and her family and 
Ireland and the peti t ion was to reside in the UK, in 
Zambrano i t  seems a purely internal  s i tuation.  
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 The only transnational  connections are between 
Colombia,  a  non EU member state and Belgium. All  the 
relevant facts  –the Zambranos’ residence,  the work,  the 
bir th,  the nationali ty – were at tached to Belgium soil ,  
according to the law of Belgium322.  
This was brought to the at tention of the Court  by 
al l  the member states represented by agents in the 
judgment.  The Court  said that  “all  governments which 
submitted observations to the Court  and the European 
Commission argue that  a si tuation such as that  of  Mr.  
Ruiz Zambrano’s second and third children,  where 
those children reside in the Member State of  which they 
are nationals and have never lef t  the terri tory of  that  
Member State,  does not  come within the si tuations 
envisaged by the freedoms of  movement and residence 
guaranteed under European Union law. Therefore,  the 
provisions of  European Union law referred to by the 
national court  are not  applicable to the dispute in the 
main proceedings”.  
In response to this ,  Zambrano argued that  “ the 
rel iance by his  children Diego and Jessica on the 
provisions relating to European Union ci t izenship does 
not  presuppose that  they must  move outside the Member 
State in question and that  he,  in his  capacity as a 
family member,  is  enti t led to a right  of  residence and is  
exempt from having to obtain a work permit  in that  
Member State”.   
The Court  candidly decided that  “Article 20 TFEU 
precludes national measures which have the ef fect  of  
depriving ci t izens of  the Union of  the genuine 
enjoyment of  the substance of  the rights conferred by 
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Rationing Family Values in Europe and America: An Immigration Tug of 
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virtue of  their  status as ci t izens of  the Union  (see,  to 
that  ef fect ,  Rottmann, paragraph 42)”.  
In fact  i t  would be hard for  the Court  to decide 
otherwise.  One of the most  important  aspects  in 
Rottmann was the decision that  the si tuation – i .e .  EU 
cit izenship – fel l  within the scope of EU law by “reason 
of i ts  nature and consequences”323.  
In contrast  with the extremely short  Court  decision,  
the AG in this  case,  Sharpston,  delivered a thorough 
and comprehensive opinion324.  AG Sharpston just if ies 
that  there is  no need for cross-border movement to 
apply EU law in this  case,  on a very interest ing 
academic example:    “ i f  one insists  on the premiss that  
physical  movement to a Member State other than the 
Member State of  nationali ty  is  required before 
residence rights as a ci t izen of  the Union can be 
invoked,  the result  r isks being both strange and 
i l logical .  Suppose a fr iendly neighbour had taken Diego 
and Jessica on a visi t  or two to Parc Astérix in Paris ,  
or to the seaside in Brit tany.  They would then have 
received services in another Member State.  Were they 
to seek to claim rights  arising from their  ‘movement’  i t  
could not be suggested that  their  si tuation was ‘purely 
internal’  to Belgium. Would one visi t  have suff iced? 
Two? Several? Would a day trip have been enough; or 
would they have had to stay over for a night  or two in 
France?  I f  the family,  having been obliged to leave 
Belgium and indeed the European Union,  were to seek 
refuge in,  say,  Argentina,  Diego and Jessica would be 
                                              
323 DIMITRY KOCHENOV, A Real European Citizenship; A New Jurisdiction 
Test; A Novel Chapter in the Development of the Union in Europe (2011), 83. 
324 ANJA LANSBERGEN and NINA MILLER, European Citizenship Rights in 
Internal Situations: An Ambiguous Revolution? Decision of 8 March 2011, 
Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v. Office national de l’ emploi 
(ONEM) (2011), 290. 
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able,  as EU cit izens,  to invoke diplomatic and consular 
protection from other Member States’  missions in that  
third country.  They could seek access to documents and 
write to the Ombudsman. But they would not ,  on this  
hypothesis ,  be able to rely on their  rights as ci t izens of  
the Union to go on residing in Belgium. I t  is  di f f icult  to 
avoid a sense of  unease at  such an outcome. Lottery 
rather than logic would seem to be governing the 
exercise of  EU cit izenship rights”.  
The opinion of the AG in this  case,  confirmed by 
the Court ,  directly contradicts  the opinion of Jessurum 
d´ Oliveira in his  comment on the Rottmann case,  in 
what he predicted would be one the most  diff icult  
outcomes to deal  with.  As d´Oliveira said in his  
comment,  “ i f  a Dutch national who has l ived and 
worked in Greece and Germany moves to the United 
States and voluntarily becomes a naturalised US cit izen 
and thereby loses his  Union ci t izenship,  EU law has 
nothing to say about i t .  The broadly formulated 
operative part  of  the judgment admits  a development 
that  wil l ,  so I  surmise,  also bring this  type of  cases 
under the spell  of  EU law”325.  
What the Court  said in Rottmann and clearly 
reaffirms in Zambrano is  that  EU law has something to 
say whenever the exercise of  EU cit izenship r ights and 
l ibert ies are at  s take,  regardless of  the internal  nature 
of  the si tuation or whether third countries are involved. 
As AG Sharpston r ightly puts i t ,  “ the Court’s  
reasoning in Rottmann, read in conjunction with i ts  
earlier ruling in Zhu and Chen,  may readily be 
transposed to the present  case (…)Moreover,  l ike 
Catherine Zhu,  Diego and Jessica cannot exercise their  
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rights as Union ci t izens (…)the facts  of  this  case do not  
consti tute a purely internal si tuation”.  
   I t  is  therefore clear ,  both for  the AG in this  case 
and for the Court ,  that  as long as EU cit izenship r ights 
might be affected by a national  court  decision related to 
the EU cit izenship status and i ts  relat ionship with 
national  ci t izenship,  EU law has a say in i t .  I t  is  not  an 
invention in this  case;  i t  is ,  rather,  an evolution than 
can clearly be identif ied here in the combination of the 
rulings in the Chen and Rottmann cases.  
The decision of the Court  immediately followed 
this  conclusion,  without any further considerations:  
“Article 20 TFEU is  to be interpreted as meaning that  i t  
precludes a Member State from refusing a third country 
national upon whom his minor children,  who are 
European Union ci t izens,  are dependent,  a right  of  
residence in the Member State of  residence and 
nationali ty  of  those children,  and from refusing to grant 
a work permit  to that  third country national,  in so far 
as such decisions deprive those children of  the genuine 
enjoyment of  the substance of  the rights attaching to the 
status of  European Union ci t izen”.   
In her thorough opinion,  AG Sharpston addressed 
two addit ional  issues not  regarded by the Court:  
proportionali ty and reverse discrimination and 
fundamental  r ights .  Given the importance to my overall  
claim I  wil l  comment on the f irst  two.  
The reference to the proport ionali ty principle is  
total ly just if ied given the importance that  the principle 
played in the Rottman case.  According to AG 
Sharpston,  “ in assessing proportionali ty  in the present  
case,  the national court  wil l  need to take into account 
the fact  that  Mr.  Ruiz Zambrano worked full  t ime for 
nearly f ive years for Plastoria.  His employment was 
declared to the Off ice national de la sécurité sociale.  
He paid the statutory social  security deductions,  and 
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his employer paid the corresponding employer’s 
contributions.  He has thus in the past  contributed 
steadily and regularly to the public f inances of  the host  
Member State.  In my view, these are factors that  point  
to the conclusion that  i t  would be disproportionate not  
to recognise a derivative right  of  residence in the 
present  case.  Ult imately,  however,  the decision is  one 
for the national court ,  and the national court  alone”.   
Although the Court  did not  address the 
proportionali ty principle,  as the decision resulted 
directly from the application of Article 20 TFEU, i t  is  
worth recall ing the opinion of the AG. AG Sharpston 
did nothing more than apply to this  case the 
proportionali ty doctrine adopted in Rottman, by running 
the proport ionali ty test  on the facts  of  the case.  
The exercise is  very interest ing and led the AG to 
the conclusion that  i t  would be disproportionate not  to 
recognise a derivative right  of  residence in the present 
case.  The factors that  were considered in this  test  were 
the t ime Zambrano had worked for a Belgian company,  
the fact  that  his  employment was not  concealed from 
the Belgian authori t ies,  and also his  payments to the 
social  securi ty and tax departments.  
Again,  there was no direct  concern with the legali ty 
of  his  presence,  but  rather with the expectat ions raised.  
In this  case,  the conclusion of  the AG was the one I  
have just  described.  
Another concern of the AG was reverse 
discrimination.  Here she addressed the Court  directly,  
urging i t  to deal  openly with the issue of reverse 
discrimination,  al though acknowledging that  a  radical  
change in the entire case law on reverse discrimination 
would not happen overnight.  
According to Miguel Poiares Maduro,  reverse 
discrimination “occurs when a Member State is  required 
by EC law to confer rights on the nationals of  other 
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Member States which i t  does not  extend to i ts  own 
nationals therefore giving rise to discrimination 
against  the lat ter”326.  I t  derives from the general  rule 
that  prohibits  discrimination based on nationali ty327.  
When applied to EU cit izenship,  reverse 
discrimination has a restr ict ive effect .   As Dimitry 
Kochenov asserts ,  “ the general  rule is  s imple: those 
who do not  make use of  the rights of fered by Community 
law in the majority  of  cases do not  f ind themselves 
within i ts  scope.  The CJEU has been clear on this  
issue: “cit izenship of  the Union,  established by Article 
8 of  the EC Treaty,  is  not  intended to extend the scope 
ratione materiae of  the Treaty also to internal 
si tuations which have no l ink with Community law.” 
Only those who move enjoy the ful l  array of  r ights.  In 
other words,  in any si tuation where a cross-border 
element is  absent ,  European ci t izens are not  protected 
by the rules of  Community law”.  
Or,  in the eloquent words of  Anja Lansbergen and 
Nina Miller  “reverse discrimination occurs when a 
‘mobile’  EU cit izen benefi ts  from more favourable rules 
under European Union law than a ‘static’  EU cit izen 
does in his  own member state.  For example,  a European 
cit izen who moves to another member state with a third 
country family member wil l  benefi t  from European 
Union free movement rules under the Cit izens’  Rights 
Directive,  which lay down the condit ions under which 
third country national family members are enti t led to 
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join European ci t izens in the host  member state in the 
absence of  the application of  national immigration law 
at  the point  of  entry into the Union”328.  
I t  is  an undesirable phenomenon that  occurs due to 
the peculiar  nature of  the EU and of EU cit izenship,  in 
between national  and transnational  ci t izenship.   
The Court  has been trying to cope with the 
phenomenon by stretching the r ights  in order to include 
other persons that  would not  be included ratione 
materiae .  
Nothing in these recent Court  decisions prevent 
reverse discrimination from happening.  That  is  probably 
why AG Sharpston urges the Court  to solve the problem 
by addressing the issue of reverse discrimination 
directly,  in the ci t izenship context .  Therefore she 
suggested to the Court  “ that  Article 18 TFEU should be 
interpreted as prohibit ing reverse discrimination 
caused by the interaction between Article 21 TFEU and 
national law that  entails  a violation of  a fundamental  
r ight  protected under EU law, where at  least  equivalent  
protection is  not  available under national law”.  
This might be an interest ing solution to try to avoid 
the unnecessary stretching that  the Court  often engages 
in.  The Court  did not  fol low the opinion and avoided 
addressing the reverse discrimination issue.  
I  believe the solution is  to resolve the question at  
i ts  roots ,  by overcoming the peculiar  nature of  EU 
cit izenship.  I  would agree with Michaela Hailbronner 
and Sara Iglesias Sánchez when they say that  “ the only 
way for the European legal order to end this  
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phenomenon of  reverse discrimination – independently 
from the consti tut ional solutions that  the Member States 
might adopt – is  to elevate the rights to the status of  
federal  r ights .  This is  what has been achieved by the 
Court  in Rottmann – elevating the protection against  
arbitrary deprivation of  ci t izenship to the federal  level-  
and in Ruiz Zambrano, elevating the right  of  residence 
– as physical  presence – to the category of  federal  right  
(and extending therefore a privi lege that  was previously 
only enjoyed by movers under the Chen 
jurisprudence)”329.  
   As a general  comment on the Zambrano case,  I  
would say that ,  despite i ts  importance and revolutionary 
nature,  the outcome of the case could easily have been 
foreseen,  especial ly after  Rottman. 
In i ts  essential  aspects the case is  not  very 
different  from Chen. As in Chen,  the parents of  children 
who were EU cit izens claimed the r ight  to l ive in an EU 
member state terr i tory as a ci t izenship residence 
derivative r ight .  
While in Chen the UK disputed the abuse of  law 
that  Man Lavette employed in an at tempt – which was 
ult imately successful  – to circumvent the Ir ish 
nationali ty law, in Zambrano the application of the 
Belgian law was not  disputed for i t  resulted from the 
international  law rule that  prevents statelessness330.  
                                              
329 MICHAELA HAILBRONNER and SARA IGLESIAS SÁNCHEZ, The 
European Court of Justice and Citizenship of the European Union: New 
Developments Towards a Truly Fundamental Status (2011), 498-537. 
330 It seems that the fact of whether or not the Zambranos avoided registering 
their children with the Columbian consulate resulting that action in the 
attribution of Belgian citizenship to avoid statelessness remains unclear. 
Although Belgium adopted the rule in its nationality law, it is not a part to the 
Convention on the reduction of statelessness. For an interesting debate on this 
topic see KAY HAILBRONNER and DANIEL THYM, Annotation of Case 
C-34/09 (2011), 1253 and MICHAEL A. OLIVAS and DIMITRY 
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I t  is  also interest ing to note the relat ionship that  
this  case necessari ly implies between ci t izenship,  
immigration and refugee law. A general  principle of  
non refoulement is  always present in this  decision,  
al though the Court  did not  decide to intervene in i t ,  
leaving the decision related to the asylum requests  
solely within the domain of the Belgian authori t ies.  
Another dist inct  aspect  that  might be very 
important  in the future is  the question as to whether or  
not  the family consti tutes a burden on the social  
securi ty system. In a passage,  maybe unwanted by the 
Court ,  in the Chen case the Court  aff irmed that  the 
Chen family would be al lowed to benefi t  from the 
provision provided for in the directive since they had 
f inancial  resources and would not  consti tute a burden 
on the Brit ish social  securi ty system. 
That  conclusion was,  infamously,  later  used by 
several  national  immigration authori t ies to restr ict  the 
scope of the Chen decision.  Whenever the claimants of  
the residence permit  were not  able to prove the 
f inancial  means that  showed they would not  consti tute a 
burden to the social  securi ty of  the host  s tate that  would 
be considered a relevant fact  for  not  fulf i l l ing the 
condit ions laid down in Chen.     
 I t  is  unclear from the facts  if  the Zambranos would 
fulf i l l  this  condit ion as there are several  references to 
social  securi ty.  Indeed,  s ince several  requests  for  
unemployment benefi ts  were f i led,  I  would say that  
probably that  condit ion would not  be considered to be 
fulf i l led.  
The truth is  that  the Court  did not  address the 
issue,  so i t  is  most  probably a signif icant  enlargement 
                                                                                                                
KOCHENOV, Case C- 34/09 Ruiz Zambrano: A Respectful Rejoinder 
(2012).   
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of the Chen doctrine with important  consequences for 
many migrant families in similar  si tuations.  
In any event,  the conclusion according to which the 
parents of  children with EU cit izenship are enti t led,  
according to EU law, to reside with their  dependent 
children as a derivative ci t izenship r ight  was already 
solidly recognized in Chen.  
What was not  recognized in Chen was the 
possibil i ty of  absence of cross border movement,  s ince 
the Chen case was al l  about crossing the UK border.  
Once again,  the Zambrano case was not total ly 
innovative,  s ince the possibil i ty of  the intervention of 
EU law in ci t izenship cases that  were apparently purely 
internal  had already been achieved in Rottman.   
    All  in al l  the case is  of  fundamental  importance 
because i t  is  a  step forward in the aff irmation of the 
federalization of EU cit izenship.  
Immediately following the Zambrano decision,  the 
Court  issued two decisions – Shirley McCarthy vs.  
Secretary of  State for  the Home Department331 and 
Murat  Dereci  and Others v Bundesministerium für 
Inneres332 – that  represent  a small  s tep backwards in the 
euphoria that  followed the Rottman and Zambrano 
cases.  
Mrs.  McCarthy,  a  national  of  the United Kingdom, 
was also an Ir ish national .  She was born and had always 
l ived in the United Kingdom, and had never argued that  
she was or had been a worker,  self-employed person or 
self-sufficient  person.  She received State benefi ts .  In 
2002,  she married a Jamaican national .  Following her 
                                              
331 Case C-434/09, Shirley McCarthy v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department (2011). 
332 Case C-256/11, Murat Dereci and Others v. Bundesministerium für Inneres 
(2011). 
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marriage,  she applied for an Ir ish passport  for  the f irst  
t ime and obtained i t .  
In 2004,  Mrs.  McCarthy and her husband applied to 
the Secretary of  State for a  residence permit  and 
residence document under European Union law as,  
respectively,  a  Union ci t izen and the spouse of  a Union 
ci t izen.  The Secretary of State refused their  
applications on the ground that  Mrs.  McCarthy was not  
a qualif ied person (essential ly,  a  worker,  self-employed 
person or self-sufficient  person) and,  accordingly,  that  
Mr.  McCarthy was not  the spouse of  a qualif ied person.  
She appealed to the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal  
against  the decision that  had been made in relat ion to 
her by the Secretary of  State.  The Tribunal  dismissed 
the appeal  in 2006.   
The case was brought to the CJEU, which decided 
the following: 
“1. Article 3(1) of  Directive 2004/38/EC of  the 
European Parliament and of  the Council  of  29 April  
2004 on the right  of  ci t izens of  the Union and their  
family members to move and reside freely within the 
terri tory of  the Member States amending Regulation 
(EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 
64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 
75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 
93/96/EEC, must  be interpreted as meaning that  that  
directive is  not  applicable to a Union ci t izen who has 
never exercised his  right  of  free movement,  who has 
always resided in a Member State of  which he is  a 
national and who is  also a national of  another Member 
State.   
2.  Article 21 TFEU is  not  applicable to a Union 
ci t izen who has never exercised his  right  of  free 
movement,  who has always resided in a Member State of  
which he is  a national and who is  also a national of  
another Member State,  provided that  the si tuation of  
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that  ci t izen does not  include the application of  
measures by a Member State that  would have the ef fect  
of  depriving him of  the genuine enjoyment of  the 
substance of  the rights conferred by virtue of  his  s tatus 
as a Union ci t izen or of  impeding the exercise of  his  
r ight  of  free movement and residence within the 
terri tory of  the Member States”.   
In November 2011 the Court  issued another 
decision in a very similar  sense.   
A group of undocumented migrants from third 
countries al l  wanted to reside in Austria with their  
family members,  who are European Union ci t izens 
resident  in Austria and who are nationals of  that  
Member State.  I t  should also be noted that  the Union 
ci t izens concerned had never exercised their  r ight  to 
free movement.  By contrast ,  i t  must  be observed that  
the facts  giving rise to the dispute differ  as regards,  
inter  al ia ,  whether the entry into Austria of  the 
applicants in the main proceedings was lawful or  
unlawful,  their  current  place of  residence as well  as the 
nature of  their  family relat ionship with the Union 
ci t izen concerned and whether they are maintained by 
that  Union ci t izen. 
For instance,  Mr.  Dereci ,  who is  a  Turkish 
national ,  entered Austria i l legally and married an 
Austrian national  with whom he had three children who 
are also Austrian nationals  and who are st i l l  minors.  
Mr.  Dereci  currently resides with his  family in Austria.  
Mr.  Maduike,  a  Nigerian national ,  also entered Austria 
i l legally and married an Austrian national,  with whom 
he currently resides in Austria.  By contrast ,  Mrs.  
Heiml,  a  Sri  Lankan national ,  married an Austrian 
national  before legally entering Austria ,  where she 
currently l ives with her husband,  despite the subsequent 
expiry of her residence permit .  
Gonçalo Saraiva Matias – The Path to Citizenship 
246 
Mr. Kokollari ,  who entered Austria legally at  the 
age of two with his  parents ,  who possessed Yugoslav 
nationali ty at  the t ime,  is  29 years old and states that  he 
is  maintained by his  mother who is  now an Austrian 
national .  He currently resides in Austria.  Mrs.  Stevic,  a  
Serbian national ,  is  52 years old and has applied for 
family reunification with her father who has resided in 
Austria for  many years and who obtained Austrian 
nationali ty in 2007.  She has regularly received monthly 
support  from her father and she claims that  he would 
continue to support  her if  she resided in Austria.  Mrs.  
Stevic currently resides in Serbia with her husband and 
their  three adult  children. 
All  of  the persons l is ted above had their  
applications for  residence permits  in Austria rejected.  
In addit ion,  Mrs.  Heiml,  Mr.  Dereci ,  Mr.  Kokollaria and 
Mr.  Maduike have al l  been subject  to expulsion orders 
and individual  removal orders.  
The applications were rejected by the 
Bundesministerium für Inneres,  inter  al ia ,  on one or 
more of the following grounds:  the existence of 
procedural  defects  in the application;  fai lure to comply 
with the obligation to remain abroad whilst  await ing the 
decision on the application on account of  ei ther 
irregular  entry into Austria or  regular  entry followed by 
an extended stay beyond that  which was originally 
permitted;  lack of sufficient  resources;  or  a  breach of 
public policy.  
In al l  of  the disputes,  the Bundesministerium für 
Inneres refused to apply,  in respect  of  the applicants in 
the main proceedings,  a  s imilar  regime to that  provided 
for in Directive 2004/38 for the family members of  a 
Union ci t izen,  on the ground that  the Union ci t izen 
concerned had not exercised his  r ight  of  free movement.  
Similarly,  this  authori ty refused to grant  the applicants 
a r ight  of  residence pursuant to Article 8 of  the ECHR 
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on the grounds,  in part icular ,  that  their  residence status 
in Austria  had to be considered to be uncertain from the 
start  of  their  private and family l ife.  
The court  decided the following:  
“1. European Union law and,  in particular,  i ts  
provisions on ci t izenship of  the Union,  must  be 
interpreted as meaning that  i t  does not  preclude a 
Member State from refusing to allow a third country 
national to reside on i ts  terri tory,  where that  third 
country national wishes to reside with a member of  his  
family who is  a ci t izen of  the Union residing in the 
Member State of  which he has nationali ty ,  who has 
never exercised his  right  to freedom of  movement,  
provided that  such refusal  does not  lead,  for the Union 
ci t izen concerned,  to the denial  of  the genuine 
enjoyment of  the substance of  the rights  conferred by 
virtue of  his  status as a ci t izen of  the Union,  which is  a 
matter for the referring court  to veri fy .   
2.  Article 41(1) of  the Addit ional Protocol,  s igned 
in Brussels  on 23 November 1970 and concluded,  
approved and confirmed on behalf  of  the Community by 
Council  Regulation (EEC) No 2760/72 of  19 December 
1972,  must  be interpreted as meaning that  the 
enactment of  new legislation more restrict ive that  the 
previous legislation,  which,  for i ts  part ,  relaxed earlier 
legislation concerning the condit ions for the exercise of  
the freedom of  establishment of  Turkish nationals at  the 
t ime of  the entry into force of  that  protocol in the 
Member State concerned must  be considered to be a 
‘new restrict ion’ within the meaning of  that  provision”.   
 These decisions temper the outcome of the 
Rottman and Zambrano cases333.  I t  is  worth noting that  
                                              
333 PETER VAN ELSUWEGE, European Union Citizenship and the Purely 
Internal Rule Revisited Decision of 5 May 2011, Case C-434/09 Shirley 
McCarthy v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (2011), 313. 
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the facts  do not  exactly coincide with the previous 
cases.  They do not involve children,  s tatelessness or  
refugee claims.  In that  sense these cases are much less  
connected with ci t izenship interactions.  
In practice al l  the si tuations corresponded to the 
wil l  of  third country nationals ,  in some cases 
undocumented migrants,  to l ive with spouses or partners 
that  were EU cit izens.   
In none of  these cases was there a cross border 
movement.  
If  we compare the AG opinions in,  for  instance,  the 
Zambrano case and the McCarthy case,  they are 
contrast ingly different .  As Peter  Van Esluwege 
acknowledges in his  comment,  “ f irst ,  where Sharpston 
recommended the Court  to recognise that  Article 21 
TFEU contains a separate right  of  residence that  is  
independent of  the right  of  free movement,  Kokott  
considered that  EU cit izenship law only applies in a 
cross-border context  (…) Second, on the issue of  
reverse discrimination,  Advocate-General Kokott  
merely recalled the Court’s  established posit ion that  
‘EU law provides no means of  dealing with this  
problem”334.  
Although corresponding to a step backwards in the 
evolution that  very rapidly occurred with Rottman and 
Zambrano,  nothing in the MacCarthy and Murat  cases 
preempts the idea of  a federalist  evolution of EU 
cit izenship and i ts  classif ication as a form of 
transnational  ci t izenship. 
What the Court  said is  s imply that  the application 
of EU law is  s t i l l  dependent,  in some cases – because 
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Internal Rule Revisited Decision of 5 May 2011, Case C-434/09 Shirley 
McCarthy v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (2011), 310. 
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Rottman and Zambrano are st i l l  s tanding – on the cross 
border nature of  the dispute.  
I t  is  t rue that  in Rottman, for  the f irst  t ime,  the 
Court  accepted that  a  si tuation could fal l  by reason of 
i ts  nature and i ts  consequences within the ambit  of  EU 
cit izenship law335.  
Again,  as in previous CJEU decisions on 
ci t izenship,  i t  is  necessary to read between the l ines to 
sometimes extract  the most  important  conclusions.  In 
both decisions the Court  used the expression provided 
that  such refusal  does not  lead,  for the Union ci t izen 
concerned,  to the denial  of  the genuine enjoyment of  the 
substance of  the rights conferred by virtue of  his  s tatus 
as a ci t izen of  the Union .  In practice what the Court  is  
doing is  introducing a l imit  to the potential ly unlimited 
consequences of the Zambrano case,  described by the 
doctrine as “frustrat ingly opaque”336.   A  contrario sensu  
what the Court  is  saying is  that  whenever there is  a  
denial  of  the genuine enjoyment of  the substance of  the 
rights conferred by virtue of  his  s tatus as a ci t izen of  
the Union,  i t  is  not  a  purely internal  s i tuation and EU 
law is  applicable regardless of  the cross border nature 
of  the dispute337.  
A great  development in EU cit izenship law is  yet  to 
come. As I  did not  l imit  the scope of cases l ike 
Michellet t i  or  Chen,  I  do not  want to hyperbolize cases 
                                              
335 PETER VAN ELSUWEGE, European Union Citizenship and the Purely 
Internal Rule Revisited Decision of 5 May 2011, Case C-434/09 Shirley 
McCarthy v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (2011), 313. 
336 ANJA LANSBERGEN and NINA MILLER, European Citizenship Rights in 
Internal Situations: An Ambiguous Revolution? Decision of 8 March 2011, 
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(ONEM) (2011), 287. 
337 For a similar reading see DIMITRY KOCHENOV, A Real European 
Citizenship. A New Jurisdiction Test. A Novel Chapter in the Development of 
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l ike Rottman or Zambrano nor despair  with cases l ike 
MacCarthy or Murat .  
What is  relevant to recognize for my overall  thesis ,  
in the l ight  of  these developments,  is  that  EU 
cit izenship provides an unparalleled laboratory for  the 
study of ci t izenship as i t  represents the only example of  
a transnational  inst i tut ional  ci t izenship that  is  helping 
reshape the concept globally.  
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§4. How is European citizenship reshaping the concept of 
citizenship? 
 
In order to assess the impact  of EU cit izenship on 
the evolution of the ci t izenship concept in a larger 
context  i t  is  crucial  to answer the question that  Jo Shaw 
poses on the relat ionship between EU and national  
ci t izenship338.  
More specif ical ly she is  asking a question that  the 
scholars,  while praising the landmark nature of  the 
Rottmann decision,  do not  necessari ly answer:   what are 
the immediate and long term implications of  this  
decision on national  laws of ci t izenship? 
A first  l ine of  discussion relates to whether the 
Rottmann decision,  being issued in a case of  withdrawal 
of  ci t izenship and statelessness,  is  also applicable to 
cases of  granting ci t izenship339.  
I  believe i t  is  very clear that  the Rottmann l ine of  
thought is  also applicable to the granting of ci t izenship.  
First ly this  is  because,  as I  have stated above,  Rottmann 
is  not  part icularly innovative if  we consider an 
appropriate reading of Michelet t i  according to which 
EU law and International  law posed l imits  on the 
granting and withdrawal of  national  ci t izenship340.     
Then,  the Rottmann decision i tself  aff irms 
explici t ly that  i ts  provisions are applicable both to 
                                              
338 JO SHAW, Concluding thoughts: Rottmann in context (2011), 40. 
339 NATHAN CAMBIEN, Case c-135/08, Janko Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern 
(2010-2011), 375. 
340 NATHAN CAMBIEN, Case c-135/08, Janko Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern 
(2010-2011), 375. 
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acquisi t ion and deprivation of ci t izenship,  as I  have 
stated above.  
Lastly,  the biggest  innovation of the Rottmann 
decision – the importance of which I  do not  deny – is  
that  i t  highlights  a principle of  EU law that  was not  
previously evident in this  context:  the principle of  
proportionali ty.  
However,  again,  proportionali ty is  just  another 
principle of  EU law that ,  among others,  States must  
take into account when designing their  national  
ci t izenship law, in order to comply with the Michellet t i  
proviso “having due regard to community law”. One of 
these other principles may well  be,  as  AG Poiares 
Maduro asserts  in his  opinion in Rottmann, the 
principle of  legit imate expectat ions.  
I t  now being clear that  s tates must  “have due 
regard” to community law and that  means complying 
with the proportionali ty principle when establishing 
ci t izenship rules,  how does that  impact on Member 
States’  establishment of  ci t izenship rules? 
Analysing the impact of  the decision on the Dutch 
nationali ty law, Gerard René de Groot and Anja Seling  
predict  several  consequences regarding the need to 
change the law341.  In l ine with his  previous work,  De 
Groot identif ies si tuations where Dutch law, as well  as  
many other ci t izenship laws in Europe,  must  be 
reconsidered in l ight  of  these developments. 
In a word i t  can be said that  whenever a national  
ci t izenship law denies the granting of ci t izenship in a 
way that  might be considered not to pass the 
proportionali ty test ,  and even if  a  cross border element 
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is  absent  – after  Zambrano –,  that  part icular  law is  
contrary to community law with al l  i ts  consequences.  
Does that  place EU cit izenship in the posit ion of a 
federal  ci t izenship? 
According to Rainer Bauböck,  there are three ways 
of looking into this  relat ionship:  "stat is t ,"  "unionist ,"  
and "pluralist"  approaches.  
“The statist  approach regards the Union as a 
federal  s tate-in-the-making and opts for a ci t izenship 
model that  would ref lect  the principles applied within 
contemporary federal  democracies.  This approach has 
only few advocates and would entail  a quite radical  
departure from the path the European Union follows to 
this  day.  Although i t  would be unwise to exclude the 
possibil i ty  of  the EU's future transformation into a 
federal  s tate,  e .g. ,  af ter a new major war involving 
several  European states,  this  scenario is  currently 
rather farfetched.   
The unionist  approach aims primarily at  
s trengthening ci t izenship of  the Union by making i t  
more important for i ts  individual bearers and more 
inclusionary for the Union's  residents.  I t  di f fers from a 
federal  s tate model in that  i t  seeks to emancipate Union 
ci t izenship from member-state ci t izenship rather than 
integrate the lat ter into the former.  A unionist  approach 
of  this  kind has many advocates amongst  pro-European 
and pro-immigrant groups in civi l  society but  remains 
rather marginal in European poli t ics.  
The pluralist  approach represents a less demanding 
view in the sense that  i t  includes no general 
commitment to strengthening ci t izenship of  the Union 
vis-a-vis  the member states.  Instead,  i t  seeks to apply 
general  norms of  democratic legit imacy at  both levels  
and to balance these concerns where they appear to 
confl ict  with each other.  The label  pluralist  emphasizes,  
on the one hand,  the autonomous value of  both levels  of  
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vertically-nested ci t izenship and,  on the other hand,  
respect  for the horizontal  plurali ty  and autonomy of  
member-state ci t izenship.  I t  is  meant to apply to the EU 
in i ts  current  s tate of  federal  integration.  At  the same 
t ime,  the pluralist  approach that  I  wil l  describe and 
defend is  s t i l l  reformist  in seeking to overcome 
normative defici ts  of  the present  arrangement and 
integrative in promoting a more consistent  conception 
of  mult i level  ci t izenship compared with the status-
quo”342.  
Although Bauböck was writ ing before the latest  
developments in EU cit izenship law from the court  
decisions,  I  would st i l l  adhere to his  thesis .  
We are st i l l  not  at  the point  of  considering a 
federal  ci t izenship,  not  only because the EU is  not  a 
federal  s tate at  the moment,  but  also because national  
ci t izenship is  s t i l l  a  product of  the national  legislator .  
While i t  is  t rue that  the local  legislator can have a 
relevant role even in federal  ci t izenships,  as the Swiss 
example shows343,  I  wil l  not  claim that  the role of  the 
national  legislat ion in the EU is  at  that  s tage now. 
Following on from Bauböck´s proposal ,  I  would 
view the EU cit izenship influence on national  
ci t izenship rules with the pluralis t  approach,  as a 
mult i level  s tatus that  is  clearly intertwined and 
definitely influences national  law, both in relat ion to 
the granting and withdrawing of ci t izenship.  
In an effort  to maintain consistency in his  thesis  
that  reaffirmed the idea of  the domestic reserved 
domain even within the EU cit izenship law, Jessurum 
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d´Oliveira advocates a decoupling of EU and national  
ci t izenship law344.  
I t  is  very remarkable that  even a scholar  whose 
views on the exist ing CJEU decisions on ci t izenship 
have tended to deny the strong interactions between EU 
and national  ci t izenship345 acknowledges the 
revolutionary importance of  the more recent  case 
decisions.  In fact ,  he says,  that  “what the Court  is  
doing is  reversing the relationship between the 
possession of  a nationali ty  of  a member state and Union 
ci t izenship.  Because Union ci t izenship is  at  s take when 
the nationali ty  of  a member state is  lost  or acquired 
nationali ty  law has to take this  consequence into 
account.  That nationali ty  law is  thereby made 
dependent on Union law to a certain extent ,  while 
Union ci t izenship is  precisely presented by the Treaty 
as being a dependent variable of  the possession of  the 
nationali ty  of  a member state.  I f  one fol lows the 
Court’s  l ine of  thought to i ts  logical  conclusion,  then 
every member state has to take EU law into account at  
the t ime of  acquisi t ion or loss of  i ts  nationali ty ,  
because Union ci t izenship systematically depends on 
i t”346.   
This is  a  crucial  conclusion,  especial ly relevant in 
the words of  an author that  represents the more cautious 
l ine of  thought on this  relat ionship:  from now on every 
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member state must  take into account EU law when 
establishing internal  rules on access to ci t izenship.  
In an at tempt to maintain the autonomy of internal  
ci t izenship law, D´Oliveira proposes a decoupling of 
the concepts.  
As he describes i t  “ there is  room for decoupling the 
concepts of  nationali ty  and Union ci t izenship: by 
maintaining Union ci t izenship in the case of  loss of  
member state nationali ty  under certain circumstances 
( to be determined).  That has the great  advantage that  in 
order to emphasize the importance of  Union ci t izenship,  
the EU would no longer need the ( indirect)  authority 
over the nationali ty  law of  the member states that  the 
Court  has accorded to i t ,  and that  can only serve to 
benefi t  the clari ty  of  the relationship between the 
member states and the EU. I f  the EU sees Union 
ci t izenship as a fundamental  status for the peoples of  
Europe,  then that  no longer needs to depend on the 
idiosyncrasies of  the application of  national nationali ty  
law, but  rather the EU can determine that  certain 
groups of  people who lose their  member state 
nationali ty  wil l  nonetheless remain Union ci t izens.  The 
Rottmann case makes i t  relevant to think about 
decoupling them in this  way”.   
This proposal  is  in fact  an interest ing recognit ion 
of the EU cit izenship status as a mult i level  s tatus with 
undeniable interactions with national  ci t izenships.  I  do 
not  advocate a monoli thic concept of  EU cit izenship 
and f ind the multi level  approach very appealing.  In 
fact ,  that  approach has always been favoured by those 
that  uphold a vision of interaction between EU and 
national  ci t izenship.   
However,  for  the purposes of  my argument i t  is  
important  to recall  – and this  is  undeniable even for the 
more sceptical  doctrine – that  the Member States must  
comply with EU law when establishing the rules of  
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access to ci t izenship and if  they breach i t  the Court  is  
competent  to review the case.   
The idea i tself  is  revolutionary but ,  as  I  have stated 
above,  i t  has long been the result  of  the correct  
interpretat ion of EU law and CJEU case decisions.  
The impact  of  EU cit izenship on national  
ci t izenship law cannot be l imited to the EU Member 
States.  I t  is  evident  that  the CJEU jurisdict ion does not  
extend to the rest  of  the world.  However,  i t  is  also true 
that  the principles identif ied by the CJEU are not  
inherently European. 
In fact ,  unlike a typical  federal  decision,  the CJEU 
is  not  identifying federal  rules and principles and 
making them mandatory for the States.  The principle of  
proportionali ty is  not  only a principle of  EU law but 
also a principle of  international  law. What the CJEU is  
saying is  that  this  principle matters  in ci t izenship 
issues.  
Bearing in mind that  the Michellet t i  proviso 
demanded respect  for Community law but also 
international  law, the CJEU contribution is  not  
irrelevant when drawing a general  conclusion or noting 
a trend towards considering proportionali ty when 
assessing whether national  global  ci t izenship rules 
comply with general  international  law. 
I t  is  clear  that ,  al though international  law 
boundaries on ci t izenship are growing,  they are st i l l  
l imited when compared to those we can identify within 
European ci t izenship.  
So is  European ci t izenship closer to a national  
ci t izenship or is  i t  leading the way to a new form of 
transnational  ci t izenship and a revolution in the way 
international  law treats  ci t izenship? 
Those who try to encapsulate European ci t izenship 
point  to the model of  federal  ci t izenship.  Having 
federal  elements in i ts  consti tut ion,  the European Union 
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could be the cradle for  a federal  ci t izenship.  The Swiss 
example and the early US example show that  derivative 
ci t izenship is  not  an obstacle to a true federal  
ci t izenship347.  
On the other hand,  i t  can be argued that  being 
derivative and not yet  having left  that  s tage,  European 
cit izenship is  closer to transnational  law and thus to 
transnational  ci t izenship. 
I t  is  clear ,  as stated before,  that  European 
cit izenship is  very different  from national  ci t izenships,  
even those in early federations.  Of course one can argue 
that  Europe is  a  very young federation and huge 
development for the status can be foreseen.  
As Christoph Schönberger asserts ,  “as a general  
rule,  one can conclude that  the primacy of  s tate 
ci t izenship is  the normal si tuation of  young Federations 
based on a voluntary agreement of  formerly 
independent states.  The system only tends to be 
abandoned much later once the Federation is  
consolidated”348.  
That  might be the case had ci t izenship not  been an 
evolutionary concept.  Cit izenship has undergone great  
developments and can neither be captured nor 
crystal l ized.  
In any event,  European ci t izenship has contributed 
largely to reshaping the concept of  ci t izenship349.  
What,  then,  was the main purpose of  the drafters  in 
creating European cit izenship? 
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Definitely underlying this  was the wil l  to create the 
European people.  Furthermore European ci t izenship was 
created in my view as a way of granting legit imacy to 
the European inst i tut ions.  
The evolution of the EU remains largely inter-
governmental ,  which means that  the legit imacy of the 
European inst i tut ions rel ies primarily on Governments 
and Parl iaments and only indirectly on the people.  
This contributes largely,  as I  have previously 
stressed,  to the crisis  of  the inst i tut ions in Europe – 
beginning with the European consti tut ion – because 
there is  l i t t le  control  from the people over inst i tut ions 
and poli t ical  decisions.  
The actual  meaning of ci t izenship in a democratic 
society depends on i ts  relat ionship with the people.  
Only the people can legit imate a poli t ical  s tructure and 
i ts  rules and inst i tut ions.  
Joseph Weiller  s tresses that  being a beneficiary of  
r ights created by others does not  transform the al ien 
into a ci t izen and,  thus,  ci t izenship is  an important  
source of legit imacy for legal  rules.  The legit imacy of 
those rules rel ies on the demos  to which the al ien 
aspires to belong350.  If  that  legit imacy does not  exist ,  
the rules and the inst i tut ions are themselves in crisis  for  
they can no longer be called democratic351.   
According to Seyla Benhabib,  the democratic rule 
means that  every member of  a sovereign body is  to be 
respected as a possessor of  human rights in a self-
governance regime in which everyone shall  be 
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simultaneously recognized as author and subject  of  the 
laws352.  When that  rule is  not  complied with we would 
have a “paradox of democratic legit imacy”.  I  wil l  come 
back to this  paradox later .   
I  believe that  the creation of  European ci t izenship 
tr ied to cope with this  paradox by designing the 
European people.  This would overcome the crisis  of  
legit imacy in the European inst i tut ions.  Obviously the 
drafters’  efforts  did not  succeed.    
This is  not  to say that  the drafters  went in the 
wrong direction.  The effort  was posit ive and 
contributed,  as stressed before,  to improvements in the 
international  perception of ci t izenship.  The problem is  
probably not  in European ci t izenship i tself  but  in the 
concept of  national  ci t izenship of  the Member States – 
and ult imately sovereignty – upon which European 
cit izenship largely rel ies.  
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V – Migrants’ rights protection and migrants as citizens in 
waiting  
 
§1.  Global Protection of migrants’ rights  
 
Immigration represents an important  challenge to 
the internal  laws of the States.  The need for law 
enforcement,  integration of foreigners and the 
definit ion of their  r ights  and obligations and the 
relat ionship between immigration and ci t izenship rules 
are some of the aspects  that  concern lawmakers and 
judicial  actors al l  over the world.  
In this  context  i t  is  part icularly important  to define 
the r ights  of  so-called 'Migrant workers ' .  In fact ,  the 
increased mobil i ty result ing from the simplif ication of 
travel ,  globalization,  and a greater  awareness of  
national  dispari t ies  and of migration opportunit ies  has 
led to major movements of  people seeking work in 
countries other than that  of  their  origin.  
I t  is  therefore very important  to assess the 
international  legal  r ights  and protection of migrants and 
migrant workers and their  families which have been 
developed in order to prevent these persons from being 
exposed to exploitat ion and al l  sorts  of  i l legal  
activit ies.  Recent examples show that  migrants are 
part icularly vulnerable to the actions of  clandestine 
immigration networks,  of  which they are,  unfortunately,  
the main vict ims. 
As I  have stressed above,  an important  dimension 
in the protection of r ights can nowadays be found in the 
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universalization of human rights and human dignity353.  
For that  purpose,  personhood has replaced ci t izenship.   
Even at  the internal  level ,  Consti tut ions have been 
placing human dignity at  the maximum level  of  the 
consecration of fundamental  r ights,  which means that  
they cannot deny these r ights  to foreigners simply 
because they lack the quali ty of  ci t izens354.   
Cit izenship r ights as such are thus reduced to those 
r ights that  have an inseparable l ink to the status of  
ci t izen.  Since human dignity is  the cornerstone of 
fundamental  r ights,  one should conclude that  most  
fundamental  r ights  are inextricably l inked to the human 
person regardless of  the ci t izenship status.   
The mass movements of  people that  we have 
recently witnessed are based on very different  
motivations.  As I  have s tated above,  seeking a better  
job and overall  l iving condit ions can st i l l  be identif ied 
as the major reason why people migrate355.  According to 
UN figures,  the overwhelming majori ty of  migrants in 
the world who are not  refugees left  their  countries of  
origin in search of better  economic condit ions356.  
However,  that  search does not  always take place 
from developing countries to developed countries -  the 
so-called the South-North move.  I t  also takes place 
within developing countries.  Indeed,  in 1980,  48% of 
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all  international  migrants l ived in developed countries 
(except the USSR) and 52% in developing countries.  
However,  this  si tuation changed and in 2000 63% of al l  
international  migrants were l iving in developed 
countries while only 37% lived in developing 
countries357.   
The migratory movements which led to these 
changes resulted from several  factors.  Salary 
differences and job opportunit ies made the developed 
countries increasingly at tractive as a dest ination for 
migrants from developing countries ,  especial ly when 
other l inks already existed,  such as family t ies  or  
national  origin networks.  I t  is  often the case that  a  
part icular  national  minori ty is  known for a certain 
profession in a country.  That  could be the case of  cab 
drivers in Luxembourg – who tend to be Portuguese – or  
deli  owners in New York City – most  of  whom are of  
Asian origin.  The reason for these factors is  not  so 
much the special  dedication of those workers to that  
part icular  function but  much more the pre-exist ing t ies 
and jobs found by countrymen.  
The above data is  of  great  importance in 
understanding the legal  framework of the migratory 
movements.  Indeed,  al though the trend indicates 
intensif ied movements from South to North,  numbers 
show that  migration between developing countries is  
s t i l l  s ignificant .  On the other hand,  the data also 
indicates that  the pre-existence of t ies between 
countries or  people is  a  key factor in the geographical  
distr ibution of migratory movements.  This means that  
while regulating migration and migrants’  r ights  – both 
from an international  and a national  s tandpoint  – 
part icular  at tention should be devoted also to the 
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members of  the migrant’s  family’s ,  s ince family t ies are 
st i l l  a  very relevant element in the decision to migrate.  
The most  comprehensive international  instrument 
on the protection of migrants’  r ights is  the International  
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of  All  
Migrant  Workers and Members of  Their  Families,  which 
I  wil l  analyze later .  
Although the Convention is  not  the only 
international  instrument relevant to this  subject ,  i t  is ,  
however,  the most  recent in a body composed of seven 
instruments that  correspond to the "core" of  
international  treaties on human rights .  
The other six are the International  Covenant on 
Civil  and Poli t ical  Rights,  the International  Covenant 
on Economic,  Social  and Cultural  Rights,  the 
Convention on the Elimination of All  Forms of Racial  
Discrimination,  the Convention against  Torture and 
Other Cruel  Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or  
Punishment,  the Convention on the Elimination of All  
Forms of Discrimination against  Women and the 
Convention on the Rights of  the Child358.   
The reason why the core UN treaties on Human 
Rights are invoked within the context  of  the protection 
of migrants is  again due to the fact  that  most  of  the 
migrants’  r ights which need protection relate to 
personhood and not to ci t izenship or to their  part icular  
condit ion as migrants.  So whenever talking about 
migrants’  r ights we are generally referring to Human 
Rights.   
This raises the question about the need for a 
specif ic convention on the protection of migrants’  
r ights or  the r ights  of  migrant workers.  I t  also raises the 
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question of the compatibil i ty of  such a convention with 
the other instruments.   
Although i t  seems clear  that  earl ier  instruments on 
human rights already enshrined basic human rights at  
the international  level ,  a  specif ic  convention dealing 
with the protection of migrants in general  or  with 
migrant workers in part icular  is  nevertheless very 
useful .  I t  not  only codifies in one instrument al l  the 
r ights  of  migrants that  are protected but  can also 
address r ights that  are specif ic to migrants ,  such as the 
r ight  to family reunificat ion. 
As to the compatibil i ty,  as long as such a 
convention develops the core instruments applicable to 
human rights within the migrants’  r ights  context ,  there 
is  no reason to fear any kind of overlapping that  could 
cause any harm either to the protection of migrants’  
r ights or  to the coherence of  the international  system. 
In addit ion to the regulatory framework result ing 
from the general  treaties on human rights,  i t  is  also 
important  to take into consideration the work developed 
by the International  Labor Organization (ILO),  
especial ly on the protection of migrant workers’  r ights .   
Among the instruments that  were approved within 
the ILO, two are part icularly important:  the Migration 
for Employment Convention,  1949 (No. 97) based on 
equal treatment of  nationals and legal  immigrants in 
employment,  and the Convention on Migrant Workers 
1975 (No. 143),  which aims to el iminate i l legal  
migration and employment and establishes condit ions 
and respect  for  the r ights of  undocumented migrants ,  
establishing measures in order to both el iminate i l legal  
networks and punish employers359.   
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The Migration for Employment Convention,  1949 
(No. 97) requires member states to recognize equal  
r ights and provide equal  treatment to migrant  workers 
without any discrimination based on nationali ty,  race,  
rel igion or sex.  States should treat  documented migrants 
as if  they were ci t izens with respect  to labor r ights,  
according to i ts  internal  legislat ion.  
According to Convention No. 143 member states 
must  respect  the human rights of  al l  migrant  workers.  
States should also el iminate i l legal  migration networks 
and impose sanctions on employers.  In addit ion,  s tates 
should adopt and pursue a policy to ensure equal  
treatment in employment and the enjoyment by migrant  
workers of  social  securi ty,  union r ights and cultural  
r ights.  
The legal  framework for the protection of migrants’  
human rights at  the international  level  is  composed of 
the basic core UN treaties on human rights  and is  
complemented by the specif ic provisions on migrant  
workers in the International  Convention on the 
Protection of  the Rights of  All  Migrant  Workers and 
Members of  Their  Families and also within the ILO 
context360.  
Maybe a general  convention on protection is  
necessary,  especial ly to set  out  international  migrants’  
human rights protection in a unif ied document.  
However,  as I  wil l  show when describing the 
negotiat ion and rat if ication process of  the International  
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of  All  
Migrant  Workers and Members of  Their  Families,  this  
would never be an easy and consensual  endeavor.     
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§2.  The International Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families 
 
The International  Convention on the Protection of 
the Rights of  All  Migrant  Workers and Members of  
Their  Families is  the only comprehensive public 
international  law instrument that  specif ically deals  with 
migrants’  r ights .  
I t  was adopted by Resolution 45/158 of the General  
Assembly of the United Nations,  on 18 December 1990.  
This Convention entered into force on 1 July 2003,  after  
rat if icat ion by the f irst  twenty States Part ies.  
The Convention aims,  as stated in the Opinion of 
the European Economic and Social  Committee “ to 
protect  the human rights and dignity of  people across 
the globe who emigrate for economic or employment-
related reasons by means of  appropriate legislation and 
good national practice.  The common basis  for such 
international legislation on migratory policies should 
be the promotion of  democracy and human rights.  The 
Convention also safeguards the balance between the 
dif ferent  s i tuations in both countries of  origin and host  
countries.  
This convention is  one of  seven international 
United Nations treaties governing human rights.  I t  
recognizes that  certain basic human rights,  as defined 
in the Universal  Declaration of  Human Rights,  must  be 
guaranteed internationally for all  migrant workers and 
their  families.  I t  codif ies in a comprehensive and 
universal  manner the rights of  migrant workers and 
their  families on the basis  of  the principle of  equali ty  of  
treatment.  I t  sets  out  those rights  that  must  be granted 
to immigrants who are in a regular and an irregular 
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si tuation,  set t ing down minimum standards of  
protection in terms of  civi l ,  economic,  poli t ical ,  social  
and employment rights and recognizing that  migrant 
workers must  have fundamental  rights that  are 
safeguarded in international rules.   
This convention further develops previous 
conventions of  the ILO by extending the legal 
framework to all  immigration worldwide,  promoting just  
treatment for immigrants and striving to prevent 
exploitation of  irregular immigrants.  I t  looks at  the 
migration process as a whole from education,  selection,  
departure,  transit  and residence in the country of  
employment to return to and re-establishment in the 
country of  origin”361.  
The content  of  the Convention would seem to be 
quite consensual,  given that  i t  entai ls  r ights  that  are 
already protected by both the international  human rights 
legal  system and by the internal  consti tut ions.  In fact ,  
beyond a reference to fundamental  r ights  enshrined in 
the majori ty of  modern consti tut ions,  the Convention 
focuses much of i ts  at tention on the r ights  of  workers -  
also included in this  l is t  of  fundamental  r ights -  
adapting them to the specif ic needs of the migrants.  
However,  the length and complexity of  the 
rat if icat ion process contradicts  this  assert ion.  Indeed,  
the Convention entered into force almost  thir teen years 
after  i ts  s ignature.  As of today,  none of the developed 
countries that  are known for being “host  s tates” have 
rat if ied i t362.  
The formal process of  draft ing the Convention 
began on December 17,  1979,  when the UN General  
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Assembly,  through Resolution No. 34/172,  created a 
working group,  open to al l  member states,  with the 
purpose of draft ing an international  Convention for the 
protection of al l  migrant  workers and members of  their  
families.  Eleven years later ,  on December 18,  1990,  the 
text  was adopted and opened for signature by the 
member states363.  
The working group was open to al l  UN member 
states.  The working method used by the UN diverged 
from other international  texts .  The decision was taken 
to create an open working group rather than l imit  i t  to a 
restr icted number of  countries or  request  a  draft  from 
the International  Law Commission.  The result  was a 
very f lexible and open method that  ended up providing 
meaningful  representation and a desirable 
universali ty364.  
The main method of decision was not based on the 
majori ty rule but  on consensus.  The consensus was "the 
natural  development of  a protracted negotiat ion that  
began in an atmosphere of  distrust  and hosti l i ty.  This 
working method also avoided fr ict ion between 
developed or industrial ized countries and most  
developing countries.  The text  of  the Convention 
however suffered the effects  of  this  method.  The 
commitment has resulted in the abandonment of  the 
strongest  posit ions,  and where the content  was more 
controversial ,  the r ights of  migrants quickly became 
mere recommendations to states.   
                                              
363 GONÇALO SARAIVA MATIAS and PATRÍCIA FRAGOSO MARTINS, A 
convenção internacional sobre a protecção dos direitos de todos os 
trabalhadores migrantes e dos membros das suas famílias: perspectivas e 
paradoxos nacionais e internacionais em matéria de imigração (2007), 27. 
364 RYSZARD CHOLEWINSKI, Migrant workers in international human rights 
law: their protection in countries of employment (1997), 143. 
Gonçalo Saraiva Matias – The Path to Citizenship 
270 
Adopting the consensus rule also had the objective 
of  facil i tat ing the rat if ication process.  The subsequent 
developments have shown that  the effort  was not  
successful365.  
One of the most  str iking aspects  of  the Convention 
negotiat ions was the existence of coordinated groups of 
countries.  I t  was possible to clearly identify four 
groups:  i)  the group of the eastern countries,  composed 
of the USSR and i ts  al l ies ,  i i )  the group of 77,  
including the authors of  the original  proposal  ( including 
Algeria,  Mexico,  Pakistan,  Turkey,  Egypt,  Barbados and 
Yugoslavia,  and Morocco and India,  which also 
belonged to this  group al though often followed isolated 
posit ions),  i i i )  the MESCA (Mediterranean and 
Scandinavian),  which was the most  influential  group,  
composed of seven Mediterranean and Scandinavian 
States (Spain,  Portugal ,  Greece,  I taly,  Finland,  Norway 
and Sweden) and iv)  the group of Western and 
industrial ized countries not  belonging to the MESCA 
(including the United States,  Austral ia ,  Germany, 
Netherlands,  Denmark,  Canada and Japan).  France 
maintained an independent posit ion as an observer of  
the MESCA366.  
MESCA's posit ion was directly against  
undocumented immigration.  According to MESCA, 
                                              
365 JUHANI LONNROTH, The International Convention on the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of their Families in the Context of 
International Migration Policies: An Analysis of Ten Years of Negotiation 
(1991), 724.   
366 JUHANI LONNROTH, The International Convention on the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of their Families in the Context of 
International Migration Policies: An Analysis of Ten Years of Negotiation 
(1991), 731; RYSZARD CHOLEWINSKI, Migrant workers in international 
human rights law: their protection in countries of employment (1997), 144.  
Gonçalo Saraiva Matias – The Path to Citizenship 
271 
encouraging this  form of migration would make i t  even 
more diff icult  to control367.   
On the other hand,  the group of 77 was concerned,  
during the negotiat ions,  primarily with the protection of 
i ts  nationals  as migrant  workers and their  t reatment in 
the host  countries368.  
According to Cholewinsky,  the industrial ized 
countries had three fundamental  concerns during the 
negotiat ions.  First ly,  they wanted to maintain sovereign 
control  over immigration policy regarding the 
admission of immigrants and the legalization of 
undocumented immigrants.  They also specif ically 
opposed the provisions entai l ing posit ive obligations 
rather than mere suggestions and,  consequently,  social  
costs .  Thirdly,  they were committed to ensuring that  the 
Convention was f lexible enough to accommodate 
various poli t ical ,  legal  and administrat ive views and 
internal  regulat ions369.  
The MESCA group,  despite having emerged as a 
reaction to the proposal  of  the Group of 77,  came to 
assume a key role in the negotiat ion of the Convention.  
I ts  posit ion appeared to mediate the arguments of  
developed and developing countries370.  
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Despite the efforts  during the negotiat ion process 
of  the Convention to make i t  easier  and to speed up the 
rat if icat ion process,  this  proved to be long and winding.  
The Convention was adopted by Resolution 45/158 of 
the General  Assembly of the United Nations on 
December 18,  1990,  and only came into force,  thir teen 
years later ,  on July 1,  2003,  after  the rat if ication of the 
f irst  twenty states.  
In any event,  the Convention entered into force 
without the rat if ication of most  of  the host  States.  The 
developed countries could argue,  nevertheless,  that  the 
non-rat if icat ion of  the Convention does not  undermine 
their  compliance with the other fundamental  
international  instruments that  protect  human rights,  and 
that  their  own consti tutions already protect  the same 
kind of r ights  both for documented and undocumented 
migrants.  They may also argue that  the Convention adds 
l i t t le  to their  practice of  protection of migrants’  r ights .  
However,  i f  that  is  the case,  there is  no reason for their  
lack of enthusiasm in rat ifying the convention. 
The reason for that  lack of enthusiasm may be 
another.  In fact ,  the Convention is  applicable to all  
migrants.  All  migrants ,  in this  context ,  means 
documented and undocumented migrants .  Although the 
el imination of undocumented migration was a common 
concern during the negotiat ions,  i t  was not so clear  that  
the protection of the undocumented migrants would be.  
Having,  for  the f irst  t ime,  a  comprehensive 
international  document that  specif ically provides for 
r ights  of  undocumented migrants might be an addit ional  
reason for the reluctance of  developed countries in 
rat ifying the Convention. 
One of the most  relevant aspects  of  this  Convention 
is  the definit ion of migrant  worker.  According to 
Article 2,  “the term "migrant worker" refers to a person 
who is  to be engaged,  is  engaged or has been engaged in 
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a remunerated activity in a State of  which he or she is  
not  a  national”.   
According to Article 3,  the Convention shall  not  
apply to a)  persons sent  or  employed by international  
organizations and agencies or persons sent  or  employed 
by a State outside i ts  terr i tory to perform official  
functions,  whose admission and status are regulated by 
general  international  law or by specif ic international  
agreements or  conventions;  (b)  persons sent  or  
employed by a State or  on i ts  behalf  outside i ts  terr i tory 
who part icipate in development programmes and other 
co-operation programmes,  whose admission and status 
are regulated by agreement with the State of  
employment and who, in accordance with that  
agreement,  are not  considered migrant workers;  (c)  
persons taking up residence in a State different  from 
their  State of  origin as investors;  (d)  refugees and 
stateless persons,  unless such application is  provided 
for in the relevant national  legislat ion of,  or  
international  instruments in force for,  the State Party 
concerned; (e)  Students and trainees;  (f)  Seafarers and 
workers on an offshore instal lat ion who have not been 
admitted to take up residence and engage in a 
remunerated activi ty in the State of  employment.  
This provision seeks to exclude from the scope of 
the Convention some categories of  workers that  shall  
not  be treated as migrant  workers.  That  is  the case of  
stateless persons,  the representatives of  States or  
international  organizations,  and refugees.  In the lat ter  
case they are already protected by other international  
instruments,  such as the Convention relat ing to the 
Status of  Refugees.  
More debatable is  the question of whether these 
categories – part icularly the stateless – have sufficient  
protection in the international  instruments applicable to 
their  s i tuation.   
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Also debatable is  the exclusion of investors,  
s tudents and trainees.  One of the Convention’s cri teria 
for  defining migrant workers is  the compensation of the 
activity.  So here the reference to trainees should be 
interpreted as referring to persons included in unpaid 
training programs. 
The explanation for the exclusion seems to be the 
at tempt to prevent the loss of  cri t ical  mass – also 
known as brain drain – that  would result  from the 
set t l ing of  students,  usually with great  potential,  in the 
host  countries.  Another explanation may be the relat ive 
immunity of  these categories to the i l legal  immigration 
networks,  the main focus of  concern of the Convention.  
Even more incomprehensible is  the exclusion of 
investors.  Indeed,  they carry on a profi table activity so 
the cri teria used in the convention related to 
remuneration would be fulf i l led.  Another reason,  
however,  may explain the exclusion of investors from 
the scope of the Convention.  According to Lönnroth,  an 
ideological  reason might explain this  exclusion,  as the 
protection of migrants’  r ights  was perceived as the 
protection of the poorer workers.   The name "Onassis" 
was widely used as a reference in this  debate.  
Paradoxically,  too,  the tradit ional  view of emigration as 
potential ly being beneficial  to the country of  origin 
may have led to hesitat ion in accepting a consolidation 
of the si tuation of certain categories of  migrant  
workers.  For example,  owners of  shops in Paris  might 
shorten their  s tays and send larger remittances to their  
countries of  origin if  they did not  enjoy too many rights 
in the host  country.  Ideological  as well  as  strategic 
reasons may therefore just ify this  exclusion371.  
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States are,  however,  prohibited from making 
exclusions other than those mentioned in the 
Convention.  The Convention applies – as indeed the 
t i t le  expressly states – to all  migrant  workers.  As 
mentioned above,  in accordance with Article 88,  "a 
State rat ifying or acceding to the present  Convention 
may not exclude the application of any Part  of  i t ,  or ,  
without prejudice to Article 3,  exclude any part icular  
category of migrant workers from its  application”.  
During the negotiat ions there was an intention to 
include a provision that  would al low states to specify 
parts  of  the Convention applicable to certain categories 
of  people in condit ions of  reciprocity.  I t  would al low 
the non-application of certain r ights.  The application of 
the Convention on a reciprocal  basis  was rejected based 
on the belief  that  this  concept would be contrary to the 
idea of  universali ty of  fundamental  r ights  and could 
lead to discrimination in treatment by the host  countries 
of  migrant  workers according to their  country of  
origin372.  
In addit ion to migrant  workers the Convention is  
concerned also with the protection of the members of  
their  families.  Under Article 4 of  the Convention,  the 
term "family members" means "persons married to 
migrant workers or  having with them a relat ionship 
that ,  according to applicable law, produces effects  
equivalent  to marriage,  as well  as their  dependent 
children and other dependent persons who are 
recognized as members of  the family by applicable 
legislat ion or applicable bilateral  or  mult i lateral  
agreements between the States concerned.” The 
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definit ion of "family member" rests  largely on external  
rules to the Convention since i t  refers to the internal  
legislat ion of the States or  bi lateral  or  mult i lateral  
agreements.  I t  is  understood that  the Convention did not 
wish to take a posit ion in matters  as controversial  as the 
definit ion of the family.  However,  States are under a 
general  obligation of non-discrimination.  
Most of  the r ights  protected in the Convention are 
common to documented and undocumented migrant 
workers in regular  and irregular employment.  This 
shows that  according to the Convention the protection 
of human rights is  directly connected with personhood 
and not with the legali ty of  the immigration or the 
ci t izenship status373.  
There are,  however,  some rights that  the 
Convention includes as being exclusively documented 
r ights – Articles 36 to 56.  These r ights  are generally in 
direct  correlat ion with the immigration status of  the 
migrants.  Among these r ights are the  maintenance of 
poli t ical  r ights  in the country of  origin (Article 41);  
social  r ights (Article 43),  the r ight  to exemption of 
import/export  taxes related to household goods (Article 
46),  the r ight  to free transfer of  funds or remittances 
from the State of  employment to the State of  origin or 
any other State (Article 47),  the r ight  of  residence and 
work (Article 49),  the r ight  to choose an activity 
(Article 52),  the r ight  to labor protection (Article 54) 
and the r ight  not  to be expelled (Article 56).  
There are also a number of  social ,  poli t ical  or  
economic provisions relat ing to more sensit ive matters  
that  were set  out  as recommendations to States.  This is  
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the case of  the recommendation that  the host  States 
permit  movement within their  terr i tory of  migrant  
workers and members of  their  families (Article 38),  the 
mild  recommendation for  the recognit ion of poli t ical  
r ights in the host  country (Article 42),  the 
recommendation on family reunificat ion (Article 44). 
 Some rights which are exclusively for  documented 
migrants are more disputable,  s ince i t  is  argued that  
they could well  be extended to undocumented migrants,  
as they relate more to personhood than to the specif ic  
status of  the migrant  in the host  country.   This is  the 
case of the r ight  to information (Article 37) and the 
r ight  of  associat ion (Article 40)374.  
In any event,  i t  is  important  to recall  that  the 
Convention shall  not  undermine the sovereign decision 
of states on immigration admittance.  As the Convention 
clearly states in Article 79,  “nothing in the present  
Convention shall  affect  the r ight  of  each State Party to 
establish the cri teria governing admission of migrant 
workers and members of  their  families.  Concerning 
other matters  related to their  legal  s i tuation and 
treatment as migrant  workers and members of  their  
families,  States Part ies shall  be subject  to the 
l imitat ions set  forth in the present  Convention”. 
As for ci t izenship,  al though not providing for a 
specif ic r ight  to ci t izenship,  the Convention includes in 
Articles 1 and 7 a general  rule of  non-discrimination 
based on nationali ty and a r ight  to a nationali ty of  
children,  in Article 29.  Also,  as I  have described above,  
the Convention encourages States to extend some rights  
that  are tradit ionally associated with the ci t izenship 
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status to documented migrants.  This is  a  reproduction 
of the rule set  out  in the general  t reaty on the r ights  of  
children,  which,  by granting a fundamental  r ight  to 
nationali ty,  aims to avoid statelessness among children.   
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§3.  The protection of undocumented migrants 
 
a)  The protection of undocumented 
migrants within the Convention framework 
 
One of the main concerns of  the Convention 
drafters  was the tension between States in favor of  the 
r ights of  undocumented migrants and others who 
understood that  these provisions could encourage 
undocumented migration375.   
From the poli t ical  point  of  view the position 
adopted in the Convention is  a  compromise between the 
states that  saw the recognit ion of r ights  for  
undocumented migrants as a threat  to their  sovereignty 
and others that  declared that  the protection of these 
r ights was the only posit ion consistent  with the 
international  protection of human rights  and human 
dignity.   
According to Article 5 of  the Convention,  “for the 
purposes of  the present  Convention,  migrant  workers 
and members of  their  families:   (a)  Are considered as 
documented or in a regular si tuation if  they are 
authorized to enter ,  to stay and to engage in a 
remunerated activi ty in the State of  employment 
pursuant to the law of that  State and to international  
agreements to which that  State is  a  party;   (b)  Are 
considered as non-documented or in an irregular 
si tuation if  they do not comply with the condit ions 
provided for in subparagraph (a)  of  the present  art icle”.   
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This provision does not  undermine the general  
principle according to which i t  is  a  sovereign decision 
of the states to regulate migration and define the status 
of  i ts  migrants.  As I  have mentioned above,  the 
convention is  very clear  in this  respect ,  s tat ing in 
Article 79 that  “nothing in the present  Convention shall  
affect  the r ight  of  each State Party to establish the 
cri teria governing admission of migrant  workers and 
members of  their  families”.  
So the Convention dist inguishes the r ights that  are 
exclusive to documented migrants from those which 
provide protection to both documented and 
undocumented migrants.  
I t  would be important  to discuss whether this  
dist inction is  acceptable from the general  international  
law perspective and from a universal  protection of 
human rights standpoint376.  
While i t  is  t rue that  international  law does 
recognize the r ight  of  each State to establish the 
admission cri teria in terms of immigration rules,  such a 
power may not be used to discriminate with regard to 
the protection of basic human rights  that  are connected 
to personhood and not  to the legali ty of  the presence in 
a given terr i tory.  
Thus,  to assess whether such discrimination 
complies with international  law, the cri terion used to 
exclude r ights from undocumented migrants must  be a 
meaningful  one that  does not  discriminate on the basis  
of  their  national  origin.  The only meaningful  cri teria 
are the ones that  relate those exclusive r ights directly 
with the legali ty of  the migrants’  presence in a given 
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terr i tory.  As I  have stated above,  i t  is  not  clear that  this  
is  the case with al l  the r ights  that  the Convention 
excludes from undocumented migrants.      
As I  have also underl ined above and will  further 
develop later ,  there are practical  obstacles to the 
exercise of  r ights granted to undocumented migrants,  
even those protected by the Convention.  Assuming that  
an undocumented migrant f inds himself  in need of 
emergency medical  assistance or may wish to benefi t  
from a given social  r ight  – r ights,  moreover,  recognized 
by the Convention – the lack of protective measures 
against  communication to the immigration authori t ies 
can lead to deportat ion.  That possibil i ty wil l  
necessari ly discourage undocumented migrants from the 
exercise of  those r ights.  The Convention contains no 
mechanism to prevent that  effect .   
Two solutions could be equated to this  problem, 
within the Convention framework.  The f irst  would 
provide for a recommendation to the states to proceed 
with the legalization of undocumented migrants found 
in i ts  terr i tory.  I t  seems clear,  however,  that  this  
solution would hardly be accepted by the states.  
Another solution would be to provide a mechanism 
whereby 'undocumented immigrants could not  be 
prosecuted for breaches of  immigration law based on 
information obtained in the exercise of  r ights  under the 
Convention377.  I  wil l  come back to these possible 
solutions in a more general  approach later  in this  
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b)  Main issues concerning 
undocumented migration 
 
The world faces today,  as ever,  the problems of 
undocumented migration.  Economic inequali ty has 
worsened between economic blocs.  The f low of 
information today is  very f luid so that  the ci t izens of  
poor countries,  despite this  condit ion,  are aware of  
global  asymmetries and aspire to a better  l i fe .  I l legal  
migration networks have f lourished,  supported by 
transportat ion facil i t ies  and the inefficiency of States in 
controll ing their  borders.  
Undocumented migration involves many 
disadvantages both for migrants and for host  countries.  
From a humanitarian standpoint ,  migrants are subjected 
to the exploitat ion of clandestine migration networks 
that  take from them substantial  f inancial  means and 
provide transport  in deplorable condit ions that  
endangers their  l i fe and physical  integri ty.   
The activi ty of  these networks is  of  course paid.  
The already precarious economic si tuation of migrant  
families is  worsened by the payments to these networks.  
Often they cannot reasonably expect  any return from 
these payments.  With the reinforced border control  
result ing in part  from undocumented migration but  also 
due to the necessi ty to control  terrorist  act ivi t ies,  
undocumented immigration has grown by use of  
clandestine networks.  
From the standpoint  of  the host  State,  the 
disadvantages are also considerable.  Undocumented 
migration undermines the integration of immigrants 
since their  s tatus wil l  always consti tute an obstacle to a 
full  and peaceful  integration.  On the other hand,  the 
presence of  undocumented migrants challenges the 
internal  working condit ions in general  s ince i t  al lows 
employers to maintain low wages.  In addit ion,  the 
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possibil i ty of  deportat ion causes a latent  tension 
between the country of  origin and the migrants’  host  
country.  
From a purely economic point  of  view, 
undocumented migration is  sometimes perceived as 
being beneficial  for  the host  country.  The low wages 
paid to undocumented migrants and the black market  
economy allow certain sectors to compete in the global  
market .   
However,  no country can seriously rely on such a 
strategy on a long-term basis.  Low wages and lack of 
contribution to the social  securi ty systems in the 
medium term jeopardize the l ivelihood of the host  
country i tself  as this  represents a decrease in tax 
revenue and a social  securi ty breach.  On the other hand,  
the f lexibil i ty of  the undocumented workforce -  who 
often assume all  sorts  of  functions and condit ions by 
virtue of  their  vulnerabil i ty -  and the ease with which 
states can proceed with deportat ion may also explain 
some tolerance of host  countries towards this  
phenomenon378.  
The truth,  however,  is  that  the presence of 
undocumented migrants in a state presupposes a fai lure 
to control  i ts  borders.  States have always claimed 
control  of  migration as part  of  their  sovereignty,  by i ts  
integration within their  exclusive domain.  Practice has,  
however,  shown that  s tates cannot control  or  halt  i l legal  
migratory movements.  Therefore,  al though they have 
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that  authori ty,  s tates have generally fai led to prevent 
the entry of  undocumented migrants379.  
States are engaging in debate about the extent  of  
any rights to be conferred on undocumented migrants.  
The special  vulnerabil i ty of  these migrants requires a 
careful  s tudy of their  r ights and their  protection380.   
Not only are basic r ights  often denied to 
undocumented migrants,  but  also in the cases where 
these r ights  are protected,  i t  is  a  challenge to protect  
their  exercise.  Indeed,  an undocumented migrant  who 
wishes to take advantage of social  r ights  recognized by 
a part icular  State may well  face the consequences of  
exercising those r ights by exposing his  i l legal  s tatus to 
the authori t ies.  
The public debate about undocumented migration is  
surrounded by controversy.  Against  the protection of 
undocumented migrants’  r ights many claim that  the 
extension of r ights to these migrants would encourage 
and even reward future violat ions of  terr i torial  integri ty 
of  state borders.  Given these arguments,  s tates have 
adopted a consistent  policy,  increasing the control  of  
undocumented immigration and using severe criminal  
measures to punish promoters of  i l legal  immigration 
and employers who hire undocumented migrants.  
 
c)  Rights of  undocumented migrants 
 
Undocumented migrants,  as  human beings,  ought to 
be enti t led to al l  the r ights  that  are connected to 
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personhood and these r ights  must  be protected by every 
State as they are protected for nationals381.  
A State may not differentiate or  adopt different  
s tandards of  r ights  protection on the basis  of  national  
origin or nationali ty.  This is  a  natural  outcome of the 
equali ty principle under international  law 382.  
Despite these basic assert ions and principles,  
l iberal  democracies seem ready to accept some form of 
discrimination between ci t izens,  migrants and 
undocumented migrants383.  
The principle of  equali ty and the equal  protection 
doctrine have been adopted by most  of  the l iberal  
democracies´  Consti tut ions or legal  systems.  That  
means that  any discrimination based on al ienage is  
inherently suspect  and subject  to close judicial  scrutiny.  
The court  decided that  al ienage is  considered as a 
suspect  classif ication in Graham v.  Richardson384,  
unlike a previous somewhat different  f inding in Plyler  
v.  Doe385.  I t  is  worth noting,  though,  that  Graham 
involved discrimination against  a  lawful permanent 
resident ,  unlike Plyler,  which concerned undocumented 
al iens.  
Gerald Neuman points  out  a  normative argument 
that  has been used to just ify discrimination based on 
al ienage.  According to this  argument,  ci t izens are 
members of  the poli ty and al iens are not ;  therefore 
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society has a r ight  to reserve goods for ci t izens.  
Neuman responds to this  argument saying that  even if  
al iens are not  full  members of  the poli ty,  some aliens 
are also members.  I t  means that  even if  some goods can 
be reserved for ci t izens,  not  al l  of  them can386.  
That  brings us to a crucial  question.  I t  is  clear  that  
States can discriminate against  ci t izens,  residents,  
al iens,  and undocumented migrants.  I t   is  also evident 
that  this  discrimination is  suspect  and should be under 
close judicial  scrutiny.  But what should the cr i teria be 
for al lowing discrimination.  What is  the basis  to 
discriminate? 
As I  have stated above,  personhood has replaced 
ci t izenship in the recognit ion and enjoyment of  most  
human rights.  These r ights  are inherent  to the human 
being regardless of  his  s tatus or national  at tachments.  
This is  set  out  in the UN core human rights  
protection instruments.  I t  is  also part icularly clear in 
the Convention discussed above.  This means that  
fundamental  r ights  l ike the r ight  to l ife but  also 
freedom of thought or due process must  be recognized 
for every human being387.  
Denying anyone – regardless of  his  s tatus – such 
rights would not  only be a violat ion of  international  
law, i t  would be a violat ion of basic principles of  ius 
cogens  that  every State,  company or individual  is  bound 
to respect .  
In a l iberal  democracy i t  would also be a direct  
violat ion of i ts  Consti tut ion.  
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I t  is  not  easy to f ind in a State’s  fundamental  r ights  
protection a group of r ights  that  is  identif iable as 
discriminable  r ights .  This exact  diff iculty was faced by 
the drafters  of  the Convention when pointing out r ights 
that  ought to be exclusive to ci t izens or even to 
documented migrants.  In some cases the result  is  
disputable,  as  I  have stated before.  
If  a  certain consensus might be found around the 
idea of  extending human rights to al l  human beings – 
thus including undocumented migrants – the same 
consensus will  certainly not  arise when discussing 
social  r ights .  
One might say that  social  r ights  are connected to 
the social  contract  and only those who are lawfully part  
of  that  contract  should be enti t led to the benefi ts .  
However,  i t  is  not  so simple.  Some of these r ights  
are enshrined as human rights in many Consti tut ions.  In 
fact  not  al l  of  the so-called social  r ights  can be 
completely detached from the concept of  human rights.  
Healthcare can be considered a social  r ight  but  can 
certainly be perceived as a human right  when 
emergency healthcare is  at  s take.  Education can 
certainly be presented as a social  r ight  but  can hardly 
be denied to innocent children,  even if  their  parents are 
immigration law violators.  
  Stephen Legomsky discusses several  arguments 
that  are usually used to deny social  r ights  to 
immigrants388.  First  and foremost ,  there is  the f inancial  
argument.  If  there is  one dist inction between human 
rights and social  r ights  that  is  not  foreign to this  
discussion i t  is  the f inancial  aspect .  In fact ,  protecting 
the l ife  or  freedom of foreigners does not  cost  more 
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than protecting the same rights  of  ci t izens.  An 
organized State wil l  provide police,  f iremen and other 
public safety and order services that  wil l  guarantee 
those r ights  within i ts  terr i tory.  To deny them to 
foreigners would imply a direct ,  unsustainable and even 
unfeasible discrimination.  A police officer or  a  f ireman 
does not  ask the nationali ty or  the immigration status of  
a person before acting to save his  l i fe .  
This is  probably not  necessari ly the case of  due 
process.  One can certainly think of the massive costs  of  
legal  defense and fees when some procedures against  
foreigners are supported by States.  However,  again i t  is  
more the cost  of  the legal  system itself  than the cost  of  
the individual  s i tuation of the protection of the 
immigrant’s  r ights .  
On a different  level  are the costs  of  social  benefi ts  
that  can be clearly identif ied and isolated.  It  is  very 
clear  how much tax payers pay for a medical  operation 
or for the education of a given child.  
    However,  as  Stephen Legosmky states,  
immigrants do pay taxes;  they pay more in total  taxes 
than they receive in total  public benefi ts  in the US389.  
Lipman adds that  “undocumented immigrants l iving in 
the United States are subject  to the same income tax 
laws as documented immigrants and U.S.  ci t izens.  
However,  because of  their  status most  unauthorized 
workers’  pay a higher ef fect ive tax rate than similarly 
si tuated documented immigrants or U.S.  ci t izens.  Yet  
these workers and their  families use fewer government 
services than similarly si tuated documented immigrants 
or U.S.  ci t izens”390.  In the US, and this  is  t rue in many 
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countries in the world,  immigrants,  including the 
undocumented,  pay al l  sorts  of  taxes,  including income 
taxes,  sales taxes and property taxes.  Legomsky says 
that  “aside from duration of  the presence,  work 
patterns,  and tax payments,  undocumented immigrants 
behave l ike other residents in addit ional ways.  Using 
taxpayer identi f ication numbers,  they buy homes and 
obtain legal mortgages from banks.  Their  foreclosure 
rate is  below the national average”391.  
Francine Lipman establishes an interest ing 
associat ion with the claim “no taxation without 
representat ion”.  In fact ,  Lipman says,  “undocumented 
immigrants,  l ike all  ci t izens and residents of  the United 
States,  are required to pay taxes.  Despite the historic 
and strong American opposit ion to taxation without 
representation,  undocumented immigrants (except  in 
rare cases)  have not enjoyed the right  to vote on any 
local ,  s tate or federal  tax or other matter for almost  
eighty years.  Nevertheless,  each year undocumented 
immigrants add bil l ions of  dollars in sales,  excise,  
property,  income, and payroll  taxes,  including Social  
Security,  Medicare and unemployment taxes,  to federal ,  
s tate and local coffers.  Hundreds of  thousands of  
undocumented immigrants go out  of  their  way to annual 
federal  and state income tax returns”392.  
   What these facts  show is  that  the argument 
against  the social  protection,  benefi ts  and r ights of  
foreigners cannot be of  an economic nature as these 
persons,  even the undocumented ones,  contribute just  as 
much as ci t izens contribute and,  in some cases,  even 
more.  
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Enjoyment of  social  benefi ts  is  also perceived as a 
magnet for  immigration,  especial ly i l legal  
immigration393.  
  The truth is  that  migrants  st i l l  come to the host  
countries regardless of  the benefi ts ,  as  long as they 
believe their  f inancial  s i tuation and that  of  their  
families might be improved.  This has happened in the 
past  when migrants subject  themselves to the dangers 
and uncertainty of coyote networks,  exploitat ion in the 
workplace and vir tually no access to social  services394.  
Even in the cases of  countries where some social  r ights  
are recognized for undocumented migrants,  their  legal  
s i tuation makes i t  very hard to exercise those r ights.  I  
wil l  come back to this  later .  
As Legomsky underl ines,  there are addit ional  
arguments usually used against  the extension of social  
r ights  to undocumented migrants that  are intertwined 
with their  specif ic si tuation:  “ the principal  argument 
for withholding public benefi ts  from undocumented 
immigrants is  that  they are not  supposed to be in the 
United States at  al l .  As wrongdoers,  the argument runs,  
they have no moral claim to receive services from the 
very government whose laws they are transgressing.  
The analogy might be to a trespasser seeking support  
from the landowner whose property he or she has 
wrongly entered”395.  
The argument might seem plausible and even 
strong.  Why should we draw resources from the,  often,  
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unbalanced public budget to protect  people that  have 
breached the law? 
This argument ought to be considered very 
carefully though.  First  of  al l ,  not  al l  the undocumented 
migrants can ipso facto  be considered wrongdoers.  In 
some cases the legal  s i tuation is  not  yet  set t led and 
legal  claims or asylum requests  are pending396.    
  Also,  as Neuman upholds,  “ there are dif ferent  
manners in which an alien's  presence could be said to 
violate the law, and there are dif ferent  forms of  
curative government action that  may impart  degrees of  
legali ty  to the alien's  presence.  Many aliens enter or 
overstay for the purpose of  working in the United 
States,  but  others act  from a variety of  motives:  some 
seek asylum from persecution; some f lee threats of  
death or injury that  do not  count as persecution under 
the asylum laws; some enter to join family members who 
are unlawful  residents;  some enter unlawfully while 
await ing lawful  admittance as a family member of  a 
ci t izen or permanent resident .  Some alien women are 
kept  in unlawful  status by husbands who could confer 
lawful  s tatus upon them but refuse for the purpose of  
maintaining control .  Some "i l legal" aliens entered the 
United States as young children without exercising any 
choice”397.  
 The last  two examples abundantly prove the fai lure 
of  the “wrongdoers” argument.  A l iberal  democracy 
based on the rule of  law simply cannot punish an 
undocumented migrant  if  the si tuation arose from an 
action of which that  person had no knowledge or which 
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arose in the absence of his  wil l ingness (children) or  
under coercion (women kept under their  husbands´ 
command).  
 Also,  as Legomsky says,  “ there are,  in addit ion,  
degrees of  moral and legal guil t .  We do not assign 
equal opprobrium to all  who violate our laws; i f  we did,  
al l  violators of  al l  laws would receive the same 
penalt ies.  Undocumented immigrants can be driven by a 
wide range of  motives,  including a desire to work,  a 
desire to rejoin their  families,  or a desire to escape 
persecution.  Laws are meant to be obeyed,  but  the 
beneficence of  the violator 's  motives is  surely relevant 
to the degree of  culpabil i ty .  That level  of  fault ,  in turn,  
should be balanced against  the level  of  hardship that  a 
deprivation of  the particular public benefi t  would 
cause”398.      
Finally,  and related to these arguments,  I  would 
add that  our criminal  systems are based on the 
proportionali ty principle.  A penalty must  be 
proportionate to the gravity of  the felony,  the guil t  of  
the agent and the abil i ty of  the penalty to deter  future 
law-breaking.  Also,  a  penalty shall  not  cause the 
society more harm than the one that  i t  intends to 
prevent.  Also,  i t  shall  only be exercised according to 
the rule of  law when due process has been followed. 
None of these principles is  applicable to the 
argument according to which an undocumented migrant 
should be str ipped of al l  social  r ights .  
There is  no dist inction,  whatsoever,  based on the 
gravity of  the action or the guil t .  All  undocumented 
migrants would be treated the same way.  
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This does not  prevent other law-breaking as i t  does 
not  discourage other undocumented migrants from 
migrating to a country,  as the above facts  prove. 
I t  is  not  a proport ionate punishment and i t  is  
certainly not  at tached to any wrongdoing.  Overstaying a 
visa or even crossing a border i l legally has less social  
censorship than serious crimes such as rape,  murder or  
terrorism. Yet,  those who commit these crimes are not  
str ipped of their  social  r ights .  If  the felon is  a  ci t izen 
he wil l  not  be str ipped of fundamental  ci t izenship r ights 
– except those closely connected with the felon 
condit ion,  such as l iberty or  freedom of speech or,  in 
some cases,  the r ight  to vote and stand for elections.  
Moreover,  no l iberal  democracy would advocate that .  
The reason is  s imple:  being str ipped of freedom by 
being incarcerated is  sufficient  punishment to achieve 
the essential  goals of  the society.  Unnecessari ly 
denying other r ights  would not  be proportionate,  
regardless of  the crime committed.  
If  this  is  a  solid l ine of  thought for  any felony,  
even the most  serious ones,  why should we think 
differently when i t  comes to undocumented migrants? 
Also,  from a collective standpoint ,  s tr ipping 
undocumented migrants of  social  r ights  can be more 
harmful than recognizing them. In the event of  a 
pandemic virus,  for  example,  i t  is  very important  that  
everyone seeks appropriate healthcare.  If  we do not 
extend healthcare to undocumented migrants i t  is  not  
expected that  they will  have that  care in such an event.  
The same can be said about education.  I t  is  certainly 
harmful for a country to force part  of  i ts  population out  
of  the schooling system. Children of undocumented 
Gonçalo Saraiva Matias – The Path to Citizenship 
294 
migrant  families wil l  lack education and that  wil l  
ul t imately pose a problem to the society as a whole399.  
A leading case on the recognit ion of a social  r ight  
to education for undocumented migrants’  children is  the 
Plyler  v.  Doe case,  which was decided in 1982 by the 
US Supreme Court400.  
“In 1975 the State of  Texas enacted section 21.031 
of  the Texas Education Code,  al lowing i ts  public school 
districts  to charge tuit ion to undocumented children.  
The Legislature held no hearings on the matter,  and no 
published record explains the origin of  this  revision to 
the school code.  Discussions with legislators from that  
t ime suggested that  i t  was inserted into a larger,  more 
routine education bil l ,  s imply at  the request  of  some 
border-area superintendents who mentioned the issue to 
their  representatives”401.  
 The Plyler  vs.  Doe case was a class action,  f i led in 
the United States Distr ict  Court  for  the Eastern Distr ict  
of  Texas in September 1977,  on behalf  of  certain 
school-age children of Mexican origin residing in Smith 
County,  Texas,  who could not  establish that  they had 
been legally admitted into the United States.  The action 
complained of the exclusion of the plaintiff  children 
from the public schools of  the Tyler Independent School 
Distr ict .  The Superintendent and members of  the Board 
of Trustees of  the School Distr ict  were named as 
defendants;  the State of  Texas intervened as a party-
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defendant.  After  cert ifying a class consist ing of al l  
undocumented school-age children of Mexican origin 
residing within the School Distr ict ,  the Distr ict  Court  
prel iminari ly enjoined the defendants from denying a 
free education to members of  the plaintiff  class.  In 
December 1977,  the court  conducted an extensive 
hearing on the plaintiffs '  motion for permanent 
injunctive rel ief402.  
In June 1982 the Supreme Court  s truck down the 
statute by a 5-4 margin.  Just ice Brenan wrote the 
majori ty opinion based on the equal  protection clause,  
saying that  a  State could not  enact  a  discriminatory 
classif ication by defining a disfavored group as non-
resident403.  
A first  argument rejected was the f inancial  
argument.  The State of  Texas argued that  the statute  
was aimed at  preserving the l imited resources for  the 
education of i ts  lawful residents.  The Court  decided,  
referring to a previous case – Graham v.  Richardson404 – 
that  resources alone could not  just ify an al ienage 
classif ication used in al locating welfare benefi ts .  
Addit ionally,  any savings that  might result  from the 
statute enforcement would be small  and uncertain and 
would not necessari ly improve the quali ty of  the overall  
education405.  
 Another argument used by the State was that  the 
legislat ion would prevent the f lood of undocumented 
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aliens.  The Court  concluded that  the objective was 
acceptable but  not  the means used: “charging tuit ion to 
undocumented children consti tutes a ludicrously 
ineffective attempt to stem the t ide of  i l legal  
immigration”406.  
The State also argued that  children of 
undocumented migrants are not  l ikely to stay in the 
country so the free education they would get  would not 
contribute to the development of  the society.  The Court  
dist inguished those who were in the State as a family 
and those who were not.  For those who intended to 
maintain their  home in the country,  “ i t  is  di f f icult  to 
understand precisely what the State hopes to achieve by 
promoting the creation and perpetuation of  a subclass 
of  i l l i terates within our boundaries,  surely adding to 
the problems and costs  of  unemployment,  welfare,  and 
crime.  I t  is  thus clear that  whatever savings might be 
achieved by denying these children an education,  they 
are wholly insubstantial  in l ight  of  the costs  involved to 
these children,  the State,  and the Nation”.  And the 
Court  added that  “ in addit ion to the pivotal  role of  
education in sustaining our poli t ical  and cultural  
heri tage,  denial  of  education to some isolated group of  
children poses an affront to one of  the goals of  the 
Equal Protection Clause: the aboli t ion of  governmental  
barriers presenting unreasonable obstacles to 
advancement on the basis  of  individual merit .  
Paradoxically,  by depriving the children of  any 
disfavored group of  an education,  we foreclose the 
means by which that  group might raise the level  of  
esteem in which i t  is  held by the majority”  407.    
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The decision of the Court  presupposes here a very 
important  idea:  that  undocumented migrants are 
residents.  That  is  the only reason to sustain that  
undocumented migrants could get  free education over 
ci t izens that  are residents in other States or  migrants 
lawfully applying from other countries.  
As Legomsky puts i t  in a dialogued form, “ the only 
undocumented immigrants whom I favor classi fying as 
in-state residents are those who have actually been 
l iving in the state.  The noncit izens who apply from 
abroad for student visas are obeying the law, and that  
is  admirable,  but  they are st i l l  charged the state’s  
nonresident tui t ion rates for one obvious reason: they 
aren’t  residents of  the state.  The people I’m talking 
about are residents.  And as I  just  explained,  i t ’s  
perfectly rational for a state to treat  i ts  own residents 
more favorably than the residents of  other jurisdict ions,  
whether the lat ter are U.S.  ci t izens from other states or 
noncit izens coming from overseas”408.  
This conclusion is  very important  for  an argument 
that  I  wil l  use later  that  favors residency over other 
connecting factors as a cri teria for  at tr ibuting 
ci t izenship.  If  undocumented migrants are residents for  
the purpose of  social  benefi ts  they are certainly also 
residents for  the purpose of  ci t izenship. 
However,  for  the moment,  for  the sake of  the 
argument I  am drawing from the Plyler  v.  Doe case,  the 
Court  concluded,  without doubt,  that  the equal  
protection clause is  applicable here.  As Justice Brenan 
affirmed in the majori ty opinion,  “sheer incapabil i ty  or 
lax enforcement of  the laws barring entry into this  
country,  coupled with the failure to establish an 
ef fective bar to the employment of  undocumented aliens,  
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has resulted in the creation of  a substantial  "shadow 
population" of  i l legal migrants — numbering in the 
mil l ions — within our borders.  This si tuation raises the 
specter of  a permanent caste of  undocumented resident 
al iens,  encouraged by some to remain here as a source 
of  cheap labor,  but  nevertheless denied the benefi ts  that  
our society makes available to ci t izens and lawful  
residents.  The existence of  such an underclass presents 
most  di f f icult  problems for a Nation that  prides i tsel f  
on adherence to principles of  equali ty  under law”409.  
This l ine of  thought of  the US Supreme Court  is  
very important  and ought to be considered nowadays in 
many other si tuations;  i t  is  valid for a  range of different  
s i tuations and in different  Nations.  Indeed,  i t  could well  
be adopted as a principle of  global  law in the sense that  
human dignity and equali ty are definitely at  s take 
whenever a Nation decides to unlawfully discriminate 
against  residents on the basis  of  their  s tatus.  I t  is  even 
more important  because i t  was not delivered in an 
opinion about a case of  l i fe  protection or a decision 
against  torture;  the Plyler  case is  a  case about free 
elementary and secondary education,  about social  
r ights410.  
  In l iberal  democracies the struggle of  
undocumented migrants is  not  so much for the 
recognit ion of  r ights – which,  as I  have shown before,  
they enjoy just  because they are human beings – but  
also for the possibil i ty of  exercising them. 
Even if  i t  seems reasonable that  an undocumented 
migrant enjoys r ights such as freedom of expression,  
due process,  r ight  to emergency healthcare or r ight  to 
                                              
409 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
410 LINDA BOSNIAK, The citizen and the Alien: dilemmas of contemporary 
membership (2006), 64. 
Gonçalo Saraiva Matias – The Path to Citizenship 
299 
education – as shown in Plyler ,  the abil i ty to exercise 
these r ights  is  not  always evident411.  
Someone who finds himself  undocumented in a 
given country is  always facing the possibil i ty of  
deportat ion.  In fact ,  regardless of  the reasons for being 
undocumented,  deportat ion is  a  possibil i ty unless we 
advocate open borders – which I  do not412.  
  If  we accept generally,  as  a provision of 
international  law, that  a  country has the r ight  to decide 
whether or  not  to admit  a  foreigner within i ts  terr i tory,  
and if  someone is  found without documents we have to 
assume that  that  person is  there without the proper 
authorization,  this  is  grounds for the country’s 
sovereign admission decision.  
In fact ,  a  visa – in whatever form we can conceive 
i t  – is  a  formal manifestat ion of that  sovereign power to 
admit  or  exclude someone from the terr i tory and of the 
condit ions in which that  person was admitted.  
Someone without a visa is  under the obligation – 
with al l  the legal  guarantees and due process – to 
explain under what condit ions he is  claiming to be able 
to stay in the terr i tory413.  
Yet this  appears to contradict  the possibil i ty of  
exercising the r ights  described above,  even the r ights  
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protected in the core human rights instruments within 
the UN system or the r ights  provided for in the 
International  Convention on the Protection of  the 
Rights of  All  Migrant  Workers and Members of  Their  
Families.  
How will  an undocumented migrant  seek healthcare 
or education for his  children if  deportat ion is  always 
pending? Wouldn´t  an undocumented migrant  avoid,  at  
al l  costs ,  benefi t ing from, for example,  emergency 
healthcare,  putt ing himself  in danger in a l i fe  
threatening si tuation,  or  even the whole society in a 
pandemic si tuation,  if  deportat ion is  a  real  possibil i ty? 
Linda Bosniak has identif ied this  problem as one of 
the main practical  obstacles within the framework of 
the Convention414.   
There are two main answers to this  diff iculty:  
guaranteeing the exercise of  r ights  without a 
deportat ion r isk by preventing authori t ies from 
report ing the immigration status to the immigration 
officials;  a  solid and permanent legalization program. 
The f irst  option f inds i ts  roots  in the sanctuary 
laws of the 1980s415.   The origins of  the sanctuary laws 
were the wil l  of  private inst i tut ions and churches to 
protect  Guatemalans and Salvadorians that  were 
believed to be refugees and whose si tuation could 
represent  a breach of the international  refugee law416.  
                                              
414 LINDA BOSNIAK, Human Rights, State Sovereignty and the Protection of 
Undocumented Migrants under the International Migrant Workers Convention 
(1991), 760. 
415 HUYEN PHAM, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate? Local 
Sovereignty and the Federal Immigration Power (2006). 
416 STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY and CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, Immigration 
and Refugee Law and Policy (2009). Mentioning a similar possibility in 
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As Huyen Pham describes i t ,  “cit ies and states also 
joined the movement,  passing “sanctuary laws” that  
declared asylum seekers could remain in their  
boundaries without fear of  arrest  by local  law 
enforcement for immigration violations.  Many of  the 
sanctuary policies also contained provisions that  
prohibited local  police from reporting immigration 
information to or otherwise cooperating with federal  
immigration enforcement.  
At  the height  of  the movement,  approximately 23 
ci t ies and four states participated.  Cit ies that  passed 
sanctuary laws included Rochester,  NY; Minneapolis ,  
Minn.;  Seatt le ,  and Chicago; states that  passed such 
laws included New Mexico,  Massachusetts  and New 
York.  
Typical  of  the sanctuary laws was that  passed by 
Takoma Park,  Maryland in 1985.  In a resolution,  
Takoma Park expressed i ts  belief  that  the United States 
has a responsibil i ty  under international law not to 
deport  refugees back to places of  persecution,  that  the 
United States violated international law by denying 
asylum to Guatemalan and Salvadoran refugees,  and 
f inally,  that  the individual volunteers in the sanctuary 
movement and the movement as a whole deserved 
government support .  In i ts  law, Takoma Park prohibited 
i ts  employees from assist ing or cooperating with the 
INS in any invest igation of  immigration violations,  from 
inquiring about the ci t izenship status of  any resident ,  
and from releasing the ci t izenship status of  any resident 
to the INS”417.  
Of course the concept of  sanctuary ci t ies evolved 
from the protection of the refugees to the protection of 
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undocumented migrants.  I t  is  now basically applicable 
to the ci t ies  where by law, local  ordinance or practice 
the public officials  are forbidden from report ing or,  at  
least ,  al lowed not to report  the immigration status of  
undocumented migrants.  In some cases they are not  
even al lowed to ask about the immigration status of  
anyone.  
First  of  al l ,  i t  can be a decision to avoid racial  and 
national  discrimination418.  I t  is  certainly true that  any 
official  would not  be compelled to ask for the 
immigration status of  anyone who looks and sounds l ike 
a national .  This is  typically the kind of question that  
arises whenever the official  is  convinced that  the 
person is  not  a  national .  In a f irst  approach,  this  can 
only be based on race,  language or other suspicious 
categories according to the equali ty clause.  In a way,  
denying that  possibil i ty to some officials  is ,  in a way,  a 
protection for the equali ty clause.  
Then we should dist inguish between different  kinds 
of  officials .  Here we could be thinking of civil  
servants,  such as those who work for the social  securi ty 
services or  even law enforcement officials  l ike state 
police or troopers.  
The lat ter  category has drawn a lot  of  at tention and 
controversy,  especial ly after  September 11 t h  419.  I t  was 
deemed inadmissible for  local  police authori t ies to 
collaborate in hiding potential ly harmful people from 
the federal  authori t ies420.  
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In November 1994 the electorate of  California 
adopted Proposit ion 187.  The purpose of this  
proposit ion was to provide for cooperation between the 
agencies of  state and local  government and the federal  
government,  and to establish a system of required 
notif ication by and between such agencies to prevent 
i l legal  al iens in the United States from receiving 
benefi ts  or  public services in the State of  California.  
“Proposit ion 187 restricted undocumented aliens´ 
access to public services,  including education and non-
emergency health care; i t  required state and local law 
enforcement,  social  services,  health care and education 
off icials  to veri fy  the immigration status of  persons 
with whom they came in contact  and to report  to the 
INS persons suspected of  being unlawfully in the United 
States;  and i t  imposed criminal penalt ies for the 
manufacture,  distribution,  sale,  or use of  false 
ci t izenship or permanent residence documents”421.  
  Proposit ion 187 was dropped short ly after  i ts  
approval and did not make i ts  way to the Supreme 
Court ,  giving the judges an opportunity to revisi t  Plyler  
v.  Doe422.  In fact ,  in March 1998,  a federal  judge in Los 
Angeles struck down Proposit ion 187423.  
In 1996 the passing of the I l legal  Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant  Responsibil i ty Act challenged 
the “sanctuary ci t ies” policy.  I t  directly addressed the 
relat ionship between local  and federal  authori t ies on 
immigration issues and banned several  protections of  
                                              
421 THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN and 
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local  authori t ies regarding the immigration status of  
residents424.  
In August  1997,  Congress enacted legislat ion to 
restore certain benefi ts  l ike food stamps to some 
categories of  migrants ,  such as children,  the elderly and 
the disabled425.  
First  and foremost,  the discussion about sanctuary 
laws is  deeply intertwined with the discussion about 
federal  and state powers.  The discussion and also the 
consequences of a sanctuary policy are far  more visible 
in a federal  s tate.  
Yet the discussion is  s t i l l  valid,  f irst ly because the 
United States is  the country where undocumented 
migration is  a  more visible and tangible problem– 
estimates point  to a population of more than 12 mill ion 
undocumented migrants426.  Secondly,  Europe,  where this  
issue is  soon to take on greater  proport ions,  is  very 
close to a federal  enti ty with harmonized immigration 
regulations,  with regard to undocumented migration.  
Finally,  even in non-federal  States the sanctuary 
response is  applicable since i t  is  conceivable to design 
a system where some officials  – in educational  or  
healthcare inst i tut ions – would not be permitted to 
report  the immigration status to other off icials  – the 
immigration officials .  
As Legomsky underl ines,  even from the law 
enforcement standpoint  the sanctuary policy al lows 
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undocumented migrants to report  crimes and cooperate 
with the police without an immediate fear  of  
deportat ion427.  
Of course the relat ionship with the police is  a  more 
controversial  one.  I t  might be easier  to admit  such a 
policy when applied to officials  working in other 
environments l ike schools,  social  securi ty or  hospitals .  
I t  is  harder for many people to conceive that  a  law 
enforcement officer  l ike a policeman would be barred 
from investigating a person’s immigration status.  
Again,  i t  might be easier  to admit  such a system in a 
federal  State with different  layers of  law officers.  
However,  this  can be said even in non-federal  
States.  I t  is  often the case that  police officials  are 
special ized according to areas of  intervention.  There is  
no specif ic reason why a traff ic policeman would 
investigate the immigration status of  a  person even if  a  
misdemeanor l ike speeding is  being committed.  There is  
no relat ionship between such an action and the 
immigration status.  In fact ,  there is  no need to ask for 
the immigration status in a traff ic  control  act ion and 
any further measure that  could lead to deportat ion 
seems disproportionate given the type of action being 
controlled.  
Of course one can always say that  more serious 
crimes can be found during routine searches l ike the 
traff ic  operations.  Yet i t  is  also true that  a  routine 
traff ic  operation does not  empower the police officer to 
search the drivers to any extent .  I t  does not  al low, for  
instance,  a  full  inspection of the car,  which is  protected 
under privacy laws,  unless there is  a  probable cause of  
a crime.  If  that  is  true for crimes l ike murder or  drug 
traff icking,  would we support  a  different  approach for 
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an undocumented migrant? If  a  traff ic police  officer  
cannot search any car randomly for drugs or concealed 
i l legal  weapons,  can he search for an undocumented 
migrant? 
  There is  a  tendency,  even in discussions,  to 
associate the undocumented migrants with criminal  
activit ies.  The legal  system promotes that  associat ion 
since i t  has evolved in the direction of criminal  law 
regulat ion of  the immigration law. As Legomsky 
affirms,  “ there is  an embryonic l i terature on the 
growing convergence of  two cri t ical  regulatory 
regimes--criminal just ice and immigration control  (…) 
The two systems intersect  at  mult iple points:  Violations 
of  the immigration laws trigger broader,  harsher,  and 
more frequent criminal consequences.  Indeed,  i t  is  no 
longer rare for refugees seeking asylum to be 
criminally prosecuted for i l legal entry.  Conversely,  
Congress has steadily expanded the l is t  of  non-
immigration-related crimes that  tr igger deportation and 
other adverse immigration consequences,  and the sheer 
numbers of  deportations on crime-related grounds have 
skyrocketed”428.  
 In the same tone,  Daniel  Kanstroom says that  
before September 11t h  immigration law was deemed to 
be civil ,  not  criminal  law. That changed afterwards not  
only due to the influx of the “so called USA PATRIOT 
ACT but also to an increasing convergence between 
criminal just ice and immigration control  systems,  part  
of  a trend that  has been evident since the late 1980s”429.  
In fact  there is  no direct  or  necessary relat ionship 
between immigration law and criminal  regulation.  
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Undocumented migrants might have breached the law at  
some point  but  i t  does not  make them criminals ,  as  I  
have previously demonstrated.  
Legomsky advocates that  there is  an asymmetric 
incorporation of criminal  just ice norms in the 
immigration law and urges “a return to the civi l  
regulatory model of  immigration law-for enforcement 
and adjudication alike.  Only then can we hope to devise 
an immigration policy that  is  at  once balanced,  
moderate,  fair ,  humane,  and,  ul t imately,  fai thful  to all  
the values that  together consti tute the national 
interest”430.  
  Also connected to this  trend,  and showing the 
importance of  actions l ike those the sanctuary ci t ies  
have adopted,  is  a  method of expell ing undocumented 
migrants known as “attr i t ion through enforcement”.  
The idea behind this  scheme is  to make immigrants´  
l ives so diff icult  that  they will  choose to self  deport431.  
Kris  Kobach advocates this  s trategy as a third way 
in between unilateral  deportat ion and legalization.  For 
this  author among the many advantages of  this  s trategy 
is  i ts  relat ive inexpensiveness432.  The analogy used is  
with speeding on a highway and the need to reinforce 
patrols  in a highway area where drivers usually speed.  
According to Kobach,  in no area of  law is  i t  acceptable 
to give up controll ing law breakers.  The proposed 
strategy would be to control  every step of the 
undocumented migrants,  denying them any social  r ights  
and t ightly controll ing employment of  these migrants.  
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To Kobach,  “what would a nationwide strategy of  
at tr i t ion through enforcement entail? Properly 
conceived,  i t  would involve several  steps:  (1)  
mandating that  al l  employers in the country use the E-
Verify system to veri fy the work authorization of  new 
employees (…); (2)  increasing the removal rate of  
al iens who have not  been convicted of  serious felonies;  
(3)  increasing the percentage of  al iens who are 
detained during removal proceedings to reduce the 
number of  absconders; (4) increasing the number (…) 
agreements between ICE and state law enforcement 
agencies;(5) ending sanctuary ci t ies by denying federal  
law enforcement funding to ci t ies  that  violate 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1373(a)-(b);21 and (6) increasing the number of  ICE 
interior enforcement agents”433.   
 In a way i t  is  the reverse approach to the sanctuary 
ci t ies.  That  is  why ending sanctuary ci t ies is  a  key part  
of  the  attr i t ion through enforcement strategy.  
Again i t  departs  from a criminal  law conception of 
the immigration law and of undocumented migrants as 
criminals.  
The sanctuary ci t ies  approach is  based on the idea 
that  the only way to guarantee the exercise of  r ights by 
the undocumented migrants is  to assure that  deportat ion 
will  not  follow automatically.  Migrants are not  
expected to report  crimes,  seek healthcare or  education 
if  they know they will  immediately be deported.  
The possibil i ty of  having these r ights  is  very 
important ,  not  only for the migrants themselves,  as  we 
are thinking about r ights protected by the core UN 
instruments on Human Rights,  but  also for the society 
as a whole.  And this  is  at  s take here.  
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I t  is  not  comparable to speeding on the highway. 
First  of  al l ,  speeding is  not  a r ight;  i t  is  a  violat ion of 
the law. Then,  there is  no collective reason to 
encourage speeding.  Finally,  the consequences of 
enforcing speed l imits  can only be the reduction of  
speeding on highways and ult imately drivers’  safety.  Of 
course there might be a general  beneficial  effect  related 
to law enforcement,  also applicable to immigration law, 
but  in this  case i t  can be counterproductive when 
compared with the costs  of  such action. 
A system designed to prevent the enjoyment of  
r ights of  undocumented migrants is  a  violat ion of  
international  law. I t  harms the migrants’  r ights and 
might be harmful for  the society.  I t  might achieve a 
l imited objective of  self-deportat ion,  but  this  is  by far  
outweighed by the negative consequences i t  brings.  
A sanctuary ci t ies approach does not  ignore the 
enforcement of  immigration law. There is  no 
prohibit ion or obstacle to the activi ty of  the 
immigration officers.  They can st i l l  investigate and,  if  
i t  is  the case,  deport  those who breach the law. Yet,  i t  
certainly does not  encourage such activit ies and,  above 
al l ,  promotes an environment where the undocumented 
migrants’  r ights  can be safely enjoyed.  
Apart  from the sanctuary strategy,  a  solid 
legalization process seems to be an adequate method of 
protecting the r ights  of  undocumented migrants.  
This is  a  highly controversial  issue.  Those who 
oppose undocumented migrants’  r ights  usually use the 
phrasing “amnesty” rather than legalization because 
they simply consider i t  as  a  reward for the law breakers,  
an amnesty for their  past  wrongdoings434.  
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The key factor in any legalization process is  the 
recognit ion that  certain undocumented migrants are in 
fact  part  of  the national  community,  contribute to i ts  
development,  raise a family,  and are,  in a word,  
residents.  
I t  is  also necessary to recognize that  from a 
practical  s tandpoint  and even bearing in mind the 
interests  of  any internal  market ,  deportat ion of a large 
part  of  the population is  s imply not  possible.  
Then,  as an al ternative to the sanctuary ci t ies 
approach,  where deportat ion is  always pending as 
described above,  legalization is  definitely a possibil i ty.  
There are compell ing legal  arguments in favor of  
legalization.  First  of  al l ,  as  said before,  undocumented 
migrants residing permanently in a given terr i tory ought 
to be considered as residents.   
Because of the permanence of their  presence and 
the t ime they have spent in the terr i tory some authors 
f ind an interest ing analogy with adverse possession in 
property law435.  I  wil l  come back to this  analogy to 
advocate the adverse possession theory applicable to the 
acquisi t ion of ci t izenship.  
In fact ,  as Carens puts i t ,  “ the moral right  of  s tates 
to apprehend and deport  irregular migrants erodes with 
the passage of  t ime.  As irregular migrants become more 
and more set t led,  their  membership in society grows in 
moral importance,  and the fact  that  they set t led without 
authorization becomes correspondingly less relevant.  At  
some point  a threshold is  crossed,  and irregular 
migrants acquire a moral claim to have their  actual 
social  membership legally recognized.  They should 
acquire a legal right  of  permanent residence and all  the 
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rights that  go with that ,  including eventual access to 
ci t izenship”436.  I  wil l  come back to the ci t izenship 
argument later .  
Legalization (or regularization) processes have 
been implemented successfully in many European 
countries.  
Arguments that  can be l is ted in favor of  
legalization are that  i t  reduces the size of  the 
undocumented immigrant population at  an acceptable 
cost ,  i t  enhances securi ty and reduces crime and i t  
brings significant  benefi ts  to legal  immigrant  
communities,  with spil l  over gains for  the health and 
vibrancy of the broader society.  Addit ionally,  
legalization programs offer  important  economic and 
social  benefi ts  by moving immigrants from the informal 
economy to the formal one437.   
The European experience shows various 
qualif ications – rules defining who is  el igible for 
legalization – for the legalizat ion process,  such as 
migration history (Germany),  employment record 
(Austria,  France,  Greece,  I taly,  The Netherlands,  
Portugal ,  Spain)and humanitarian basis  (Austria,  
Belgium, Denmark,  France,  Germany, The Netherlands,  
Sweden,  UK)438.  
Although legalization might be perceived as a 
reward for those who have broken the law, there are 
some countervail ing benefi ts  for  society.  First  of  al l ,  i t  
is  a  way of including undocumented migrants that  have 
been l iving in the community for a long t ime.  I t  is  an 
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inclusive measure.  Then,  by being inclusive,  i t  
integrates migrants that  had been l iving as pariahs unti l  
then.  I t  al lows them to benefi t  from the r ights  that  
international  law recognizes and to collaborate with the 
State’s  authori t ies in any law enforcement programs or 
actions.  Finally i t  solves a number of  pragmatic 
questions including f inding a path to ci t izenship439.  I  
wil l  come back to this  in chapter  6.  
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§4.  The rights of non-citizens: the right to vote 
 
As I  have stated above,  one of the reasons for a 
trend of thought that  diminishes the importance of  
ci t izenship and points  to i ts  decline is  the fact  that  most  
r ights are inherent  to personhood and not  to ci t izenship.  
Very few rights can be exclusively connected to 
ci t izenship,  and one of those is  voting rights .  Even so,  
Jacobson says that  “ in the poli t ical  arena,  ci t izenship is  
essential  for coting in national elections (…) the ef fect  
of  the disappearing dist inction between ci t izen and 
alien is  that  resident al iens display l i t t le  interest  in 
ci t izenship status”440.  
In fact ,  very few rights can be deemed as exclusive 
to ci t izens.  Poli t ical  r ights and the r ight  to freely enter  
and remain in the nation´s terr i tory can probably sum 
up the complex of r ights  that  are within that  
exclusivity.  
Yet there are theoretical  proposals  and practical  
experiments to extend some of these r ights to non-
cit izens441.  
Examples of  non-cit izen voting r ights can be found 
in Europe and in the United States442.  As Raskin 
describes,  “at any rate,  local  al ien suffrage has made 
much headway in the last  several  decades,  especially in 
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Europe.  In 1975 Sweden adopted voting rights  in local  
and regional elections for foreigners l iving in the 
country for three years".  In 1977 Denmark enacted a 
local  al ien suffrage policy for Nordic immigrants which 
has since been extended to give the right  to vote and 
hold local  of f ice to all  immigrants of  three years 
residence.  Norway changed i ts  consti tut ion to 
accomplish noncit izen voting in 1978,  and now all  
immigrants of  three years residence may vote.  Both 
Finland and Iceland have extended local voting rights 
to Nordic ci t izens.  The Netherlands accomplished local  
voting rights for all  immigrants in the early 1980s.  And,  
in Switzerland,  two cantons have writ ten local  al ien 
suffrage into their  consti tut ions.  A local al ien suffrage 
provision has also appeared in the new Consti tut ion of  
Estonia”443.  
At the European Union level ,  the Treaty on 
European Union provides for a r ight  to vote in local  
elections.  Article 19 of the Treaty establishes the 
following: 
“1. Every ci t izen of  the Union residing in a Member 
State of  which he is  not  a national shall  have the right  
to vote and to stand as a candidate at  municipal  
elections in the Member State in which he resides,  
under the same condit ions as nationals of  that  State.  
This right  shall  be exercised subject  to detailed 
arrangements adopted by the Council ,  acting 
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and 
after consult ing the European Parliament;  these 
arrangements may provide for derogations where 
warranted by problems specif ic  to a Member State”.  
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This is  included in the catalogue of EU cit izenship 
r ights.  This means that  an EU cit izen residing in an EU 
member state other than that  of  his  nationali ty is  
al lowed to vote and stand for office in municipal  
elections.  
 I t  should be noted though that  this  is  not  the 
typical  s i tuation of extending voting r ights  to al iens.  In 
fact  i t  was designed as part  of  the ci t izenship status that  
I  have described above.  In that  sense,  i t  is  a  weak right  
because i t  is  supposed to be the content  of  a  ci t izenship 
status.   
Although the European Union is  not  a  federal  
enti ty,  i t  has,  as I  have described,  some federalist  
aspects ,  and European ci t izenship,  as I  have classif ied 
i t ,  is  a  good example of  transnational  ci t izenship.  In 
any event,  i t  is  far  from being a simple extension of 
voting rights  to al iens.  
Also,  and even in this  context ,  the only voting 
r ights that  have been extended refer  to local  elections.  
EU cit izens are st i l l  barred from part icipating in major 
elections – l ike elections to national  legislat ive 
parl iaments and executive branches – in an EU country 
other than that  of  their  nationali ty.  
 Other examples of  al ien voting r ights ,  l ike the 
ones in the United States,  show that  these r ights  are 
typically l imited to local  elections.  I t  is  the case of  the 
New York City community school board elections and 
the Chicago local  school council  elections.  Residents,  
including some non-cit izens,  may vote in local  elections 
in several  Maryland communities444.   
                                              
444 THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN and 
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The theoretical  reason for this  claim is  the need to 
fully integrate resident  migrants and to,  according to 
the democratic principle,  al low all  the residents to 
part icipate in community l ife and i ts  poli t ical  
organization445.  
A foundational  art icle on this  claim was writ ten by 
Gerald Rosberg in the 1970s.  A first  l ine of  
argumentation derives from Plessy v.  Fergusson and the 
idea of  al ienage as a suspect  category under str ict  
scrutiny according to the equal  protection clause.  
Rosberg says that  discriminating against  al iens on 
voting rights  would fal l  under this  scrutiny because 
al ienage is  the cri teria for  the discrimination446.  
One of the advantages of  his  claim, for  Rosberg,  is  
that  conferring voting r ights  on al iens would el iminate 
that  suspect  category.  By being able to vote,  foreigners 
would be protected from the discrimination and would 
be able to part icipate in the decisions that  could 
potential ly be harmful for them. 
Although compell ing,  this  argument does not  seem 
too convincing.  I t  is  not  because voting r ights are held 
that  a  certain category is  not  suspect .  Race is  certainly 
a suspect  category while racial  minorit ies hold voting 
r ights.  A suspect  category is  characterized as protecting 
a group that  is  tradit ionally discriminated against  – for  
a variety of  reasons – and is  typically a minority in the 
sense that  i t  has no significant  poli t ical  power or 
influence over poli t ical  decisions.  In that  sense,  
foreigners,  regardless of  their  voting rights ,  wil l  always 
be a minori ty.  And as long as they are so,  al ienage 
cannot be excluded from the suspect  categories.  
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Then Rosberg says that  excluding a part  of  the 
population from the poli t ical  process means withholding 
the r ight  to vote and the poli t ical  power that  would 
enable persons and groups to protect  themselves in the 
legislat ive forum. Also under the equal  protection 
clause,  such discrimination should be under str ict  
scrutiny447.  Rosberg acknowledges though that  his  claim 
blurs the dist inction between ci t izens and al iens448.  
I  do not  think that  the reason voting r ights are 
at tached to ci t izenship is  to maintain an art if icial  
dist inction between migrants and ci t izens or for 
symbolic purposes.  The reason is  more profound. I t  is  
connected to the social  contract ,  to the fundamental  
societal  organization.  In a democratic society,  in a 
l iberal  democracy the members of  the poli ty ought to 
also be i ts  rulers .  A l iberal  democracy cannot tolerate a 
si tuation where active members of  the society are 
prohibited from part icipating in the collective 
decisions.  
On the other hand,  only effective members of  the 
poli ty should be al lowed to part icipate poli t ical ly.  An 
exception to this  rule would dilute the poli t ical  power 
among non-active members of  the society and reduce 
the effective power of  the others.  That  is  why 
residency,  in some cases more that  ci t izenship,  is  the 
key cri teria to hold voting r ights.  
So,  to go back to Rosberg’s claims,  if  we apply a 
str ict  scrutiny to discrimination against  al iens related to 
voting rights ,  we will  end up with this  di lemma:  ei ther 
the discrimination is  just if ied because they are not  
considered effective members  of  the poli ty or the 
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discrimination is  unacceptable because their  
membership is  evident.  In the f irst  case,  the 
discrimination is  appropriate.  In the second i t  would be 
considered a breach of fundamental  principles  such as 
the equal  protection clause and the democratic 
principle.  
This di lemma cannot be solved in abstract .  A 
cri terion is  needed to solve i t .  Underlying the reasoning 
of the authors that  call  for  voting rights  to be extended 
to al iens is  the idea of lawful residence449.  Rosberg 
dist inguishes resident  al iens from transients .  “ the 
transient 's  interest ,  though often substantial ,  is  
dist inguishable from that  of  the resident,  whether 
ci t izen or alien,  because the transient  wil l  predictably 
have a dif ferent  view of  short-run benefi ts  and long-run 
costs  than wil l  persons who intend to reside in the 
community indefinitely.  Drawing l ines on the basis  of  
that  dist inction is  di f f icult ,  and the courts  have 
recognized the potential  for abuse where the label  of  
transiency is  casually applied.  They have viewed with 
increasing skepticism state claims that  particular 
segments of  the population,  s tudents for example,  are 
just  passing through and lack a suff icient  s take in the 
community to deserve the vote.  In the case of  resident  
al iens (as opposed to nonresident al iens),  there can be 
no doubt that  the transient  label  is  inappropriate.  
Resident al iens have the same stake as ci t izens in the 
long-range welfare of  the communities in which they 
l ive.  They may,  to be sure,  move from one community to 
another,  and some wil l  return to their  country of  origin.  
But ci t izens also move,  and I  know of  no reason to 
believe that  resident al iens have a higher rate of  
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mobili ty  than other persons.  Like ci t izens (and unlike 
nonresident al iens),  their  r ight  to remain in their  
communities  is  unlimited by any state or federal  law. 
They are not  subject  to removal at  the caprice of  
government off icials .  They can be deported,  of  course,  
but  only by action of  the federal  government and only 
under exceptional circumstances.   I f  the resident al ien 
is  a transient  because of  the possibil i ty  of  deportation,  
then ci t izens should also be considered transients  
because of  the possibil i ty  of  removal to prison upon 
conviction of  a crime”450.  
Then one can assume that  residency is  the key 
factor in determining the at tr ibution of voting r ights  to 
al iens – maybe because we are now referring to 
residents,  migrants would be a more qualif ied word.  Yet 
if  residency is  the key factor,  how can we establish that  
these r ights  can only be extended to documented 
migrants? I t  seems clear that  undocumented migrants 
are also residents451.  
We might then conclude that  al l  residents should be 
enti t led to some cit izenship r ights,  including the r ight  
to vote.  Again,  i t  is  necessary to define residency.  For 
Rosberg,  “a resident al ien is  an immigrant admitted to 
the United States for permanent residence,  enti t led to 
work and l ive anywhere in the country”.  The key factor 
in this  definit ion is  permanent residence which implies 
a sense of stabil i ty and physical  presence.  In this  sense 
i t  is  very similar  to the concept of  ius domicil i i  that  I  
wil l  later  develop.  
Rosberg acknowledges that  “resident al iens are on 
a ci t izenship track-after f ive years they are el igible for 
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naturalization.  Their right  to remain in the United 
States does not  depend,  however,  on their  obtaining 
ci t izenship.  They serve in the armed forces and were 
subject  to conscription under the selective service 
laws”452.  And he adds “resident al iens drive on the same 
highways as ci t izens,  pay the same taxes,  breathe the 
same air ,  require the same police and f ire protection,  
and send their  children to the same schools.  To deny 
them the right  to vote is ,  in the language of  Kramer,  to 
leave them without "any ef fective voice in the 
governmental  af fairs  which substantially af fect  their  
l ives”453.  Or,  as  Aleinikoff  puts  i t ,  “permanently 
residing aliens l ive and function much as ci t izens.  They 
hold jobs,  at tend churches,  send their  children to 
school and pay taxes.  Children they give birth here are 
United States ci t izens.  From this  perspective,  the fact  
that  al iens are not  required by law to apply for 
ci t izenship is  not  surprising,  in day to day terms,  
permanently residing aliens and ci t izens are already 
virtually indist inguishable”454.  
If  the cri terion for extending voting r ights  to 
migrants is  permanent residency (or ius domicil i i  as  I  
prefer  to call  i t )  why not extend the whole ci t izenship 
status to these migrants rather than sl icing i t  and 
serving in port ions? 
Even the tradit ional  diff icult ies that  Rosberg l is ts  
as the main reasons for denying al iens voting r ights – 
Vote Fraud; Bloc Voting,  Lack of  Knowledge Needed To 
Vote Intel l igently and Disloyalty – would be easi ly 
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solved by the naturalization process.  In fact ,  none of 
these obstacles can be raised after  naturalization 
because they cannot be opposed to full  ci t izens.  On the 
contrary,  subjecting migrants to a harder process to be 
able to vote – such as a separate language and culture 
test ,  as  Rosberg seems to propose – would be a breach 
of the equal  protection clause.  The answer that  could 
clearly and easi ly overcome these identif ied obstacles is  
naturalization.     
Rosberg would counter  argue saying that  “ the 
ci t izenship quali f ication for voting is  undeniably a form 
of  durational residence requirement.  And i t  is  a 
requirement of  exceptional severity,  s ince immigrants 
are ordinarily ineligible for ci t izenship unti l  they have 
resided in the United States for f ive years”455.  
I  do not  oppose a transit ional  concept of  extending 
rights to migrants that  has been called for by Hiroshi  
Motomura “migrants as ci t izens in wait ing”456.  
However,  I  think this  concept is  only admissible in a 
l iberal  democracy if  seen as transit ional .  Aleinikoff  
says that  immigration law serves “both as a quanti tat ive 
and quali tat ive screen and that  naturalization,  in this  
scheme, bestows full  membership”457.  Some rights  – 
even voting r ights – can be granted in advance and 
other r ights  wil l  only come with full  ci t izenship.  The 
danger of  adopting a theory such as the one that  calls  
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for an extension of voting rights  to migrants without the 
transit ional  idea is  that  i t  is  used as a scheme to avoid 
granting full  ci t izenship or that  i t  contributes to the 
devaluation of ci t izenship.  
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§5.  Migrants as citizens in waiting 
 
Immigration can be seen as a transit ional  phase 
from alienage to ci t izenship.  Seen from that  
perspective,  immigration law establishes a path to 
ci t izenship458.  
Hiroshi  Motomura has eloquently called i t  “ci t izens 
in wait ing”459.  Motomura dist inguishes three views of 
immigration:  i)  immigration as transit ion;  ( i i  
immigration as contract;  i i i )  immigration as 
aff i l iat ion460.  
Immigration as transit ion treats  lawful  immigrants 
as ci t izens in wait ing,  as if  they would become 
American ci t izens.  I t  confers immigrants a presumed 
equali ty.  Motomura argues that  this  is  a  view that  dates 
back to early American t imes but  that  has somehow 
been abandoned.  According to Motomura,  “we treat  new 
immigrants as outsiders unti l  shown otherwise.  They 
may later become cit izens,  but  we no longer treat  them 
as i f  they wil l”461.  
Immigration as contract  adopts a core idea that  
immigrants have a set  of  expectat ions and 
understandings of  their  new country.  I t  does not  rely on 
a formal concept of  contract  as an agreement with two 
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part ies and signatures.  I t  also acknowledges the l imited 
bargaining power that  immigrants have in the 
contractual  process.  Immigrants are in a take i t  or  leave 
i t  posit ion before this  contract .  Rather,  immigration as 
contract  is  more related with ideas l ike fairness and 
just ice that  are normally associated with contracts .  
Despite being a model of  just ice,  immigration as 
contract  does not  confer equali ty i tself .  I t  also departs  
from the idea that  s imply being present  in the United 
States bestows certain minimum rights on lawful 
immigrants and other non-cit izens.  This is  what 
Motomura calls  terr i torial  personhood462.  
Immigration as aff i l iat ion is  an evolution of  
terr i torial  personhood. According to this  view, the 
treatment of  lawful immigrants and other non-cit izens 
should depend on the t ies they have formed. This view 
on immigration is  dependent on the existence of t ies  
such as family,  tax payments,  and children with 
ci t izenship,  and on whether the immigrants have shown 
themselves to be rel iable and productive workers.  I t  can 
also be described as earned equali ty463.  
In the words of  Crist ina Rodriguez,  “Motomura 
brings to l ight  a paradox that  has become increasingly 
apparent over the last  decade.  In a globalizing world 
marked by heightened migration and transnational 
forms of  association,  we st i l l  need robust  conceptions 
of  national,  geographically anchored ci t izenship to 
promote social  cooperation”464.  
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A first  conclusion that  must  be drawn from this  
theory is  that  i t  is  far  from the ideas of  devaluation of 
ci t izenship.  On the contrary,  the ci t izens as migrants 
approach cherishes ci t izenship as something valuable,  
as something that  i t  is  worthy wait ing for.  In fact ,  in 
order for  this  theory to make sense,  i t  presupposes that  
a  main objective of any migrant is  to obtain ci t izenship 
or,  at  least ,  that  the immigration path is  a  path to 
ci t izenship.  
In that  direction,  Motomura claims for a return to 
the view on immigration as transit ion.  A return because,  
according to this  academic,  this  was an American 
tradit ion.  In that  sense,  those who were considered 
intended ci t izens,  because they declared the intention of 
becoming ci t izens would possess many cit izenship 
r ights,  including voting r ights465.    
Immigration as transit ion means that  an immigrant  
is ,  from the moment that  he is  present  in the country,  in 
a transit ional  process,  on a path to ci t izenship.  
Motomura clearly states that  naturalization should be 
the goal  of  immigration466.  
Motomura recognizes that  “ the current  
naturalization requirements are undemanding for many 
who apply,  and for them the transit ion to ci t izenship 
can be easy and routine.  For other potentia l  ci t izens,  
however,  the requirements and procedures pose serious 
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obstacles”467.  And, he adds,  “naturalization 
requirements and naturalization rates do not tel l  the 
whole story,  of  course.  Any look at  naturalization to 
assess the inf luence of  immigration as transit ion needs 
to dig deeper than the acquisi t ion of  formal ci t izenship 
status”468.   
 As Crist ina Rodriguez recognizes,  “a framework 
for belonging that  does not  depend on having formal 
ci t izenship status but  that  nonetheless possesses many 
of  the attributes of  s trong national ci t izenship remains 
viable—indeed,  i t  is  an essential  concept.  Motomura 
reminds us of  our continued need for a simultaneously 
robust  and inclusive conception of  ci t izenship.  In a 
globalized world,  we st i l l  need expansive conceptions of  
national ci t izenship to promote social  cooperation and 
create incentives for civic engagement,  even among 
migrants whose intent  is  not  to resett le  permanently”469.  
A way to look at  the phenomena that  Motomura 
describes is  to extend rights  to migrants.  Extending to 
them the set  of  human rights  and some cit izenship 
r ights,  such as voting rights ,  would move in a similar  
direction.  I t  would not,  however,  achieve the inclusive 
goal  of  at tr ibuting ci t izenship,  nor would i t  t reat  
immigration as a ci t izenship path. 
A possible cri t icism of  Motomura´s theory is  that  i t  
does not  consider the reali ty of  globalization,  of  
frequent migrations and mult iple at tachments,  which 
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Crist ina Rodriguez calls  t ransnationalism and 
fluidity470.  
In that  sense,  s l icing ci t izenship r ights and 
delivering them to different  classes of  migrants would 
solve the problem. However,  I  don’t  deny that  an 
elaboration of Motomura´s theory might be able to 
answer the same problem. 
In fact ,  i f  globalizat ion shows us anything,  i t  is  
that  there is  no single profi le of  a migrant.  There are 
people that  migrate to set t le  and raise families and 
others that  migrate temporari ly for a job or a specif ic 
task.  We should also consider the fair ly recent 
phenomenon of the “expats”,  that  is  highly trained 
young professionals  that  work for mult inational  
companies and that  are typically relocated in the early 
stages of  their  careers.  These relocations are usually 
temporary and highly unstable,  i t  being common to 
rotate at  a  fast  pace,  often based on merit .  Different  to 
the idea of  merit ,  maybe emphasizing the idea of  earned 
equali ty expats change country sometimes at  the pace of 
their  success.  
Nothing in this  example contradicts  Motomura´s 
theory.  On the contrary,  i t  shows that  there are many 
types of  migrants and that  no single answer is  adequate 
for  them all .  Maybe some of them are not  interested in 
acquiring ci t izenship,  but  most  are.  Not al l  of  them will  
eventually walk the ci t izenship path,  but  i t  should be 
there for those who seek i t .  
Thus r ights  of  migrants should be regarded in a 
variable geometry format.  Immigration should be 
regarded as a ci t izenship path,  with natural izat ion down 
the road,  where migrants are able to enjoy some rights  
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on the way. The closer they get  to naturalization,  the 
stronger these r ights can be.  
Underlying this  al legory is  clearly the idea of 
residence.  The path means being there,  residing,  paying 
taxes,  raising a family.  These are al l  path marks.  
Length of  residence is  what crafts  the path.  
Linda Bosniak makes the case for a normative idea 
of  terr i torial i ty that  she calls  ethical  terr i torial i ty.   By 
ethical  terr i torial i ty she means the “conviction that  
r ights and recognit ion should extend to all  persons who 
are terri torially present  within the geographical  space 
of  a national state by virtue of  that  presence”471.   This 
departs  from the idea that  r ights  are universal  and that  
their  application should be extended to al l  persons 
within the terr i torial  jurisdict ion.  I t  does not  mean,  
however,  that  ci t izenship is  irrelevant472.  
A trend of thought common to these scholars is  the 
idea of  presence at tached to the enjoyment of  r ights .  
Given the fact  that  i t  is  not  legally possible – according 
to both international  law and consti tut ional  law in 
l iberal  democracies – to deny fundamental  r ights to 
migrants – as I  have stated above – authors must  elect  a  
cri terion for extending the r ights and for what kinds of  
r ights should be extended.  
Again,  i t  can bring us to an extension of some 
cit izenship r ights – eventually leading to the 
devaluation of ci t izenship – or to an idea of  ethical  
terr i torial i ty – thus call ing for a general  extension of 
r ights to al l  of  those who are present  – or to the 
migrants as ci t izens in wait ing approach.  
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The last  two visions differ  in one very important  
aspect:  while the ethical  terr i torial i ty theory is  
applicable to al l  migrants,  including the undocumented,  
the migrants as ci t izens in wait ing approach,  at  least  as  
Motomura describes i t ,  is  l imited to lawful migrants.  
When describing immigration as a transit ion Motomura 
is  very careful   to always insert  the word “lawful”,  
leaving no doubt that  undocumented migrants have no 
room in his  theory. 
That  is  probably the main l imitat ion of this  theory.  
I t  promises more than i t  delivers.  Arguing that  migrants 
should be seen as ci t izens in wait ing does not  seem to 
be too much of a claim, especial ly in countries where 
there are clear,  predefined,  legally established 
naturalization rules.  
Of course Motomura´s theory is  s t i l l  very important  
in preserving the importance of  the ci t izenship status 
and revital izing i t  in a global  age.  That alone just if ies 
his  theory.  
Also i t  is  very important  to conceive – and our 
societ ies have long given up that  conception,  as 
Motomura acknowledges – of  immigration as a 
transit ional  process to ci t izenship.     
This concept is  part icularly important  because i t  
al lows us to reconstruct  that  very path by creating 
r ights along the way that  migrants can enjoy.  That  wil l  
certainly help overcome some of the problems I  have 
identif ied above.  
I t  does not  help solve a central  problem of our 
societ ies that  is  the theme I  am analyzing in this  
chapter:  the r ights of  undocumented migrants.  
If  undocumented migrants are not  on the path to 
ci t izenship,  what kind of r ights do they have? Will  they 
be indefinitely excluded from access to ci t izenship? 
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None of these questions are answered by 
Motomura´s theory if  i t  is  read in the sense that  
undocumented migrants are not  ci t izens in wait ing.  
Yet if  we change this  approach to ethical  
terr i torial i ty and to an idea that  I  have called ius 
domicil i i  or  residence,  we might conclude – and this  is  
not  contradictory to the ci t izens in wait ing approach – 
that  residence is  the cri terion for the recognit ion of 
r ights.  
Permanent residence is  needed for the recognit ion 
of r ights  that  are not  s tr ict ly inherent  to personhood – 
that  should be recognized for al l  human beings – l ike 
some of the social  r ights .  The example here could be 
education – the US Supreme court  extended i t  to 
undocumented migrants,  in Plyler .  I t  is  fair ly 
consensual  that  i t  should be extended to al l  migrants,  
but  some sort  of  residency must  be accrued.  
So if  we agree that  residence or permanent 
residence is  the cri terion for extending rights  – and this  
is  the cri terion for the migrants as ci t izens in wait ing 
theory473 – to migrants,  and if  we agree that  
undocumented migrants are residents474,  then we have to 
conclude that  undocumented migrants are ci t izens in 
wait ing on the path to ci t izenship.  
I  wil l  later  discuss this  idea and i ts  consequences 
in more detai l  by also identifying a current  trend 
derived from international  law and l iberal  democratic 
principles to establish a fundamental  r ight  to 
ci t izenship of al l  the migrants.  
The evolution of these ideas to the point  where a 
trend l ike the one I  have just  described,  and will  later  
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elaborate on,  can be identif ied was only possible due to 
the identif icat ion of the many flaws in the at tempts to 
deny rights to migrants and,  especial ly,  to 
undocumented migrants.   
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VI – The right to citizenship 
 
§1.  Expectations  
 
The moment a migrant  sets  foot  on the soil  of  a  
country which is  foreign to him, he has a number of  
different  expectat ions regarding that  country.  
 Among those expectat ions is  the acquisi t ion of  
ci t izenship,  down the road after  a  residence period,  at  
least  for  those planning to establish a long-term 
relat ionship with the said terr i tory.  
This part icular  expectat ion is  common to both 
documented and undocumented migrants,  maybe even 
more so for the lat ter .  As I  have stressed above,  
ci t izenship is  a  powerful  integration tool  and migrants 
value i t  as  such.  For the undocumented i t  means 
freedom and the set t l ing of  a si tuation of unlawful 
presence and a daily ordeal .  
The fact  that  migrants possess these expectat ions 
does not  necessari ly mean that  they must  be legally 
protected by the host  s tate.  
According to a general  principle of  protection of  
legit imate expectat ions,  “Governments and 
international organizations may undertake changes of  
policy in their  continuing need to search for the best  
choices in the discharge of  their  functions.  However,  to 
the extent  that  policies in force earlier might have 
created legit imate expectations both of  a procedural 
and substantive nature,  for ci t izens,  investors,  traders 
or other persons,  these may not be abandoned i f  the 
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result  wil l  be so unfair  as to amount to an abuse of  
power”475.  
The principle has been aff irmed in several  
European member states,  mostly in administrat ive law, 
and was specif ically and intensely incorporated in EU 
law476.  
As Forsyth asserts  when referring to the principle 
within UK administrat ive law, i t  was f irst  introduced as 
a procedural  principle – mainly l inked to the due 
process but  soon gained a substantial  dimension,  “ in 
addit ion to procedural protection legit imate 
expectations are,  or ought to be,  substantively 
protected,  i .e .  that  in order to protect  a legit imate 
expectation a public body would be bound,  save in 
exceptional circumstances,  to exercise i ts  discretion in 
a particular way”477.  
According to Robert  Thomas,  “ the principle of  
legit imate expectations concerns the relationship 
between public administration and the individual.  I t  
seeks to resolve the basic confl ict  between the desire to 
protect  the individual’s  confidence in expectations 
raised by administrative conduct and the need for 
administrators to pursue changing policy objectives.  
The principle means that  expectations raised as a result  
of  administrative conduct may have legal consequences.  
Either the administration must  respect  those 
expectations or provide compell ing reasons why the 
public interest  must  take priori ty .  The principle 
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therefore concerns the degree to which an individual’s  
expectations may be safeguarded in the face of  a 
change of  policy which tends to undermine them. The 
role of  the administrative court  is  to determine the 
extent  to which the individual’s  expectation can be 
accommodated within changing policy objectives”478.  
In international  law, the principle of  legit imate 
expectations is  arising l inked to a general  principle of  
good fai th and the estoppel .  The main application of 
this  principle is  the area of  international  investment 
law479.  
I t  is  also an important  principle of  EU law. In fact ,  
“ the European Court  of  Justice has integrated 
legit imate expectations into i ts  review of  legali ty  s ince 
the 1970s and recognizes that  i t  “forms part  of  the 
Community legal  order”.  The development of  the 
principle was inspired by the German principle of  
vertrauensschutz,  meaning the protection of  trust”480.  
As Sharpston correctly expresses i t  “by whichever 
route the case reaches i t ,  the European Court  wil l  then 
examine the validity of  the Community measure at  issue 
with regard,  not  only to the relevant express Treaty 
provisions and the interpretation already given to these 
in exist ing case law, but  also in the l ight  of  certain 
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"fundamental  principles" that  i t  has i tsel f  developed,  
drawing on the legal tradit ions of  the dif ferent  Member 
States.  Occasionally,  the European Court  wil l  hold that  
Community legislat ion or decisions are invalid because 
one of  these fundamental  principles such as legit imate 
expectation,  proportionali ty ,  and the principle of  non-
discrimination have been violated.  The doctrine of  
legit imate expectations is  "undeniably part  of  
Community law".  The question is  then,  how and in what 
circumstances is  i t  used? What behavior wil l  create a 
legit imate expectation on which the economic agent can 
rely? On the one hand, economic activi ty  takes place 
against  a background of  uncertainty-should one regard 
all  changes in the regulatory framework as just  one 
further hazard? On the other hand,  economic agents 
have to be able to place some reliance on something i f  
continuing economic relationships are to be sustained.  
Certainly,  insurance can often be used to pass on the 
loss should i t  occur to someone else;  but  over-
insurance represents a misallocation of  resources.  For 
both legal reasons (an estoppel-type argument)  and 
economic reasons (sometimes the economic agent 
should be able to rely on the administration not 
changing the rules in the middle of  the game),  a 
doctrine of  legit imate expectations is  at tractive”481.  
Or,  in the words of  Robert  Thomas,  “while the 
principle of  legit imate expectations has a potentially 
wide scope of  application,  the European Court  has,  in 
practice,  imposed a high standard on applicants.  A 
successful  claimant must  point  to some conduct by the 
administration from which i t  was reasonable to hold 
certain expectations.  Once induced,  expectations may 
be subject  to change.  The European Court  has 
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consistently maintained that  i t  wil l  protect  expectations 
only where the change was not  reasonably foreseeable.  
Even i f  the claimant has a reasonable expectation,  the 
administration may argue that  i t  is  overridden by the 
public interest .  This requires the court  to determine 
how far an expectation is  worthy of  protection in the 
face of  a change of  policy.  Relatively few arguments 
based on legit imate expectations have succeeded.  A 
claim will  prevail  only i f  there is  a clear case of  
unreasonable treatment and the administration grossly 
misjudged the protection of  the individual’s  
expectations”482.  
The principle of  protection of legit imate 
expectations is  thus protected under international  and 
EU law as well  as  under the domestic law of many 
l iberal  democracies.  I t  is  derived from a general  
principle of  trust  and bona f ide  in the behavior of  
public enti t ies.  
I t  is  clear  that  the principle can no longer be seen 
as merely applicable within a domestic administrat ion 
or with a l imited procedural  scope.  The principle is  
broader and affects  the activi ty of  the legislator,  
administrat ion and the State as a whole.  
I ts  application to human rights and,  part icularly,  to 
immigration and ci t izenship law is  also clear.  
Notwithstanding,  as I  have stressed above,  i ts  major 
application in international  investment law, there are 
also clear  examples of  i ts  relevance in the area of 
human rights,  immigration and ci t izenship.  
We can f ind several  examples in Hong-Kong 
immigration law. As Paul Reynolds describes i t ,  “ this  
dist inctiveness of  legit imate expectations can be seen in 
the classic case of  Ng Yuen Shiu.  Here,  the applicant’s  
                                              
482 ROBERT THOMAS, Legitimate Expectations and Proportionality in 
Administrative Law (2000), 46. 
Gonçalo Saraiva Matias – The Path to Citizenship 
337 
status as an i l legal immigrant meant that  he had no 
free-standing legal right  to challenge the refusal  of  the 
Hong Kong authorit ies to grant him a hearing; only 
because of  a prior Government assurance that  i l legal 
immigrants would have such a hearing was the Court  
able to intervene,  thereby protecting his  legit imate 
expectation”483.  Other examples can be found in the 
cases Ng Siu Tung ,  in the Ng Ka Ling ,  Chan Kam Nga  
and in the Attorney-General of  Hong Kong v.  Ng Yuen 
Shui  case484.  
The conclusion of the Hong-Kong Court  in these 
cases was that  “ the doctrine [of  substantive legit imate 
expectations]  forms part  of  the administrative law of  
Hong Kong. As such,  the doctrine is  an important 
element in the exercise of  the court 's  inherent 
supervisory jurisdict ion to ensure,  f irst ,  that  s tatutory 
powers are exercised lawfully and are not abused and,  
secondly,  that  they are exercised so as to result  in 
administrative fairness in relation to both procedural 
and substantive benefi ts”485.  
The leading case on the doctrine of  legit imate 
expectations in the ECJ decisions is  the Mulder case.  In 
the Mulder case the Court  decided that  a  milk producer 
that  s topped producing milk for a  number of  years 
should not  be negatively affected by a milk surplus 
protection act  approved after  his  decision to cease milk 
production.  When he wanted to resume milk production 
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he would be affected by the measure.  The Court  said 
that  i t  was contrary to a principle of  protection of 
legit imate expectat ions486.   
I t  was referred to as an application of  the principle 
of  good fai th in international  law by the Court  of  f irst  
instance in the decision Greece vs.  Commission487.  In 
that  decision the court  said that  “ the principle of  good 
faith is  a rule of  customary international law, the 
existence of  which has been recognised by the 
Permanent Court  of  International Justice established by 
the League of  Nations (see the judgment of  25 May 
1926, German interests  in Polish Upper Silesia,  CPJI,  
Series A,  No 7,  pp.  30 and 39),  and subsequently by the 
International Court  of  Just ice and which,  consequently,  
is  binding in this  case on the Community and on the 
other participating partners.  That principle has been 
codif ied by Article 18 of  the Vienna Convention of  23 
May 1969 on the Law of  Treaties (…).  I t  should also be 
noted that  the principle of  good faith is  the corollary in 
public international law of  the principle of  protection 
of  legit imate expectations which,  according to the case-
law, forms part  of  the Community legal order (Case T-
115/94 Opel Austria v Council  [1997]  ECR II-39,  
paragraph 93)”  488.  
The principle is  present  in numerous ECJ decisions 
and opinions of AGs.  
Recently i t  was mentioned in the opinion of  AG 
Poiares Maduro in the Rottman case.  
In paragraph 31 of his  opinion on the Rottman case,  
AG Maduro said that  “as regards the withdrawal of  
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naturalisation at  issue in this  case,  some might invoke 
against  i t  the principle of  the protection of  legit imate 
expectations as to maintenance of  the status of  ci t izen 
of  the Union.  However,  i t  is  not  clear in what respect  
that  principle has been contravened,  in the absence of  
any expectation merit ing protection on the part  of  the 
person concerned who has provided false information 
or committed fraud and has thus obtained German 
nationali ty  i l legally.  More especially because,  as we 
have seen,  international law authorises the loss of  
nationali ty  in cases of  fraud,  and Union ci t izenship is  
l inked to possession of  the nationali ty  of  a Member 
State”489.  
The extent  of  this  assert ion is  unclear.  According 
to Gerard René De Groot and Anja Seling,  “ the 
principle of  the protection of  legit imate expectations,  
which Advocate General  Maduro also potential ly views 
as being capable of  restrict ing the legislative power of  
the member states in the sphere of  nationali ty  
(paragraph 31),  cannot be disregarded by the national 
authorit ies ei ther.  Unti l  now, e.g. ,  the courts  in The 
Netherlands repeatedly ruled that  the protection of  
legit imate expectations is  not  a ground for acquisi t ion 
of  Dutch nationali ty .   I t  is  l ikely that  this  view can no 
longer be maintained in the l ight  of  the principle of  
legal certainty.  We expect  that  consequently al l  member 
states have to introduce a construction which protects  
the possession of  the nationali ty  in good faith or,  to put  
i t  di f ferently,  the protection of  legit imate 
expectations”490.  
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This means that ,  according to these authors,  the 
national  rules on acquisi t ion and maintenance of 
ci t izenship ought to be revised in the l ight  of  the 
principle of  protection of legit imate expectat ions.  
In fact ,  when considering this  principle in his  
opinion,  AG Maduro is  not  saying that  the protection of 
legit imate expectat ions should not  be regarded in a case 
of  ci t izenship.  On the contrary,  by considering i t ,  the 
AG is  expressly bringing the principle into the realm of 
a discussion on ci t izenship;   and he discards i t  not  
because i t  is  inapplicable but  due to the fraud present  in 
the case.  In other words,  AG Maduro said that  Rottman 
might have expectations about retaining his  German 
cit izenship but the expectations were not legit imate 
since he had acted in a fraudulent  way during the 
ci t izenship application procedure.  
This may have an unprecedented effect  on national  
laws of ci t izenship.  As Nathan Cambien correctly 
aff irms,  “ i t  can no longer be doubted that  the 
nationali ty  rules of  the Member States have to be in 
accordance with a number of  fundamental  principles of  
Union law. This requirement evidently has 
consequences for the immigration laws and policies of  
the Member States,  s ince the cri teria for granting 
nationali ty  to third country nationals now appear to 
fal l  within the scope of  Union law. The precise scope of  
the requirement is  at  present ,  however,  far from clear.  
Do the principle of  proportionali ty  and the principle of  
legit imate expectations require,  for instance,  that  a 
Member State grant i ts  nationali ty  to third country 
national’s  longtime resident on i ts  terri tory? And does 
the Commission have the power to bring an 
infringement action against  a Member State whose 
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criteria for the acquisi t ion of  nationali ty  appear 
contrary to certain fundamental  rights? An oft -
discussed case in this  connection is  the nationali ty  
legislation of  Estonia and Latvia,  which makes i t  very 
hard for Russian-speaking minorit ies to acquire the 
nationali t ies of  these countries.  The Commission has in 
the past  expressed i ts  concern over this  s i tuation,  but  i t  
has never taken concrete action.  The Union inst i tut ions 
have so far adopted a low profi le  in nationali ty  matters,  
given the tradit ional view that  Union law had no say in 
these matters.  The increasing importance of  Union 
ci t izenship and the bold case law of  the ECJ just  
discussed may lead to a more proactive approach on 
their  part  in the near future”491.  
In fact ,  the application of  the principle to 
immigrants is  not  clear.  As I  s tated at  the beginning of 
this  chapter ,  there are a number of  expectat ions that  
every migrant has the moment she crosses the border of  
a state.  
However,  in order to be able to benefi t  from the 
protection of the principle,  those expectat ions must  be 
legit imate.  What does legit imate mean in this  context? 
I t  may mean not  fraudulent ,  as AG Maduro 
concluded in his  opinion to discard the principle in the 
Rottman case.  Yet i t  does not  necessari ly mean lawful 
or  in str ict  coincidence with a given law. 
A narrow reading of the principle would point  to a 
protection of ci t izens against  contradictory actions of  
the administrat ion,  primarily at  a  procedural  level .  
However,  as I  have described above,  the reading of 
the principle must  be broader,  not  only in substance but  
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also corresponding to a general  bona f ide  principle in 
international  law. 
First ly,  this  is  in terms of subjects:  i t  does not  only 
apply to ci t izens but  to al l  human beings.  
Then we may see i t  in terms of substance:  i t  cannot 
be l imited and isolated to a given law or precise 
moment;  i t  entai ls  the expectations of a person formed 
with regard to the State through a number of  rei terated 
acts  over some period of t ime.  
Such a si tuation is  adequate to form legit imate 
expectation.  As Habermas properly asserts ,  “ there is  a 
major gap in the proposed architecture,  which 
primarily concerns the legit imate expectations and 
demands of  ci t izens in their  contrasting roles as 
cosmopoli tan and national ci t izens.  Cosmopoli tan 
ci t izens take their  orientation from universalist ic  
standards which the peace and human rights policies of  
the United Nations must  satisfy no less than a global 
domestic poli t ics negotiated among the global players.  
National ci t izens,  by contrast ,  measure the conduct  of  
their  governments and chief  negotiators in these 
international arenas in the f irst  instance not  by global 
standards of  just ice but  above all  by the ef fective 
observance of  national or regional interests .  But i f  this  
confl ict  were fought out  in the heads of  the same 
cit izens,  the notions of  legit imacy that  evolved within 
the cosmopoli tan framework of  the international 
community would inevitably clash with the legit imate 
expectations and demands derived from the frame of  
reference of  the respective nation-states”492.  
A question that  might arise despite a broader 
reading of the principle is whether we should consider 
as legit imate the expectat ions of  a migrant  that  knows 
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or should know that ,  according to the law of the host  
country,  he or she wil l  never be able to access the 
ci t izenship of that  s tate .  
Again the narrower reading of the principle would 
not  al low this  interpretat ion,  al though i t  might permit  
the protection of migrants in cases where the law ,or the 
administrat ive policies or  procedures ,  changed after  the 
migrant´s  arr ival .  
So,  even in a narrower reading,  a State should not  
be able to change ci t izenship law or practice in order to 
make i t  harder to obtain the status and apply i t  to 
migrants already on the path to ci t izenship.  
However,  in my view, the principle must  cover a 
wider range of si tuations.  
I t  is  not  enough to say that  the migrant  must  play 
the game with the known rules.  If  i t  is  just  a  matter  of  
rules,  the principle of  legit imate expectations would 
have l i t t le  or  no effect  s ince everything would be 
reduced to a question of  legali ty and succession of  
laws.  
Expectat ions are also raised by the conduct of  the 
State and i ts  off icials ,  in an interactive game of give 
and take.  There are different  levels  of  expectations and 
their  legal  protection varies according to that  level .  
The level  of  expectat ions – and thus of legal  
protection – of a recent migrant when compared to 
someone that  has l ived in a country for a  number of  
years is  not  the same. 
The expectat ions of  the resident  migrant  are greater  
not  only because t ies have been developed,  families 
raised and professional  relat ionships created,  but  also 
because during that  path inevitable interactions with 
public officials  were maintained,  taxes were paid and 
there was an actual  contribution to society at  large.  
I t  means that  expectat ions are not  merely 
unilateral ;  they were raised by the action of the State 
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and thus they are legit imate and deserve legal  
protection.  
The whole development of  international  law, as 
well  as EU law, supports  such an interpretat ion.  
The application of this  principle to undocumented 
migrants might also sound problematic.  Even if  we 
accept that  expectat ions of  documented migrants 
deserve protection,  one may have trouble 
acknowledging application of the principle to the 
undocumented493.  
How can the principle protect  people that  
unlawfully entered a given terri tory? 
I  believe that  the protection of legit imate 
expectations is  even more evident in the case of the 
undocumented.  
In a l iberal  society where legal  mechanisms for 
naturalization are clear and adequate,  the protection of 
legit imate expectat ions might not  be at  s take.  A migrant  
knows exactly what the path to ci t izenship is  and must  
proceed accordingly,  given that  the path has been 
designed in an adequate fashion.  This is  not  necessari ly 
the case in al l  societ ies – and that  is  reason enough to 
consider the principle as a general  rule – but  i t  is  
hopefully the case of  l iberal ,  democratic and 
consti tut ional  democracies.  
Most  probably those who will  be permanently 
excluded from cit izenship in these societ ies are the 
undocumented migrants.  
Of course one may say that  their  expectat ions are 
never legit imate for they were founded on an unlawful 
and fraudulent  action.  
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I  would agree with this  assert ion if  the expectat ions 
were invoked by a recent undocumented migrant .  
However,  again,  expectations over a period of t ime are 
not  unilateral ;  they are raised by the State and i ts  
officials .  What I  have said about documented migrants 
and their  integration in the fabric of  society and the 
raising of  families can also be said about the 
undocumented.  They are in the exact  same social  
s i tuation.  
Yet their  expectat ions receive no protection from 
the law, whatsoever.  That  is  why i t  is  so important  to 
assess them on a case-by-case basis .  I t  might well  be 
the case that  an undocumented migrant  had expectations 
raised based on the conduct of  public officials  and,  
down the road,  after  s ignificantly contributing to the 
building of a country and raising a family there,  the 
migrant is  deported as if  he had never set  foot  in the 
country.  
Even from an equali ty standpoint ,  a  resident  
undocumented migrant  that  possess a large number of  
expectations and t ies to the country cannot be treated in 
the same way as a newly arrived migrant that  is  just  
t rying to deceive the border control .  
A usual  argument against  this  perspective is  that  i t  
consti tutes a reward for the i l legali ty.  However,  as  
Stephen Legomsky convincingly argues,  “at least  some 
undocumented immigrants have acquired a moral 
“right” to legalization.  As residents of  the community,  
their  interests  in remaining here increase with the 
passage of  t ime.  Their roots grow deeper,  and their  t ies  
to local ,  s tate,  and national communit ies become 
correspondingly more extensive.  I t  might well  be that  at  
some point  those interests  so outweigh society’s  
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interests  in deporting them as to ripen into a moral 
right  to remain”  494.  
I  believe that  the evolution of the principle of  
protection of legit imate expectat ions l inked to 
immigration and ci t izenship law helps to develop a 
general  trend towards the protection of migrants´  
expectations in acquiring the ci t izenship of the State of  
residence,  regardless of  their  s tatus in that  State,  given 
those expectat ions were not  unilateral  but  were raised 
by the State,  the legislator and public officials  over a 
period of t ime.   
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§2.  Proportionality 
 
As the l i terature on the principle of  protection of 
legit imate expectations abundantly shows,  i t  is  
intertwined with the principle of  proport ionali ty.  
In fact ,  legal  certainty,  good fai th,  expectat ions 
and proportionali ty are al l  interconnected in the sense 
that  an act  of  authori ty from the State cannot be 
absolute,  free of  l imits ,  in terms of i ts  effects  on the 
human beings subject  to i ts  jurisdict ion.  
I t  is  not  a matter  of  just ice,  rather of  legal  
certainty and expectations.  A human being cannot be 
subject  to arbitrary treatment from the authori ty of  the 
state.  This is  enshrined not only in most  of  the 
consti tut ions of  l iberal  democracies but  also as a 
general  principle of  international  law495.  I t  is  also a 
principle of  EU law496.  
At the EU level  the principle was specif ically 
invoked by the ECJ in the Rottman case,  al though i t  
was not  mentioned by AG Maduro in his  opinion.  
The way for the Court  to mention the 
proportionali ty principle was paved by the opinion of 
AG Maduro when referring to the principle of  
legit imate expectat ions.  The Court  did not  follow this  
                                              
495 THOMAS M. FRANCK, On Proportionality of Countermeasures in 
International Law (2008), 715. 
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principle that  was,  in any event,  discarded by the AG 
because of the fraudulent  nature of  the action under 
scrutiny,  but  added to the f inal  decision that  member 
states must  take EU law into consideration when 
establishing national  ci t izenship law, including i ts  
principle of  proport ionali ty.  As I  s tated in chapter  4,  i t  
was the f irst  t ime that  the Court  named a specif ic 
principle of  EU cit izenship law. 
As Cambien recalls ,  “ the only principle of  Union 
law that  has been explici t ly  treated by the Court  as 
such a l imitation thus far is  the principle of  
proportionali ty .  In Rottmann, the ECJ confirmed that  
where the withdrawal of  Member State nationali ty  
entails  the loss of  Union ci t izenship,  i t  would only be 
valid under Union law i f  i t  respects  the principle of  
proportionali ty .  The principle of  proportionali ty  is  a 
general  principle of  Union law, which also f igures in 
the Charter of  Fundamental  Rights of  the European 
Union.  One of  the essential  functions of  the principle is  
to safeguard the individual against  national measures 
that  impose excessive burdens.  The principle of  
proportionali ty  requires that  the contested national 
measure be suitable both to achieve the aim pursued 
("test  of  suitabil i ty")  and to determine whether the 
means-ends f i t  is  well  calibrated ("test  of  necessi ty") .  
The aim pursued must ,  moreover,  be a legit imate one.  A 
third test  of ten described in the l i terature on 
proportionali ty  and sometimes found in the case law is  
the test  of  "proportionali ty  sensu stricto," where a 
measure wil l  be disproportionate i f  i t  has excessive 
ef fects  on the applicant 's  interests”497.   
I t  is  important  to assess what that  means in terms 
of implications for the member states’  ci t izenship laws,  
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as well  as for  the international  law of ci t izenship as a 
whole.  
According to Gareth Davies,  “ the centrali ty  of  
proportionali ty  and the conventionali ty  of  ci t izenship 
concepts in the Member States does mean that  dramatic 
ef fects  of  EU law are not obviously l ikely.  This is  
particularly so given that  i t  wil l  usually be national 
judges who must apply the proportionali ty  principle to 
the national measures – they are unlikely to wield an 
anarchic knife.  However,  one should be cautious before 
dismissing EU law as harmless.  Union ci t izenship is  an 
example of  a concept which was widely seen as bringing 
no substantive content  in i ts  early years,  but  has 
gradually developed into a peg upon which the Court  
has been able to hang important judgments,  impacting 
on many areas of  national law and policy,  from access 
to benefi ts  to the law on surnames.  There may well  be 
more aspects  of  national ci t izenship law vulnerable to 
EU law than a f irst  glance suggests .  I t  wil l  be not  so 
much the wider principles which wil l  be potentially 
confl ict ing,  but  their  use and application in particular 
circumstances.  For example,  in the Netherlands,  there 
has been considerable discussion concerning the 
withdrawal of  Dutch nationali ty  from f irst  or second 
generation Dutch ci t izens who commit serious or 
mult iple crimes.  Some of  the proposal envisaged could 
result  in the stripping of  Union ci t izenship from those 
who were born Union ci t izens,  and who commit  crimes 
which might not  even be serious enough to just i fy  their  
deportation under the ci t izenship directive”498.  
The effects  of  the application of such a principle 
are incommensurate.  Also assessing the implications of  
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the principle on Dutch ci t izenship law, Gerard René De 
Groot and Anja Seling say that  “ in particular,  problems 
could arise with regard to Articles 14 and 15 (1) (d)  of  
the Netherlands Cit izenship Act  which regulates the 
loss of  Dutch Nationali ty  by deprivation.  Generally,  the 
principle of  proportionali ty  also applies in Dutch 
national law. However,  in addit ion,  fol lowing 
Rottmann, ci t izens need to have the chance before their  
newly acquired Member State nationali ty  may be 
revoked to reacquire their  old nationali ty .  Moreover,  in 
the l ight  of  the Rottmann ruling,  i t  is  questionable 
whether the Court  wil l  accept  that  deprivation becomes 
ef fective immediately,  before a decision of  revocation 
becomes unchallengeable.  According to Dutch law, 
after revocation of  Dutch nationali ty  by the Dutch 
Minister of  Justice the person immediately loses his  
Dutch passport  even i f  the person concerned challenges 
this  decision.  I t  can be questioned whether this  is  in 
accordance with EU law and in particular with the 
principle of  proportionali ty .  In addit ion,  with regard to 
Article 15 (1) (d) of  the Netherlands Cit izenship Act ,  i t  
is  doubtful  whether deprivation of  Dutch nationali ty  
because of  fai l ing to have made ‘every ef fort  to divest  
himself  of  his  or her original  nationali ty’  can be 
accepted i f  a person concerned after having lost  Dutch 
nationali ty  can again be naturalised without making 
‘every ef fort  to divest  himself  of  his  or her original  
nationali ty’ .  I t  can be assumed that  the Court  wil l  not  
accept such a si tuation as being compatible with the 
principle of  proportionali ty .  In particular,  decisions 
relating to deprivation of  nationali ty ,  where the person 
concerned promised to renounce his  or her old 
nationali ty ,  but  then subsequently discovers that  this  
act  actually costs  a lot  of  money,  seem to stand very 
uneasily with the principle of  proportionali ty .  In fact ,  
the Council  of  State found i t  impossible to prevent the 
deprivation by using the argument of  the high costs  
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encountered.  However,  af ter the loss of  Dutch 
nationali ty ,  the person involved could apply again for 
naturalisation and ask for a waiver of  the requirement 
of  renunciation due to the high costs  involved”499.  
The si tuations described are al l  related to the 
withdrawal of  ci t izenship.  However,  as I  s tated in 
chapter  4,  I  believe that  the doctrine present in Rottman 
can be used in the case of granting ci t izenship.  
In fact ,  proport ionali ty is  a  common principle in 
criminal  law. Despite cri t icism from many authors,  
sanctions relat ing to immigration law violat ions have 
become criminalized500.  
Thus deportat ion now falls  under the str ict  scrutiny 
of the proportionali ty principle501.  
   According to Angela Banks,  “ the right  to remain 
for noncit izens is  based on two principles – connection 
and proportionali ty .  The jus nexi  principle provides a 
basis  for identi fying members of  the poli ty .  Members 
have a heightened l iberty interest  in remaining in the 
United States.  Deportation for minor criminal activi ty  
is  an i l legit imate deprivation of  the l iberty interest  to 
remain in the United States because i t  is  
disproportionate.  The f irst  comprehensive crime-based 
deportation regime in the United States was rooted in 
both the jus nexi  principle and proportionali ty .  
Reliance on these foundational norms has diminished 
and must  be restored to achieve a more just  deportation 
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regime. In order to realize this  goal the right  to remain 
cannot depend on ci t izenship status”502.  
I  wil l  come back to ius nexi  later  but  i t  is  clear and 
understandable that  deportat ion,  especial ly if  
considered a criminal  sanction,  ought to be under the 
str ict  scrutiny of the proportionali ty principle.  This 
means that  every deportat ion decision must pass the 
proportionali ty test  and prove to be necessary and the 
benefi ts  must  outweigh the costs .   
This str ict  scrutiny is  especial ly important  and 
relevant in cases – regardless of  the migrant  status – 
where long term residence has occurred and families are 
involved.  
Here we cannot claim that  the principle of  
proportionali ty demands a lawful act;  i t  is  precisely 
applicable in the area of criminal  law where the actions 
are unlawful by nature.  Penalt ies must  be proportionate 
to the crime and the individual  s i tuation. 
I  am not praising the criminalization of the 
immigration law. Quite to the contrary,  I  have discussed 
this  in chapter  5 and argued otherwise.  Yet one cannot 
forget  the very nature of  deportat ion and the special  
importance of  the proport ionali ty principle in i ts  
application.  
This is  to reach a conclusion that  the principle is  
also applicable to undocumented migrants.  As 
Legomsky rightly points  out ,  when referring to 
proportionali ty and the rule of  law in the context  of  
undocumented migrants and deportat ion,  “I  view 
proportionali ty  as one essential  element of  the rule of  
law. Moreover,  when a law is  violated on such a large 
scale,  i t ’s  not  as i f  the only response consistent  with 
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f ideli ty  to the rule of  law is  to step up enforcement.  An 
alternate response is  to ask whether the absence of  
respect  for that  law is  evidence that  the law 
insuff iciently accommodates the relevant interests .  
When that  is  the case,  changing an unrealist ic  law 
might be preferable to heavier enforcement”503.  
Thus,  connecting proport ionali ty to deportat ion and 
to the withdrawal of  ci t izenship we can identify another 
trend towards the r ight  to ci t izenship.  
Proport ionali ty here must  of  course be l inked to 
expectations.  I  am not advocating a prohibit ion on 
deportat ion that  would mean an open borders theory.  On 
the contrary,  deportat ion might be a proport ionate 
action when immigration law has been breached and few 
or no t ies have been developed with the country.  
On the other hand,  when those t ies  are signif icant  
in terms of belonging,  deportat ion is  the last  resort  and 
can easily be considered disproportionate.  That is  why 
widespread legalization programs have been 
implemented in some European countries504.  
What does i t  mean if  we consider i t  
disproportionate to deport  a  person? What does 
legalization entai l? What are the consequences in terms 
of ci t izenship?  
These questions are hard to answer.  Probably an 
immediate answer would be that  i t  is  acceptable not  to 
deport  an undocumented migrant  that  shows significant  
t ies  with the country but  legalization is  not  admissible 
or the granting of ci t izenship.  
                                              
503 STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, Portraits of the Undocumented Immigrant: A 
dialogue (2009), 9. 
504 MARK R. ROSEMBLUM, Immigrant legalization in the United States and 
European Union: policy goals and program design (2010). 
Gonçalo Saraiva Matias – The Path to Citizenship 
354 
That answer might be a poli t ical  one but i t  is  not  
morally or  legally admissible.  
A person that  cannot be deported must  have a legal  
s tatus in relat ion to the country where he is  l iving in.  
Law cannot create pariahs or de facto  s tateless 
persons505.  
I t  is  clear  then that  even undocumented migrants 
must  have a track to ci t izenship,  even if  i t  means going 
to the back of the l ine on the path to ci t izenship.  I  wil l  
come back to this  later .  
So a decision not  to deport  based on 
proportionali ty – which is  absolutely necessary from a 
legal  s tandpoint  – must  be followed by an integration of 
the migrant  in some status.  Only a legalization – or 
regularization,  as designated in some European 
countries506 – can correctly provide a solution for this  
problem. 
At this  point ,  just  for  the sake of clari ty and 
argument,  I  must  conclude that  whenever an 
undocumented migrant  is  in a si tuation of having 
created strong t ies with a country by the passage of 
t ime i t  is  disproport ionate to deport  her.  
Following that  decision,  a  legalizat ion process 
must  be in place or otherwise we are transforming the 
migrant into a pariah.  
But would i t  be proport ionate to deny the migrant  
access to ci t izenship? 
As I  have stressed above,  proportionali ty 
irremediably entered the immigration and ci t izenship 
discourse.  Again,  i t  would not  be proportionate to have 
a decision that  excludes someone from cit izenship 
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permanently.  I t  is  too harsh a measure to condemn 
someone who is  enti t led by law to l ive in a country to 
permanent al ienage and prohibit  access to ci t izenship.  
That  is  why a naturalization process is  available in 
any l iberal  democracy.  Even from an equali ty 
standpoint ,  how can we differentiate documented 
migrants that  wil l  have a path to ci t izenship from 
legalized ones that  were once undocumented but  became 
legalized after  an official  decision not  to deport  them 
due to the proportionali ty principle? 
I  am not claiming that  the proport ionali ty principle 
must  play a decisive role here.  In this  chapter ,  using the 
ammunition collected in the previous ones,  I  am 
identifying a trend that  results  from a set  of  facts  and 
arguments in the direction of a r ight  to a specif ic 
ci t izenship.  
However,  i t  is  certainly undeniable that  
proportionali ty plays a role in immigration and 
ci t izenship law and that  this  principle is  breached if  we 
decide to deport ,  deny rights or  permanently exclude a 
migrant  from cit izenship.  
Other arguments may help this  one and I  wil l  
discuss them later  in this  chapter.    
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§3.  Ius domicilii 
 
The l i terature on ci t izenship usually discusses ius 
soli  and ius sanguinis  as  the cri teria for  the at tr ibution 
of ci t izenship507.  
I  do not  intend to challenge this  view that  is so 
deeply rooted in worldwide practice to the point  that  i t  
can even be considered international  customary law508.   
However,  these cri teria are solely connected to the 
original  at tr ibution of ci t izenship;  they do not operate 
in the so-called derivative at tr ibution or naturalization.  
Most  probably the reason for the difference is  that  
naturalization is  perceived as an absolute sovereign 
domain of the states,  even more than the granting of 
original  ci t izenship.  
I t  is  so much so that  natural izat ion is  usually 
described as an act  of  wil l  by the state that  can be 
rendered because of  different  reasons such as relevant 
or  heroic services to the state509.   
Although the granting of ci t izenship of origin is  
not  an irrelevant subject  to migrants,  especial ly for the 
second and third generations,  the most  sensit ive issue is  
naturalization.  
For the sake of  my argument,  natural izat ion is  key 
in the sense that  the r ight  to ci t izenship due to 
residence in a country is  usually a question of 
naturalization.  
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Probably because of  the intense migration 
movements that  have recently occurred and the pressure 
they put  on ci t izenship,  authors have now discussed 
much more the cri teria that  are applicable to 
naturalization rather than to ci t izenship of  origin.  
Ayelet  Shachar paid at tention to naturalization.  
According to her,  “ this  postnatal  path to membership,  
at  the end of  which stands the ult imate prize of  
ci t izenship in the country of  immigration,  is  long and 
arduous.  (…) To become eligible for naturalization,  a 
person must  f irst  be legally admitted as a long-term 
resident;  before that ,  he or she must  have gained a 
valid entry visa to the country.  In a world of  regulated 
borders,  this  is  not  easy,  especially when the individual 
is  seeking entry to one of  the world’s more prosperous 
nations.  Each year,  only a minuscule percentage of  the 
global population is  granted a coveted immigrant visa 
and is  permitted to enter through the “golden door” 
and into one the world’s richest  countries (…).  The 
classic path of  naturalization thus represents the 
culmination of  a process of  graduated transformation,  
in which formal ci t izenship is  the ult imate prize”510.  
The arguments that  I  have been using al l  point  to 
non-arbitrary legislat ion on naturalization.  This means 
that  unlike the tradit ional  theory on the absolute 
sovereignty of states over ci t izenship and 
naturalization,  I  have shown that  there are growing 
l imits  being imposed on the States,  especial ly to control  
and l imit  discrimination and arbitrary decisions.  
Also,  as Shachar expresses and as I  have been 
highlighting,  a great  deal  of  the r ight  to ci t izenship,  as 
a r ight  that  forms i tself  though a path,  results  from 
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interactions with the State,  expectat ions, and t ime 
elapsed.  
So if  we were to determine a cri terion that  is  
adequate to define the at tr ibution of ci t izenship by 
naturalization,  ius domicil i i  might be i t .  
Ius domicil i i  is  already a cri terion incorporated in 
most  national  ci t izenship laws.  In fact ,  naturalization is  
usually acquired after  a  period of permanent residence 
in the host  country.   
So what difference would i t  make to elect  a  new ius 
domicil i i  principle? 
Ius domicil i i  is  usually determined in national  
ci t izenship laws in different  designs according to the 
internal  wil l  and sovereignty.  I t  is  basically a matter  of  
choice of the host  country.  
According to my view, there is  a  trend that  makes 
i t  mandatory for States,  based on moral  and legal  
arguments,  to provide for naturalization of migrants – 
documented or undocumented – after  a certain period of  
residence.  
Ruth Rubio-Marin proposed an automatic 
naturalization of resident al iens.  According to her,  “ the 
need to go one step further and proclaim automatic 
access is  not  irrelevant.  I t  rests  on a important 
conceptual di f ference.  More than a right  to naturalize 
(or regularize) ,  what is  claimed is  the right  to be 
recognized as a legit imate holder of  al l  the rights 
granted to ci t izens (…) underlying this  notion of  an 
autonomous claim to membership is  the idea that  
permanent resident al iens have to be seen as belonging 
to the consti tuent  community already”511.  
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Although she presents a compell ing thesis ,  she then 
engages in a long discussion on the merits  and 
inconveniences of  an automatic at tr ibution of 
ci t izenship from the standpoint  of  the migrant  and of 
the society.  
I  do not  think this  is  the main point .  Just  the mere 
acceptance of ci t izenship as a r ight  that  the migrant 
holds against  the State is  revolutionary.  I t  is  not  
necessary to go further and impose i t  on migrants.  I ts  
configuration as a r ight ,  especial ly as a human right  in 
the context  of  international  human rights ,  provides the 
adequate background.  
As a r ight  i t  is  up to the migrant  to exercise i t  or  
not .  So,  after  a  period of residence,  the migrant  would 
be able to exercise the r ight  to ci t izenship against  the 
State – without the possibil i ty of  the State denying i t  – 
but  the exercise of  this  r ight  would always be a 
decision of the migrant .  
Residence was also correctly considered by Rainer 
Bauböck.  He affirms that  a  ci t izen is  an inhabitant  of  
the state in what he calls  the principle of  residence.  A 
blunt application of this  principle would serve to “ turn 
into a ci t izen everybody who l ives in the terri tory and 
to deprive anybody of  ci t izenship who leaves the 
terri tory”512.  But he recognizes that  “ there is  neither a 
natural  way of  determining a threshold of  permanent 
residence,  nor an international authority which could 
override the sovereignty of  independent states and 
impose such a standard cri terion”513.   
Yaffa Zilbeshats  correctly assesses this  question by 
electing residence as the cri terion to grant  ci t izenship 
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and configuring i t  as  a human right .  Actually she says 
that  “ i f  residence is  the central  l ink required for giving 
rise to the right  to nationali ty ,  then when the 
requirement of  residence has been met,  the State wil l  be 
under a duty to grant nationali ty”514.  
 Zilbershats´  theory is  inspired in the writ ings of  
Michael  Walzer,  especial ly in the Spheres of  Just ice.   
In this  book,  Walzer establishes a paral lel  between 
residence and ci t izenship.  He calls  for the 
naturalization of residents saying that  the members of  
the community must  be prepared to accept foreigners as 
equals,  on a moral  basis .  He uses several  examples and 
comparisons.  One is  of  a family with l ive-in servants 
that  he compares to a tyranny.  Another image is  of  the 
Athenian “metics”.  In Ancient  Greece Athens,  as I  
described in chapter 1,  foreigners were permanently 
excluded from access to ci t izenship.  Not recognizing a 
fundamental  r ight  to ci t izenship based on residence 
would be equal  to the discrimination against  the 
“metics” in ancient  Greece.  Another example is  the 
guest  workers515.  
Joseph Carens,  in a response to Noah Pickus,  also 
affirms,  as I  quoted in chapter  3 that  “anyone who has 
resided lawfully in a l iberal  democratic state for an 
extended period of  t ime (e.g.  f ive years or more) ought 
to be enti t led to become a ci t izen i f  he or she wishes to 
do so”516.  
More recently,  Ayelet  Shachar proposed an 
interest ing theory of substantial  and genuine connection 
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that  she calls  jus nexi .  According to Shachar,  “ the idea 
of  adopting a functional,  genuine-connection cri terion 
for defining ci t izenship f inds support  from an 
unexpected source: the jurisprudence of  international 
law. In the landmark 1955 Nottebohm decision,  the 
International Court  of  Just ice held that  ci t izenship is  
not  merely an empty “ti t le .” I t  must  ref lect  instead: “a 
legal bond having as i ts  basis  the social  fact  of  
at tachment,  a genuine connection of  existence,  interests  
and sentiments,  together with the existence of  
reciprocal rights and duties.  I t  may be said to 
consti tute the juridical  expression of  the fact  that  the 
individual upon whom it  is  conferred .  .  .  is  in fact  more 
closely connected with the population of  the [s] tate 
conferring [cit izenship]  than with any other [s] tate”517.   
Shachar revisi ts  Nottebohm and the genuine l ink 
theory to reach the conclusion that  whenever an 
effective l ink exists ,  ci t izenship must be granted.  She 
says,  “returning to the Nottebohm case,  which deals 
directly with our subject  of  inquiry,  namely,  
i l luminating the meaning to be given to the genuine 
connection conception of  membership,  the ICJ 
articulates several  di f ferent  factors that  need to be 
taken into consideration in identi fying whether a real  
and ef fective l ink has been established,  granting that  
the importance (or weight)  of  these factors might vary 
from one case to the next .  This  l is t  of  factors (which is  
i l lustrative rather than conclusive),  includes,  in the 
court’s  words,  “the habitual  residence of  the indiv idual 
concerned but also the centre of  his  [or her]  interests ,  
his  [or her]  family t ies,  his  [or her]  participation in 
public l i fe ,  at tachment shown by him [or her]  for a 
given country and inculcated in his  [or her]  children,  
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etc.” This “center of  interests” test  is  pragmatic and 
functional;  i t  requires evidence of  the establishment of  
a genuine connection between the individual and the 
poli t ical  community”518.  
So to Shachar,  domicile is  not  enough.  A genuine 
l ink theory must  take other factors into consideration,  
namely those referred to by the court  in the Nottebohm 
decision as showing an at tachment between the person 
and the State.  
She gives the name jus nexi  to this  connection 
cri terion.  
She adds that  “ these connections need not  grow out 
of  blood or terri tory; they may well  develop out of  
experiences of  social  interaction that  takes place under 
the normative umbrella of  a given poli t ical  community 
and within a particular geographical  location.  In this  
way,  jus nexi  ref lects  the idea of  democratic inclusion,  
according to which those who are habitually subject  to 
the coercive powers of  the state must  gain a hand in 
shaping i ts  laws,  i f  they so choose.  In this  respect ,  jus 
nexi  di f fers from a pure domicile-based principle of  
membership that  would provide automatic 
naturalization (ex lege) for anyone residing in the 
poli ty  af ter their  presence is  deemed permanent,  as 
advanced,  for example,  by Ruth Rubio-Marin in 
Immigration as a Democratic Challenge”519.  
She argues that  in her theory what is  necessary is  
“not mere physical  presence in the terri tory but  also the 
passage of  t ime and social  connectedness,  the lat ter 
referring to the requisi te  “center of  l i fe” cri teria,  
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which i tsel f  can be interpreted in more generous or 
more stringent ways”520.  
  I  have a sympathetic view on the jus nexi  theory 
because i t  not  only revisi ts  Nottebohm in a correct  way 
– as I  have interpreted i t  in chapter  2 –,  anchoring the 
argument in the international  law on ci t izenship and i ts  
current  interpretat ion,  but  also provides for  solid 
arguments in the direction of a fundamental  r ight  to 
ci t izenship.  
According to Shachar,  jus nexi   differentiates i tself  
from ius domicil i i  as  described by Ruth Rubio-Marin in 
two ways:  i)  i t  demands more than mere domicile,  i t  
refers to the requisi te “center  of  l i fe” and i i)  i t  rel ies on 
the choice of  the migrant  and does not  impose 
ci t izenship against  his  wil l .  
As to the f irst  argument,  some caution is  
recommended.  Because of  the broad nature of  the 
concepts involved,  i t  wil l  give the States significant  
discret ion in defining the procedure to grant  
ci t izenship.  
Who defines center  of  l i fe? Or social  
connectedness? 
States wil l  create al l  sorts  of  procedures to uti l ize 
these concepts as barriers  to ci t izenship and to regain 
sovereignty over i t .  
The clear advantage of a  purely domicile theory is  
that  i t  is  objective.  There is  no dispute – other than 
factual  by way of evidence – over the period that  
someone has resided in a given country. 
States tend to test  the degree of  integration of  the 
ci t izenship candidate through an exam on language and 
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culture.  That would probably be the way to confirm the 
degree of  connection in Shachar´s theory.  
However,  these tests  are not  consensual .  Sometimes 
they can be manipulated to create substantial  barriers  to 
naturalization.  
As Carens asserts ,  “requirements refer to legally 
enforceable standards that  must  be met as a condit ion 
of  naturalization (such as length of  residence,  
demonstrating a certain level  of  language proficiency,  
passing a test  on the country’s history and inst i tut ions,  
etc.)  (…) with respect  to requirements,  I  think the 
standards should be very low. Indeed,  I  think that  
length of  residence is  the only standard that  is  
ul t imately just i f iable for permanent residents”521.   
  Even the delays in deciding a naturalizat ion 
peti t ion can consti tute an i l legit imate obstacle to 
naturalization and defer the residence demand beyond a 
reasonable period522.     
When discussing the naturalization cri teria in the 
US, Gerald Neuman cri t icizes what he calls  obsolete 
and ideological  qualif ications and questions proficiency 
in English as a naturalization cri terion523.  
In a dialogue with Neuman´s art icle,  Legomsky 
responds that  “both the nature and the value of  the 
ci t izenship bond might depend also on the way in which 
ci t izenship is  acquired.  One who acquires ci t izenship 
through naturalization might value the result ing status 
as a hard-earned reward for the t ime and effort  
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invested in studying the English language,  American 
history,  and civics”524.   
In any event,  natural izat ion cri teria that  Neuman 
calls  “ideological  qualif icat ions” are highly 
controversial  and pose serious questions in terms of a 
substantive r ight  to ci t izenship.  
Peter  Spiro identif ies a trend towards relaxing 
naturalization requirements in the U.S.  He says that  
“naturalization has never been and is  s t i l l  not  today 
merely for the asking.  The thresholds do,  however,  show 
signs of  being relaxed,  in both law and practice,  at  
least  relative to mid-twentieth-century standards.  The 
residency requirement has been reduced with respect  to 
various applicants,  most  notably spouses of  U.S.  
ci t izens.  Other statutory measures exempt many 
applicants from the language and civics requirements,  
based on age,  length of  residence,  and physical  or 
mental  impairment (broadly defined in practice) .  Those 
subject  to the civics requirement face a test  that  
requires nothing more than memorization.  The language 
requirement has been clari f ied to require only facil i ty  
in simple English,  and examiners are generous in 
f inding i t  satisf ied.  With the end of  the cold war,  
ideological  restrict ions implicate a t iny number of  
cases.  Even the oath requirement,  long standing as an 
absolute ( i f  in most  cases easily satisf ied) condit ion to 
naturalization,  is  now waivable where the applicant 
cannot for mental  reasons understand i ts  nature.  
Perhaps the most  serious obstacles to naturalization 
are the fear of  tests  that  uneducated would-be 
applicants often harbor,  the maze of  the immigration 
bureaucracy,  and a fee that  represents a hefty bite  out  
of  many immigrant wallets”.   
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On residence,  Spiro adds that  “residency has been a 
requirement for naturalization since the Founding.  
Current  law mandates a f ive-year period of  residency as 
a permanent resident al ien in most  cases,  including 
physical  presence for at  least  half  that  period with no 
interruption of  longer than a year.  The durational 
residency requirement is  the most  unbending of  al l  
quali f ications for naturalization; although there are 
reductions in the required duration for some categories 
of  applicants,  there are no waivers from applicable 
thresholds based on disabil i ty  or humanitarian 
considerations.  Residency requirements may be 
passively satisf ied ( that  is ,  i t  takes no special  abil i ty  to 
meet them),  but  naturalization wil l  not  be granted 
before they have been fulf i l led.  Durational residency 
requirements present another deployment of  the 
terri torial  premise.  As with the birth ci t izenship 
regime—under which most  individuals garner 
ci t izenship by virtue of  where they were born— the 
naturalization regime makes an assumption about 
physical  presence,  namely,  that  by being present ,  one 
wil l  become a member of  the national community as a 
matter of  fact  and assimilate whatever characterist ics 
make up the national identi ty”525.  
Spiro then cri t icizes the test  requirements,  giving 
dramatic examples l ike that  of  persons with disabil i t ies  
as an unacceptable si tuation where the test  might be 
discriminatory.  Fortunately these si tuations have been 
considered within the naturalization procedures ,  where 
waivers are available526.  
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An assessment of  the cri teria to fulf i l l  the jus nexi  
requirement proposed by Shachar would necessari ly 
entai l  some form of test  and discretion.  
I  do not  oppose these tests,  in principle,  just  as I  
do not  think they consti tute,  per se ,  inadmissible 
barriers  to naturalization.  However,  again,  these tests  
ought to be assessed in the context  of  a  fundamental  
r ight  to ci t izenship based essential ly on residence. 
 A str ict  proport ionali ty assessment is  necessary 
and cannot,  in terms of substance,  length or delay,  
consti tute an obstacle to naturalization.  I t  is  quite 
evident that  if  a  State is  l imited in i ts  powers to restr ict  
naturalization – as is  becoming consensual  – i t  cannot 
circumvent those l imitat ions by imposing addit ional  
requisi tes or  disproport ionate natural izat ion tests .  
I  think that  Shachar´s  theory – al though appealing 
– ought to be confined.  Or i t  wil l  serve the opposite 
goal  to that  which is  intended.  By creating a broad and 
indefinite  concept of  connection i t  wil l  provide States 
with the grounds for discret ionary discrimination.  
The second difference in relat ion to Ruth Rubio-
Marin´s ius domicil i i  is  that  jus nexi  would not be 
automatic.  Again,  al though that  was the formulation 
that  Ruth Rubio-Marin elected to configure for  ius 
domicil i i ,  I  do not  think i t  is  s tr ict ly necessary;  there 
can be a fundamental  r ight  to ci t izenship based on 
residence that  is  not  automatic but  depends on the 
voluntary exercise of  that  r ight  by the migrant .  In this  
context  I  would agree with Shachar ,  but  we need to 
acknowledge that  an ius domicil i i  theory can have a 
different  formulation to Rubio-Marin´s,  namely 
regarding automatic at tr ibution.  
The idea of  revisi t ing Nottebohm is  also very 
appealing.  As I  have asserted in chapter  2,  I  think that  
the potential  of  the genuine l ink theory has never been 
total ly explored.  I t  should work not  only in a negative 
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way – to enable a State to challenge another State´s  
at tr ibution of ci t izenship based on the lack of an 
effective l ink – but  also in a posit ive way – granting a 
migrant a fundamental  r ight  to ci t izenship based on the 
existence of such a l ink.  
I  total ly agree with Shachar on that  point .  In a 
recent  art icle,  Robert  Sloane rejects  the historical  
importance of  Nottebohm and the genuine l ink theory.  
He says that  “ the conception of  nationali ty  expressed in 
Nottebohm’s dicta certainly describes one plausible 
vision of  nationali ty ,  and i t  continues to have salience 
in some areas of  international law. But the genuine l ink 
theory is  neither the only nor,  necessarily,  the most  
appropriate,  regulatory tool .  No single doctrine wil l  be 
ef fective and well-suited to the international regulation 
of  nationali ty  in every circumstance.  Rather,  
international law would be better served by atomizing 
the concept by i ts  dist inct  functions and regulating (or 
not  regulating) nationali ty  at  the international level  
commensurately”527.  
Although I  do not follow Sloane in his  narrow 
reading of the Nottebohm decision and i ts  impact  on 
later  developments in international  ci t izenship law, i t  is  
worth noting his  warning against  a  monoli thic reading 
of the ci t izenship concept.  
In fact  I  do not  wish to f ind one cri terion that  
serves as the master  key to open the door of  the r ight  to 
ci t izenship.  My proposit ion is  of  a more modest  nature.  
While acknowledging a general  t rend towards the 
recognit ion of this  r ight  that  is  anchored both in general  
principles of  international  law and in democratic and 
moral  arguments,  I  wish to identify this  trend in a 
complex web of arguments and facts .  
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In that  sense I  do not  think that  ius domicil i i  or  ius 
nexi  a lone can solve al l  the problems and grant  
ci t izenship.  
However,  I  certainly advocate that  residence is  a  
very important  connecting factor for al l  the reasons 
described.  Moreover,  i t  has an addit ional  advantage:  i t  
is  objective,  easi ly identif iable and provable.  
In any event,  i t  is  clear  from the l i terature ci ted 
that  a  trend is  forming in the direction of a general  
r ight  to a ci t izenship of  a State based on residence and 
other at tachments with that  State over a period of t ime.  
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§4.  Adverse possession 
 
I t  has become clear that  the passage of t ime is  
essential  in the definit ion and acquisi t ion of a 
fundamental  r ight  to ci t izenship.  
Time and residence seem to be the cornerstone 
cri teria for  a r ight  to naturalization.  
I  have just  discussed the issues and diff icult ies 
around residence.  
Time is  a no less controversial  question.  Should 
t ime be relevant to acquire ci t izenship? On what 
grounds? How much t ime should be enough to acquire 
ci t izenship? 
These questions are certainly relevant and must  be 
answered before trying to establish a solid t ime passage 
theory on the acquisi t ion of ci t izenship. 
An interest ing analogy that  has been established,  as 
referred to by Stephen Legomsky, is  comparing the 
legalization r ight  to adverse possession in property528.  
 Monica Gomez established the analogy with regard 
to the si tuation of undocumented migrants.  According 
to her,  “ the doctrine of  adverse possession of  property 
offers equitable principles that  logically support  the 
plight  of  the i l legal immigrant,  as well  as basic 
elements that  easily apply to the way in which i l legal 
immigrants come to "possess" an America identi ty ,  i f  
only in abstract  terms.  I f ,  for the sake of  administrative 
convenience,  due process in deportation cannot be the 
norm, then immigration by adverse possession wil l ,  at  
the very least ,  provide equitable protections to 
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deserving i l legal immigrants as the federal  government 
undertakes to uproot the very trees i t  planted”529.  
Timothy Lukes and Minh Hoang also dedicated 
their  at tention to the parallel  between adverse 
possession and immigration.  They affirm that  “a 
legit imate claim, then,  for patriation of  undocumented 
workers based on the legal  prerequisi tes of  adverse 
possession,  is  compell ing.  Undocumented immigrants 
clearly occupy the United States,  especially given the 
sense in which occupation is  related to physical  
connection and interaction with the land”530.  
Both art icles give a great  deal  of  consideration to 
the fulf i l lment of  the property law adverse possession 
and immigration law. My purpose here is  not  to try and 
perfectly f i t  adverse possession into the realm of 
immigration but  to f ind within adverse possession i ts  
general  principles that  might be applicable to 
immigration and ci t izenship. 
More recently,  Ayelet  Shachar suggested applying 
the adverse possession theory to immigration and 
ci t izenship in the context  of  her jus nexi  proposal .  She 
argues that  “adverse possession thus offers a “start l ing 
means of  acquiring property.” “Startl ing” because i t  
holds that  a trespasser – that  is ,  a person who entered 
without permission – may obtain ful l  t i t le  to the 
property into which he or she ini t ial ly  entered 
unlawfully,  i f  the occupancy (or in our case,  residency) 
is  peaceful ,  continuous,  and visible “for all  the world 
to see i f  the owner cared to look.” To acquire t i t le  in 
this  way,  however,  certain condit ions must  apply.  The 
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most signif icant of  them is  that  the entrant must  have 
resided in the terri tory in actual possession for an 
extended period of  t ime”531.   
When comparing adverse possession to ci t izenship,  
Shachar says that  “ i f  the authorit ies have chosen to turn 
a blind eye to the “adverse possession” by mil l ions of  
unauthorized migrants who sett led within their  terri tory 
(after crossing the border without permission or 
overstaying their  visas),  then there must  be a point  in 
t ime when they are estopped by their  own inaction; in 
other words,  the unauthorized entrants ought to gain 
immunity from deportation and removal,  in addit ion to 
being offered an eventual route for legalizing their  
status”.  And she concludes that  “what counts are “the 
t ies that  non-cit izens develop over t ime.” This f i ts  
f lawlessly with the logic of  jus nexi  and the doctrine of  
adverse possession,  and in a similar fashion,  provides a 
remedy only after expectations to stay have been 
established,  a process that  in most  jurisdict ions 
requires the passage of  a signif icant amount of  t ime”532.  
A common angle of  analysis  in al l  these theories is  
that  adverse possession should be applicable to 
migration and to the si tuation of undocumented 
migrants.  The relat ionship with ci t izenship is  not  clear .  
Shachar mentions “an eventual route for legalizing 
their  s tatus”.   
Monica Gomez is  more categorical  when she admits 
that  “ the status of  the immigrant adverse possessor 
should be changed to that  of  legal permanent resident,  
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after which he may naturalize according to the same 
rules that  al l  legal permanent residents must  fol low”533.  
So what these authors believe ought to be obtained 
by adverse possession is  a  r ight  to legalization and not 
the r ight  to ci t izenship.  I  think the adverse possession 
is  too powerful  to end up producing a mere r ight  to 
legalization (which might be controversial  in the US but 
corresponds to a practice in many European 
countries534) .  I  wil l  come back to this  later .  
As I  have underl ined above,  I  wil l  not  try to f i t  
adverse possession in the immigration context .  As 
Lukes and Hoang correctly put  i t ,  “more important than 
quali f ication for legal standing,  however,  is  
just i f ication of  extending the concept of  adverse 
possession to undocumented immigrants.  Here i t  helps 
to consider adverse possession in terms of  widely 
recognized policy considerations”535.  
As these authors recognize,  adverse possession 
tends to fal l  under two dist inct  concepts:  the influence 
of t ime and the influence of improvement.  
I  want to focus on the passage of t ime.  As Joseph 
Singer eloquently phrases i t ,  “ the adverse possessor –
the person who has been occupying the property – has 
come to “shape his  roots to his  surroundings,  and when 
the roots have grown to a certain size,  cannot be 
displaced without cutt ing at  his  l i fe”536.  
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Adverse possession,  which dates back to Roman 
law – usucapio  – ,  is  anchored in a general  principle of  
legal  certainty.  The possession of land for a continued 
period of t ime and in an open and notorious way shall  
enti t le  the possessor to the ownership of  the land.  
The main objective of  this  mechanism is  to protect  
expectations of  the possessor and the community and 
promote legal  certainty.  In that  sense i t  is  well  
connected to the principle that  I  have discussed above 
of legit imate expectat ions.  
The passage of t ime has signif icant  legal  
implications.  Sometimes i t  is  preferable to set t le  a  
si tuation that  is  de facto  consolidated than to maintain 
the uncertainty over i ts  legal  definit ion. 
 To come back to immigration,  a  migrant  maintains 
a stable relat ionship with the land of the country where 
he or she resides and creates expectations in an open 
and notorious way.  
Of course here a f irst  argument might arise.  The 
status of  the migrant  is  not  always evident or  even 
whether he is  a  migrant .  However,  that  is  exactly the 
beauty of the comparison to adverse possession.  The 
possessor is  not  the proprietor nor is  i t  evident for 
others that  he is  not  the proprietor;  he must  act ,  openly 
and notoriously as the proprietor  in order to fulf i l l  the 
requirement.  
  So the mere concealment of  the migrant  s tatus – 
notably of  the undocumented status – is  not  an obstacle 
to the fulf i l lment of  the prerequisi te .  Migrants do 
behave normally in society and act  as if  they were 
ci t izens537.  
                                              
537 MONICA GOMEZ, Immigration by Adverse Possession: Common Law 
Amnesty for Long-Residing Illegal Immigrants in the United States (2007-
2008), 113-114. 
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Now I must  consider the adverse possession of 
legalization versus adverse possession of ci t izenship.  I  
said before that  the adverse possession of legalization – 
as proposed by the l i terature – is  too weak for this  
powerful  tool .  
Adverse possession al lows for the acquisi t ion of 
property,  one of the most  important  r ights  at  an internal  
level .  If  we transpose i t  to the international  and 
sovereign level ,  is  i t  enough to claim a r ight  to 
legalization? And more important  than that:  is  
legalization enough to achieve the objectives of  legal  
certainty that  just ify adverse possession.  
I t  seems to me that  we are demanding major 
principles to solve an administrat ive,  almost  
bureaucratic question.  
Of course the authors recognize that  legalization is  
a  stage on the path to ci t izenship.  Eventually a 
legalized migrant  wil l  acquire ci t izenship,  but  not  
because he has a fundamental  r ight  to i t .  That  wil l  
eventually happen after  not  being deported,  being 
legalized via adverse possession and f inally having 
fulf i l led the requirements of  naturalization that  remain,  
which,  for the most  part ,  are discret ionary.  
Shachar says that  adverse possession and jus nexi  
go well  together538.  For that  to be the case,  adverse 
possession must  relate to ci t izenship and not  to 
legalization,  otherwise jus nexi  is  only providing the 
State further motives for scrutiny and screening of 
migrants after  a  nightmare of procedures and t ime 
passing.  
                                              
538 AYELET SHACHAR, The birthright lottery: citizenship and global 
inequality (2009), 187. 
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The only meaningful  way I  see of  using the adverse 
possession al legory is  if  i t  is  directed towards 
ci t izenship,  regardless of  the migrant´s  status.  
In fact ,  i t  should also be applicable to documented 
migrants.  I  understand that  the si tuation of the 
documented in a l iberal  democracy is  not  a  matter  of  
concern in terms of naturalization.  However,  i t  could be 
in countries without a fair  naturalization process.  
In theoretical  terms i t  does not  make sense to 
differentiate between documented and undocumented 
migrants in terms of acquisi t ion of ci t izenship through 
adverse possession.  The same arguments apply to both 
(even if  the dist inction between bona f ide  and mala f ide  
might apply here) .  
 The difference would result  from the t ime frame. 
There ought to be a reasonable period of t ime after  
which al l  human beings residing effectively in a given 
country are enti t led to i ts  ci t izenship regardless of  their  
s tatus.  There is  no reason here – considering al l  the 
above arguments – to differentiate between the 
documented and undocumented.  
In a l iberal  democracy,  the documented migrants 
would be enti t led to a naturalization procedure that  is  
presumably shorter  than the standard t ime frame for 
naturalization according to the said general  rule.  So 
they would not  be in the exact  same si tuation:  the 
documented would have access to ci t izenship though a 
faster  lane than naturalization,  according to the national  
law; the undocumented would only have access to 
naturalization after  a  standard number of  years in 
residence.  
In a country without a natural izat ion procedure or 
with a discriminatory or disproportionate one,  the 
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standard t ime frame would be applicable to al l  – 
documented and undocumented539.  
And my conclusion,  because i t  is  drawn from 
general  principles and from the arguments I  set  out  in 
previous chapters,  especial ly chapter 2,  identif ies a 
trend anchored in international  law rather than in 
national  policies.  
Thus,  i t  is  not  necessary for a State to legislate two 
different  procedures.  Only one naturalization procedure 
is  necessary.  Documented migrants may access i t  af ter  
the period of t ime specif ied in the national  law; 
undocumented migrants may access i t  af ter  the standard 
international  period of t ime. 
The lat ter ,  of  course,  would not  be exempt from the 
other prerequisi tes in the national  law, namely language 
and culture tests ,  but  as I  have argued above,  these tests  
should be of low diff iculty and in part icular they should 
not  consti tute addit ional  substantial  obstacles to 
naturalization.  According to this  trend,  after  the said 
international  s tandard of t ime,  migrants do have a 
fundamental  r ight  to ci t izenship.  
The major question now is:  what should that  
s tandard period of t ime be? 
When discussing adverse possession,  authors look 
at  the t ime frame for the acquisi t ion of property.  Again,  
no matter  how appealing the comparison may be,  i t  
makes l i t t le  sense to look for a substantial  argument in 
terms of residence demand in national  or  comparative 
property law. 
Immigration and ci t izenship laws are r ich enough 
to provide us with the material  we need to f ind that  
t ime frame. 
                                              
539 Concurring with the conclusion on the basis of residence see YAFFA 
ZILBERSHATS, The human right to citizenship (2002), 103-104. 
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A number of  studies have been conducted on 
comparative naturalization policies,  especial ly 
regarding the t ime frame for naturalizat ion.  
One of the most  comprehensive research projects ,  
al though somewhat outdated now, was conducted by 
Patrick Weil .  This research compares data in 25 
different  countries in the world from Austral ia  to 
several  European countries,  to Israel ,  Mexico,  Russia 
and the US. I t  shows that  al l  these countries have a 
naturalization procedure based on a certain residence 
length.  The residence period ranges from 3 to 10 years.   
Of the 25 countries included in the research,  4 have a 
residency demand before naturalization of less than 5 
years,  15 have between 5 and 10 years and 6 have ten 
years or more540.   
Some very important  research on naturalization in 
Europe was conducted by the NATAC project .  
According to the conclusions of  this  research project ,  
“Even where the law i tsel f  does not  create dif f icult  
hurdles,  access to nationali ty  may be blocked by 
administrative practices and implementation 
procedures.  We recommend that  applicants for 
naturalization should not  be burdened by high fees and 
excessive demands for off icial  documents.  There should 
be a maximum period within which applications have to 
be decided.  Civil  servants dealing with naturalization 
should be trained and supervised,  negative decisions 
should always have to be just i f ied in writ ing and 
applicants should have the opportunity to complain and 
the right  of  appeal.  Public administrations ought to 
provide assistance and cooperate with migrant 
organizations in helping immigrants prepare their  
applications and meet language requirements.  In 
                                              
540 PATRICK WEIL, Access to Citizenship: A comparison of Twenty-Five 
Nationality Laws (2001), 22-23. 
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countries where the implementation of  nationali ty  laws 
is  delegated to regional or local  authorit ies,  i t  is  
important  to ensure uniform standards in applying the 
law”541.      
There is  an understandable concern to avoid the 
administrat ive naturalization procedure being uti l ized 
as a way to create addit ional  obstacles,  due to 
bureaucratic barriers  or  intentional  manipulations of  the 
application of the law. Naturalizat ion procedures should 
be fast  and smooth.  The idea of  a maximum period for 
these procedures to occur is  very appealing.  
This study also looks at  the length of  residence in 
different  European States necessary to acquire 
ci t izenship.  
According to i ts  conclusions,  “member States 
require a minimum residence period of  between three 
years (Belgium, for acquisi t ion by naturalization) and 
ten years (Austria,  Greece,  I taly,  Portugal and Spain).  
Eight  s tates require f ive years or less.  In most  
countries,  residence must  have been legal and the 
applicant’s  place of  habitual  residence must  have been 
in the state concerned.  Generally,  residence must  have 
been uninterrupted immediately before the application.  
Short  residence requirements are preferable for the 
sake of  security of  residence,  social  inclusion and 
poli t ical  integration.  Since ful l  protection against  
expulsion,  legal equali ty  and poli t ical  participation 
generally st i l l  depend on nationali ty ,  lower residence 
requirements reduce the risk of  creating a large and 
relatively stable group of  second-class ci t izens.  (…) 
Five years is  long enough to acquire genuine l inks to 
and practical  knowledge of  the country of  
                                              
541 RAINER BAUBÖCK, EVA ERSBØLL, KEES GROENENDIJK and 
HARALD WALDRAUCH, The Acquisition of Nationality in EU Member 
States: Rules, Practices and Quantitative (2006), 13. 
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naturalization.  (…) Austria grants naturalization by 
enti t lement after f i f teen years in the case of  proven and 
sustained integration,  or after thirty years without 
further condit ions,  which is clearly too long”542.  
An interest ing comparative survey in Europe with 
detai led conclusions and f igures was presented by Marc 
Morjé Howard in 2009.  In terms of natural izat ion 
requirements he concludes that  “seven countries 
(Austria,  Denmark,  Germany,  Greece,  I taly,  
Luxembourg,  and Spain )  could be characterized as 
“historically restrict ive” in the 1980s,  al though some 
were more so than others.  Finland,  the Netherlands,  
Portugal,  and Sweden were in the “medium” category,  
though with dif ferent  combinations of  scores 
dist inguishing the Nordic and non-Nordic countries.  
Finally,  the four-country group of  Belgium, France,  
Ireland,  and the United Kingdom consti tute the 
“historically l iberal” category”  543.  
Great  at tention has been given to naturalization in 
European countries by EUDO CITIZENSHIP, an 
observatory within the European Union Observatory on 
Democracy (EUDO) web platform hosted at  the Robert  
Schuman Centre of  the European Universi ty Inst i tute in 
Florence.  This Observatory issues regular  surveys on 
naturalization policies and practices in the EU. One of 
the last  s tudies was conducted by Sara Wallace 
Goodman. She did a survey on Austria,  Belgium, 
Bulgaria,  Croatia,  Cyprus,  Czech Republic,  Denmark,  
Estonia,  Finland,  France,  Germany, Greece,  Hungary,  
Iceland,  Ireland,  I taly,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  
                                              
542 RAINER BAUBÖCK, EVA ERSBØLL, KEES GROENENDIJK and 
HARALD WALDRAUCH, The Acquisition of Nationality in EU Member 
States: Rules, Practices and Quantitative (2006), 13. 
543 MARC MORJÉ HOWARD, The Politics of Citizenship in Europe (2009), 22-
29. 
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Malta,  Moldova,  the Netherlands,  Norway, Poland,  
Portugal ,  Romania,  Slovakia,  Slovenia,  Spain,  Sweden,  
Switzerland,  Turkey,  and the United Kingdom. 
The survey includes 33 countries.  Of these,  1 has a 
residency demand of three years,  1 of  four years,  11 of 
f ive years,  2 of  six years,  4 of  seven years,  6 of  eight  
years,  1 of  nine years,  6 of  ten years and 1 of  twelve 
years544.   
In any event,  al though there are a great  deal  of  
changes from survey to survey due to a fast  variat ion in 
ci t izenship law, these surveys confirm some general  
t rends.  
First ,  countries tend to have a natural izat ion 
procedure based on a residence period.  
This period usually ranges from 3 to 10 years,  5 
being the most  common t ime frame. 
Based on this  data,  i t  is  possible to f irmly conclude 
that  there is  a  general  international  trend – as far  as i t  
is  possible to collect  data,  and being aware of  the lack 
of data from many countries in the world – towards 
naturalization based on residence after  a  period of no 
more than ten years.  
As I  have described in chapter  2,  there is  an 
addit ional  element of  international  law. The European 
Convention on Nationali ty establishes that  each State 
Party shall  provide in i ts  internal  law for the possibil i ty 
of  naturalization of persons lawfully and habitually 
resident  in i ts  terr i tory.  In establishing the condit ions 
for naturalization,  i t  shall  not  provide for a period of 
residence exceeding ten years before the lodging of an 
application.  
                                              
544 SARA WALLACE GOODMAN, Naturalisation Policies in Europe: 
Exploring Patterns of Inclusion and Exclusion (2010), 7. 
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This is  an addit ional  element in the said trend 
towards a period of around ten years of  residency.  
As Paul Weiss points  out  about ius soli  and ius 
sanguinis ,  “concordance of municipal  law does not  yet  
create customary international  law; a universal  
consensus of opinion of States is  equally  necessary”545.  
However I  am not trying to conclude that  there is  a  
customary law of naturalization after  a  period of 10 
years of  residence;  that  conclusion would be short  and 
inaccurate.  
I t  would be short  because i t  would not  include 
undocumented migrants;  i t  would be inaccurate because 
the psychological  element of  the customary law would 
be impossible to prove.  
On the contrary,  my claim is  just  to identify an 
international  trend in the direction of naturalization 
after  a  certain period of t ime in residence (around ten 
years) .  
This trend f inds support  in international  law not 
because i t  was formed on the basis  of  customary law but 
because i t  is  anchored in international  law fundamental  
principles described in this  chapter that ,  in some cases,  
may be considered as ius cogens  or  mandatory 
international  law. 
I t  is  not  only the case of  the principle of  protection 
of expectat ions or proportionali ty;  i t  is  also certainly 
the case of  the adverse possession analogy that  I  
discussed here,  insofar as i t  represents an application of 
a general  principle of  legal  certainty.  
                                              
545 PAUL WEISS, Nationality and Statelessness in international law (1979), 96. 
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§5.  The paradox of democratic legitimacy 
 
From a democratic principle standpoint  the absence 
of a r ight  to ci t izenship is  also problematic.  
As I  described in chapter  5,  a  universalist ic  r ights  
approach based on human rights in international  law 
leaves ci t izens with a l imited number of  r ights.  
I t  is  not  that  these r ights ,  al though l imited,  are not  
important .  I  am referring to the r ight  to freely enter  and 
exit  the terr i tory of the State and to poli t ical  r ights .  As 
I  have shown in the previous chapters,  these r ights  have 
a powerful  inclusion potential  and cannot be 
disregarded.  The at tempts to disperse ci t izenship 
elements and give some to migrants are also not 
successful  enterprises from my perspective,  for  they 
miss the inst i tut ional  and inclusion element that  is  very 
important  in the ci t izenship status.  
Anyhow, a permanent exclusion of permanent 
residents from poli t ical  r ights consti tutes what can be 
called “the paradox of democratic legit imacy”.  
Seyla Benhabib developed this  theory in her work.  
According to Benhabib,  “ ideally,  democratic rule means 
that  al l  members of  a sovereign body are to be 
respected as bearers of  human rights,  and that  the 
consociates of  this  sovereign freely associate with one 
another to establish a regime of  sel f-governance under 
which each is  to be considered both author of  the laws 
and subject  to them”546.  
In another passage she explains clearly her theory:  
“ the democratic people shows i tsel f  to be not  only the 
                                              
546 SEYLA BENHABIB, The Rights of Others, Aliens, Residents and Citizens 
(2004), 43. 
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subject  but  also the author of  i ts  laws.  (…) Popular 
sovereignty means that  al l  ful l  members of  the demos 
are enti t led to have a voice in the art iculation of  the 
laws by which the demos is  to govern i tsel f .  Democratic 
rule,  then,  extends i ts  jurisdict ion in the f irst  place to 
those who can view themselves as the authors of  such 
rule.  As I  wil l  argue,  however,  there has never been a 
perfect  overlap between the circle of  those who stand 
under the law’s authority and the ful l  members of  the 
demos.  Every democratic demos has disenfranchised 
some, while recognizing only certain individuals as ful l  
members.  Terri torial  sovereignty and democratic voice 
have never matched completely.  Yet  presence within a 
circumscribed terri tory,  and in particular continuing 
residence within i t ,  brings one under the authority of  
the sovereign – whether democratic or not”547.   
This is  a  crucial  aspect .  In a democratic society 
there must  be a coincidence between the demos  and the 
poli t ical  community.  A society cannot be deemed 
democratic if  part  of  the demos  is  excluded from 
poli t ical  r ights  and poli t ical  part icipation.  
That  is  what happened in ancient  Greece with 
women and foreigners (metics)  as described in chapter  
1.  That  is  why I  referred to democracy in ancient  
Greece in cautious terms.  By modern Western 
standards,  i t  would not be considered a democracy 
without women’s part icipation or a general  exclusion of 
foreigners.  
The exact  same discussion took place in the US 
about Civil  Rights and racial  discrimination.  Full  
                                              
547 SEYLA BENHABIB, The Rights of Others, Aliens, Residents and Citizens 
(2004), 19-20. 
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democracy was only obtained when women and African 
Americans were al lowed to vote548.  
No matter  how distant  these reali t ies may seem, a 
permanent exclusion of migrants from poli t ical  r ights  
wil l  place them in the same si tuation as al l  of  the above 
discriminated classes that  international  law and modern 
consti tut ions actively contradicted.  
The argument has a strong moral  and ethical  claim. 
As Linda Bosniak phrases i t  when theorizing about 
ethical  terr i torial i ty,  “ i t  is  both anti-democratic and 
morally wrong in l iberal  terms to allow for treatment  of  
a class of  persons who are l iving among us as social  
and poli t ical  outsiders”549.  
I t  is  rooted in the thinking of Michael  Walzer who, 
in his  book Spheres of  Justice ,  convincingly argues that  
“ the relevant principle here is  not  mutual aid but  
poli t ical  just ice.  The guests  don´t  need ci t izenship – at  
least  not  in the same sense in what they might be said 
to need their  jobs.  Nor are they injured,  helpless,  
dest i tute,  they are able-bodied and earning money.  Nor 
are they standing,  even f iguratively,  by the side of  the 
road,  they are l iving among the ci t izens.  They do 
socially necessary work,  and they are deeply enmeshed 
in the legal system of  the country to which they have 
come. Participants in economy and law, they ought to 
be able to regard themselves as potential  or future 
participants in poli t ies as well .  (…) They must  be set  on 
the road to ci t izenship”550.  Walzer,  as  I  mentioned 
                                              
548 SEYLA BENHABIB, The Rights of Others, Aliens, Residents and Citizens 
(2004), 46. 
549 LINDA BOSNIAK, Being Here: Ethical Territoriality and the Rights of 
Immigrants (2007), 389. 
550 MICHAEL WALZER, Spheres of Justice. A defense of pluralism end equality 
(1983), 59-60. 
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above,  compares a community without naturalization to 
a tyranny.  
A nation without a path to ci t izenship,  with unclear 
or  bureaucratic naturalization procedures that  take 
significant  t ime or exclude part  of  the population – l ike 
the undocumented migrants – is  set t ing part  of  the 
demos  aside from the poli ty.  This can be compared to 
undemocratic societ ies or  t imes when parts  of  the 
population where excluded from the democratic process.  
Certainly,  these societ ies cannot be called or cannot 
call  themselves democracies.  
One of the major issues when discussing the 
paradox of democratic legit imacy is  the last  word:  
legit imacy. 
In a democratic society,  the legit imacy of the 
government and the laws is  drawn from the people.  The 
consti tut ion of the US begins with the expression “We 
the people”.  Many social  and poli t ical  convulsions 
started with issues of  poli t ical  representation and 
legit imacy: “no taxation without representat ion”.  
As Seyla Benhabib correctly asserts ,  “ the 
democratic sovereign draws i ts  legit imacy not merely 
from its  act  of  consti tut ion but ,  equally signif icantly,  
from the conformity of  this  act  to universal  principles 
of  human rights  that  are in some sense said to precede 
and antedate the wil l  of  the sovereign and in 
accordance with which the sovereign undertakes to bind 
i tsel f .  “We, the people,” refers to a particular human 
community,  circumscribed in space and t ime,  sharing a 
particular culture,  history,  and legacy”551.  
                                              
551 LINDA BOSNIAK, Being Here: Ethical Territoriality and the Rights of 
Immigrants (2007), 44. 
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And she adds in another eloquent passage:  “Yet this  
paradox of  democratic legit imacy has a corollary which 
has been l i t t le  noted: every act  of  sel f- legislation is  
also an act  of  sel f-consti tut ion.  “We, the people,” who 
agree to bind ourselves by these laws,  are also defining 
ourselves as a “we” in the very act  of  sel f-
legislation”552.  
Jürgen Habermas also wrote on ci t izenship and 
legit imacy.  According to him, “with the inst i tut ion of  
egali tarian ci t izenship,  the nation s tate not  only 
provided democratic legit imation but created,  through 
widespread poli t ical  participation,  a new level  of  social  
integration as well .  In order to ful f i l l  this  negative 
function,  democratic ci t izenship must ,  however,  be more 
than just  a legal status;  i t  must  become the focus of  a 
shares poli t ical  culture”  553.  
  The legit imacy problem can be condensed in this  
passage from Benhabib:  “be not only the subject  but  the 
author of  the law”554.  
In fact ,  migrant  residents are permanently exposed 
and subjected to the laws of the country where they 
reside.  They are members of  the community;  pay taxes,  
and part icipate in the economy. For that  matter ,  they 
are permanent members of  the community.  
 In that  sense,  we can have a group of people that  
is  permanently subjected to the laws of a given country 
but  has no say in i ts  design.  This is  the paradox of 
democratic legit imacy.  
                                              
552 SEYLA BENHABIB, The Rights of Others, Aliens, Residents and Citizens 
(2004), 45. 
553 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, The European Nation State – Its Achievements and 
Its Limitations – On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship 
(1997), 117. 
554 SEYLA BENHABIB, The Rights of Others, Aliens, Residents and Citizens 
(2004), 181. 
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If  we think of  al l  the people that  occupy a terr i tory 



















I t  is  certainly true that  they are al l  subject  to the 
laws of the country,  but  in different  ways. 
Cit izenship and poli t ical  r ights are reserved to 
those in the center .  I  am not advocating that  legit imacy 
depends upon the exercise of  poli t ical  r ights by al l  
these classes of  people.  Yet i t  is  certainly true that  if  
the group in the center  ut i l izes i ts  power to exclude al l  
the others from poli t ical  part icipation and does so in a 
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In the words of  Michael  Walzer,  i t  would be l ike a 
club whose members use their  power to perpetuate their  
influence by excluding others from accessing i t555.  
This does not  mean a theory of open borders.  As 
Walzer also recognizes,  countries have a r ight  to 
control  their  borders and to establish an immigration 
policy.  
I t  means that  a  human being that  is  a  permanent 
resident  in a State should not  be permanently excluded 
from poli t ical  part icipation in that  State.  And if  that  
s i tuation eventually occurs i t  wil l  cause a legit imacy 
crisis  in that  State.  I ts  laws will  be i l legit imate and 
undemocratic because they were drafted – directly or 
via representat ive democracy – not  by al l  the members 
of  the poli ty but  by a group that  expressly excludes part  
of  the population.  
Here we need to deal  with the concept of  people 
and population.  They do not necessari ly coincide.  
Usually the concept of  people is  considered to be a 
legal  one,  defined by the internal  ci t izenship laws.  In a 
way, a law on ci t izenship is  the internal  instrument to 
design the people.  
As I  have described in previous chapters,  
especial ly in chapters 2 and 5,  international  law largely 
defers this  competence to the national  legislator.  
However,  this  certainly cannot be arbitrary.  Any 
discrimination on the basis  of  race,  gender,  national  
origin,  etc,  would consti tute a direct  violat ion of the 
equali ty principle in international  law. The 
establishment of  l imitat ion on this  domestic sovereign 
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power is  a  matter  of  no controversy these days in 
international  law556.  
What I  want to argue here is  that  because of  the 
democratic principle there are addit ional  l imitat ions 
besides those mentioned suspect  categories.  
The question that  should be asked is:  what should 
the people be? Who should integrate the demos? 
Going back to the f igure,  I  do not  think that  al l  the 
categories mentioned should automatically integrate the 
people.  They are not  part  of  the demos .  
International  law may provide some help here.  
These categories can be found in the definit ion of 
migrants and i ts  exclusions in the International  
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of  All  
Migrant  Workers and Members of  Their  Families557.  
Tourists  and students are certainly a group of 
people that  only have contact  with the laws of the 
country for a l imited period of t ime.  I t  is  not  disputed 
that  they are subject  to the laws of the country they 
visi t ,  but  i t  is  not  for a sufficient  period of t ime to 
just ify their  part icipation in the internal  poli ty.  There is  
an addit ional  argument to exclude tourists .  In the 
majori ty of  cases,  their  visi t  is  optional  and therefore 
their  subjection to the law of the country is  purely 
voluntary.  A tourist  can even refuse to visi t  a  country 
because he is  not  wil l ing to respect  i ts  laws.  Of course 
i t  can be said that  a  migrant´s  presence in a given 
country is  also voluntary and that  when the si tuation 
changes they are always free to leave.  That is  certainly 
true,  at  least  in l iberal  democracies that  do not  control  
exit  movements of  people,  but  one cannot compare the 
level  of  at tachment of  a  tourist  to that  of  a  resident 
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migrant .  The damages and losses of  such a si tuation are 
incommensurate.  Life has been set t led in that  country.  
For that  matter ,  the resident  migrant  is  much closer to 
the si tuation of the ci t izen who, if  not  sat isf ied with the 
poli ty,  can always leave.  And no one would dare to 
make such a proposit ion in a democratic and l iberal  
society to just ify the l imitat ion on ci t izen’s poli t ical  
r ights.  
Diplomats,  even those who may reside in the 
country for a longer period of t ime are not  only 
representing a foreign polit ical  community but  are also 
protected by international  regulations.  In that  sense,  
al though subject  to a significant  number of  laws of the 
country,  they are exempted from many which means that  
there is  no reason for them to integrate the demos .  
Refugees are,  of  course,  a  different  category and 
that  is  why i t  is  not  represented in the f igure.  Although 
they are protected by international  law, once admitted 
they are fully subject  to the laws of the country.  In that  
sense they become members of  the demos.  Their  
protection under international  law eases the legal  
s i tuation in the country of  refuge.  First ,  the UN 1951 
Convention Relat ing to the Status of  Refugees,  
provides,  in Article 33,  for  a general  principle of  
prohibit ion of expulsion or return,  also known as non-
refoulement.  Then,  the Convention,  in Article 34 
establishes a duty on States to naturalize refugees:  “ the 
Contracting States shall  as far as possible facil i tate the 
assimilation and naturalization of  refugees.  They shall  
in particular make every ef fort  to expedite 
naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as 
possible the charges and costs  of  such proceedings”558.  
This is  a  clear example of  an international  law 
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instrument that  imposes obligations on states regarding 
naturalization.  
In any event,  i t  is  not  only refugees that  are 
specif ically protected under international  law, but  their  
s i tuation,  once regularized under the standard asylum 
seeking procedure provided in the convention,  ought to 
be considered as that  of  documented al iens and provide 
access to the ci t izenship path in any l iberal  democracy. 
Migrants,  especial ly the undocumented,  are in a 
tr ickier  s i tuation.  After  a  certain period of t ime – for  
this  matter  I  wil l  use the argumentation of §4 – they are 
permanent residents and members of  the demos.  That is  
the case regardless of  their  s tatus.  Although 
permanently subject  to the laws of the country,  they 
may well  be in a si tuation in which they are also 
permanently excluded from poli t ical  part icipation.  
Then,  a part  of  the actual  demos  is  permanently 
excluded from poli t ical  part icipation in their  
community.  I t  is  a  clear  si tuation where a paradox of 
democratic legit imacy occurs.  
As Joseph Weiler  clearly states,  “Citizens 
consti tute the demos of  the poli ty  – ci t izenship is  
frequently,  though not necessarily,  conflated with 
nationali ty .  This,  then,  is  the other,  collective side,  of  
the ci t izenship coin.  Demos provides another way of  
expressing the l ink between cit izenship and democracy.  
Democracy does not  exist  in a vacuum. I t  is  premised 
on the existence of  a poli ty  with members – the demos – 
by whom and for whom democratic discourse with i ts  
many variants takes place.  The authority and legit imacy 
of  a majority to compel a minority exists  only within 
poli t ical  boundaries defined by a demos.  Simply put ,  i f  
there is  no demos,  there can be no democracy”559.  
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 This means that  from a democratic and legit imacy 
standpoint  i t  is  absolutely necessary for  a State that  
cherishes these values to establish a ci t izenship path 
through transparent  and expedit ious natural izat ion 
procedures to grant  ci t izenship to al l  the permanent 
residents of  the terr i tory,  namely documented and 
undocumented migrants.  
Only such a path may open the way to an 
indispensable coincidence between the demos and the 
legal  definit ion of the people.  When these two concepts 
fai l  to coincide,  the country can no longer be 
considered democratic.  
No matter  how strong and definit ive this  claim may 
sound, this  l ine of  argumentation is  just  another piece 
in the big puzzle I  am trying to build in order to,  as  
solidly as possible,  identify a trend towards a 
fundamental  r ight  to ci t izenship.  
In that  sense,  a  possible cri t icism of the arguments 
related to the paradox of democratic legit imacy have to 
do with the nature of  the democratic principle in 
international  law. 
Unlike other principles that  I  have used here,  such 
as protection of expectations,  proportionali ty,  equali ty 
or legal  certainty,  the democratic principle can hardly 
be sustained to be part  of  the general  principles of  
international  law. 
In any event,  there is  a  growing importance of the 
democratic principle in international  law. 
Steven Wheatley wrote a notable art icle on the 
democratic rule in international  law560.  His angle was on 
the democratic defici t  of  international  inst i tut ions and 
legislat ive bodies.  This defici t  is  well  known at  the 
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level  of  the European Union,  as I  discussed in chapter  
4.  
In this  art icle,  Wheatley asserts  that  international  
inst i tut ions ought to incorporate democracy in order to 
legit imize their  act ion.  This can be done ei ther by 
internalizing democracy in every international  actor or  
by creating a world democratic super state.  
Habermas also cherishes this  vision.  He says that  
“ the democratic legit imacy of  the compromises 
negotiated here would rest  on two pil lars.  As in the 
case of  international treaties,  i t  would depend,  on the 
one hand,  on the legit imacy of  the negotiating partners.  
The delegating powers and regional regimes would have 
to take on a democratic character themselves.  In view 
of  the democratic defici t  that  exists  even in the 
exemplary case of  the European Union,  this  extension 
of  the chain of  legit imation of  democratic procedures 
beyond national borders already represents an 
immensely demanding requirement”  561.  
In a way,  while the democratic principle cannot be 
expressly deemed as a principle of  ius cogens ,  i t  is  
certainly making i ts  way in international  law. Since 
there is  a  democratic claim in the governance and 
decisions of  the international  bodies and if  these bodies 
are composed of representat ives of  the countries,  i t  is  
highly predictable that  the principle wil l  contaminate 
the whole international  community. 
The democratic principle is  also rooted in the 
practice of  international  law. I t  has provided 
just if ication for some of the most  well -known mili tary 
interventions in the international  arena,  with or  without 
a mandate from the UN Security Council .  
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As I  aff irmed in the introduction,  my standpoint  is  
not  exclusively international  law as we classically know 
it .  I  wish to draw moral  and ethical  arguments as well  
as legal  ones,  in a transnational  perspective.  
In that  sense,  whenever public transnational  law is  
applicable I  am will ing to recognize i t  and accept i t  
with al l  i ts  binding legal  international  consequences.  
Yet even when the international  law case is  
doubtful ,  I  think i t  is  relevant to recognize an 
international  practice that  may not consti tute 
international  customary law but certainly embodies 
what is  now called transnational  law. 
As I  have underl ined in the introduction – and this  
case suits  well  the argumentation about the democratic 
principle – i t  is  sometimes more relevant to f ind a trend 
or even a norm that  is  forming in the transnational  or  
global  arena,  than to assert  the existence of a solid 
international  law norm that  is  then disputed by the 
international  community.  
That  is  intuit ively the case of  the democratic 
principle.  Even though i t  might be controversial  to 
award i t  the statute of  a general  principle of  
international  law, i t  is  undisputable that  i t  has been key 
in the resolution of many international  confl icts  and is  
rooted in the transnational  discourse. 
Apart  from the transnational  dimension,  i t  is  also 
important  to consider the democratic principle even 
from a national  s tandpoint .  As I  have underl ined above,  
a  country that  fai ls  in this  principle by lacking 
legit imacy in i ts  laws because of  the deficient  
naturalization process and divergent concepts of  demos  
and people,  cannot call  i tself  a  democracy.  
Again,  my sole purpose is  to identify this  l ine of  
argumentation that ,  combined with the other arguments,  
al lows for the recognit ion of  a trend towards the 
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existence of a fundamental  r ight  to the ci t izenship of 
the State of  residence.     
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§6.  Prospective 
  
Citizenship is  undergoing great  development these 
days.  As I  have shown, scholars and transnational  
courts  are devoting a lot  of  at tention to i t .  
Although there is  no consensual  approach,  
developments clearly show a trend towards increasing 
interactions and l imitat ions on national  ci t izenship from 
international  and transnational  law. 
This happens not  only via the tradit ional  
international  law instruments but  also through the 
adoption of practices that  increasingly consti tute 
international  practice.   
A first  response from scholars,  as  I  explained in 
chapter  3,  was the diffusion and transnationalization of 
ci t izenship elements.  Even i ts  devaluation was 
considered.  In a way,  this  is  recognit ion of the 
inevitable international  fashion of ci t izenship and the 
response to that ,  t rying to protect  i ts  core values or,  at  
least ,  i ts  s tatus.  
I  do not believe in sl icing ci t izenship.  I t  is  s t i l l  an 
important  s tatus with legal ,  moral  and ethical  
implications562.  Data shows that  i t  is  valued as such563.  
Studies and surveys show that  migrants st i l l  search for 
ci t izenship for inclusion and i t  is  a  powerful  inclusive 
tool .  
                                              
562 MARC MORJÉ HOWARD, The Politics of Citizenship in Europe (2009), 7. 
563 EWSI Special Feature 2013/03: Access to Nationality for Third-country 
Nationals, available at http://www.migpolgroup.com/public/docs/EWSI_SF-
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According to the Eurostat ,  “ the number of  people 
acquiring the ci t izenship of  an EU Member State was 
776 000 in 2009,  corresponding to an 11.1 % increase 
with respect  to 2008.  The main contribution to this  
increase came from the United Kingdom, where 
acquisi t ions rose from 129 000 in 2008 to 204 000 in 
2009; this  was largely due to a relatively low number of  
acquisi t ions in the United Kingdom in 2008,  which was 
a consequence of  changes in staff  al location within the 
responsible national authority.   Several  other EU 
Member States recorded an increase in the number of  
acquisi t ions of  ci t izenship between 2008 and 2009. In 
absolute terms,  the highest  increases,  af ter the United 
Kingdom, were observed in I taly (5 700 more),  Romania 
(3 800),  Portugal (3 200) and Luxembourg (2 800).  In 
some cases (such as Luxembourg,  Portugal and 
Romania) these increases are due to recent reforms of  
the respective nationali ty  laws,  which had the ef fect  of  
boosting the number of  applications.   Relative to the 
size of  the resident population,  Luxembourg granted the 
highest  number of  ci t izenships: 8.1 per 1 000 
inhabitants ,  fol lowed by Cyprus (5.1),  the United 
Kingdom (3.3) and Sweden (3.2).   One indicator which 
is  commonly used to measure the ef fect  of  national 
policies concerning ci t izenship is  the 'naturalisation 
rate ' ,  in other words,  the ratio between the total  
number of  ci t izenships granted and the stock of  foreign 
residents in each country at  the beginning of  the year.  
The country with the highest  naturalisation rate in the 
EU-27 in 2009 was Portugal (5.8 acquisi t ions per 100 
foreign residents) ,  fol lowed by Sweden (5.3) and the 
United Kingdom (4.8).  On the other hand,  Luxembourg,  
due to i ts  large share of  foreign residents (43.0 % on 1 
January 2010) had a naturalisation rate below the EU-
27 average,  despite being the EU Member State with the 
highest  number of  ci t izenship acquisi t ions per 
inhabitant .   More than 90 % of  those who acquired the 
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cit izenship of  an EU Member State in 2009 were 
previously ci t izens of  a non-member country; this  was 
the case in nearly all  of  the Member States.  However,  in 
Luxembourg and Hungary the majority of  new 
cit izenships granted were to ci t izens of  another EU 
Member State.  In the case of  Luxembourg,  the largest  
share (almost  half  of  those from EU Member States that  
were granted ci t izenship) was that  of  Portuguese 
ci t izens,  while in the case of  Hungary almost  
exclusively that  of  Romanian cit izens.   As in previous 
years,  the highest  number of  new cit izens in the EU 
Member States in 2009 was composed of  ci t izens of  
Morocco (59 700,  corresponding to 8 % of  al l  
ci t izenships granted) and Turkey (51 800,  or 7 %).  
Compared with 2008,  the number of  ci t izens from 
Morocco acquiring ci t izenship of  an EU Member State 
fel l  by 6 %, while the number of  Turkish ci t izens rose 
by 5 %. The largest  share of  Moroccans acquired their  
new cit izenship in France (43 %),  I taly (15 %) or Spain 
(11 %),  while the largest  shares of  Turkish people 
acquired their  new cit izenship in Germany (48 %) or 
France (18 %)”.  
The f igure from Eurostat  (source Eurostat ,  
migration and migrant  population stat is t ics)  is  
i l lustrat ive:  
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The OECD International  Migration Outlook 2012 
also shows a steady increase of naturalization rates at  
the level  of  the member states.  The survey not  only 
includes EU member states but  also the United States,  
Russia,  Korea,  Japan,  Mexico,  South Africa,  Turkey,  
Switzerland,  Norway, New Zealand,  Chile,  Canada and 
Austral ia .  This survey shows the naturalization rate 
evolution by country from 2000 to 2010.  Not al l  the 
countries show an increase in the naturalization rate but  
the general  t rend is  clearly towards a steady increase in 
the numbers564.  
So contrary to the beliefs  of  the theorists  of  
ci t izenship devaluation,  reali ty shows that  ci t izenship is  
s t i l l  a  desired status and migrants see in i t  their  way 
into full  integration and poli t ical  part icipation in the 
host  country.  
The US and EU provide most  of  the examples and 
data that  I  use in my argument.  This is  just  because the 
immigration f low is  s tronger to these areas of  the 
world.  The US is  s t i l l  the country with the largest  
migration stock565.  Estimates show around 12 mill ion 
undocumented migrants l iving in the US. This poses 
major challenges for the immigration law and is  an 
invaluable laboratory for those studying the effects  of  
migration on ci t izenship.  
The EU is  also a very important  laboratory.  Being a 
space of integration and freedom of movement and 
establishment i t  is  s t i l l  not  a  federal  State ,  which poses 
al l  sorts  of  interest ing questions that  I  discussed in 
chapter  4.  The creation of European ci t izenship,  which I  
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Gonçalo Saraiva Matias – The Path to Citizenship 
401 
call  the only example of an inst i tut ional  transnational  
ci t izenship,  is  also a challenge to the relat ions between 
international ,  t ransnational  and national  ci t izenship 
law. 
Some of the examples and court  decisions that  I  use 
originated in the EU courts  and practice.  This is  not  a  
coincidence:   ci t izenship is  undergoing great  
development in the EU because of these complex 
relat ionships.  However,  i t  is  also undeniable that  
principles and practices followed at  the EU level  wil l  
contaminate the rest  of  the world regarding ci t izenship 
and countries’  l imitat ions and obligations.  
The mere claim or identif ication of trend towards a 
r ight  to a specif ic ci t izenship is  already revolutionary 
in nature.  Even if  everyone agrees that  in l iberal  
democracies the existence of a naturalization path is  a  
given fact ,  the idea of  spell ing i t  out  as a r ight  that  
overrides national  sovereignty over ci t izenship is  far  
from being consensual .  The claim is  also useful  for 
other countries that  might not  possess a transparent  
naturalization path or a path at  al l .  
I  understand that  the most  controversial  claim I  
make is  related to the undocumented migrants.  This is  a  
source of great  controversy in every country that  deals  
with this  phenomenon.  
What I  came to f ind while writ ing this  dissertat ion 
was that  no moral ,  ethical  or  legal  reason al lows us to 
differentiate between documented and undocumented 
migrants regarding the r ight  to ci t izenship.  
Put l ike this ,  the last  aff irmation might sound 
outrageous.  A clear argument pops up in the reader´s 
mind: undocumented migrants consciously breach the 
host  country’s immigration laws.  
I t  is  certainly true.  Yet,  as I  have discussed,  the 
source of a r ight  to a specif ic ci t izenship is  not  
compliance with the countries’  ci t izenship laws or the 
Gonçalo Saraiva Matias – The Path to Citizenship 
402 
reward of  the host  country to the well  behaved migrants 
that  complied with the applicable regulat ions.  
The sources of  this  r ight  are the legal  principles – 
both of  international  and transnational  law – that  are 
applicable to al l  human beings,  regardless of  their  legal  
s tatus.  
Although there are valid,  understandable and,  
sometimes,  even compell ing arguments against  a  
naturalization path for undocumented migrants,  i f  we 
think and accept the premises that  I  present  and deal  
with the said r ight  in the context  of  these principles,  
one cannot differentiate and needs to accept that  
documented and undocumented migrants are in the same 
si tuation as far  as these principles are concerned.  
I  do not  wish to make an exaggerated claim. I  
recognize that  poli t ical  r ights are usually not  included 
in the core universal  human rights .  Thus extending 
ci t izenship to this  group of r ights is  not  obvious or 
consensual .  
My sole purpose was,  through research into the 
most  recent and up-to-date scholarly opinions and court  
case decisions,  to identify a trend. 
This trend is  not  defined by a single argument or 
l ine of  thought.  Rather on the contrary,  i t  takes a 
complex set  of  arguments and signs to identify this  
trend.  
Needless to say,  I  expect  great  developments in 
international  and transnational  ci t izenship law in the 
near future.  
I  anticipate,  for  the reasons I  have explained above,  
that  most  of  these developments wil l  come from the 
European Union.  
The reason for this  anticipation is  evident.   
First ly,  increasing interactions between national  
and EU cit izenship law will  produce the necessary 
material  for  this  study.  The intense activity of  the ECJ 
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in recent  months on matters  of  ci t izenship al lows a 
fair ly solid predict ion that  more news is  in the pipeline.  
Then,  the EU has the inst i tut ional  basis  that  
international  law lacks to resolve ci t izenship issues,  
especial ly those which arise between individuals and 
the State.  A landmark case in international  law l ike 
Nottebohm is  not  l ikely to happen often given the 
special  nature of  international  law jurisdict ion.  On the 
other hand,  the EU judicial  system provides the tools  
for individuals to bring such cases to just ice.  An 
increment in l i t igation related to ci t izenship wil l  also 
bring more cases as people believe i t  is  worth bringing 
such cases to the at tention of the court .  
Finally,  an expected deepening of EU integration,  
especial ly in the poli t ical  f ield,  wil l  bring ci t izenship to 
the center  of  the discussion and developments are 
expected as well .  
The only r isk to this  theory that  this  integration 
may pose is  that  the EU may become closer to a federal  
sate and reduce i ts  impact on the international  law of 
ci t izenship.  
However,  as I  have also stated above,  that  wil l  not  
happen before a substantial  contamination of the 
international  arena regarding the fundamental  principles 
of  ci t izenship law. 
One may also ask how will  that  trend be 
implemented and with what mandatory force? 
This is  not  a mere rhetorical  question;  i t  is  a  
substantial  one.  I t  is  not  my intention here to discuss 
the classical  question of coercion in international  law. 
I t  is  way beyond the scope of this  dissertat ion. 
I  wil l  also not  discuss,  for  i t  is  also beyond the 
scope,  the jurisdict ional  system in international  law.  
However,  i t  is  s t i l l  worth mentioning,  in 
prospective terms,  how I anticipate the trend will  be 
implemented in the national  legal  orders.  
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An obvious and ongoing process is  what can be 
called “de facto harmonization”.  
The States wil l  not  expressly admit  that  they have 
harmonized their  ci t izenship laws with other states but  
i t  wil l  happen de facto .  
Evidence of this  harmonization can be found in the 
worldwide naturalization patterns,  incorporation of ius 
domicil i i  as  the main natural izat ion cri terion,  the 
uniform time frame for naturalizat ion that  I  have 
identif ied in this  chapter  and the generalized trend 
towards relaxing naturalizat ion procedures and t imes.  
A very clear  example of  “de facto” naturalization 
occurred in Ireland after  the Chen case566.  
As John Handoll  describes,  “ i t  also became 
relevant that ,  in May 2004, Advocate General Tizzano 
had delivered his  Opinion in the Chen case,  concluding 
that  a child of  non-national parents born in Northern 
Ireland and hence enti t led to Irish ci t izenship and 
enjoying,  through her parents,  suff icient  resources to 
ensure that  she would not become a burden on the 
f inances of  the host  s tate,  was enti t led as a matter of  
Community law to reside in Northern Ireland.  (…) It  
was,  to say the least ,  potential ly embarrassing to the 
Irish government to retain a ci t izenship regime,  with 
such Community law consequences in another Member 
State,  especially where the right  to the company of  a 
parent had been rejected in Irish law. (…) In June 
2004,  the Bil l  was passed by the people in a 
referendum. The Twenty-Seventh Amendment of  the 
Consti tut ion Act  2004 and the amendments thereby 
made to art .  9 of  the Consti tut ion represented for the 
persons concerned a return to the status quo ante the 
1998 consti tut ional amendment ref lecting the Brit ish-
                                              
566 See chapter 4. 
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Irish Agreement.  Any enti t lement to ci t izenship for 
these persons again became dependent on legislation,  
rather than consti tut ional prescription”567.  
Also on the change of the Ir ish ci t izenship law, 
Howard says that  “nonetheless,  in the years fol lowing 
the Good Friday agreement,  there was a growing 
awareness – or at  least  perception – of  the “unintended 
consequences” of  the extremely l iberal  jus soli  rule.  
Apparently,  growing numbers of  pregnant 
undocumented immigrants ( the most  prominent 
examples were from Nigeria) were arriving in Ireland 
for the purpose of  giving birth to a baby who would 
receive Irish ci t izenship,  and thereby extend residence 
rights to the mother (as caretaker)  as well .  Although 
Handoll  refers to this  scenario as “something of  a 
caricature,” i t  fueled a  public “acrimonious debate” 
about what some called “cit izen tourism”568.  
Although the Chen case is  not  a  naturalization 
si tuation,  i t  is  nevertheless a clear  example of  a “de 
facto” harmonization where a country,  by a people´s 
referendum, decided to change the ci t izenship law due 
to the fear of  the consequences of  i ts  interaction with 
other ci t izenship laws in the EU context .  That  example,  
the ECJ decision and the fear of  Ireland being used as a 
hub for giving birth to children in order to acquire EU 
cit izenship clearly influenced the popular decision to 
amend the Consti tut ion.  
This is  not  to say that  Ir ish sovereignty was 
diminished but one must  recognize the effects  of  the 
decision on the Ir ish ci t izenship law. 
                                              
567 JOHN HANDOLL, Country Report: Ireland (2012), 9. 
568 MARC MORJÉ HOWARD, The Politics of Citizenship in Europe (2009), 
163. 
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International  courts  may also apply this  trend based 
on the general  principles that  I  identif ied569.  
This was the case of  the ECJ in the cases described 
in chapter  4,  especial ly in Rottman, with a specif ic 
reference to the principle of  proport ionali ty.  I t  is  t rue 
that  in none of these cases did the court  force a State to 
confer i ts  ci t izenship on a migrant.  Yet the speed and 
intensity of  the changes in case law in Europe al lows us 
to anticipate that  such a decision may occur in the near 
future.  
The same will  probably happen at  the level  of  
general  international  courts .  Although their  jurisdict ion 
is  l imited,  as I  underl ined above,  the growing 
conclusion of international  treaties with implications on 
ci t izenship law, as well  as the development of  general ly 
applicable principles may also give r ise to such 
decisions.  The jus domicil i i  or ,  in Shachar´s  
formulation,  jus nexi  theory,  may lead an international  
court  to revisi t  the Nottebohm decision in such a way 
that  the effective l ink means not  only a negative 
l imitat ion on States’  sovereignty over ci t izenship but  
also a posit ive one,  conferring a fundamental  r ight  to 
ci t izenship when a resident migrant shows an effective 
l ink with the terr i tory of  the said state.  
As Habermas theorizes,  I  do not  expect  a  world 
state or  authori ty or  legislator  to be able to regulate 
ci t izenship any t ime soon570.  In any event,  even from a 
classic international  law standpoint ,  i t  is  not  
revolutionary to conceive the application of  general  
                                              
569 H. F. VAN PANHUYS, The Rôle of Nationality in the International Law – An 
Outline (1959), 178. 
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principles whose reading is  revised under a consensual  
approach according to the natural  evolution of the 
society.  As I  said in previous chapters,  t radit ional  
conceptions on ci t izenship must be reviewed after  the 
tremendous changes that  transnational  migration has 
forced on ci t izenship.  
Finally,  probably more in l ine with the current  
s tage of international  law and of transnational  law, the 
activity of  national  courts  cannot be disregarded.  
I t  is  not  my purpose here – i t  is  beyond the scope 
of this  thesis  – to discuss Anne-Marie Slaughter´s  
theory as to whether international  law should be applied 
by international  courts  or  domestic courts571.  
I  just  wish to recognize two facts .  
In l iberal  democracies,  the principles and practices 
that  I  identif ied and that  support  the trend I  described 
are enshrined in most  of  the consti tut ions.  For that  
reason an application of  these principles by national  
courts  is  not  unthinkable.  That would mean that  these 
courts  might str ike down national  ci t izenship laws 
based on the unconsti tut ionali ty under the said 
principles.  
Another possibil i ty would be to acknowledge the 
application of international  law by national  courts  – as 
they should do,  at  least  in al l  the monist  regimes –
leading to the same result  mentioned,  this  t ime based on 
the breach of international  law572.  
Finally,  some of these principles may well  be 
considered mandatory international  law – or ius cogens  
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1103. 
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–, which would legit imize the intervention of national  
courts ,  even in dualist ic  systems.  
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There is  a  growing tendency towards the 
devaluation of the concept of  ci t izenship.  I t  was 
perceived for many years as a key instrument of  internal  
sovereignty.  Once States become transparent  as a 
consequence of globalization and global  governance,  
internal  instruments of  sovereignty become less 
powerful .  
This is  part icularly evident  in the tendency which 
may be identif ied in  both scholarly works and in State 
practice towards extending broader legal  r ights to non-
cit izens.  
There is  room, however,  for  a different  proposal  
for reassessing ci t izenship and the interconnection of 
the concept both with the global  arena and internal  
democratic policies.  
Based on basic principles of  transnational  
ci t izenship law, such as the principle of  protection of 
legit imate expectat ions,  the principle of  
proportionali ty,  ius domicil i i  and adverse possessions,  
as well  as the democratic principle and also based on 
the naturalization pattern around the world,  i t  should be 
possible to determine that  no ci t izen in wait ing should 
be permanently excluded from cit izenship.  Although 
this  proposit ion might sound quite consensual  – 
especial ly within Western countries with standard 
naturalization policies – the basic essence of what has 
been said is  very controversial .  I t  not  only imposes a 
posit ive duty overriding an important  dimension of 
sovereignty – the symbolic definit ion of the people – 
but  i t  also gives r ise to a discussion about 
undocumented migration.  The Western pattern on 
naturalization policies certainly does not  include 
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undocumented migrants.  However,  the same 
considerations about the democratic principle apply to 
this  category of migrants,  most  of  whom stay for 
several  years in a country with the tolerance of the host  
State,  to say the least .  The access of  these migrants to 
ci t izenship is  an active question in the US and is  
becoming one in Europe as well .  There is  no legal  
answer whatsoever,  even though i t  is  widely recognized 
that  undocumented migrants have,  as would seem 
obvious,  human rights.  Does that  mean that  they also 
hold the r ight  to ci t izenship? 
However,  there is  certainly a different  posit ion for 
the nation-state from Westphalia to the global  world.  A 
global  world without a global  s tate st i l l  needs 
tradit ional  s tates to enforce i ts  principles and rules.  As 
I  see i t ,  States are obliged by the transnational  law to 
enforce basic principles and rules through their  
t radit ional  enforcement channels.  I t  is  very clear that  
international  and transnational  law will  not  be enforced 
otherwise.  
This does not mean,  though, that  States remain free 
to do whatever they wish as long as this  does not  
confl ict  with other States.  Internal  constraints  
increasingly result  from international  and transnational  
law, even in areas considered to be the realm of 
sovereignty,  such as ci t izenship.  
 





A cidadania,  considerada durante séculos um 
instrumento fundamental  da expressão da soberania do 
Estado,  tem sido polí t ica e conceptualmente 
desvalorizada nos últ imos anos.  
Tal  resulta do processo de globalização e da perda 
de relevância dos mecanismos de afirmação da 
soberania na ordem interna e externa e tem como 
consequência,  entre outras,  a  extensão de direi tos aos 
estrangeiros.   
Apesar de esta prática poder ser  interpretada como 
uma forma de consagrar direi tos polí t icos e de garantir  
a  part icipação efetiva dos imigrantes,  na comunidade,  
não corresponde à melhor forma de proceder à sua 
integração.   
Têm sido desenvolvidas diversas teorias sobre a 
evolução do conceito de cidadania.  Algumas delas 
defendem a desvalorização do conceito,  outras 
reconhecem a pulverização dos seus elementos e outras,  
ainda,  preconizam o seu desmembramento e a extensão 
dos seus elementos aos imigrantes.  Estas teorias têm 
sido identif icadas como cidadania global  ou 
transnacional .   
É,  todavia,  possível  uma proposta diferente para a 
reavaliação da cidadania e para a interconexão com a 
ordem jurídica internacional  e  as comunidades polí t icas 
nacionais.   
Com efeito,  quando os imigrantes deixam o seu 
país  de origem, para viver num outro país ,  tornam-se,  
nas palavras de Motomura,  “cidadãos em espera”.  Isto 
significa que são criadas expectat ivas relat ivamente à 
aquisição da cidadania do país  onde vivem e em que se 
integraram económica,  social  e  poli t icamente.   
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Corresponderia a  um paradoxo democrático afastar  
estas pessoas,  de forma permanente,  do estatuto de 
cidadania.  A afirmação da irrelevância do conceito e a 
extensão de direi tos polí t icos aos imigrantes não 
resolve tal  paradoxo.  Esta extensão nunca será plena e 
aos imigrantes fal tará o elemento inclusivo do conceito 
de cidadania.  Será sempre discriminatória a conceção 
segundo a qual ,  de acordo com determinada perceção da 
soberania,  o membro do “clube” – nas palavras de 
Michael  Walzer – possa excluir  permanentemente os 
outros do exercício de direi tos polí t icos.   
Assim, é necessário reconhecer o poder da 
cidadania como instrumento de inclusão – e negar a 
teoria do declínio da cidadania – bem como reconhecer 
que a pulverização dos seus elementos e a sua 
concessão aos imigrantes não permitirá at ingir  aquele 
objet ivo últ imo, uma vez que o acesso ao estatuto lhes 
estará negado.   
O estudo das polí t icas de naturalização,  em 
diversos países,  permite-nos identif icar uma tendência 
no sentido da existência de um procedimento e cri tério 
comum em matéria de atr ibuição da cidadania aos 
imigrantes.  Da mesma forma, é hoje possível  identif icar  
instrumentos de direi to internacional  – tal  como a 
Convenção Europeia sobre a Nacionalidade – que 
impõem obrigações aos Estados na concessão da 
cidadania.   
Em face desta realidade é hoje necessário 
reinterpretar  os textos que estabelecem o direi to à 
cidadania,  como a Declaração Universal  dos Direitos do 
Homem. Foram lidos,  durante muito tempo, como 
instrumentos de prevenção da apatridia.  No mesmo 
sentido,  encontramos outros tratados e decisões de 
Tribunais internacionais .  O direi to à cidadania era 
concebido como um limite negativo à soberania dos 
Estados.  Um Estado poderia recusar ou ultrapassar a 
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decisão de um outro Estado,  de concessão da cidadania,  
se tal  decisão fosse arbitrária (por ausência de 
efet ividade) ou conduzisse à apatr idia.   
A relei tura da Declaração é,  pois ,  necessária.  Num 
mundo globalizado onde até a cidadania – “últ imo 
bastião da soberania” (Stephen Legomsky) – se tornou 
global ,  não é suficiente considerá-la como um limite 
negativo à soberania dos Estados.  Será porventura 
necessário admitir  a  imposição posit iva aos Estados.  
Tal  s ignif ica que se considerarmos a cidadania como 
uma consequência natural  de um caminho iniciado no 
momento em que o imigrante atravessou a fronteira de 
um Estado para aí  residir ,  teremos de conceder que,  
provavelmente,  o direi to à cidadania,  hoje,  não é já  o 
direito a ter uma cidadania ,  mas o direi to de aceder a 
uma cidadania determinada .   
Tendo por base princípios de direi to transnacional  
da cidadania,  tais  como o princípio da proteção das 
legít imas expectat ivas,  o princípio da 
proporcionalidade,  o “ius domicil i i”  e  a usucapião e o 
princípio democrático bem como, tendo em conta os 
cri térios de naturalização em diversos países,  é  possível  
afirmar que nenhum “cidadão em espera” deveria  ser  
permanentemente excluído do perímetro da cidadania.   
Apesar de aparentemente consensual ,  sobretudo em 
países ocidentais  com cri térios razoáveis de 
naturalização,  a  afirmação geral  deste direi to é ainda 
muito controversa.  Não só se reconhece a imposição de 
l imites a uma dimensão muito importante da soberania – 
a definição simbólica de povo – como abre a porta à 
discussão sobre a imigração i legal .   
Os mencionados padrões e cri térios de 
naturalização não se aplicam, contudo,  à  imigração 
i legal .  Na verdade,  porém, as considerações a propósito 
dos princípios fundamentais  e ,  em especial ,  do princípio 
democrático,  devem aplicar-se a esta categoria de 
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imigrantes,  cuja residência é estabelecida,  em muitos 
casos,  com a tolerância dos Estados de acolhimento.  O 
acesso destes imigrantes à cidadania é uma questão 
candente nos Estados Unidos e está também a tornar-se 
relevante na Europa.  A afirmação incontestável  da 
t i tularidade de direi tos humanos por estes imigrantes 
deve incluir  também o direi to à cidadania?  
Não se procura uma resposta definit iva a esta 
questão,  mas a investigação realizada e a argumentação 
expendida permitirá compreender o estado da arte na 
discussão desta matéria,  bem como identif icar uma 
tendência que se verif ica,  cada vez mais,  em trabalhos 
académicos e decisões judiciais ,  qual  seja a de 
reconhecer a existência de um direi to a uma cidadania 
concreta.   
Este trabalho não se debruça sobre uma jurisdição 
em part icular .  As referências ao Direi to de alguns 
Estados e,  mesmo, ao Direi to europeu e internacional  
têm por objetivo a identif icação de exemplos e 
explicações contextuais  de um conceito mais vasto de 
cidadania.  A abordagem é,  assim, verdadeiramente,  de 
Direi to transnacional,  entendido como o conjunto de 
regras e princípios que concorrem para determinada 
solução jurídica,  independentemente do lugar ou 
jurisdição onde essa solução ocorre ou de onde é 
originária.   
Esta dissertação aborda a evolução do conceito de 
cidadania,  desde as variações semânticas até à evolução 
das civil izações clássicas,  da Idade Média e da 
Revolução Francesa;  centra-se na evolução do direi to 
internacional  da cidadania e no novo direi to 
internacional  da cidadania;  estuda o conceito de 
cidadania transnacional  e suas variações;  analisa a 
cidadania europeia como o único exemplo inst i tucional  
de cidadania transnacional;  dedica atenção especial  às 
relações entre a cidadania nacional  e  europeia;  põe em 
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discussão as decisões judiciais  recentes e muito 
relevantes dos Tribunais Europeus;  lança um olhar 
especial  para o conceito de migrantes como cidadãos em 
espera,  estudando os direi tos dos migrantes e o seu 
caminho para a cidadania.   
Conclui-se,  coligindo argumentos para a 
identif icação de uma tendência no sentido de um direi to 
geral  a  uma cidadania específ ica.      
 
 
 
 
